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This thesis problematises the treatment of gender in judicial reasoning in the 
cases decided under Hindu custody law in Indian courts. India has several 
religious personal laws to regulate the lives of its citizens. Of these, Hindu law 
governs the personal lives of about 800 million people in India and forms the 
largest set of personal laws. It is largely based on Common Law Principles, due 
to colonial influence at the time of its codification. However, there has been 
limited research on case law in this area of law, especially in terms of analysing 
gender in these judgments. This thesis takes a set of cases not previously 
analysed, problematises how judges approach gender in them, and thereby 
contributes to Indian legal feminist and religious personal law literature. 
The site of this research is a set of custody cases decided under the Hindu 
Minority and Guardianship Act, 1956. In the first part of the thesis, the 
underlying premises of judicial reasoning in the cases are studied. The analysis 
of the cases draws out disparity of treatment of gender in these cases, as well 
as underlying normative assumptions about gender roles in judicial reasoning. 
Further, the thesis demonstrates how the middle-class Hindu woman is 
constructed as a privileged but subordinate person RU´Elite Dependentµ in 
judicial reasoning. The analysis challenges the claim that these cases are 
decided in line with Constitutional ideals. The central argument developed 
from the cases is that judicial reasoning is based on normative ideas of gender 
and the judges do little to rectify gender inequities. 
The second part of the thesis examines the possible impact of judicial 
reasoning in the cases under study on the formulation of a new Uniform Civil 
Code to replace religious personal laws in India. The key argument in this part 
of the thesis is that the Hindu code should not be used as a blueprint for this 
Uniform Civil Code, as the gendered nature of judicial reasoning raises 
ii 
 
important concerns on the egalitarian nature of the Hindu Code. Using both 
the parts, this thesis verifies and expands the hypothesis proposed by Indian 
legal feminists that religious personal law in India is gendered. This thesis 
contributes to Indian legal feminist scholarship on religious personal laws in 
general and to the specific debates in India. The analysis of case law as well as 
the formulation of the category of Elite Dependent are its unique 
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Prologue 
When I began this thesis, I had separated from my (now ex) husband and one 
of the conditions of the separation (and later, divorce) was that I give up custody 
RIP\VRQ,WZDVD+REVRQ·VFKRLFHZKLFKFDXVHGPHWREHRVWUDFLVHGE\PRVW
of my family and some people I considered friends. I was the subject and object 
of intense scrutiny and name-calling and had the support of very few friends 
during a personally trying time. These incidents served as a catalyst to seek 
answers about how normative notions of gender inherent in law and society 
impact the lives of Hindu women like me, especially in instances when one went 
against the established social norms. 
I appeared in court for my divorce proceedings in 2015. Since my ex and I had 
filed for a divorce by mutual consent to fast track the process, it was necessary 
that I did not highlight the emotional issues of the marriage. The district 
magistrate, who doubled up as the judge of the family court, presided over our 
case. I took to the witness stand and my advocate ran through the list of 
standard questions on the breakdown of marriage and the need for divorce. 
Then, the judge asked me if I wished to stay within the marriage. I replied with 
DILUP¶1R·6KHDVNHGLI,was ok to relinquish custody of my child and I answered 
in the affirmative. She then proceeded to lecture me about how I was not being 
a good wife and mother, as I was shirking my responsibilities. She stressed on 
WKHQHHGWR¶DGMXVW·ZLWKRQH·VKXVEDQG as it is in the interest of RQH·Vchildren. 
Again, she questioned if I will stay in the marriage. I responded that while I 
appreciated everything she had said, I was unable to stay in the marriage. She 
WKHQVDLGWKDWWKHUHDOLVVXHZDVWKDW,ZDV¶RYHU-educateG·DQGWKDWWKHUHZDV
no point in reasoning with women like me, as we think we know it all. She then 
said that she is signing the divorce decree with a heavy heart because of my 
actions. I felt judged, both literally and legally, at that moment. 
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This incident was an eye-opener that changed the way I viewed my research, as 
I realised that judicial reasoning in custody cases is often coloured by social 
norms. My education and my ability to make independent decisions in my life 
became weapons to be used against me, due to my gender. I began to reflect on 
how normative ideas of what it means to be a woman, or a mother largely 
influences judicial reasoning, more than the actual interpretation of the law. 
Moreover, the Constitution of India guaranteed my right to equality and 
considered me to be on par with my ex-husband or any other person, but the 
judge chose to treat me as a second-order citizen, due to her gendered view of 
my actions. This research then emerged from my personal experience, which has 
served to ground my theoretical perspectives. In many ways, my lived experience 
has informed and perhaps influenced my research immensely.  
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Chapter 1 ² Introduction: The Gendering of Hindu Law1 
1.1 Beginnings 
As a woman who has spent the better part of my life in a male-dominated 
Hindu society and being one of the privileged to have the benefits of higher 
education, I often reflected on the role of women in Hindu families. Most 
Hindu women of my background, the educated upper middle-class, had 
access to good quality education and life choices. There were some exceptions 
to this, especially those who were denied higher education or were provided 
lesser quality of education compared to men,2 but most had the benefit of 
privilege that was denied to our poorer sisters. But despite privilege, these 
women were not entirely independent to make their life decisions. Their 
education, marriage, career or social standing were dictated by the men in 
their natal or marital families ² fathers, brothers or husbands and later, sons. 
India, being a society steeped in male privilege, such practices were seldom 
questioned as women did not have alternative sources of support or 
livelihood.  
Having witnessed these instances first-hand and experienced most of the 
social pressures myself, I decided to adopt women in the Hindu family as the 
starting point of my research. Questions of gendered norms were invariably 
intertwined in the Hindu family, as there existed different sets of standards 
                                                             
 
1 ,ĞƌĞ ĂŶĚ ƚŚƌŽƵŐŚŽƵƚ ŵǇ ƚŚĞƐŝƐ ? / ƵƐĞ ƚŚĞ ƚĞƌŵ  ‘ŐĞŶĚĞƌ ?  ?ĂůŽŶŐ ǁŝƚŚ ŝƚƐ ǀĞƌď ĨŽƌŵƐ ƐƵĐŚ ĂƐ 
gendering/gendered) to denote social relations and not identities. 
2 It is a common occurrence in India to prevent girl children from education, as they are considered 
better for housework and had to be married early. Moreover, in houses with male and female 
children, it was considered better to educate the son as he will support the parents, while daughters 
ǁŽƵůĚďĞŵĂƌƌŝĞĚŝŶƚŽĂŶŽƚŚĞƌŚŽƵƐĞŚŽůĚ ?^ŽŵĞƚŝŵĞƐ ?ĚĂƵŐŚƚĞƌƐǁĞƌĞĨƵŶĚĞĚĨŽƌ “ůĞƐƐĞƌ ?ĚĞŐƌĞĞƐ
ŝŶ,ƵŵĂŶŝƚŝĞƐǁŚŝůĞƐŽŶƐǁĞƌĞĨƵŶĚĞĚƚŽƐƚƵĚǇ “ďĞƚƚĞƌ ?degrees such as medicine or engineering. 
This was based on the gendered premise that the son is the future asset generator of the family while 
the daughter is an economic dependent. While this attitude is changing in urban areas to some 
extent, they continue to exist in semi-urban and rural India. 
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based on gender. My personal experience of living in an arranged marriage 
that disintegrated with time and my struggles with normative ideas on gender 
roles, both as a woman and as a parent in a Hindu family, propelled me 
towards analysing how gendered relations in families are produced and 
reproduced in Hindu law. Lastly, my legal background, especially my training 
in law and my experience in family courts during the initial years of my legal 
practice, awakened my interest in understanding how women negotiate the 
complexities of family life and law. So, I gravitated WRZDUGVTXHVWLRQVRIODZ·V
interaction with family structures and the relationship between law and 
women in India.  
As in most countries, there is a distinction between the provisions of gender 
equality in the letter of law and social equality on the ground in India. While 
the Indian Constitution supports principles of affirmative action for the socially 
disadvantaged,3 the Constitution and other laws do not account for the 
historical lack of privilege faced by women and other social groups. There are 
several such disadvantaged groups within the framework of Indian laws and 
social norms. An analysis of all these groups would be complicated and 
beyond the scale of this thesis. Instead, I focus on the category of the middle-
class Hindu woman for two reasons ²  
1. While this group is considered more privileged than most other social 
groups, the privilege hides the inherent gender bias faced by this 
category of Hindu women. As they are privileged, social norms tend to 
construct them as independent women in control of their lives, while 
hiding the gendered assumptions that confront them. 
                                                             
 
3 The Indian Constitution specifically provides that the State has the authority to make special 
provisions in favour of women and children (Article 15(3)). This was included as a provision for 
affirmative action to help those who were vulnerable groups in need of protection. Such provisions 
of affirmative action were provided for other historically disadvantaged categories too. 
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2. This is the category that I personally identify with due to my lived 
experience and environment. Personal affiliation and identification 
helps me to relate to my work of analysing the law and its effects on 
this category of women. However, I recognise that such personal 
affiliation may make me less attentive to my location within and outside 
the sphere of this thesis. 
Some of my initial thoughts on the Hindu woman were - How does Hindu law 
imagine the middle-class Hindu woman? Are there inherent gendered 
assumptions in judicial reasoning that impact this woman? Might any such 
assumptions affect the ways in which she encounters or experiences the law? 
I turned to the Hindu code to identify the enactment that would provide a 
suitable basis of study for these questions that I wished to explore. I found 
that in custody cases decided under Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act 
(HMGA), 1956, normative ideas on gender roles are evident as these cases 
offer ample scope to define the role of a woman and mother. I selected 
custody cases under HMGA that were decided between 2000 and 2014, as the 
foundation of my analysis.4  
During the duration of this research, debates surrounding the proposed 
introduction of a Uniform Civil Code (UCC) began to gain momentum in India. 
I take a short detour here to explain IndiD·VV\VWHPRI5HOLJLRXV3HUVRQDO/DZV
(RPLs) and the UCC, before elaborating on its role in my thesis. In 1947, the 
leaders of newly independent India felt compelled to maintain it as a secular 
nation and to differentiate it from Pakistan, which was established as an 
Islamic state. The Preamble of the Indian Constitution describes India as a 
VRYHUHLJQVRFLDOLVWVHFXODUGHPRFUDWLFUHSXEOLF7KHZRUG¶VHFXODU·GHQRWHV
                                                             
 
4 While I have explained the choice of the enactment here, I have elaborated on the choice of the 
case-laws and the period of study in detail later in this chapter. I have also explained the methodology 
of analysis of case-laws in Chapter 2. 
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that the Indian state does not affiliate itself to any religion. In the Indian 
context, secularism indicates that the state is equidistant from all religions and 
treats all religions equally.5 While secularism may be considered an essential 
feature of polity in the Indian Constitution, religion is a key player in society. 
To establish its secular credentials, the Indian state continued with the policy 
of non-interference in religious matters adopted by colonial rulers.6 However, 
this was viewed as a temporary provision until society and law sufficiently 
evolved to allow the integration of RPLs into the Uniform Civil Code (UCC), as 
envisaged under Article 44 of the Indian Constitution.7  
While the Indian version of secularism is enshrined in the Constitution, there 
are certain political and legal factors that are context-specific to India today. 
These are the existence of religious personal laws in a secular democracy, the 
presence of the multi-religious nation state, as well as the jurisdiction of 
secular (non-religious) courts to decide what is religious. The current 
government, which has its roots in the Hindu Right, has committed itself to 
                                                             
 
5 This is different from the Western interpretation of secularism as separation of the church and the 
state. While the nature of Indian secularism has a whole body of literature dedicated to it, it is outside 
the scope of this thesis. I have provided a summary understanding of the concept for adding cogency 
to my arguments here. 
6 The British colonial rulers of India followed a policy of administering RPL for Hindus, Muslims, 
Christians and Parsis separately but reserved the right to legislate all RPLs. The independent Indian 
state adopted a policy of social reform for the modernisation of the nation. It chose to remain secular 
but governed matters of family and religion. For a detailed discussion on this, see Chapter 3. India 
continues to have a legal system in which Civil and Criminal issues are common to all citizens, but 
personal laws with respect to marriage, divorce, custody, maintenance or succession are governed 
by the respective religious laws of the individuals. But both these sets of laws are administered by 
the same courts. A detailed account of the Court structure and judicial system in India is provided in 
Appendix 1  W Indian Court Structure. 
7 For instance, see Maitrayee Mukhopadhyay, Legally Dispossessed: Gender, Identity and the Process 
of Law (Stree, Calcutta 1998). The UCC provision was placed under the Directive Principles of State 
Policy, the non-justiciable part of the Indian Constitution. Successive governments have not taken 
any initiative to implement the UCC, even when the Supreme Court of India has indicated its 
displeasure on this subject (For instance, see the Shah Bano judgment, discussed in Chapter 3). In the 
recent times, there is a move to enact the UCC along the lines of the Hindu Code. For more on this, 
see chapter 3. 
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the creation of the UCC, albeit along the lines of the Hindu code.8 This agenda 
has contributed to increased momentum in formulating the UCC and it 
included the publication of a questionnaire on 7th October, 2016 by the Law 
Commission of India, which sought the opinion of the lay public, legal 
specialists and gender justice activists on the provisions of the UCC.9 My 
research on how Hindu law imagines the middle-class Hindu woman and 
gender is relevant to this debate because it highlights the possibility of 
differential treatment on the basis of gender and identifies areas of inherent 
gender bias in Hindu custody law. Further, since it is proposed that the Hindu 
code (or parts of it) will be utilised as a blue print for the UCC, my research 
contributes to ,QGLDQOHJDOIHPLQLVWV·DUJXPHQWVRQthe treatment of gender 
in law and gender justice,10 especially from the perspective of how Hindu 
women experience the law.  
The following sections outline the framework of my thesis by first explaining 
the area of my study, viz., Hindu law; and then identifying the theoretical 
                                                             
 
8 The Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) is the political front of all the organisations that come under the 
umbrella term of Hindu Right in India. The party captured a thumping majority in the Indian general 
elections in 2014 and came to power by forming the Central or Union Government in India. Its 
election manifesto in 2014 sets out that one of its aims is the formulation of the Uniform Civil Code 
in India, along the lines of Art.44 of the Indian Constitution. It states that the BJP believes that there 
can be no gender equality till the adoption of a Uniform Civil Code that protects the rights of all 
women and that the ƉĂƌƚǇ ŝŶƚĞŶĚƐ ƚŽ ĚƌĂĨƚ ƚŚĞ h ďǇ  ‘ĚƌĂǁŝŶŐ ƵƉŽŶ ƚŚĞ ďĞƐƚ ƚƌĂĚŝƚŝŽŶƐ ĂŶĚ
ŚĂƌŵŽŶŝƐŝŶŐ ƚŚĞŵ ǁŝƚŚ ƚŚĞ ŵŽĚĞƌŶ ƚŝŵĞƐ ? (ŚĂƌĂƚŝǇĂ :ĂŶĂƚĂ WĂƌƚǇ ?  ‘BJP Election Manifesto  ? ? ? ? ?
(2014), accessed 11 February 2017). &ĞŵŝŶŝƐƚ ƐĐŚŽůĂƌƐŚŝƉ ŝŶ /ŶĚŝĂŶ ŚĂƐ ĐƌŝƚŝƋƵĞĚ ƚŚĂƚ ƚŚĞ ƉĂƌƚǇ ?Ɛ
agenda is to make the Hindu code form the blueprint of the UCC, thereby taking away the rights of 
minorities under their RPLs. For more on this, see ZĂƚŶĂ<ĂƉƵƌ ? ‘A Leap of Faith: The Construction of 
Hindu Majoritarianism through Secular Law ? ? ? ? ? ? ) ? ? ?dŚĞ^ŽƵƚŚƚůĂŶƚŝĐYƵĂƌƚĞƌůǇ ? 
9 >ĂǁŽŵŵŝƐƐŝŽŶŽĨ/ŶĚŝĂ ? ‘UCC Questionnaire ? ? ? ? ? ? ),  accessed 7 February 2017.The questionnaire 
has been attached as Appendix 2 and some of its important parts have been analysed in Chapter 6. 
10 Ratna Kapur argues that ƚŚĞƚĞƌŵ “ŐĞŶĚĞƌũƵƐƚŝĐĞ ?ƌĞĨĞƌƐƚŽƚŚĞƉƌŽĐĞƐƐŽĨƵŶĞĂƌƚŚŝŶŐŐĞŶĚĞƌďŝĂƐĞƐ
that are inherent in legal processes and exploring the ways in which these biases affect the way in 
which women experience law. She asserts further that gender justice is contingent on location, 
especially location in terms of family, class/religious community and nation-state (Ratna Kapur, 
 ‘ŚĂůůĞŶŐŝŶŐƚŚĞ>ŝďĞƌĂů^ƵďũĞĐƚ P>Ăǁ and Gender Justice in South Asia ?ŝŶDĂŝƚƌĂǇĞĞDƵŬŚŽƉĂĚŚǇĂǇ
and Navsharan Singh (eds), Gender Justice, Citizenship and Development (Zubaan 2007). I adopt this 
view of gender justice in my thesis in the context of the Hindu woman, especially the middle-class 
Hindu woman, in Hindu law. 
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perspectives that inform my research. Having outlined the background and 
theory that inform the research, I elaborate on the key themes, arguments and 
questions that are undertaken in this thesis.  Finally, I sketch the outline of the 
chapters that follow and develop my thesis. In the next section, I demonstrate 
why I have chosen Hindu law as my area of study for this research. 
1.2 Why Hindu Law? 
My thesis focuses on understanding how the middle-class Hindu woman is 
constructed in judicial reasoning. I choose the Hindu Code as the field from 
which I selected cases for closer study due to the reasons outlined in this 
section. The Hindu Corpus or Code consists of four Acts passed by the 
Parliament of India after the independence of the nation from colonial rule in 
1947: the Hindu Marriage Act (1955), Hindu Succession Act (1956), Hindu 
Minority and Guardianship Act (1956) and Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance 
Act (1956. Taken together, these Acts are collectively called the Hindu Code. 
The significance of these enactments is that they succeeded in changing the 
definition of the Hindu family, which had far-reaching effects on Indian polity, 
law and society.11 It is significant in the context of this thesis that the Hindu 
Code Bill generated much debate in the 1940s between liberal and 
conservative legislators on the nature and role of women in Hindu society.12 
While the Indian nationalist movement provided the platform for women to 
participate in the struggle for independence from colonial rule, it was in the 
controversies surrounding the Hindu Code Bill that the perception of women 
and notions of gender in contemporary society came to be highlighted. The 
                                                             
 
11 More on this in Chapter 3. 
12 The Hindu Code Bill was an important legislative event in the history of newly independent India. 
The passage of the Bill and the debates surrounding it have been discussed in detail in Chapter 3. 
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female subject played an important role in the cultural construction of the 
nation, during and after the colonial rule.13 
Hindu law reform was a flagship component of the post-independence 
JRYHUQPHQW·V DSSURDFK to social progress.14 The Hindu code and the 
depiction of Hindu women in this code was considered both as the template 
for the personal laws of other communities, and as a demonstration of the 
VWDWH·VDELOLW\WROHJLVODWHDQGUHVWUXFWXUHUHODWLRQVZLWKLQWKe Hindu family. The 
Indian state undertook various affirmative social legislations for women as 
these were viewed as the path to development and progress.15 While 
affirmative action was undertaken by the state, it did not completely displace 
or over rule religious, cultural or social norms. Religion was (and has remained) 
one of the important markers for defining identity in India.16 The partition of 
the country on religious lines specifically facilitated the constructs of modern 
and secular views of the individual in politico-legal discourse of newly 
independent India. While religion and gender were identified as markers of 
individual and familial identity in the Indian Constitution and other laws 
(including the Hindu code) passed during this period, caste,17 an important 
                                                             
 
13 For more on this, see Tanika Sarkar, Hindu Wife, Hindu Nation - Community, Religion and Cultural 
Nationalism (Indiana University Press 2001), Maitrayee Mukhopadhyay, Legally Dispossessed: 
Gender, Identity and the Process of Law (Stree, Calcutta 1998).  
14 ibid.  
15 For instance, the responsibility of the state to ensure affirmative action towards women and 
minorities was incorporated in the Indian Constitution. Several legislations such as the Dowry 
Prohibition Act, 1961 were passed by the Indian Parliament to undertake positive affirmative action 
favouring women. 
16 For instance, the last census of India provides a country-wide break up of religious groups. For 
more on this, see Office of the Registrar General and Census Commissioner, 
<http://www.censusindia.gov.in/2011census/Religion_PCA.html> accessed 19 September 2017. 
17 Caste is a form of social classification which originated based on occupations and later took on 
adverse forms of persecution. The Brahmins (Preceptors) were the highest caste, followed by the 
Kshatriyas or Warriors, Vaishya or merchants and Shudras or servile classes. There existed other types 
of social ordering outside the caste hierarchies such as Mlecchas or foreigners and Nishadas or tribals. 
Over time, Brahmins maintained social superiority. The lower castes tried to emulate the upper castes 
by imitating their ritualistic practices to gain social mobility. This process was termed as 
 “^ ĂŶƐŬƌŝƚŝǌĂƚŝŽŶ ?. For more on this, see Paola Bacchetta ? ‘^ĂĐƌĞĚ^ƉĂĐĞŝŶŽŶĨůŝĐƚŝŶ/ŶĚŝĂ PdŚĞĂďƌŝ
Masjid Affair ? ? ? ? ? ? ) ? ?'ƌŽǁƚŚĂŶĚŚĂŶŐĞ, ^ƵĚŝƉƚĂ<ĂǀŝƌĂũ ? ‘Religion and Identity in India ? ? ? ? ? ? ) ? ?
Ethnic and Racial Studies, Rosalia Condorelli,  ‘ŶŵĞƌŐĞŶƚist vs a Linear Approach to Social Change 
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social marker, was deliberately left out as it did not align with the ideal of the 
modern Indian citizen. Hence, in the Hindu code as well as the Indian 
Constitution, the legal subject is constructed on the lines of gender and 
religion, while all other markers of identity take a back seat.  
As Narendra Subramanian argues, policymakers tended to regulate family life 
by upholding group or community norms and by emphasising a normative 
vision of family life, which was carried out by introducing gender equalizing 
laws with cultural accommodation, in the years following Independence.18 At 
the same time, as the Indian state demonstrated an intention to improve the 
position of women in society, it displayed a paternalistic approach to social 
reform.19 It exercised its powers to regulate religious personal laws as a 
mechanism by which to maintain the political aims of nation-building and 
national integration.20 But this approach was problematic as it reinforced 
normative ideas of gender roles in the public sphere of the Indian nation, apart 
from the axis of gender demarcating roles in the private sphere. Therefore, 
Hindu law reforms gave women more legal rights on paper, than in practice. 
Though the Hindu code had inherent issues of gender imbalance as 
highlighted above, one of its important contributions is that it provided 
OHJLVODWLYH GHILQLWLRQ RI WKH WHUP ¶+LQGX· )RU H[DPSOH 6HF RI +LQGX
Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956 defines a Hindu as any person who is 
a follower of Hindu religion or any of its sects and that it applies to Buddhist, 
Jains and Sikhs as well as any person who is not a Muslim, Christian, Jew or 
                                                             
 
WƌŽĐĞƐƐĞƐ P'ĞŶĚĞƌ>ŽŽŬŝŶŽŶƚĞŵƉŽƌĂƌǇ/ŶĚŝĂďĞƚǁĞĞŶDŽĚĞƌŶŝƚǇĂŶĚ,ŝŶĚƵdƌĂĚŝƚŝŽŶ ? ? (2015) 4 
SpringerPlus.Caste is an important axis of identity and conflict in the social context and it also 
determines the prevalence of traditional laws. However, as I confine myself to the study of judgments 
in which caste plays no role in judicial reasoning, I have not analysed it as a primary identity marker 
here. 
18 EĂƌĞŶĚƌĂ^ƵďƌĂŵĂŶŝĂŶ ?  ‘Legal Change and Gender Inequality: Changes in Muslim Family Law in 
India ? ? ? ? ? ? ) ? ?>Ăǁ ?^ŽĐŝĂů/ŶƋƵŝƌǇ ? 
19 Archana Parashar, Women and Family Law Reform in India (Sage Publications Pvt Ltd, New Delhi 
1992). 
20 ibid.  
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Parsi by religion. This definition finds resonance in other enactments of the 
+LQGXFRGH$UWLFOHRIWKH,QGLDQ&RQVWLWXWLRQSURYLGHVWKDW¶reference to 
Hindus shall be construed as including a reference to persons professing the 
Sikh, Jaina or Buddhist religion, and the reference to Hindu religious 
LQVWLWXWLRQV VKDOOEHFRQVWUXHGDFFRUGLQJO\· 6XE-clause (b) of Clause (2) of 
Explanation II of Article 25, Constitution of India). This is perhaps one of the 
few instances in modern secular legislative history globally, when an attempt 
was made to define the follower of a religion.  
This definition also throws light on the impact of the Hindu personal law 
V\VWHPLQ,QGLD:KDWLVFRQVLGHUHGDV¶+LQGX·ODZWRGD\LVDFXULRXVLQVWDQFH
of anglicizing of Hindu local laws and customs, where community rights were 
converted to individual rights.21 0RUHRYHUWKHFDWHJRU\RI¶+LQGX·DVHYLQFHG
by the enactments of the Hindu code, is broad-EDVHG,WLVHYLGHQWWKDW¶+LQGX·
is a default bucket category that includes persons professing Buddhist, Jain 
and Sikh religion, as well as children born to parents professing the Hindu 
faith and persons who do not belong to any religious denomination or are 
atheists or agnostics. By this logic, Hindu law governs about 800 million+ 
people, about 1/7th of human population.22 Only Christians, Muslims and 
Parsis living in India are exempt from this definition as they have exclusive 
53/V JRYHUQLQJ WKHLU UHVSHFWLYH FRPPXQLWLHV 7KHUHIRUH ¶+LQGX· ODZ YHHUV
away from religious inclination and is applicable to about 80% of the Indian 
population now. Currently, Hindu law has very little in common with 
customary law or Hindu religion. It is more in line with Common Law 
principles, such as restitution of conjugal rights and welfare of the child, that 
                                                             
 
21  Werner Menski, Hindu Law - Beyond Tradition and Modernity (Oxford University Press, New Delhi 
2008). 
22 Indian Census 2011 states that about 966 million (79.8%) are followers of Hindu religion, 20 million 
(1.72%) are Sikh, 8.4 million (0.70%) are Buddhists and 4.45 million (0.37%) are Jains. Also, over 7.9 
million belong to minor religions and sects. All these categories are classified as Hindus under law. 
(Office of the Registrar General and Census Commissioner, 
<http://www.censusindia.gov.in/2011census/Religion_PCA.html> accessed 19 September 2017).  
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were a colonial legacy.23 As the Hindu Code is modelled along liberal 
principles and is premised on gender equality on paper, it cannot be 
completely categorised as religious law. However, its allusions to the premise 
of equality and the volume of people it governs make it an important gauge 
of normative notions of gender within religious personal laws in India. 
Another factor that makes the Hindu Code significant is the rise of the Hindu 
Right in Indian politics after the 1980s. The Hindu Right paints a different 
imagination of Nation, in which normative gender roles are emphasised in the 
realms of society and family. A political party (Bharatiya Janata Party or BJP for 
short) with Hindu Right roots captured power in 2014 and now wishes to 
model the personal laws of other communities along the lines of the Hindu 
Code. If this is carried through, the Hindu code is in a strange position of being 
used both as a standard and a correction manual. From the above points, it is 
evident that the reach and value of the Hindu code among RPLs is unmatched 
in India. Moreover, due to its impending relevance on the UCC, it is a topical 
area of research in the administration of personal laws. It is within this area of 
law that I situate my research. Having provided a selective overview of the area 
of law and its role in my thesis, I now turn to this domain of scholarship to 
elaborate on the theoretical perspectives that inform my research, in the next 
section. 
1.3 Theoretical Perspectives 
In India, as in most other countries, each aspect of social reality is gendered 
due to the inter-relation of patriarchal practices with politics, economy, 
religion, law and culture.24 In my thesis, I focus mainly on how judicial 
reasoning on gender roles within the Hindu family subscribes to normative 
                                                             
 
23 For more on this, see Chapter 3. 
24 Kumkum Sangari and Sudesh Vaid (eds), Recasting Women - Essays in Colonial History (Zubaan, 
New Delhi 1989). 
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notions of gender. Throughout my thesis, I use terms such as normative 
notions of gender or gendered norms. What are the normative ideas of 
gender in judicial reasoning that I am referring to here? The normative notions 
that I refer to, are the ideas that men and women are different and that they 
must perform certain roles in families due to their gender. For instance, the 
man is considered the breadwinner or provider and the woman is the nurturer 
or caregiver. These roles are the product of normative ways of thinking about 
gender and arise from socially conditioned ways of constructing gender 
differences. In this section, I elaborate on the theoretical perspectives, mostly 
informed by the scholarship of Indian legal feminists, which have helped me 
to form the basis of my analysis throughout this thesis. 
In my thesis, I study judicial reasoning predominantly through the lens of 
Indian feminist legal theory. Currently, there are several key themes or debates 
in contemporary feminist legal theory in India. These themes include the 
notion of equality and sameness between men and women within marriage, 
the use of the generic term 'women' which takes away context and location 
for women from minority communities and the notion of 'universal' human 
rights values, which is Western in origin but is applied to the non-West.25 I use 
the first of these themes, namely, the notion of equality and sameness 
between men and women within marriage, as a key focus in my thesis. 
However, my explorations are not on the concept of equality specifically. 
Rather, I analyse how inherently normative and gendered notions present in 
judicial reasoning undermine and obstruct gender justice. Specifically, I focus 
on the nature of treatment of men and women in the Hindu family by the 
Courts, to determine if the treatment is same or different, based on gender of 
the individual. So, I situate my thesis within the first theme in contemporary 
                                                             
 
25 Flavia Agnes, Family Law Volume 1: Family Laws and Constitutional Claims (Oxford University Press 
2011). 
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feminist legal theory in India, by questioning whether there really exists a 
notion of equality or sameness within the Hindu family, in view of the 
disparate treatment of gender by the judges in the cases under study.  
In the initial stages of my research, I read different strands of scholarship 
ranging from feminist epistemology to relational equality to Indian feminist 
theory. Of these varied scholarship, two articles that I read influenced my 
overarching approach to the cases under study and my thesis. The first one is 
´:RPHQ RI /HJDO 'LVFRXUVHµ E\ &DURO 6PDUW :KLOH DUJXLQJ WKDW ODZ LV
gendered, Smart mentions WKDW LQVWHDG RI DVNLQJ ´+RZ ODZ FDQ WUDQVFHQG
JHQGHU"µZHQHHGWRTXHVWLRQ´+RZGRHVJHQGHUZRUNLQODZDQGKRZGRHV
ODZZRUNWRSURGXFHJHQGHU"µ26 I paraphrased her question to ask how does 
gender work in Hindu custody law and how does judicial reasoning in this law 
work to produce/reproduce gender. The second work is that of Ratna Kapur 
WLWOHG´&KDOOHQJLQJWKH/LEHUDO6XEMHFW/DZDQG*HQGHU-XVWLFHLQ6RXWK$VLDµ 
wherein Kapur argues that gender justice can be achievable if gender biases 
inherent in legal processes are unmasked, especially by throwing light on the 
ZD\VLQZKLFKWKHVHELDVHVDIIHFWZRPHQ·VH[SHULHQFHRIODZ27 Most Indian 
OHJDOIHPLQLVWV·FODLPWKDWDOOUHOLJLRXVSHUVRQDOODZVKDYHDQLQKHUHQWJHQGHU
bias. I further this claim by demonstrating how judicial reasoning in custody 
cases exhibit disparate treatment of gender, due to normative ideas on gender 
roles.28 I argue that it is important to identify these biases in legal processes, 
to strengthen the cause of gender justice in religious personal laws in India. 
Due to the influence of these writers, I formulated my thesis into two distinct 
                                                             
 
26 ĂƌŽů ^ŵĂƌƚ ?  ‘The Woman of Legal Discourse ?  ? ? ? ? ? )  ? ^ŽĐŝĂů ĂŶĚ >ĞŐĂů ^ƚƵĚŝĞƐ ? While most 
literature I have used in my thesis belongs to Indian feminist legal literature category, I have used 
some literature outside this category to support my arguments throughout the thesis. 
27 Ratna Kapur,  ‘ŚĂůůĞŶŐŝŶŐƚŚĞ>ŝďĞƌĂů^ƵďũĞĐƚ P>ĂǁĂŶĚ'ĞŶĚĞƌ:ƵƐƚŝĐĞŝŶ^ŽƵƚŚƐŝĂ ?ŝŶDĂŝƚƌĂǇĞĞ
Mukhopadhyay and Navsharan Singh (eds), Gender Justice, Citizenship and Development (Zubaan 
2007). 
28 More on this in Chapter 6. 
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parts. Part One consists of an analysis of a set of cases selected on the basis 
that they have a distinct gendered basis for their reasoning. This is my 
exploration of how gender roles work in judicial reasoning in Hindu custody 
law and how this reasoning works to produce a certain type of Hindu woman 
in the cases under study.29 Part Two of the thesis demonstrates how such 
gendered judicial reasoning impacts the notion of gender justice in RPLs in 
India.30 I now analyse the two theoretical strands that inform my research in 
the following sub-sections. In the last sub-section, I provide an example of 
gender asymmetry in property ownership in Hindu law, which shows that 
disparate treatment of gender may not be confined to custody cases but is 
prevalent elsewhere in the Hindu code too. 
1.3.1 Feminist Engagement on Family 
Many Indian feminists have long held the view that the traditional gender 
hierarchy in Indian society has adversely affected ZRPHQ·VSRVLWLRQDQGVWDWXV
in society.31 )XUWKHUVRPHIHPLQLVWVKDYHDUJXHGWKDWWKHUHDUH´PXOWLSOHDQG
RYHUODSSLQJSDWULDUFKLHVµ32 which are being constantly shaped by culture and 
class. They contend that these notions of patriarchy are responsible for the 
inequalities that exist between men and women in society.33 The oppression 
                                                             
 
29 More on this in Chapters 4 and 5. 
30 More on this in Chapter 6. 
31 For instance, see Nivedita Menon, Recovering Subversion - Feminist Politics Beyond the Law 
(Permanent Black 2004), Nivedita Menon, Seeing like a Feminist (Zubaan, India with Penguin UK 
2012), EŝƌŵĂůĂĂŶĞƌũĞĞ ? ‘ŶĂůǇƐŝŶŐtŽŵĞŶ ?ƐtŽƌŬhŶĚĞƌWĂƚƌŝĂƌĐŚǇ ? ?ŝŶ<^ ĂŶŐĂƌŝĂŶĚhŚĂŬƌĂǀĂƌƚŝ
(eds), From Myths To Markets, Essays on Gender (Manohar Publications 1999), Uma Chakravarti, 
Gendering Caste Through a Feminist Lens (Stree, Calcutta 2003), Flavia Agnes, Law and Gender 
Inequality -dŚĞWŽůŝƚŝĐƐŽĨtŽŵĞŶ ?ƐZŝŐŚƚƐŝŶ/ŶĚŝĂ (Oxford University Press 1999). 
32 The best argument for multiple patriarchies has been made by <ƵŵŬƵŵ ^ĂŶŐĂƌŝ ?  ‘Politics of 
Diversity: Religious Communities and Multiple Patriarchies ? ? ? ? ? ? ) ? ?ĐŽŶŽŵŝĐĂŶĚWŽůŝƚŝĐĂůtĞĞŬůǇ ? 
DĂŶǇŽƚŚĞƌĨĞŵŝŶŝƐƚƐŚĂǀĞĨŽůůŽǁĞĚ^ ĂŶŐĂƌŝ ?ƐĂƌŐƵŵĞŶƚƐ ?/Ŷ ƚŚĞ/ŶĚŝĂŶĐŽŶƚĞǆƚ ?ƉĂƚƌŝĂƌĐŚǇŝƐĂƐǇƐƚĞŵ
in which the beneficiaries are male, and the agents of enforcement are all the members of a family 
and it possesses a high degree of social and familial sanctions. Here, I confine myself to various 
perspectives on patriarchies to set the context for my arguments and do not analyse these in depth, 
as my focus is on disparate treatment of gender in the cases under study. 
33 &ŽƌĞǆĂŵƉůĞ ?ĂĐĐŽƌĚŝŶŐƚŽƚŚĞtŽƌůĚĐŽŶŽŵŝĐ&ŽƌƵŵ ?Ɛ'ĞŶĚĞƌ'ĂƉ/ŶĚĞǆĨŽƌƚŚĞǇĞĂƌ ? ? ? ? ?ǁŚŝĐŚ
critically examined four important areas of inequality - economic participation and opportunity, 
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of women is usually perpetuated by resorting to normative stereotypes of 
women, such as the role of the  mother as nurturer.34 While women are forced 
to conform to patriarchal standards and culture, most men tend to recognise 
that it is advantageous to them if the subordinate position of women are 
maintained in society.35 Most feminists agree that the focus is on men, since 
PHQGHILQHWKHKRXVHKROGVRFLHW\DQGQDWLRQLQ,QGLDDQGZRPHQ·VSRVLWLRQV
are relational, that of daughter, sister or mother.36 Gender inequalities 
continue to exist, like in other countries. What makes the Indian case unique 
is that multiple markers, such as caste and class, intersect to create or deepen 
existing inequalities. So, what are the factors that caused the emergence of 
new forms of patriarchy in India? Cultural values, religious norms, social 
organisation and gender ideology are some of the factors that interacted with 
each other to create statutory norms in the period just after independence 
from colonial rule.37  
A literature review on this topic indicated that a certain ideal of the middle-
class Hindu woman³the central actor in this thesis³was constructed through 
interactions between the colonial government and the nationalist movement 
in late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The question of how gender 
                                                             
 
educational attainment, political empowerment, and health and survival - India ranks 114th among 
128 countries, as cited in Aparajita Chowdhury and Manoj Manjari Patnaik,  ‘ŵƉŽǁĞƌŝŶŐŽǇƐĂŶĚ
Men to Achieve Gender Equality in India ? ? ? ? ? ? ) ? ?:ŽƵrnal of Developing Societies 455. The report 
claims that  the index comprises of economic, political, educational, and health parameters. India has 
ŽǀĞƌĂůů ? ? ? ?ƉĞƌĐĞŶƚŐĞŶĚĞƌĞƋƵĂůŝƚǇ ?/ŶĞĐŽŶŽŵŝĐƉĂƌƚŝĐŝƉĂƚŝŽŶĂŶĚŽƉƉŽƌƚƵŶŝƚǇ ?/ŶĚŝĂ ?ƐƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶŝƐ
127, at 41.3 percent. 
34 For instance, see Archana Parashar,  ‘&ĂŵŝůǇ>ĂǁĂƐĂDĞĂŶƐŽĨŶƐƵƌŝŶŐ'ĞŶĚĞƌ:ƵƐƚŝĐĞĨŽƌ/ŶĚŝĂŶ
Women ? ? ? ? ? ? ) ?/ŶĚŝĂŶ:ŽƵƌŶĂůŽĨ'ĞŶĚĞƌ^ƚƵĚŝĞƐ ? ? ? ? 
35 For instance, see Steve Derne,  ‘,ŝŶĚƵDĞŶdĂůŬĂďŽƵƚŽŶƚƌŽůůŝŶŐtŽŵĞŶ෴ PƵůƚƵƌĂů/ĚĞĂƐĂƐĂdŽŽů 
ŽĨƚŚĞWŽǁĞƌĨƵů ? (1994) 37 Sociological Perspectives. 
36 For instance, see Huma Ahmed-'ŚŽƐŚ ? ‘Chattels of Society: Domestic Violence in India ? ? ? ? ? ? ) ? ?
Violence Against Women.ĐĐŽƌĚŝŶŐƚŽDĞŶŽŶĂŶĚŚĂƐŝŶ ? ‘&ĂŵŝůǇ ?ĐŽŵŵƵŶŝƚǇĂŶĚƐƚĂƚĞĞŵĞƌŐĞĂƐ
ƚŚĞƚŚƌĞĞŵĞĚŝĂƚŝŶŐĂŶĚŝŶƚĞƌůŽĐŬŝŶŐĨŽƌĐĞƐĚĞƚĞƌŵŝŶŝŶŐǁŽŵĞŶ ?ƐŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂůĂŶĚĐŽůůĞĐƚŝǀĞĚĞƐƚŝŶŝĞƐ ? 
(Ritu Menon and Kamla Bhasin, Borders and Boundaries: WoŵĞŶŝŶ/ŶĚŝĂ ?ƐWĂƌƚŝƚŝŽŶ (Kali for Women 
1998).  
37 N Subramanian, Nation and Family - Personal Law, Cultural Pluralism and Gendered Citizenship in 
India (Stanford University Press 2014). 
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structures institutions and historical experience was addressed by Indian 
IHPLQLVWV HDUO\ DQG WKH WKHPHV RI ZRPHQ·V H[LVWHQFH ZHUH SUREOHPDWL]HG
since the nineteenth century under the colonial rule.38 Partho Chatterjee 
DUJXHV WKDW WKH QDWLRQDOLVWV UHVROYHG WKH ¶:RPHQ· question by creating a 
dichotomy between the inner, spiritual world of middle-class Indians that 
contrasted with the outer, material world.39 The inner or the world of the home 
KHOG,QGLDQWUDGLWLRQDOYDOXHVZKLOHWKHRXWHURQHZDVLQIXVHGZLWK´:HVWHUQµ
values. The women were the guardians of this inner world and even when 
exposed to the benefits of a Western style education, they were expected to 
remain traditional. Thus, the figure of the Indian middle-class woman was 
born, and this was used as the yardsWLFN IRU WKH´UHVSHFWDEOHZRPDQµ7KLV
created a new patriarchy defined by the norms of the educated middle-class.40  
So, it emerged that the hegemonic cultural construct of the nation was the 
Hindu middle-class woman.41 This was accompanied by the social 
coQVWUXFWLRQRIWKH+LQGXIDPLO\DVD´PRGHUQFRQMXJDOXQLWµ.42 The dominant 
ideology of the Hindu family was that it was patriarchal and heterosexual in 
nature.43 In this type of family, gender played an important role to determine 
                                                             
 
38 <ĂůƉĂŶĂ<ĂŶŶĂďŝƌĂŶ ? ‘Voices of Dissent ?ŝŶZŽďŝŶZŝŶĞŚĂƌƚ ?ĞĚ ) ?ůŝŽ ? ? ? ? ) ? 
39 WĂƌƚŚŽŚĂƚƚĞƌũĞĞ ? ‘dŚĞEĂƚŝŽŶĂůŝƐƚZĞƐŽůƵƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞtŽŵĞŶ ?ƐYƵĞƐƚŝŽŶ ?ŝŶ<^ĂŶŐĂƌŝĂŶĚsĂŝĚ ?^ ?
(eds) (Zubaan 1989). 
40 Here, I use patriarchy in the sense of male privilege and essentializing gender relations, which 
ŚĞůƉĞĚ ƚŽ ŚŝĞƌĂƌĐŚŝǌĞ  “ĂŶ ƵƉƉĞƌ-ĐĂƐƚĞ ? ƉƌŽƉĞƌƚŝĞĚ ? ƉĂƚƌŝůŝŶĞĂů ? EŽƌƚŚ /ŶĚŝĂŶ ŵĂůĞ ƚƌĂĚŝƚŝŽŶ ?
(Maitrayee Mukhopadhyay, Legally Dispossessed: Gender, Identity and the Process of Law (Stree, 
Calcutta 1998). This patriarchal tradition defined men as breadwinners and women as homemakers, 
thereby making women economic dependents. Further, this helped to maintain unequal resource 
positions within the family that served to keep the family power balances intact (Bina Agarwal, 
 ‘ĂƌŐĂŝŶŝŶŐ ? ?ĂŶĚ'ĞŶĚer Relations: Within and Beyond the Household ? ? ? ? ? ? ) ?&ĞŵŝŶŝƐƚĐŽŶŽŵŝĐƐ
1). 
41 Maitrayee Mukhopadhyay, Legally Dispossessed: Gender, Identity and the Process of Law (Stree, 
Calcutta 1998). 
42 Mytheli Sreenivas, Wives, Widows & Concubines - The Conjugal Family Ideal in Colonial India (Orient 
Black Swan, India 2009). 
43 For a detailed discussion on the dominant heterosexual family ideology in India, see Brenda 
Cossman and Ratna Kapur, Subversive Sites - Feminist Engagements with Law in India (Sage 
Publications India Pvt Ltd 1996). 
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DSHUVRQ·VVWDQGLQJDQGULghts within the family. The state recognised only the 
dominant family norm of the patriarchal heterosexual family in the Hindu 
Code Bill, and over time this emerged as the only norm.44 The heterosexual, 
monogamous nuclear family that was central to modern family life became 
the normative model of family in Hindu law.45 This model of the Hindu family 
was inherently gendered and conceptualised the role of the Hindu woman 
along normative ideals of womanhood and motherhood, and considered the 
Hindu woman to be the repository of culture and traditional values, despite 
being educated and/or modern.46 Even in late 20th century, the patriarchal, 
patrilineal and virilocal47 marriage, which is inherently gendered, was the 
universally accepted form of marriage in India. Thus, gender emerged as a 
significant differentiator of roles in the Hindu family and this is one of the 
theoretical perspectives that inform my research. 
The relationship between tradition and modernity in India does not 
necessarily mean polarization or social dichotomy. Instead, it can sometimes 
be a fusion of traditional and modern elements or a reinforcement of one by 
                                                             
 
44 For more on this topic, see ZŝŶĂsĞƌŵĂtŝůůŝĂŵƐ ? ‘Hindu Law as Personal Law: State and Identity in 
the Hindu Code Bill Debates, 1952 - 1956 ? ŝŶ d >ƵďŝŶ ? Z ĂǀŝƐ :ƌ ? ĂŶĚ :< <ƌŝƐŚŶĂŶ  ?ĞĚƐ )  ?&ŝƌƐƚ ?
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2010), ZŝŶĂ sĞƌŵĂ tŝůůŝĂŵƐ ?  ‘The More Things Change: 
ĞďĂƚŝŶŐ'ĞŶĚĞƌĂŶĚZĞůŝŐŝŽŶŝŶ/ŶĚŝĂ ?Ɛ,ŝŶĚƵ>ĂǁƐ ? ? ? ?- 2006 ? ? ? ? ? ? ) ? ?'ĞŶĚĞƌ ?,ŝƐƚŽƌǇ, Rachel 
Sturman, dŚĞ 'ŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚŽĨ ^ŽĐŝĂů >ŝĨĞ ŝŶŽůŽŶŝĂů /ŶĚŝĂ >ŝďĞƌĂůŝƐŵ ? ZĞůŝŐŝŽƵƐ >Ăǁ ?ĂŶĚtŽŵĞŶ ?Ɛ
Rights  ?EĞǁzŽƌŬ ?Ezථ PĂŵďƌŝĚŐĞhŶiversity Press 2012). 
45 For a detailed discussion on this, see E^ƵďƌĂŵĂŶŝĂŶ ? ‘Making Family and Nation: Hindu Marriage 
Law in Early Postcolonial India ? ? ? ? ? ? ) ? ?dŚĞ:ŽƵƌŶĂůŽĨƐŝĂŶ^ƚƵĚŝĞƐ, Brenda Cossman and Ratna 
Kapur, Subversive Sites - Feminist Engagements with Law in India (Sage Publications India Pvt Ltd 
1996). 
46 More on this in Chapter 3. 
47 Virilocality refers to patrilocal residence, a social system in which a married couple reside with or 
ĐůŽƐĞƚŽƚŚĞŚƵƐďĂŶĚ ?ƐƉĂƌĞŶƚƐ ?/ƚŝƐĂƐŽĐŝĂůƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĞŝŶ/ŶĚŝĂĨŽƌƉĂƌĞŶƚƐƚŽƚĞůůŐŝƌůƐĨƌŽŵĂǇŽƵŶŐĂŐĞ
ƚŚĂƚƚŚĞǇŶĞĞĚƚŽŐŽƚŽĂĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶƚŚŽƵƐĞ ?ŝ ?Ğ ? ?ŚƵƐďĂŶĚ ?ƐŚŽƵƐĞ ) ?^Ž ?ƚŚĞǇƐŚould learn to behave 
ƉƌŽƉĞƌůǇƐŽƚŚĂƚƚŚĞǇĞĂƌŶƚŚĞŝƌƉĂƌĞŶƚƐĂŐŽŽĚŶĂŵĞŝŶƚŚĞŚƵƐďĂŶĚ ?ƐĨĂŵŝůǇ ?ǁŽŵĂŶ ŝƐŽĨƚĞŶ
ƚŚŽƵŐŚƚƚŽďĞŵĂƌƌǇŝŶŐƚŚĞŵĂŶ ?ƐĨĂŵŝůǇ ?ƌĂƚŚĞƌƚŚĂŶƚŚĞŵĂŶŚŝŵƐĞůĨ ?ĂƐƐŚĞŵƵƐƚĂĚũƵƐƚĂŶĚĂĚĂƉƚ
to the culture and traditions of her new family from the day of her marriage. (Nivedita Menon, Seeing 
like a Feminist (Zubaan, India with Penguin UK 2012). 
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the other through mutual adaptations.48 For example, there still exist strong 
ties with Hindu traditions and extended families in contemporary Indian 
society, DQGWKLVLQWXUQOHDGVWRWKHFRPSOLDQFHZLWK¶DUUDQJHGPDUULDJHV·DV
the dominant form of marriages as well as traditional or gendered conception 
of marital roles. Many Indian legal feminists claim that the discourse on the 
family in India tends to align itself with the dominant sexual ideology of Indian 
society in general, in which the family is headed by the eldest male member 
and the woman is represented to be the repository of culture. The ideal 
woman is pure, chaste and virginal prior to her marriage and becomes 
devoted to her husband after marriage. The relationship between a man and 
a woman can exist only in the form of marriage, which is considered a sacred 
bond to sanctify a heterosexual union.49  
Most feminist scholars like Archana Parashar and Flavia Agnes claim that 
gender was domesticated by state policy in India after independence from 
colonial rule, as women were viewed as the key to ensure the perpetuation of 
patriarchal values in family and society and to maintain status quo. 50 However, 
from 1947 to the present, there has been a tension that is evident in law-
making between the need to provide gender equality while protecting the 
interests of women, as they were considered weaker when compared to men. 
Indian lawmakers considered it important to maintain gender equality in legal 
policy, without disturbing gender roles, as this would lead to cultural and 
                                                             
 
48 ZŽƐĂůŝĂŽŶĚŽƌĞůůŝ ? ‘An Emergentist vs a Linear Approach to Social Change Processes: A Gender Look 
in Contemporary India between Modernity and Hindu Tradition ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ) ?^ƉƌŝŶŐĞƌWůƵƐ.  
49 Brenda Cossman and Ratna Kapur, Subversive Sites - Feminist Engagements with Law in India (Sage 
Publications India Pvt Ltd 1996). 
50Archana Parashar, Women and Family Law Reform in India (Sage Publications Pvt Ltd, New Delhi 
1992), Flavia Agnes, Law and Gender Inequality -dŚĞ WŽůŝƚŝĐƐ ŽĨ tŽŵĞŶ ?Ɛ ZŝŐŚƚƐ ŝŶ /ŶĚŝĂ (Oxford 
University Press 1999). They also argue that the lawmakers considered it important to contain 
ǁŽŵĞŶ ?ƐƐĞǆƵĂůŝƚǇĂƐƚŚŝƐǁĂƐĞƐƐĞŶƚŝĂůĨŽƌƚƌĂŶƐŵŝƐƐŝŽŶŽĨƉƌŽƉĞƌƚǇƚŽƚŚĞŵĂůĞŚĞŝƌƐŽĨƚŚĞĨĂŵŝůǇ
and the notion of sexual control in marriages was followed to ensure the regulation of property 
relationships. (Flavia Agnes, Law and Gender Inequality -dŚĞ WŽůŝƚŝĐƐ ŽĨ tŽŵĞŶ ?Ɛ ZŝŐŚƚƐ ŝŶ /ŶĚŝĂ 
(Oxford University Press 1999)). 
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social conflicts.51 This tension spills over to the interpretation of the law by the 
judges, as I explore in later chapters. 
Some feminist scholars argued that the claim of the post-independence Indian 
state to reform Hindu law on the grounds of conformity of principles with the 
Indian Constitution was premised on unequal gender relations. They stated 
that the formulation of the Indian Constitution as well as personal laws 
exhibited an inherent tension between dominant (and unequal) gender 
relations.52 Moreover, while state laws embraced the concept of gender 
equality on paper, personal law reforms (especially Hindu law) did not alter 
the family power structure, as this was thought to come at great political 
cost.53 What we can say for certain in this scenario is that equality and 
protectionism tend to be at loggerheads with each other in the Indian 
Constitution as well as the Hindu code, and this struggle is reflected in the 
judicial decisions to this day.54  
The need to balance widely-held, culturally-grounded assumptions on gender 
and Constitutional notion of gender equality is one of the important sources 
                                                             
 
51 sŝũĂǇĂ EĂŐĂƌĂũĂŶĂŶĚƌĐŚĂŶĂ WĂƌĂƐŚĂƌ ?  ‘DǇƌŽƚŚĞƌ ?Ɛ<ĞĞƉĞƌ PZĞŐƵůĂƚŝŽŶŽĨ ƚŚĞ ƌŽƚŚĞƌ WSister 
Relationship in the Religious Personal Laws of India ?  ? ? ? ? ? )  ? ?^ŽƵƚŚƐŝĂ P:ŽƵƌŶĂůŽĨ^ŽƵƚŚƐŝĂŶ
Studies.Flavia Agnes, Sudhir Chandra and Monmayee Basu, Women and Law in India: An Omnibus 
Comprising Law and Gender Inequality, Enslaved Daughters, Hindu Women and Marriage Law 
(Oxford University Press 2004). 
52 For more on this, see ŚƌŝƐƚŝŶĞ<ĞĂƚŝŶŐ ?  ‘&ƌĂŵŝŶŐƚŚĞWŽƐƚĐŽůŽŶŝĂů^ĞǆƵĂůŽŶƚƌĂĐƚ෴ PĞŵŽĐƌĂĐǇ ?
Fraternalism and State Authority in India ?  ? ? ? ? ? )  ? ? ,ǇƉĂƚŝĂ, Zakia Pathak and Rajeswari Sunder 
ZĂũĂŶ ? ‘ “^ŚĂŚĂŶŽ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ) ? ?^ŝŐŶƐ ? 
53 Archana Parashar, Women and Family Law Reform in India (Sage Publications Pvt Ltd, New Delhi 
1992). 
54 Equality and protectionism emerged from the twin ideas that originated during the nationalist 
movement in the early twentieth century - the liberal, unmarked citizens who needed to be treated 
equally and the elite, upper-class Hindu woman who needed to be protected for her own good. These 
concepts did not exist in pre-colonial Hindu law and were a product of the colonial interaction with 
Indian nationalism, with liberalism thrown in for good measure. Indian nationalist leaders considered 
it important for Indians to have their own non-Western definitions of modernity and claimed that 
Indians were modern but not Western. However, tŚŝƐ ŵŽĚĞƌŶŝƚǇ ƚĞŶĚĞĚ ƚŽ ďĞ ĨƌĂĐƚƵƌĞĚ ?  “ŚĂůĨ
ƌĞĨůĞĐƚŝŶŐĂŶĚŚĂůĨƌĞũĞĐƚŝŶŐƚƌĂĚŝƚŝŽŶ ? ?ŶŽƚ ũƵƐƚ ŝŶ/ŶĚŝĂďƵƚ ŝŶƚŚĞĞŶƚŝƌĞƐƵď-continent (Pratiksha; 
Ăǆŝ ?^ŚŝƌŝŶD ?ZĂŝĂŶĚ^ŚĂŚĞĞŶ^ĂƌĚĂƌůŝ ? ‘>ĞŐĂĐŝĞƐŽĨŽŵŵŽŶ>Ăǁ P “ƌŝŵĞƐŽĨ,ŽŶŽƵƌ ?ŝŶ/ŶĚia and 
Pakistan ? ? ? ? ? ? ) ? ?dŚŝƌĚtŽƌůĚYƵĂƌƚĞƌůǇ). 
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of friction within Hindu law. I have found that this tension is evident in judicial 
reasoning in the cases under study and contributes to disparate treatment of 
women and men by the judges, as I explain in subsequent chapters. In the 
next section, I demonstrate how feminist perspectives on religious personal 
laws analyse disparate treatment of gender in these laws.  
1.3.2 Feminist Engagement on Religious Personal Laws55 
For Indian feminists, the inability of the courts and the legislature to 
implement gender equality in family and personal laws is an attempt by the 
state (as represented by its legislative and judicial arms) to ensure that women 
are treated as second-class citizens.56 They claim that questions on ZRPHQ·V
rights are subsumed within the sphere of the family and this leads to a 
reduction of their autonomy in the polity.57   In the Indian feminist discourse, 
the ideas of gender and gender justice are important markers to define 
ZRPHQ·VFRQGLWLRQLQWKHSROLWLFDOOHJLVlative, social and legal spheres.  
So, how is gender viewed in Indian legal policy? Menon claims that legal policy 
in India largely uses gender as a category and not as a lens of examination.58 
She argues that the judiciary confines itself to normative ideals of womanhood 
and motherhood and adopts the idea that women need protection, compared 
to men.  Here, the issue is one of latent patriarchy in the state apparatus. 
Feminist theoretical engagement with legal discourse in India critiques legal 
systems to be andro-centric, as they promote active or passive discrimination 
                                                             
 
55 For a detailed analysis of this literature, see Chapter 6. 
56 For instance, see Rajeswari Sunder Rajan, The Scandal of the State - Women, Law and Citizenship 
in Postcolonial India (Duke University Press 2003).See also Nivedita Menon, Seeing like a Feminist 
(Zubaan, India with Penguin UK 2012), ZĂũĞƐǁĂƌŝ^ƵŶĚĞƌZĂũĂŶ ?  ‘Women between Community and 
State: Some Implications of the Uniform Civil Code Debates in India ? ? ? ? ? ? ) ? ?^ŽĐŝĂůdĞǆƚ, Catharine 
DĂĐ<ŝŶŶŽŶ ? ‘Sex Equality under the Constitution ŽĨ/ŶĚŝĂ PWƌŽďůĞŵƐ ?WƌŽƐƉĞĐƚƐ ?ĂŶĚ “WĞƌƐŽŶĂů>ĂǁƐ ? ?
(2006) 4 International Journal of Constitutional Law, Flavia Agnes, Law and Gender Inequality -The 
Politics of tŽŵĞŶ ?ƐZŝŐŚƚƐŝŶ/ŶĚŝĂ (Oxford University Press 1999). 
57 WĂƵůĂĂŶĞƌũĞĞ ? ‘dŚĞĐƚƐĂŶĚ&ĂĐƚƐŽĨtŽŵĞŶ ?ƐƵƚŽŶŽŵǇŝŶ/ŶĚŝĂ ? ? ? ? ? ? ) ? ?ŝŽŐĞŶĞƐ ? ? ? 
58 Nivedita Menon, Recovering Subversion - Feminist Politics Beyond the Law (Permanent Black 2004).  
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against women and interpret law in patriarchal ways, thereby eroding the 
subjective experience of women under law.59  
While the law is presumed to be neutral in its treatment of citizens, Indian 
feminists argue that it gravitates towards protectionism of women based on 
gendered perception of roles within and outside families, especially within 
RPLs. In judicial discourse, facts and law tend to mesh together with the 
notional elements of a patriarchal system and women are generally denied 
agency as chattel, as it is considered necessary to undertake reification and 
subjugation of women to maintain the patriarchal system.60 Judges often 
reflect and follow social norms in their legal reasoning and decision-making, 
which is often clear from the judicial language used in judgments.61 Some 
Indian legal feminist scholars offer a critique of gendered norms and biases in 
RPLs, which is a useful lens of analysis that can be employed for judicial 
reasoning.62 Thus, there is a clear agreement among feminist scholars that 
religious personal laws tend to be gender discriminatory.63 
For a long time, most feminists in India considered law to be the only tool to 
remedy gender inequalities and restore gender justice.64  But in due course, 
Indian feminists realised that law is just one of the tools that help to achieve 
gender justice.65 While most Indian legal feminists engage with a critique of 
                                                             
 
59 Nivedita Menon, Seeing like a Feminist (Zubaan, India with Penguin UK 2012). 
60 <ĂůƉĂŶĂ<ĂŶŶĂďŝƌĂŶ ? ‘Judicial Meanderings in Patriarchal Thickets: Litigating Sex Discrimination in 
/ŶĚŝĂ ? (2009) XLIV Economic and Political Weekly. 
61 ^ƌŝŵĂƚŝ ĂƐƵ ?  ‘Judges of Normality: Mediating Marriage in the Family Courts of Kolkata, India ?
(2012) 37 Signs. 
62 For a nuanced critique of the role of judges in family law, see ibid, Srimati Basu, The Trouble with 
Marriage - Feminists Confront Law and Violence in India (University of California Press 2015). In some 
instances such as cases on succession laws, scholars have pointed out that judges attempt to bridge 
ancient Hindu traditions with modern legal principles, creating a new and egalitarian rhetoric. For a 
more detailed discussion on this, see PP Saxena,  ‘^ƵĐĐĞƐƐŝŽŶ>ĂǁƐĂŶĚ'ĞŶĚĞƌ:ƵƐƚŝĐĞ ? ŝŶƌĐŚĂŶĂ
Parashar and Amita Dhanda (eds) (Routledge 2008). 
63 More on this in Chapter 6. 
64 Nivedita Menon, Recovering Subversion - Feminist Politics Beyond the Law (Permanent Black 2004). 
65 For a detailed analysis on this, see Chapter 6. 
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policy and legislation, very few engage with caselaw in their analysis. There 
exists virtually no scholarship on Hindu custody law, especially by way of case 
law analysis. My original contribution to this literature is that I strengthen this 
body of literature by way of caselaw analysis in a hitherto unexplored area of 
law. ,EXLOGRQWKHIHPLQLVWV·DUJXPHQWWKDWWKH+LQGXFRGHVKRXOGQRWIRUP
the basis for the UCC, as it is evident from my caselaw analysis that the 
application of law in judicial reasoning has gendered undertones, while being 
ostensibly perceived to be neutral. 
I use some of the threads of feminist theory that I have discussed in this 
section - gendering of roles in the Hindu family and disparate treatment of 
men and women within Hindu families ² in my analysis of case law in 
subsequent chapters. I make an important contribution to existing theory by 
demonstrating how its arguments are valid in analysing judicial reasoning, as 
I demonstrate in chapters 4, 5 and 6. In the next sub-section, I provide an 
example of the case of property ownership in Hindu Law, to explain how Hindu 
legislation exhibits a differential treatment based on gender and why it is 
necessary to explore this treatment, in the interest of gender justice. 
1.3.3 Gender Asymmetry ² Example of Property Ownership in Hindu Law 
Many Indian legal feminists claim that the conjugal family systems in Hindu 
ODZFRQVWUXFWDVXERUGLQDWHSRVLWLRQDVZHOODVLGHQWLW\IRUZRPHQ:RPHQ·V
interests are considered legitimate only in terms of community or familial 
interests and not as individual interests. In such a system, the role of women 
and their economic entitlements are determined only by four basic factors ² 
title, fault, need and contribution.66 This meant that a woman who is a 
homemaker did not have a value of her own and was commonly treated as 
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the property or chattel of her husband, while the husband was entitled to own 
independent property. She was entitled to property only by default, in the 
event of her being widowed or divorced. However, while she did not have the 
right to claim financial resources during her marriage, she was provided the 
right of maintenance by law. This implied that she needed to walk out of the 
marriage to be able to seek legal recourse to financial remedies while she was 
powerless if she stayed within her marriage. Moreover, the Hindu woman did 
not obtain property rights or maintenance automatically, if she obtained 
custody of her children. She had to sue separately for maintenance under the 
Criminal Procedure Code. More importantly, her rights over marital property 
is virtually non-existent as there is no legislation governing rights of a Hindu 
woman over marital property post-divorce.67 Thus, the right to property and 
right to maintenance are outside the purview of the HMGA and involve 
separate claims or suits. Here, I specifically provide the example of property 
rights of the Hindu woman to explain the disparate and gendered treatment 
in law.  
Property was envisaged in law as a set of relationships of belonging that are 
interlinked to the space and gender hierarchies.68 With the codification and 
enforcement of laws in the Hindu code, it came to follow that the morality of 
marriage was closely linked to economic claims, an argument that has been 
iterated by many Indian feminist scholars. I utilise this theoretical perspective 
                                                             
 
67 The right over marital property is virtually non-ĞǆŝƐƚĞŶƚŝŶ/ŶĚŝĂ ?ƐZW>ƐŽƌŝƚƐƐĞĐƵůĂƌůĂǁƐ ?ĂƐƚŚĞ
ĐŽŶĐĞƉƚŽĨ ‘ŵĂƌŝƚĂůĂƐƐĞƚƐ ?ĚŽĞƐŶŽƚĞǆŝƐƚŝŶ/ŶĚŝĂŶĨĂŵŝůǇůĂǁũƵƌŝƐƉƌƵĚĞŶĐĞ ?/ŶƚŚĞĞǀĞŶƚŽĨĚŝǀŽƌĐĞ ?
the wife or husband has no claim on the property of the other, irrespective of their religious 
affiliation. Under Sec.24 and Sec.25 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1956, permanent alimony and 
maintenance can be claimed by either spouse, in the event of not having a permanent source of 
income.   Under the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, a woman can make claims as a daughter, widow or 
widowed daughter-in-law over coparcenary property. Equal rights for Hindu women over 
coparcenary property was well-established only by way of the Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act, 
2005. However, this Act does not cover the rights of divorced Hindu women. 
68 sŝũĂǇĂ EĂŐĂƌĂũĂŶĂŶĚƌĐŚĂŶĂ WĂƌĂƐŚĂƌ ?  ‘DǇƌŽƚŚĞƌ ?Ɛ<ĞĞƉĞƌ PZĞŐƵůĂƚŝŽŶŽĨ ƚŚĞ ƌŽƚŚĞƌ WSister 
Relationship in the Religious Personal Laws of India ?  ? ? ? ? ? )  ? ?^ŽƵƚŚƐŝĂ P:ŽƵƌŶĂůŽĨ^ŽƵƚŚƐŝĂŶ
Studies. 
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for making a sub-argument on economic advantage within the Hindu family 
in subsequent chapters. Here, I explain how there is a gendered treatment that 
provides economic advantage to Hindu men, by using the example of 
property ownership in Hindu law. 
While the reforms in Hindu law attempted to manage diverse and competing 
expectations at several levels,69 they are not entirely successful in addressing 
the questions of gender parity within the family.  The notion of individual 
property ownership in the Hindu Code views property as a social relation and 
gendered access to property is located within the family system.70 Moreover, 
the patriarchal thrust on lineage and property systems is undeterred by the 
codification of Hindu law. For instance, under Hindu law, daughters have an 
HTXDOVKDUHLQWKHIDWKHU·VSURSHUW\RQSDUZLWKVRQV+RZHYHUPRVWIDPLOLHV
do not include daughters in the division of family property on the grounds of 
providing them adequate dowry at the time of their marriages. The domestic 
space of the Hindu family is considered as shared, irrespective of sharing of 
ownership or equality in relationships.71 The unequal power relationships in 
the domestic domain tend to increase vulnerability of women as they are 
forced to remain in relationships for want of adequate resources to ensure 
their independence. While family is thought to be an institution that 
conventionally worked on altruism72, this claim is proved incorrect due to the 
increase in gendered vulnerability and differential privileges in the Hindu 
family.  
                                                             
 
69 WerneƌDĞŶƐŬŝ ? ‘Slumdog Law, Colonial Tummy Aches and the Redefinition of Family Law in India ?
(2010) 30 Sage. 
70 Archana Parashar, Women and Family Law Reform in India (Sage Publications Pvt Ltd, New Delhi 
1992). 
71 <ĂůƉĂŶĂ<ĂŶŶĂďŝƌĂŶ ? ‘^ŽĐŝŽůŽŐǇŽĨĂƐƚĞĂŶĚƚŚĞƌŽŽŬĞĚDŝƌƌŽƌ PZĞĐŽǀĞƌŝŶŐZŵďĞĚŬĂƌ ?Ɛ>ĞŐĂĐǇ ?
[2009] Economic and Political Weekly. 
72 WƌĂĚĞĞƉWĂŶĚĂĂŶĚŝŶĂŐĂƌǁĂů ? ‘DĂƌŝƚĂůsŝŽůĞŶĐĞ ?,ƵŵĂŶĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶƚĂŶĚtŽŵĞŶ ?ƐWƌŽƉĞƌƚǇ
Status in India ? ? ? ? ? ? ) ? ?tŽƌůĚĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶƚ ? 
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Due to the traditional social structure that emphasises caste and religious 
identities, women in Hindu families are closely tied to their community and 
religious identities. In a patriarchal society like India, women tend to have a 
notion of secondary citizenship, identity and belonging, as they are placed in 
positions that are secondary or subservient to men.73 As citizenship and 
familial membership is split along gendered lines, it has led to social 
discrimination of women, regulation of sexuality and construction of 
gendered identities to govern the female half of the population differently. 
Within the Hindu family, these identities are delineated along clear hierarchies 
and economic control, favouring males. From this example of property 
ownership in Hindu law, we can infer that there exists a disparate treatment in 
Hindu law, based on gender. Such imbalances reinforce the case for the need 
to rectify this asymmetry of treatment of gender in law. I use this example here 
to highlight why it is necessary to employ the theoretical perspectives that I 
have adopted in this thesis, viz., how gender works in Hindu law (and how law 
works to produce gender) as well as the need to explore this disparate 
treatment of gender in law.  In the next section, I focus on the key themes, 
arguments and research questions that I explore in this thesis.   
1.4 Key Themes, Arguments and Questions 
In this section, I appraise the key themes and arguments of this thesis, which 
emerge from my case analysis. Each of these themes corresponds to one of 
the subsequent substantive chapters in my thesis. I advance my key themes 
and arguments to address the following research questions ² 
1. How have judges engaged with gender and gender roles in the custody 
cases decided from 2000 to 2014, under the Hindu Minority and  
                                                             
 
73 Rajeswari Sunder Rajan, The Scandal of the State - Women, Law and Citizenship in Postcolonial 
India (Duke University Press 2003). 
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2. Guardianship Act, 1956?74 
3. How have judges conceptualised the Hindu woman in the cases under 
study? 
4. How does judicial reasoning on gender roles impact/inform the 
feminist debates on RPLs? Based on judicial reasoning in the cases 
under study, can the Hindu code be used as a blueprint for the UCC? 
I now elaborate on the themes associated with each of these questions below. 
1.4.1 Judicial Reasoning on Gender and Gender Roles 
The first theme of my analysis is the MXGJHV· interpretative engagement on 
gender and gender roles in the Hindu family, which I discuss in detail in 
Chapter 4. The upper courts (under study here) often tend to emphasise the 
widely-held social norms, as the judges are mostly a product of the society 
from which they emerge.75 The gender-neutral citizen-subject of the Indian 
Constitution is frequently interpreted in gendered ways in these judgments. 
The common approach adopted by the judges is to employ protectionism 
towards gender difference in these judgments, as I explain in Chapter 4 later.76 
Women are often viewed as being subordinate to men. They are perceived to 
be weaker and in need of protection of their bodies and rights. The judges 
interpret the state to be in the position of protectors of women, thereby 
emphasising the difference between genders as well as perpetuating these 
differences. While there exists the fiction of the gender-neutral citizen-subject 
in law, latent gender norms are reified in judicial reasoning.  
                                                             
 
74 For a detailed discussion on the period of study, viz., 2000  W 2014, see Chapter 2. 
75 For a detailed discussion on this, see Leila Seth, Talking of Justice - WĞŽƉůĞ ?ƐZŝŐŚƚƐŝŶDŽĚĞƌŶ/ŶĚŝĂ 
(Aleph Book Company 2014), ^ƌŝŵĂƚŝĂƐƵ ? ‘Judges of Normality: Mediating Marriage in the Family 
Courts of Kolkata, India ? ? ? ? ? ? ) ? ?^ŝŐŶƐ. 
76 Throughout my thesis, I use ƚŚĞƚĞƌŵ ‘ƉƌŽƚĞĐƚŝŽŶŝƐŵ ?to refer to the practice of shielding Hindu 
women, by interpreting their roles within families along normative notions of womanhood and 
motherhood and by considering them as a weaker sex that needs protection from men.  
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In the cases I analyse, the judges attempt to explain and delineate the 
relationship between these women and their families. For instance, in the case 
of Githa Hariharan, they adopt the Constitutional principle of equality and 
strive to treat women as citizen-subjects.77 I argue that in doing so, they adopt 
a protectionist stance on gender difference. I build on the above arguments 
to demonstrate how gendered norms get normalised in judicial reasoning and 
judges attempt to construct a one-size-fits-all model of womanhood and 
motherhood for all women, without considering their background or diverse 
situations. There is a conscious attempt at creating a unitary ¶solution· for a 
plural condition. I argue that it is evident from this case and others, that many 
judges view gender as a category in the Constitutional checklist for equality, 
rather than being a different approach to interpretation of laws. As a result, 
there emerges a tension between normative notions upheld in the judgments 
under study and the modern notion of rights provided by the Constitution. In 
the next section, I explain how the judges tend to use the trope of the Elite 
Dependent to ease this tension, without considering how this stance obstructs 
gender justice and that this approach is inherently premised on entrenched 
gender norms.  
Further, I analyse the use of the welfare principle in judicial reasoning. While 
the judges are careful to premise their reasoning on welfare while deciding 
custody of children, it emerges from the cases that they often premise welfare 
on the economic or material advantages provided by one parent. As the father 
in the Hindu family usually emerges as the financially capable parent, this 
HFRQRPLF DGYDQWDJH WHQGV WR WLS WKH VFDOHV LQ WKH IDWKHU·V IDYRXU LQ PRVW
                                                             
 
77 Githa Hariharan v. Reserve Bank of India (1999) (2) SCC 228. This case is the starting point of my 
analysis and provides a good example of the tension found in judicial reasoning between the 
Constitutional ideal of gender equality and underlying gendered notions. For a discussion on why this 
is the point of origin of my case analysis, see Chapter 2. For a detailed analysis of this case, see Chapter 
4. 
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instances. This, along with the provisions of Sec. 6(a) of HMGA, provides the 
father with an edge over the mother. Moreover, judicial reasoning tends to 
favour providing custody of girl children to their mothers and boy children to 
their father, while justifying this gender-based reasoning to be in the best 
interests of the child. I argue that though the welfare principle appears to be 
even-handed at first glance, it is hijacked from its child-centric focus by the 
inherent gendered norms in judicial reasoning. 
1.4.2 The Construction of the Elite Dependent 
To denote the group of upper middle-class Hindu women who appear in 
majority cases under discussion as parties to the suit, I have introduced the 
FDWHJRU\RI´(OLWHDHSHQGHQWµ78 7KHWHUP´(OLWHµLQGLFDWHVWKDWWKHVHZRPHQ 
have the advantage of privilege, in comparison to other Indian women from 
the marginalised classes. There is a presumption of an affluent background 
and access to higher education for this group, as it comes from the upper 
middle-class society. Moreover, as the judgments under study are appeals to 
the High Courts or the Supreme Court of India, which are the highest courts 
of the land, it is safe to premise that most of these women have access to 
expensive legal representation. This premise is strengthened by the fact that 
none of the parties in these cases were represented by Amicus Curiae. I have 
used the term ¶dependent· in the literal sense, to imply the subsidiary position 
held by these Hindu women, in comparison to Hindu men. The construction 
of the Elite Dependent in judicial reasoning forms the theme of my analysis in 
Chapter 5. I argue that this construction rests on normative notions of gender 
                                                             
 
78 dŚŝƐŝƐƚĞƌŵŝƐŝŶƐƉŝƌĞĚďǇƚŚĞƚĞƌŵ “ůŝƚĞSƵďĂůƚĞƌŶ ?ƵƐĞĚďǇ Purnima Bose, to denote the category 
of the colonial subject who was elite compared to compatriots but subaltern in the relationship with 
the colonial master. As the term  ‘ƐƵďĂůƚĞƌŶ ?ŚĂƐĂƐƐŽĐŝĂƚŝŽŶƐǁŝƚŚƉŽƐƚ-colonial literature which is not 
a lens used in this thesis, I have modified the term and evolved a new category of Hindu women 
constructed by the judicial reasoning in the judgments under study (Purnima Bose, Organizing 
Empire: Individualism, Collective Agency, and India (Duke University Press 2003). 
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norms, which is reflected in the reasoning employed in the judgments. This 
category symbolises the disproportionate treatment in gender relations and 
reflects the nature of gender relations within the Hindu family. 
As I explained earlier, Indian feminists claim that the Hindu family is premised 
on gender difference and economic control, as it hides the nature of economic 
advantage provided to the male members of the family at the cost of its 
female members. Women are viewed as economic dependents rather than 
asset generators in this family. In those instances, in which women have 
economic advantage, they manage to obtain better leverage for negotiating 
the family spaces. However, I am confining this observation to the category of 
the Elite Dependent, as the judgments under study do not reflect the reality 
of lived experiences of all women in India.  
As seen earlier, the Elite Dependent, who is educated but retained traditional 
values, became the blueprint for normative womanhood in the Hindu code.79 
So, according to the judges, how does this ideal woman behave? She is the 
homemaker who cares for the house (cooking, cleaning, and deploying all 
other skills needed to ensure a smooth running of a household) and provides 
physical comforts for her husband as well as his family. Upon the birth of her 
children, she cares for their physical and emotional well-being, and it is the 
responsibility of her husband to provide for them financially. While she may 
be educated, and have a career of her own, she puts the interest of her family 
first. As a wife and mother, she is always willing to sacrifice her comforts and 
her career for the sake of her husband and children.   
Thus, this norm of womanhood and motherhood is used as the standard 
against which all others are measured. Any violation of this gendered role is 
                                                             
 
79 More on this in Chapter 3. 
31 | P a g e  
 
considered socially deviant behaviour.80 Such a woman is the fulcrum of her 
family and if she fails in her role as a respectable woman and mother, it could 
result in the breaking of established family structures. I argue that this view on 
gendered roles is adopted by the judges in their reasoning in the cases under 
study. Further, I argue that the notion of the Elite Dependent is often used by 
the judges to resolve the tension between equality provided to the unmarked 
citizen of the Indian Constitution and protectionism accorded to women.  
1.4.3 Gendering of Law 
As I explained in Section 1.3, my focus in this thesis is on how gender is treated 
in Hindu custody law and how judicial reasoning in the cases under this law 
work to produce gender. While the Constitution of India guarantees the right 
to equality to all citizens irrespective of caste, religion or sex, the rights of the 
middle-class Hindu women in their marriages and families are mostly not on 
par with their male counterparts. This is not context-specific to India, but it 
does highlight the economic vulnerability and disparity experienced by 
women, especially those trapped in abusive marriages. However, the thrust of 
my thesis is not on the notion of rights or the concept of equality. Rather, I 
focus on the disparity of treatment between parents in judicial reasoning and 
argue that this disparity is caused due to normative ideas of gender inherent 
in judicial reasoning. While I have used the concept of equality in some 
instances, this is with a view to contrast it with disparate treatment of gender 
in the cases. Further, I use the idea of equality in my critique of judicial 
reasoning in the cases to point out that while the reasoning claims to be based 
on an ideal of equality, it is premised on disparate notions of gender. I use the 
concept of equality for contrast and critique, but my concentration is on 
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disparate treatment. I have used thHWHUP¶JHQGHUSDULW\·LQPRVWSODFHVLQWKLV
thesis to indicate this disparity, rather than equality. 
As I explained earlier, I focus on normative notions that underlie how judges 
view gender roles within families. This reasoning does not account for fluidity 
of gender or gender roles and operates on preconceived biases and 
perceptions about gender. Moreover, this type of reasoning is unfair and 
unjust to all who are subject to it, irrespective of their gender, as it tends to 
confine them in rigidly structured categories. So, my argument is that this type 
of reasoning, involving normative ideas, views gender disparately and creates 
a gendered hierarchy within families. I focus on how judicial reasoning works 
to produce a certain construction of gender roles, by way of my caselaw 
analysis in Chapters 4 and 5.  
The common thread that runs across my thesis is the question of how gender 
works in law, especially the area of law I analyse in these cases. While 
unpacking how gender works in this area of law, I simultaneously analyse the 
consequences of this line of questioning on religious personal laws in India. 
The third and final theme of my analysis focuses on how the inherently 
gendered interpretation of Hindu custody law by the courts impacts gender 
relations in personal laws at the level of theory and practice, which I explain in 
detail in Chapter 6. I analyse the relationship between judicial reasoning and 
feminist positions on RPLs in that chapter. I argue that judicial reasoning 
privileges normative definitions of gender roles over gender equality, thereby 
proving the feminist claim that law is gendered. At the level of legislation, this 
impacts the formulation of a UCC, as such reasoning would be an impediment 
to gender justice. 
As seen from the subsections above, the central argument I make in this thesis 
is that judges in the child custody cases under study tend to impose a one-
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size-fits-all idea of motherhood and womanhood upon the women who knock 
on the doors of appellate courts for custody disputes. Judicial reasoning 
HPSOR\HGLQWKHVHFDVHVUHVRUWVWRWKHXVHRIWKHWURSHRI¶(OLWH'HSHQGHQW· 
to resolve the tension between gender equality provided in the Indian 
Constitution and protectionism of women. Moreover, judicial reasoning tends 
to use normative ideas on gender and gender roles to hijack the child-centric 
welfare principle provided in the HMGA. 
In my substantive chapters (Chapters 4 to 6) that follow, I first analyse judicial 
reasoning on gender, especially gender roles in the family, and the welfare 
principle. I demonstrate that the judicial reasoning exhibits areas of friction 
between disparate treatment of gender and gender equality. I argue that the 
judges try to reconcile this friction, by using protectionism to explain the 
disparate treatment. I then analyse how the judges design and define the Elite 
Dependent in the cases under study, especially with respect to gender roles 
within the family. Further, I demonstrate that the judicial interpretation is 
premised on normative ideas on gender roles and I argue that this bias is 
instrumental for a disparate treatment between men and women in judicial 
reasoning in these cases. Finally, I formulate how such gendered 
interpretations may upset the UCC apple cart, if the Hindu code is adopted as 
a blueprint for the UCC. In the following chapters, I undertake a detailed 
analysis of the above elements of the cases under study to answer my research 
questions. In the next section, I have provided an overview of the outlines of 
further chapters by detailing the arguments and discussions in each of them. 
1.5 Chapter Outlines 
In the next chapter, I elaborate on the methodology adopted by me for 
analysis of case law used in this thesis. I provide an insight into the process of 
choosing and studying the cases and the themes that emerged from them. I 
also elaborate on my approaches and a few limitations that I encountered 
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during this process. In the third chapter, I describe how colonial intervention 
created a certain ideal of the Hindu middle-class woman and how it 
introduced gender as an axis of analysis for the Hindu family. I then explain 
KRZWKHQDWLRQDOLVWDQGZRPHQ·VPRYHPHQWDOWHUHGWKHSHUFHSWLRQVRI WKH
Hindu family. I locate the origins of the Hindu code and discuss how certain 
colonial perceptions were carried over to the Hindu code. I then explain the 
FRGH·VIRUPXODWLRQDQGHYROXWLRQZLWKVSHFLDOUHIHUHQFHWRWKH8&&GHEDWHV
In the fourth chapter, I elaborate on the judgment of Githa Hariharan and 
examine how gender norms and gender equality are perceived in this 
judgment. I then analyse how the welfare principle is conceived in the judicial 
reasoning in the cases under study. I argue that there is a latent notion of 
economic advantage, premised on gender, which is evident in judicial 
reasoning.   
In the fifth chapter, I further the case analysis, with special reference to the 
Hindu family. I analyse how judicial reasoning on gender roles within the 
Hindu family, is constructed along normative ideals. I then analyse how the 
figure of the Elite Dependent is constructed by judicial reasoning in the cases 
under study, leading to a disproportionate treatment based on gender. In the 
sixth chapter, I analyse the relation between gendered nature of judicial 
reasoning and UCC debates in India, by appraising the arguments on personal 
laws and UCC made by feminist legal scholarship in India. I then use this 
analysis to argue that judicial reasoning, which is premised on normative 
formulations of gender, impact gender justice in the UCC. In the concluding 
chapter, I reflect on some aspects of my case analysis and scholarship. Finally, 
I outline the trajectory for further research. 
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Chapter 2 - Methodology of Case Law Analysis 
2.1 Introduction 
In Chapter 1, I explained the choice of Hindu law as my area of research and 
the key themes, arguments and questions I address in my thesis. In this 
chapter, I examine the parameters I used to analyse the custody cases under 
study. Firstly, I demonstrate how these choices came about in my research 
journey and explain the method underpinning my case law analysis. Secondly, 
I explore how my key themes and research questions emerged from my case 
analysis. Thirdly, I elaborate on why these cases can be taken as indicators of 
differential and gendered treatment of parents in judicial reasoning. This 
chapter highlights the methodological contribution of my thesis to feminist 
scholarship in India in general, and to specific debates on Indian personal laws.  
I begin this chapter by explaining the evolution of my research project. In the 
following section, I set out the research design and the method I adopted to 
analyse 200 cases decided under Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act 
(HMGA), 1956. In the next section, I elaborate on the process of my case 
analysis by explaining how I sorted and organised the cases into themes. 
Further, I discuss my personal position as a researcher and the advantages and 
limitations of such a position. In the concluding section, I provide an overview 
of the chapter as well as some benefits of the process of case law analysis that 
I evolved for my research. 
2.2 The Paths Travelled 
While I had practised in family law courts at an early stage of my career, my 
research interest in custody law began during the time I worked on my 
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0DVWHUV·WKHVLV81 At that time, I had separated from my ex-husband and had 
to leave my child behind. There was much stigma attached to me as the ¶bad 
mother· who abandoned her child. I contemplated on the nature of 
motherhood and the labelling of good and bad mothers that existed in social 
standards. As a student of law, I wanted to explore how these standards 
DSSHDUHGLQ OHJDOUHDVRQLQJ6RP\0DVWHUV·GLVVHUWDWLRQIRFXVHGRQ/HJDO
Parenthood in Hindu law.  I explored questions of gender equality that existed 
in Hindu law using notions of relational equality. But I was unable to obtain 
satisfactory insights from the literature on equality, as my lived experiences 
repeatedly reinforced that there was no such ideal of equality in real life in 
India. This process raised some questions for me, especially in terms of 
methodologies and frameworks of research. I began to question if it is 
appropriate to use a single frame of reference for the Indian condition, 
considering its diversity and plurality and whether equality was a good lens to 
adopt for research on Hindu law. Moreover, while India is very diverse in every 
sphere and it was impossible to generalise any idea to its entire population, 
the existing laws attempt just such an exercise.82 While I explored questions 
of equality and subjecthood in Hindu custody law for my MA dissertation, I 
was convinced that there is a need to look at this body of law from a different 
angle, using approach(es) suitable for its study. 
In the final semester of my MA, one of my courses was on the philosophy of 
science and some of my readings included the works of Donna Haraway and 
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Humanities. This programme was from August 2011 to May 2013 and consisted of 4 semesters. It was 
loosely based on the model of U.S. Liberal Arts programmes and provided a lot of scope for 
interdisciplinary research and writing. I separated from my ex-husband and child in 2012, in the 
ŵŝĚĚůĞŽĨƚŚŝƐƉƌŽŐƌĂŵŵĞ ? /ǁƌŽƚĞŵǇŵĂƐƚĞƌƐ ? ƚŚĞƐŝƐŶƉƌŝů  W May 2013, a period in which my 
experiences as a student and my personal experiences as a parent converged to produce my MA 
dissertation. 
82 The famous economist, Joan Robinson, said that ͞The frustrating thing about India is that whatever 
ǇŽƵĐĂŶƌŝŐŚƚůǇƐĂǇĂďŽƵƚ/ŶĚŝĂ ?ƚŚĞŽƉƉŽƐŝƚĞŝƐĂůƐŽƚƌƵĞ ? ?ĂƐƋƵŽƚĞĚďǇŚĞƌƐƚƵĚĞŶƚŵĂƌƚǇĂ^ĞŶ ?
(ŵĂƌƚǇĂ^ĞŶ ? ‘Contrary India ? ?The Economist, 2005), accessed 20 September 2017). 
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6DQGUD+DUGLQJ+DUDZD\·VDUJXPHQWVRQVLWXDWHGNQRZOHGJH83 DQG+DUGLQJ·V
DUJXPHQWVRQZRPHQ·VYRLFHVDQGVXEMectivity in research84 made me reflect 
RQ WKH LPSRUWDQFH RI ZRPHQ·V H[SHULHQFHV DQG VRFLDO ORFDWLRQV WR WKH
production of feminist epistemology. From my further research on standpoint 
theory, I understood that due to its very definition and nature, it could be used 
DV DQ ´HSLVWHPRORJ\ PHWKRGRORJ\ DQGRU SROLWLFDO VWUDWHJ\µ85 Standpoint 
theory focuses primarily on certain positions such as knowledge is socially 
situated and that research on socially marginalised groups, especially in terms 
of relations of power, would contribute to improving both knowledge and 
methodology. My understanding of standpoint theory was that it is a chair in 
which one sits and everything that iV ZLWKLQ YLHZ FRQWULEXWHG WR RQH·V
standpoint. Of course, the flip side was that one did not see the chair one is 
sitting on. While standpoint theory has its fair share of critique,86 I focus on 
how it argues that our experiences and our social location shape our view of 
the world.87 Moreover, Hindu law treats all Hindu women as a monolithic 
category with the same rights, without looking at the urban/rural, 
educated/illiterate or upper/lower class divides, not to mention divisions of 
caste, all of which are important axes of analysis. Due to this, standpoint theory 
suited the monolithic nature of Hindu law, as it does not address difference 
                                                             
 
83 ŽŶŶĂ:,ĂƌĂǁĂǇ ? ‘^ŝƚƵĂƚĞĚ<ŶŽǁůĞĚŐĞƐ PdŚĞ^ĐŝĞŶĐĞYƵĞƐƚŝŽŶŝŶ&ĞŵŝŶŝƐŵĂƐĂ^ŝƚĞŽĨŝƐĐŽƵƌƐĞ
ŽŶƚŚĞWƌŝǀŝůĞŐĞŽĨWĂƌƚŝĂůWĞƌƐƉĞĐƚŝǀĞ ? ? ? ? ? ? ) ? ?&ĞŵŝŶŝƐƚ^ƚƵĚŝĞƐ ? 
84 Sandra Harding, tŚŽƐĞ ^ĐŝĞŶĐĞ ? tŚŽƐĞ <ŶŽǁůĞĚŐĞ ? dŚŝŶŬŝŶŐ ĨƌŽŵ tŽŵĞŶ ?Ɛ >ŝǀĞƐ (Cornell 
University Press 1991).  
85 Sandra Harding, Introduction: Standpoint Theory as a Site of Political, Philosophic and Scientific 
Debate (Sandra Harding ed, Routledge 2004). 
86 There are several critiques of standpoint theory, especially that it creates a false notion of 
universalism and epistemic relativism. More significantly, it does not address the concept that has 
been key to feminist thinking in the recent past  W difference, especially difference among women. For 
instance, see ^ƵƐĂŶ,ĞŬŵĂŶ ?  ‘Truth and Method: Feminist Standpoint Theory Revisited ?  ? ? ? ? ? )  ? ?
Signs: Journal of Women in Culture & Society. However, Harding argues that it is important to use the 
 “ĚĞĐĞŶƚƌĞĚ ƐƵďũĞĐƚ ŽĨ ŬŶŽǁůĞĚŐĞ ĂŶĚ ŚŝƐƚŽƌǇ ? ŝŶ ĨĞŵŝŶŝƐƚ ƌĞƐĞĂƌĐŚ ?  ?Harding,  ‘/ŶƚƌŽĚƵĐƚŝŽŶ P
^ƚĂŶĚƉŽŝŶƚdŚĞŽƌǇĂƐĂ^ŝƚĞŽĨWŽůŝƚŝĐĂů ?WŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚŝĐĂŶĚ^ĐŝĞŶƚŝĨŝĐĞďĂƚĞ ?). 
87 Judith Lorber, Gender Inequality: Feminist Theory and Politics (Oxford University Press 2010). 
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but tends to promote essentialism or universalism of women as a monolithic 
category. 
My takeaway from standpoint theory is that self-reflexivity could be a good 
methodological approach to my research, as it helps to illuminate my 
experiences as a woman and my position as a researcher and a student of law. 
As Samia Bano argues, stand point is a good method of reconciling personal, 
subjective experiences and research, as the researcher is in the position of the 
researched and understands the dynamics of the relationship.88 For me, the 
important questions at that juncture of my research were - Where am I 
situated in the process of creating this knowledge? How do my experiences 
contribute to this process?  
I began this journey with standpoint theory as my line of enquiry, but I did not 
restrict myself to this theory. While individual experiences produce 
possibilities, they can also reproduce limitations of RQH·V ZRUOGYLHZ 6R ,
wanted to use a combination of approaches to arrive at answers for my 
research questions. Due to my personal experiences, I wanted to understand 
whether judges treated men and women differently under Hindu custody law 
and if yes, how was this treatment different. I then turned to Indian feminist 
literature, which helped me to formulate some ideas about the difference in 
treatment between men and women in Hindu law and about how normative 
ideas on gender roles underlie the perception of society around us. I found 
that women like me, who were urban, middle/upper class and educated, did 
not have a prominent position in this literature. There was limited research 
                                                             
 
88 She argues that stand point theory is useful in feminist research, in which the binaries of 
insider/outsider are destabilised as the researcher is both simultaneously, especially in terms of 
power and hierarchical difference. She has used this argument for her research on Muslim personal 
laws in the UK. (Samia Bano,  ‘^ƚĂŶĚƉŽŝŶƚ ? ? ‘ŝĨĨĞƌĞŶĐĞ ?ĂŶĚ&ĞŵŝŶŝƐƚZĞƐĞĂƌĐŚ (Reza Banakar and Max 
Travers eds, Hart Publishing 2005). Since her area of research is similar to mine, her arguments are 
useful to the subject of my research too. 
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available on this type of women, as most social/legal researchers favoured 
working on marginalised or oppressed women.89  
What the Indian legal feminist literature yielded was that feminist vocabulary 
LQ,QGLDWRRNDWXUQIURP¶ZRPHQ·VLVVXHV·WR¶ULJKWVRIEHLQJDQHTXDOFLWL]HQ·
DQG¶JHQGHUMXVWLFH·GXHWRVHYHUDOVRFLR-political reasons over the decades.90 
This was an attempt to broaden the scope of the conversation without having 
WRGHILQH¶ULJKWV·DWHYHU\VWDJH91 This conversation then shifted to the need 
to examine how women encountered patriarchy in their everyday lives and 
´how patriarchal power is experienced in the minute and dense capillaries of 
IDPLO\DQGVRFLDOOLIHµ92 With this shift, the scholarship then focused on how 
women experience the law in their everyday lives, especially within the family. 
Further, while Indian feminists have held on to a position of a unified notion 
RI ¶ZRPHQ· DV D VLQJXODU FDWHJRU\ KLVWRULFDOO\ WKLV DWWLWXGH FKDQJHG
considerably in  recent years with a rising awareness that there are several 
divides among women such as elite and subordinate, urban and rural, Hindu, 
Christian, Parsi or Muslim as well as upper-caste or Dalit.93 Most Indian 
feminists vigorously questioned the concept of gender equality, asking 
whether unequals can be treated as equals, both in law and in society. It is this 
questioning attitude that I adopt in my analysis of cases in this thesis. As I 
explained in Chapter 1, I do not analyse the concept of equality, rather, I 
                                                             
 
89 For more on this, see ĚŝƚŝDŝƚƌĂ ? ‘To Be or Not to Be a Feminist in India ? ? ? ? ? ? ) ? ?:ŽƵƌŶĂůŽĨtŽŵĞŶ
and Social Work. 
90 More on this in Chapter 6. 
91 S Raju,  ‘dŚĞ/ƐƐƵĞƐĂƚ^ƚĂŬĞ PŶKǀĞƌview of Gender Concerns in Post-/ŶĚĞƉĞŶĚĞŶĐĞ/ŶĚŝĂ ? (1997) 29 
Environment and Planning A. 
92 h<ĂůƉĂŐĂŵ ? ‘Life Experiences, Resistance and Feminist Consciousness ? ? ? ? ? ? ) ?/ŶĚŝĂŶ:ŽƵƌŶĂůŽĨ
Gender Studies. 
93 For a detailed discussion on this, see Tanja Herklotz,  ‘ĞĂĚ>ĞƚƚĞƌƐ෴ ?dŚĞhŶŝĨŽƌŵŝǀŝůŽĚĞƚŚƌŽƵŐŚ
ƚŚĞǇĞƐŽĨƚŚĞ/ŶĚŝĂŶtŽŵĞŶ ?ƐDŽǀĞŵĞŶƚĂŶĚƚŚĞ/ŶĚŝĂŶ^ƵƉƌĞŵĞŽƵƌƚ ? ? ? ? ? ? ) ?^ƺĚĂƐŝĞŶ-Chronik 
- South Asia Chronicle, Hyderabad Anveshi Law Committee,  ‘'ĞŶĚĞƌ :ƵƐƚŝĐĞ KŶůǇ Ă >ĞŐĂů /ƐƐƵĞ ?
WŽůŝƚŝĐĂů^ƚĂŬĞƐŝŶhĞďĂƚĞ ? [1997] Economic and Political Weekly. 
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analyse how the treatment of gender in the cases undermines the idea of 
equal treatment of men and women in judicial reasoning.  
Being a non-custodial parent, custody was and continues to be a topic that 
personally impacts me. Moreover, my experiences in the Family Courts, both 
as a lawyer and as a petitioner, made me aware of disparate treatment based 
on gender. So, I travelled many paths as a middle-class educated Hindu 
woman, lawyer, divorcee, non-custodial parent and a student of law to arrive 
at analysing custody cases in Hindu law. Once I decided that these cases would 
be the basis of my research and the Indian feminist literature would be my 
framework, I studied the Acts under Hindu law to identify which of them were 
suitable for my research. I found that the Hindu Minority and Guardianship 
Act (HMGA) dealt exclusively with custody questions in Hindu law. What was 
significant about my choice of cases was that this legislation or body of case 
law had not been analysed or theorised by others. This was (and continues to 
be) a niche area in which there is virtually no scholarship. I found just one 
article that was written on the custody aspect of religious personal laws in 
general.94 Apart from this article, no other academic source existed on these 
cases. Both in terms of my choice of legislation, as well as caselaw analysis, 
this would be a unique and pioneering project, prompting me to choose case 
law under HMGA as my area of investigation. I wanted to evaluate if an 
analysis of custody cases could provide collective insight drawn from judicial 
opinions and this was the starting point of my research into these cases. 
                                                             
 
94 This article, written by Asha Bajpai (ƐŚĂĂũƉĂŝ ? ‘Custody and Guardianship of Children in India ?
(2005) 39 Family Law Quarterly), discusses custody and guardianship from the angle of the child and 
focuses on cases prior to 2000 mostly. Moreover, it is not confined to Hindu Law and cuts across the 
spectrum to other RPLs too. 
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2.3 Research Design and Methods Used 
While I discuss the methods and process of case analysis in greater detail in 
the next section, I have provided an overview of my research design and 
approaches here. In this section, I explain how I analysed a socially constructed 
reality of which I am a part, against the backdrop of my professional and 
personal experiences, using certain approaches. My personal experience 
served as an entry point into my research and it helped to direct my line as 
well as method of enquiry. This in turn led to the formulation of theory from 
the cases I studied. The below diagram is a pictorial representation of my 
research paradigm.  
 
Figure 1 - Research Paradigm 
The objectives of my research were two-fold ² theoretical and practical. At the 
level of theory, I wanted to explore the judicial vocabulary on gender in Hindu 
custody law. I examined Indian feminist legal scholarship to understand what 
is known about the relationship between gender and judicial reasoning and 
to identify the gaps in that knowledge. Using this, I arrived at a framework of 
questioning how the judges constructed the Hindu woman in Hindu custody 
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law, especially in the role of a mother. At a practical level, I analysed the judicial 
interpretation of gender differences in the custody cases, in relation to 
religious personal laws and the formulation of a Uniform Civil Code in India. 
In Chapter 1, I elaborated on the key themes and arguments I address in my 
thesis. To address these themes and arguments, I advanced the following 
research questions ² 
1. How have judges engaged with gender and gender roles in the custody 
cases decided from 2000 to 2014, under the Hindu Minority and 
Guardianship Act, 1956?  
2. How have judges conceptualised the Hindu woman in the cases under 
study? 
3. How does judicial reasoning on gender roles impact/inform the 
feminist debates on RPLs? Based on judicial reasoning in the cases 
under study, can the Hindu code be used as a blueprint for the UCC? 
Question 1 and Question 2 both emerged directly from, and are answered by, 
the sample of cases analysed (These questions are elaborately discussed in 
Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 respectively). I explain the process of how these 
questions emerged from the case analysis, later in this chapter. From the case 
analysis, I generated a theory of how judicial reasoning is gendered in custody 
cases. Question 3 (addressed extensively in Chapter 6) emerged as a practical 
application of that theory to a crucial contemporary development in the field 
of Indian personal laws: the formulation of a Uniform Civil Code. The process 
I explain in this chapter pertains to the first two research questions and does 
not engage with the third research question. The third research question 
evolved by taking the case law analysis a step further, using the perspectives 
of both theory and application of law. For this question, I used my case law 
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analysis and the work of Indian legal feminist scholars to address the practical 
implications that arise out of my first two research questions. 
Gender is the central category of analysis in my research, in line with some 
feminist approaches.95 I examined how the judges have explained or defined 
gender and gender roles in these cases. I focused on discussions of gender 
and parental roles in the judgments, to ascertain the nature of gendered 
relations in judicial reasoning. Further, I analysed how these discussions have 
been rooted in normative ideas of womanhood and motherhood, while the 
judges attempted to balance it with gender equality. I explored the areas of 
disparate treatment between men and women in these judgments, to 
ascertain if there was a gender bias inherent in judicial reasoning.  
While this is my broad approach to the thesis, I adopted what can loosely be 
termed as a grounded theory approach96 of developing an explanation to 
understand a situation from the material in the cases themselves. I explored 
the research questions with an open mind. I initially used broad, open-ended 
questions and let the ideas and themes emerge from the cases. Once I 
classified the cases based on themes that emerged from them initially (more 
on this in the next section), I unpacked them in greater detail subsequently. I 
conducted a structured analysis of the cases using Excel spreadsheets, for 
which samples are attached in this chapter as well as the appendix. My analysis 
involved aspects such as parties to the case, Acts and legal principles used, 
                                                             
 
95 For more on how gender operates as a category of analysis, see ĞďŽƌĂŚ>ZŚŽĚĞ ? ‘Feminist Critical 
Theories ? ? ? ? ? ? ) ? ?^ƚĂŶĨŽƌĚ>ĂǁZĞǀŝĞǁ ? For an Indian perspective on this, see Brenda Cossman and 
Ratna Kapur, Subversive Sites - Feminist Engagements with Law in India (Sage Publications India Pvt 
Ltd 1996). 
96 For more on a historical perspective on grounded theory, see Kathy Bryant, Antony; Charmaz, 
Grounded Theory in Historical Perspective: An Epistemological Account (Kathy Bryant, Antony; 
Charmaz ed, SAGE Publications 2007). While grounded theory has several positions and arguments 
ǁŝƚŚŝŶ ŝƚ ? / ŚĂǀĞ ĐŚŽƐĞŶ ƚŽ ƵƐĞ ŝƚ ĨƌŽŵ ƚŚĞ ƉĞƌƐƉĞĐƚŝǀĞ ƚŚĂƚ ŝƚ ŽĨĨĞƌƐ ƐĐŽƉĞ ƚŽ  ‘ƚŚŝŶŬ ŽƵƚƐŝĚĞthe 
ƉĂƌĂĚŝŐŵ ? ?ĂƐƌǇĂŶƚĂŶĚŚĂƌŵĂǌĂƌŐƵĞ ?dŚĞƉůƵƌĂůŶĂƚƵƌĞŽĨŵǇĐĂƐĞƐĂƐǁĞůůĂƐƚŚĞ/ŶĚŝĂŶƐŝƚƵĂƚŝŽŶ
needed a theory that enabled me to think outside established or regular theoretical paradigms. 
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outcome of the case and the other bases for decisions. It was this approach 
which led me to formulate the concept of the Elite Dependent, which is my 
original contribution to theory. I explain this further in subsequent sections 
and in Chapter 5. This approach also helped me to identify those instances 
ZKLFK ZHUH ´PRPHQWV RI SRWHQWLDOµ LQ ZKLFK WKH MXGJHV UHDVRQHG DORQJ
gender-just lines, like the case of Chethana Ramatheertha.97 
2.4 Process of Case Analysis 
2.4.1 Case Collection and Initial Selection 
Any researcher who engages in case law analysis can identify with some basic 
questions/issues that arise ²Which are the cases I should choose, Why and 
How many? Also, in which order should I choose the cases? Do I analyse the 
cases first or should I look at the literature?   In this section, I explain how I did 
what I did and why I chose certain ways of looking at the cases, in the process 
of my case analysis. 
After deciding on the area of study, my next step was to start collecting the 
cases that I would require for the study. During a field trip to India, I 
collaborated with the Centre for Law and Policy Research in Bangalore. The 
Centre provided me free access to their databases and this helped me 
immensely, as it was a faster as well as a less expensive method to collect 
cases. I collected the cases over a period of five weeks at the Centre. I worked 
on databases such as Manupatra (a database for Indian legal research) and 
the Judgments Information System that consists of judgments of Supreme 
Court of India and several High Courts (www.judis.nic.in). Initially, I conducted 
a search for cases decided under HMGA exclusively or in conjunction with 
other acts, such as the Guardians and Wards Act, 1890, using key word 
                                                             
 
97 For a detailed discussion of this case, see Chapters 4 and 5. 
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searcKHVVXFKDVDFRPELQDWLRQRI¶+LQGXODZ·DQG¶FXVWRG\·7KHQ,VHDUFKHG
for special references to roles of parents in the cases that dealt with custody 
under Hindu law, so that I could filter the most relevant cases from these 
databases. I wanted to understand how the judges looked at parents and 
whether there was differential treatment based on gender. At the end of this 
exercise, I collected around 470 cases that dealt with custody cases under 
Hindu law and referenced parents. These cases spanned decades and I refer 
to these as my personal database of cases. 
I then focused on deciding: Which are the cases I should choose, why should 
I choose them and how many of them should I choose for my research from 
my personal database? My initial (and broad) research objective was to do a 
historical and political analysis of the circumstances surrounding the cases and 
analyse the impact of these circumstances on the cases. I attempted to 
organise the cases based on a chronological order of decades, from 1950s to 
2010s, upon my return to the UK. However, the sheer number of cases 
dissuaded me from this idea subsequently, as it proved to be a very broad and 
unwieldy attempt at categorisation and analysis. I then decided to explore 
alternative mechanisms for analysis.  
During the time of my research trip, I was simultaneously reading about the 
background of formulation of the Hindu code and the subsequent 
developments and debates in personal laws at that time. The Hindu Right 
played a significant part in this background, especially with their role in the 
co-RSWLRQRIWKH,QGLDQIHPLQLVWV·SRVLWLRQRQWKHIRUPXODWLRQRID8&&$W
that point, India had its general elections and the Hindu Right came to power 
with a majority. During my visit for case collection, I observed that there 
seemed to be a general mood of exhilaration in the country as many Indians 
adopted a majoritarian view of politics. I witnessed this in media reports and 
personal interactions. I was curious to understand the impact of this political 
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trend on gender issues. The party that came to power stated that it was 
interested in formulating a UCC, as a part of its manifesto. These events 
influenced my thinking about my project. While I set out to analyse custody 
cases initially, I then started to look at how my analysis would contribute to 
the UCC debates. 
With the UCC formulation in the background, I then started a process of 
selecting the cases that would be most relevant to connecting the UCC 
formulation to the gender issues I wished to address. After dividing the cases 
on a chronological basis, I used key sections from Hindu Minority and 
Guardianship Act, 1956 (HMGA), to guide my selection. HMGA is a compact 
act consisting of 13 sections. Of these, Section 6 (Father being the natural 
guardian of a Hindu minor) and Section 13 (Welfare principle) were the key 
sections used by the judges, based on which most cases in my personal 
database were decided. I used these sections as the starting point of my 
analysis. Within the 470 cases, about 200 cases spread across decades were 
decided based on these sections and I started analysing these cases. My aim 
was to develop my analysis organically from what the cases were telling me, 
rather than trying to fit them into any existing framework. I did a close and in-
depth reading of these cases to analyse if there are any common themes 
emerging from them.98  
                                                             
 
98 At that point, there were also readings that influenced my approach to the cases. I was inspired by 
ŽƌŽƚŚǇ  ? ^ŵŝƚŚ ?Ɛ ĂŶĂůǇƐŝƐ ŽĨ ĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐĞ ĂƐ Ă ŵĞƚŚŽĚŽĨ ƐƉĞĂŬŝŶŐ ĂŶĚ ĞŶƋƵŝƌǇ ĂŶĚ ŚŽǁ ƐŽĐŝĂů
relations could be penetrated or discovered from within, through textual analysis (Dorothy E Smith, 
Texts, Facts and Femininity - Exploring the Relations of Ruling (Routledge 1990)).The writings of my 
ƐƵƉĞƌǀŝƐŽƌƐǁĞƌĞĂůƐŽŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶƚŝŶĨůƵĞŶĐĞƐĂƚƚŚŝƐũƵŶĐƚƵƌĞ ?ŝĚŝ,ĞƌŵĂŶ ?ƐĂŶĚ^ ƵŚƌĂŝǇĂ:ŝǀƌĂũ ?ƐĐƌŝƚŝĐĂů
and insightful analysis on cases under UK law helped me to formulate my line of enquiry for the cases 
I studied (Didi Herman, An Unfortunate Coincidence: Jews, Jewishness and English Law (Oxford 
University Press 2011), ^ƵŚƌĂŝǇĂ :ŝǀƌĂũ ĂŶĚ ŝĚŝ ,ĞƌŵĂŶ ?  ‘It Is Difficult for a White Judge to 
Understand: Orientalism, Racialisation, and Christianity in English Child Welfare Cases ? ? ? ? ? ? ) ? ?ŚŝůĚ
and Family Law Quarterly, Suhraiya Jivraj, The Religion of Law - ZĂĐĞ ? ŝƚŝǌĞŶƐŚŝƉ ĂŶĚ ŚŝůĚƌĞŶ ?Ɛ
Belonging (Palgrave Macmillan 2013)). Amanda Perry-KeƐƐĂƌŝƐ ?ƐŝŶƐŝŐŚƚƐŽŶƚĞǆƚ ?ĐŽŶƚĞǆƚĂŶĚƐƵď-text 
in adopting a socio-legal approach to international economic law helped me approach my cases from 
the angle of text and sub-text and discover the hidden layers in judicial reasoning (Amanda Perry-
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What emerged from a reading of the cases was that welfare principle was used 
as the paramount legal principle to decide on custody cases under HMGA. 
While the father was considered the natural guardian under HMGA, this was 
not always followed in all cases. Once the custody of the child was disputed, 
it emerged that the Welfare principle became the key factor for deciding 
custody. In the event of a contradiction between Sec. 6(a) and Sec.13, the latter 
superseded the former in judicial reasoning, in most instances. The questions 
on my choice of cases that emerged at this stage continued throughout my 
research until the time of finalising my substantive chapters. I refined my 
choice of cases at every stage of the process, in line with the evolution of my 
research questions.  The selection process underwent further refinement as I 
explain in the following sections. 
2.4.2 Emergence of Themes 
Phase one of my case analysis dealt with developing a thematic classification 
of how parents were treated and how welfare was defined in these cases. In 
all the cases, the welfare of the child was considered as the paramount 
principle for deciding custody of minor children, under HMGA. So, I further 
refined the thematic classification to those pertaining only to parents and 
criteria for welfare. For ease of reference and access, I plotted the cases under 
the following headings on an excel spreadsheet ² cause title, date of decision, 
decade, case facts and comments/quotes from the cases.  I made several 
spreadsheets of data that I have plotted on the cases. A sample of the 
spreadsheet can be seen in Figure 2.99  
                                                             
 
<ĞƐƐĂƌŝƐ ? ‘tŚĂƚŽĞƐ/ƚDĞĂŶƚŽdĂŬĞĂ^ŽĐŝŽ->ĞŐĂůƉƉƌŽĂĐŚƚŽ/ŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůĐŽŶŽŵŝĐ>Ăǁ ? ? ?Socio-
Legal Approaches to International Economic Law - Text, Context, Subtext (Routledge 2013).  
99 I have provided detailed samples of these spreadsheets in Appendix 3. 
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This stage of analysis produced a crucial finding: that a Supreme Court 
judgment in the case of Githa Hariharan100 challenged the social and legal 
convention of gendering of parental roles, by invoking a right of gender 
equality provided in the Indian Constitution. In this case, the Constitutional 
validity of Sec.6 (a) of HMGA was challenged. This section stated that the 
father was the natural guardian of a Hindu minor and the mother came after 
the father. The petitioner claimed that this was in violation of the right to 
equality provision in the Indian Constitution. The Court opined that the 
provisions of the Act do not contravene the Constitution of India as legislative 
intent is to be construed as being in alignment with gender equality found in 
the Constitution ²  
´,W LV ZHOO VHWWOHG WKDW LI RQ RQH FRQVWUXFWLRQ D JLYHQ VWDWXWH ZLOO EHFRPH
unconstitutional, whereas on another construction, which may be open, the 
statute remains within the constitutional limits, the Court will prefer the latter 
on the ground that the Legislature is presumed to have acted in accordance with 
the Constitution and courts generally lean in favour of the constitutionality of 
the statutory provisions."101  
While the father is the natural guardian as provided by Sec. 6(a), the judges 
tend to ignore this provision once the custody of the child was disputed and 
granted custody based on welfare of the child. However, they were unwilling 
to strike down Sec.6 (a) as being unconstitutional, despite this anomaly. The 
Court provided an explanation to reconcile two contradictory positions, using 
the principle of welfare as the basis of its reasoning.  
The important outcome of the Githa Hariharan judgment was that it opened 
the flood gates for discussing gender parity of parents, a concept that did not 
                                                             
 
100 Githa Hariharan v. Reserve Bank of India (1999) (2) SCC 228.  
101 Ibid. 
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exist in cases before. However, a close reading of the judgment produced a 
second important finding: although the Court was addressing gender equality, 
it premised its reasoning on gendered norms. This case was important for my 
analysis as this was the first instance in which the judges spoke of gender 
equality between parents, a criterion that I was focused on exploring. I decided 
to use this case as my starting point because of its reasoning on gender 
equality and parental roles. This insight structured phase two of my case 
analysis, which focused on those cases that used Githa Hariharan as a 
precedent. As this case was decided in 1999, I decided to read the cases in the 
descending order, starting from the most recent. I reasoned that the latest 
cases would be less researched, compared to the older ones, and they would 
also provide better insights about post-liberalisation India.102  
Having addressed the issues of which cases I wished to analyse, why this set 
of cases as well as the order of analysis, I now turned to another important 
question in case law analysis - Do I complete the analysis of cases first or 
should I look at the literature? I decided that I would analyse these cases while 
reading the literature simultaneously. My reasoning was that this process 
would provide me with parallels from both case law and scholarship and I 
would be able to perceive and connect the dots. In the next section, I 
demonstrate the outcome of conducting my case law analysis in conjunction 
with the theoretical perspectives that emerged from the Indian feminist 
scholarship. 
  
                                                             
 
102 India opened its doors to foreign investments and arrival of multinational corporations in 1990. I 
reckoned that the decade after this liberalisation, different trends may emerge in judicial reasoning, 
as the country was open to fresh ideas and possibilities.  













12.05.2008 2000 Appellant and respondent 
had breakdown of 
marriage and were 
fighting for custody of 
only child, Mother 
(Appellant) moved family 
court to be declared lawful 
guardian of minor son and 
to get his custody, Family 
court relied on evidence 
provided by mother and 
awarded her custody, 
father challenged the 
order in High Court, HC 
obtained advice from 
director of psychology and 
wishes of child and set 
aside judgment of family 
court, Mother appealed to 
Supreme Court, Appeal 
dismissed 
´Better financial 
resources or their 
love for the child 
may be one of 
the factors but 
not the sole one, 





as prime concern, 
Father is 
presumed to be 
better suited to 
look after the 
interests of the 
child by statutes 
as he is normally 
the working 
member and 
head of the 
family¬. Child's 
best interest is 
addressed when 
he is with his 
father.µ 














16.01.2009 2000 Father and mother of girl 
child married by Hindu 
law. Mother moved back 
to her parents· home due 
to IDWKHU·Valcohol 
problems, while father 
claims desertion. Mother 
alleged that the father 
forcibly kept the daughter 
in his custody. Mother was 
TV/Film star and in public 
interviews, she did not 
acknowledge the presence 
of her child or that she 
was married. Thorough 
examination of 
counselling records and 
parents· status. Custody 
given to mother, with the 
proviso that if she tries to 
poison the child's mind 
against the father, the 
decision may be reversed. 
´We are 
conscious of the 
emphasis laid by 
the learned 
Counsel for the 
petitioner that 
the lap of a 
mother is the 
natural cradle 
where the safety 
and welfare of 
the child can be 
assured and 
there is no 




court is expected 
to give due 










Figure 2: Sample of first phase of case analysis (Emphasis added to indicate the 
gendered nature of assumptions in the reasoning)
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2.4.3 Postulates and Arguments  
In the second phase of my case analysis, my objective was to ascertain the 
premises on which judicial reasoning was based, and how the judges viewed 
parental roles within Hindu families. I also wished to ascertain if gendered 
hierarchies that existed in families and society at large also existed in the 
MXGJHV·UHDVRQLQJ$ERXWFDVHVGHFLGHGEHWZHHQDQGXVHGGitha 
Hariharan as a precedent and I decided to use these cases to test my 
hypotheses. I examined the reasoning of the judges and the factors that were 
explicitly cited by the judges as the criteria to decide on the welfare of the 
child in the judgments. I identified 58 cases as best illustrations of the 
identified themes and ideas and decided to reference them in the thesis. 
Of these 58 cases, 41 cases involved a custody dispute between the father and 
the mother of the child(ren), i.e. parent vs. parent custody dispute. 13 cases 
referred to a custody dispute between a parent and grandparent(s) of the 
child(ren), i.e. parent vs. grandparent custody case. The remaining 4 cases 
referenced certain aspects of personal laws in India (For instance, the case of 
Shah Bano Begum). Of the 41 parent vs. parent cases, mothers were awarded 
custody in 32 cases, while fathers were awarded custody in 8 cases. In one 
case, which involved the custody of two children, the parents were awarded 
the custody of one child each. While it did appear that mothers were awarded 
custody in their favour in most of the cases, the reasoning for awarding such 
custody was premised on normative notions of gender. However, the welfare 
principle was used as the legal premise for awarding custody and gendered 
UHDVRQLQJ ZDV GLVJXLVHG WR DSSHDU DV VXSSRUWLQJ WKH FKLOGUHQ·V ZHOIDUH 
While women did seem to win custody, the judicial reasoning that led to this 
outcome was premised on archaic and one-size-fits-all notions of 
womanhood and motherhood, rather than gender equality. As I explained 
earlier, the focus of my thesis is the process of judicial reasoning, rather than 
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its outcome. So, it is problematic to consider what might be a favourable result 
when it is premised on gendered reasoning, as the means tend to defeat the 
ends in these cases. 
The gendered premise of judicial reasoning became even more apparent in 
the parent vs. grandparent cases. Of the 13 cases in this category, 
grandparents were awarded custody in 5 cases. What is interesting to note is 
that in all these instances, it was the paternal grandparents who were awarded 
custody against the mother. The father of the child was awarded custody in 5 
cases against the maternal grandparents, out of which 3 cases involved the 
death of the mother of the child, for which the father was directly or indirectly 
accused. In the other two instances, maternal grandparents had brought up 
the child from a very young age and both children were in their early teens. 
Despite this situation, the father of the child was awarded custody in these 
cases. The mother of the child was awarded custody against the paternal 
grandparents in the remaining 3 cases. However, in two of these cases, the 
reasoning was based on the ideals of womanhood and motherhood, as 
envisaged by the judges. It was only one case which exhibited a moment of 
potential where the judges exercised reasoning based on gender parity to 
decide on the custody of the child. This category of cases reinforced the idea 
that it was important to consider the process of how the judges arrived at the 
decision for custody of the child(ren), rather than focus on just the outcome 
of the cases.  
From both sets of cases, I identified that the focus is on the process of judicial 
reasoning in all these cases, rather than the outcome or result of the custody 
dispute. It became evident that reasoning based on normative gender roles 
was not confined to parent vs. parent disputes. In fact, it was more 
pronounced in the parent vs. grandparent disputes. In this category, paternal 
grandparents were provided special treatment, while maternal grandparents 
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did not stand much of a chance to win custody. This underlined that deeply 
entrenched normative ideas of gender were reflected in judicial reasoning. 
Moreover, in these instances, grandparents were standing in loco parentis, in 
the absence, inability or death of a parent. In this sense, they were being 
viewed as substitute parents by the Courts. The reasoning in these cases was 
premised on similar lines of the reasoning in parent vs. parent cases. Since it 
was my focus to study the process of judicial reasoning in these cases, it was 
evident that this process was similar, irrespective of whether parents or 
grandparents were seeking custody of the child(ren). For this reason, I have 
used cases involving parent vs. parent as well as parent vs. grandparent for 
my analysis in Chapters 4 and 5. 
Apart from the above analysis, I specifically examined whether preferential 
treatment was provided to either parent in same or similar circumstances. For 
instance, if it is evident in cases that the parents are equal in terms of 
education, income and/or social standing, do the judges favour one parent 
over the other? If yes, what was their reasoning for providing 
preferential/different treatment of parents? Another point of my examination 
was to analyse whether any gendering or stereotyping of parental roles were 
present in the cases. For instance, I analysed if the mother is treated as the 
caregiver or nurturer and the father is considered as the provider or 
breadwinner in these cases. 
The judgments that I studied cited welfare or best interests of the child as the 
primary basis for making custody decisions. The cases revealed that in many 
instances the welfare principle was premised on material or financial 
circumstances in which the child was raised. This point gave me an important 
link to the argument made by most Indian feminists that all personal laws are 
gender discriminatory. In the body of Indian feminist literature, personal laws 
held a prime position historically. For a long period of time, Indian feminists 
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viewed law as the instrument to deliver gender justice.103 This view altered 
with changing circumstances, as feminist theorists and activists shifted 
towards alternative solutions, rather than viewing law as the only instrument 
of social change. Parashar and others maintained that gender justice can 
become achievable only when there is a separation between religion and 
family law.104 7KH\ DUJXHG WKDW LW LV LPSRUWDQW WR FUHDWH D ¶ULJKWV UHJLPH·
favouring women, though the Constitution did provide equal rights to women. 
While the Courts were willing to validate the rights of women in some 
respects, they found that there is a judicial reluctance to apply equality 
principles to personal laws.105 So, most scholars acknowledged that while laws 
are inherently gendered, this gendering is starker in the realm of personal 
laws. My analysis on the Welfare principle aligned with this position and I 
explain this in detail in Chapter 4. 
Another important insight during this phase of case analysis was that the 
gender imbalance inherent in judicial reasoning created a certain figure of the 
Hindu woman, who is educated and follows traditional values, rather than 
EHFRPH´:HVWHUQLVHGµRU´PRGHUQLVHGµ106 This figure is constantly subject to 
a tension between her individual rights and her subordinate/secondary social 
status. I coined the term ´ (OLWH'HSHQGHQWµWRGHQRWHWKLVILJXUHDQG,H[SORUHG
how the judges often created this figure in their reasoning. The concept of the 
Elite Dependent is one of my key contributions in the thesis. Using the 
literature, I then analysed how the nature of judicial reasoning and the figure 
                                                             
 
103 More on this in Chapter 6. 
104 For instance, see Archana Parashar,  ‘&ĂŵŝůǇ>ĂǁĂƐĂDĞĂŶƐŽĨŶƐƵƌŝŶŐ'ĞŶĚĞƌ:ƵƐƚŝĐĞĨŽƌ/ŶĚŝĂŶ
Women ? ? ? ? ? ? ) ?/ŶĚŝĂŶ:ŽƵƌŶĂůŽĨ'ĞŶĚĞƌ^ƚƵĚŝĞƐ ? ? ? ? 
105 ĂƚŚĂƌŝŶĞDĂĐ<ŝŶŶŽŶ ? ‘Sex Equality under the Constitution of India: Problems, Prospects, and 
 “WĞƌƐŽŶĂů>ĂǁƐ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ) ?/ŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂů:ŽƵƌŶĂůŽĨŽŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶĂů>Ăǁ. Here, MacKinnon argues that 
the reason for this reluctance is that the notion of sex equality is a Western concept and hence it is 
resisted by the Indian judiciary.  
106 TŚĞ ŝĚĞĂ ƚŚĂƚĂ ǁŽŵĂŶǁŚŽ ƌĞĐĞŝǀĞĚĞĚƵĐĂƚŝŽŶǁŽƵůĚ ƚĞŶĚ ƚŽ ĨŽůůŽǁ  ‘ŵŽĚĞƌŶ ? ŝĚĞĂƐ ƐƵĐŚĂƐ
independence, rather than stick to traditional or subservient gender roles was prevalent in popular 
discourse during the late colonial as well as post-colonial periods in India. More on this in chapter 3. 
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of the Elite Dependent help to enhance my argument that judicial reasoning 
is inherently gendered and is based on normative notions of gender roles 
within the family. I deepened and strengthened this argument by analysing 
the application of judicial reasoning, as the literature confined itself to the 
letter of the law in most instances. Further, I analysed the cases to understand 
how judicial reasoning tends to reproduce existing gender norms. I have 
demonstrated these aspects in detail in Chapters 4, 5 and 6. During this 
analysis, I synthesised the themes that emerged from the cases with the 
literature and explored the linkages between the two. 
As I explained earlier, I was looking at the decisions of the appellate courts, 
mainly the Supreme Court of India and the state-level High Courts. I expanded 
my earlier excel spreadsheet to include further headings on the court in which 
the case was decided as well as the legislation or sections under which the 
decision was made (Figure 3). This was with the view to understand whether 
there were regional differences among the courts and if there were other 
trends that may emerge from them. However, the application of gender norms 
in judicial reasoning was not the prerogative of any one court and it appeared 
to be a more universal phenomenon. There were some gender neutral and/or 
gender-just judgments that were passed by some courts, which were, again, 
not specific to any region. Also, reasoning based on normative gender roles 
was not confined to the geographies perceived to be conservative parts of the 
country. For instance, in the case of Venugopalan vs. Beena, the Kerala High 
Court ruled that the mother should be given custody of the girl child as she 
would be in a better position to instil traditional values of marriage and family 
in her daughter. This reasoning based on normative gender roles came from 
the High Court of the state which had a matrilineal system of inheritance in 
customary Hindu law and consistently performed well on several 
developmental indicators, including highest levels of literacy in the country. 
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So, this phase of my case analysis yielded more scope to theorise on the 
gendered nature of judicial reasoning. My first area of further analysis was the 
Welfare principle that was used as the basis for all the decisions. What was 
distinct about Welfare is that it was repeatedly mentioned as the paramount 
consideration for deciding custody cases.107 Since this was the primary legal 
principle used to decide on custody, I analysed various ways in which welfare 
was defined by the Courts in these cases. What emerged was that judicial 
premise on welfare mostly rested on normative notions of gender and gender 
roles. For example, gender of the child played a key role in decisions and so 
did the financial capacity (mother must become the father or have the 
capability of being a breadwinner). Other cases offered some insights on how 
marriage, family, matrimonial discord, roles and remarriage of parents were 
viewed by the courts. The underlying commonality in all these instances was 
the adherence to gendered and social norms in deciding legal questions. 
When I started to analyse gendered perceptions, I found that there were many 
layers to unpack from the cases.  
In the third phase of my analysis, I conducted a more detailed analysis of the 
different aspects of welfare, as provided in the sample list I have attached at 
the end of this section (Figure 4). I read and re-read the cases to understand 
how welfare is premised on gender norms. These readings helped me to 
define and sharpen my ideas on how gendered perceptions played a large 
role in the way judges reasoned about parents. It was this exercise that largely 
shaped my ideas on judicial construction of the father and the mother as well 
as the family. I could discern the roles of the Caregiving mother and the 
Deviating PRWKHULQWKHMXGJHV·UHDVRQLQJ7KHLQ-depth reading of the cases 
                                                             
 
107 For a detailed discussion on this, see Chapter 4. 
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led me to the constructioQRIWKH(OLWH'HSHQGHQWIURPWKHMXGJHV·UHDVRQLQJ
I started to trace the patterns of disparate treatment between the father and 
mother in these cases and how this disparity revealed a tension between the 
PRWKHU·V ULJKWV DQG KHU VHFRQGDU\ VWDWXV LQ WKH Iamilial hierarchy. From a 
broad and open-ended format, I migrated to seeking answers for specific 
questions at this stage. By the time of this analysis, I had written initial drafts 
of two of my substantive chapters. I categorised the cases thematically and 
plotted where they would fit into each of these substantive chapters. I have 
provided a sample of such classification below (Figure 5). This helped in 
nuancing the arguments made in these substantive chapters.  This was the last 
and defining phase of my case analysis as it helped to set my objectives in 
place. The process of my case analysis helped to translate my research from 
the real to the abstract, as I transitioned from the cases that were real to theory 
that was abstract. In the next section, I appraise my personal position as a 




59 | P a g e  
 
 
 Figure 3: Sample of second phase of case analysis
Case Court Acts 
/Rules/Orders 












Wards Act, 1890 






Father died, mother 
remarried and lived 
with child and second 
husband. Paternal 
grandmother sued for 
custody based on 
precedent that 
mother's remarriage 
makes the child to 
appear to be in foster 
care of step father 
´7KHFKLOGIURPWKH
very beginning is in 
the care and custody 
of her natural mother, 
i.e., the respondent.... 
The argument that as 
respondent has 
remarried, custody of 
the minor should be 
entrusted to the 
appellant is abhorrent 
to the very concept of 
parenthood and a 
throwback to feudal 
times in our social 
past. The right of a 
widow to remarry, is 
absolute and not 
circumscribed by any 
condition that 
requires her to give 
up her minor child as 
a condition precedent 
to a second 
PDUULDJHµ 
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S.no. Case Keywords Comments 
1 Mausami Moitra 
Ganguli vs. Jayant 
Ganguli 
Welfare, Rights of 
parents, financial 
resources 
Welfare as stability and security 
2 Amit Beri son of 
Hardaya Narain Beri 
and Hardaya Narain 
Beri son of Jai Narain 
Beri vs. Smt. Sheetal 
Beri wife of Amit Beri 




Welfare as a point of fact and not 
of law 
3 Arun Grover vs. Ritu 
Grover 
Welfare, No 
contact with child 
Welfare by derivation - father 
didn't meet the child or bear his 
expenses 
 
 Figure 4: Sample of analysis on Welfare Principle       
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 Figure 5: Chapter-wise classification in third phase of case analysis      
 















´There has been number of 
divergence of views that if 
mother is a drunkard, or 
she is a licentious lady, 
having extra marital 
relationship, or that she is 
unable to look after 
required welfare of the 
child or that she is morally 
unfit, she cannot be given 
custody of a child.µ 
Mother accused of being 
an accomplice to father's 
killing by her paramour. 
Child with grandparents.  
5.3.1 
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5HVHDUFKHU·V3HUVRQDO3RVLWLRQ 
As I explained earlier, my lived experience was largely responsible for my 
choice of looking at custody cases. My personal experience in family courts in 
India made me realise that there was a huge gap in the way men and women 
were perceived by the judges. I observed that most women who approached 
the Courts for divorce and custody had to struggle through long and tedious 
hours of waiting to be called to appear before the judge. Even when they did 
appear, they had to endure incisive questioning about their personal lives. 
Often, they were viewed as deviant, as they chose to break social taboos on 
divorce. This perception was visible in the deprecating way the judges spoke 
to them in court. During the long periods we spent waiting for the case to be 
called, one of my clients recounted her internal struggle of seeking a divorce 
after twenty-five years of being married to an abusive and alcoholic man. She 
had a well-paying job and two grown children (closer to me in age) but she 
could not bring herself to seek divorce because of social pressure. She put up 
with his physical and emotional abuse for decades. However, she resisted 
when he started to abuse their daughter. She fought with him and he left the 
family, never to return. She had not heard from him for over seven years and 
had come to seek an ex-parte GLYRUFH GXH WR KHU FKLOGUHQ·V LQVLVWHQFH
Though she was an educated woman and could support her family and herself, 
the judge subjected her to probing questions on her conduct that were 
borderline insulting. At that point, I was a rookie lawyer who was trying to 
learn the ropes in a system that resembled a maze.  While I felt this was 
dehumanising at many levels, there was little I could do then. I did not realise 
the deep impact that this would have on the psyche of a person undergoing 
it, until I was put in such a position. 
My next encounter with the judicial system was during my divorce process. 
Initially, I thought that a passage of fifteen years would have caused it to 
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change in some ways. I was mistaken, as I found out to my detriment. 
Gendered perceptions had not altered. Instead, they seemed to have 
deepened. Moreover, the way the judges treated persons before them was 
often based on gendered norms ² women were supposed to be taking care 
of family and children, men were supposed to work and earn outside the 
home. These experiences were vastly responsible to turn my attention towards 
family relationships and especially towards how a Hindu woman was 
perceived by the judges in their reasoning. My experiences have both helped 
and hindered. They have helped me to better discern underlying gendered 
norms in judicial reasoning and their impact on lived experiences. They have 
hindered at times by making me less objective about my research, especially 
when dealing with cases like mine. In many ways, reading these cases was 
both cathartic and traumatic. While this is my personal position as a 
researcher, I also encountered some limitations with respect to the subject 
area. 
2.6 Limitations of the Research 
The limitations that I encountered during the process of case-analysis where 
both theoretical and empirical in nature. An important finding that emerged 
from my analysis was that these cases represent Common Law principles 
masquerading as religious law. Though these cases come under Hindu law, 
religion is mentioned only in one of them. The reference to religion had no 
bearing on the reasoning in the case. Modern Hindu law cannot be compared 
to other religious laws (for instance, the Sharia) because it is mostly rooted in 
Common-Law and is intended to be a secular code by its framers.108 To 
superimpose notions of religion/religious law or even customary Hindu law 
on modern Hindu law, may result in a strange and inexplicable marriage. 
                                                             
 
108 More on this in Chapter 3. 
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Therefore, I decided to treat it like liberal secular law, as it does not explore 
any questions of religion. Moreover, anyone who is not a Christian, Parsi or 
Muslim is considered as a Hindu by definition, under Hindu law. There maybe 
a few cases in my analysis which deal with individuals who follow Sikh or Jain 
religion or are even atheists. I have included them in the analysis as they are 
viewed as Hindus under law and these cases are included under the body of 
Hindu law.  
Some of the other limitations that I have encountered in my thesis were 
empirical in nature. For example, I cannot use my analysis to draw conclusions 
about Indian women in general. This is because the pool of cases that I have 
analysed specifically pertain to upper-class, elitist Hindu women and cannot 
be used to infer any propositions about all Indian women. Moreover, as I 
REVHUYHGHDUOLHU¶ZRPHQ·FDQQRWEHUHGXFHGWRDVLQJOHFDWHJRU\LQ,QGLD'XH
to sheer size and diversity of India, it is virtually impossible to generalise any 
trend for the whole country. My research provides insights into how normative 
notions on gender roles are produced, reproduced and iterated in custody 
cases and how this has an impact on formulation of a UCC for India. I do not 
attempt to provide solutions for the larger social issues of gender and caste 
in India. Another minor point is that I am a student of history and law and I 
hold multiple degrees in the humanities and social sciences (including a 
0DVWHUV· LQ ,QWHUGLVFLSOLQDU\+XPDQLWLHV'XHWRWKLVEDFNJURXQG ,SUHIHUD
multidisciplinary, particularly historical, approach to my work.109 This has been 
useful most of the time, but it may have caused me to look at the cases with 
specific lenses. 
                                                             
 
109 This may be evident in a few of my subsequent chapters. 
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 2.7 Concluding Remarks 
While my research is the first of its kind on Hindu custody law, certain key 
elements of it can be used in other contexts as well. I have developed a unique 
method of case analysis that combines several approaches, which can be used 
as a prototype for future research. For instance, I have attempted to provide 
a rich context and in-depth description of the cases and the larger socio-
political circumstances surrounding the legislation. These circumstances are 
not confined to Hindu custody law and they are useful to look at several 
legislations in India, within and outside Hindu law. 
Here, I have demonstrated how I conducted my case analysis, using a step-
by-step process. I have provided an explanation on several aspects of my 
research process, like research design and methods adopted, which can be 
used in similar context, such as the analysis of cases in other legislations under 
Hindu law. Moreover, this process may be helpful to obtain similar results if 
followed for gender-based analysis of legislation. This need not be confined 
to Hindu law and can be extended to other personal laws as well as legislations 
with gender implications. In the interest of fairness and credibility, I have 
explained my personal positions and biases as well as limitations that 
impacted the research. My research contributes strongly to aspects of gender 
in legislation at a broad level and to case law analysis in Hindu law at a specific 
level. I hope that my research would open new ways of thinking about gender 
and law in the Indian context. In the next chapter, I appraise the formation of 
the Hindu code and the context in which it was created, to set the stage for 
my case analysis in further chapters. 
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Chapter 3 ² The Hindu Woman in the Hindu Code 
3.1 Introduction 
Personal law systems in most countries under colonial rule were largely 
influenced by state-society relations and discourses of community that were 
prevalent among the ruling class or policy-making elite.110 The imperial power 
constituted the definition of state, while the colonized people constituted 
society and hence, there was an encounter between the ideas of the colonizer 
and colonised in this sphere. This encounter was always categorised in terms 
of traditional binaries, such as modern and indigenous. With the rise of 
nationalism in colonised states, it became important to construct different 
discourses of nation and community that would aid the nationalist agenda. 
This in turn led to the creation of discourses on personal laws, as personal law 
systems helped to frame and reflect group cultures and the visualization of 
group norms by individuals.111 Personal law systems serve the function of 
grounding normative notions of society and India is not an exception to this 
rule.112 In India, like in other colonized nations, the concepts of nation and 
community, legal rationale and democratization of the nation were important 
influences in personal law reform since the colonial times.113 
                                                             
 
110 This included the discourses of nation, cultural groups and traditions (N Subramanian, Nation and 
Family - Personal Law, Cultural Pluralism and Gendered Citizenship in India (Stanford University Press 
2014). 
111 Largely, the features that influenced personal law changes in India were nationalist discourses, 
protectionist policies for women, categorization of cultural groups, ideals of modernity and the idea 
that personal law was a bridge between modernity and cultural practices (ibid). 
112 For instance, see Nivedita Menon, Seeing like a Feminist (Zubaan, India with Penguin UK 2012), 
Rajeswari Sunder Rajan, The Scandal of the State - Women, Law and Citizenship in Postcolonial India 
(Duke University Press 2003),  Flavia Agnes, Law and Gender Inequality -dŚĞ WŽůŝƚŝĐƐŽĨtŽŵĞŶ ?Ɛ
Rights in India (Oxford University Press 1999). 
113 N Subramanian, Nation and Family - Personal Law, Cultural Pluralism and Gendered Citizenship in 
India (Stanford University Press 2014). 
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As I explained in Chapter 1, India continued to follow the colonial system of 
Religious Personal Laws (RPLs) to govern different religious communities, after 
independence from colonial rule. There exists a Constitutional provision for 
the amalgamation of RPLs and the creation of the Uniform Civil Code (UCC), 
with the aim of establishing equality before law for all citizens of India. 
However, this has not been carried out by successive governments in almost 
seventy years. The UCC question has become topical recently, with the Law 
Commission of India distributing questionnaires to the Indian public at large 
and seeking public opinion on UCC and questions of gender in RPLs.114 While 
it is debatable in what form and time frame the UCC would be enacted, the 
RPLs continue to govern the entire Indian population. So, what are the origins 
of RPLs in India? How did the colonial and nationalist interventions influence 
and shape RPLs? What were the effects of these interventions on the 
formulation of the Hindu code, especially from the aspect of gendering of 
roles? These are the questions that I attempt to answer in this chapter, thereby 
providing the background for analysis of case law in the Hindu code further 
ahead. 
In this chapter, I focus on the evolution of the figure of the middle-class Hindu 
woman, whom I call thH ´(OLWH 'HSHQGHQWµ,115 in Hindu personal law. This 
figure emerged through a confluence of narratives from the colonial, 
QDWLRQDOLVW DQG WKH ZRPHQ·V PRYHPHQWV· LQ ODWH nineteenth and early 
twentieth century India. While I critique how the judicial treatment of the Elite 
                                                             
 
114 Law Commission of India,  ‘UCC Questionnaire ?  ? ? ? ? ? ),  accessed 7 February 2017.This has also 
been published in major newspapers in India. For instance, see The Hindu News Bureau,  ‘>Ăǁ
ŽŵŵŝƐƐŝŽŶ^ ĞĞŬƐWƵďůŝĐKƉŝŶŝŽŶŽŶhŶŝĨŽƌŵŝǀŝůŽĚĞ ? The Hindu, New Delhi, 8 October 2016). Until 
the end of December, about 40,000 responses have been received by the Law Commission (Press 
Trust of India ?  ‘ ? ? ? ? ? ?ƉůƵƐĂŶĚŽƵŶƚŝŶŐ PZĞƐƉŽŶƐĞƐƚŽYƵĞƐƚŝŽŶŶĂŝƌĞŽŶhŶŝĨŽƌŵŝǀŝůŽĚĞ ?The 
New Indian Express New Delhi, 22 December 2016). 
115 /ĐŽŝŶĞĚƚŚĞƚĞƌŵ “ůŝƚĞĞƉĞŶĚĞŶƚ ?ƚŽŝŶĚŝĐĂƚĞĞĚƵĐĂƚĞĚ ?ƵƉƉĞƌŵŝĚĚůĞ-class Hindu woman who 
is one of the key actors in these judgments (the other being the Hindu man). For more on this, see 
Chapters 1 and 5. 
68 | P a g e  
 
Dependent is based on gendered roles in Chapter 5, I evaluate how this figure 
gets incorporated in legislation of the Hindu code in this chapter.  I begin by 
appraising the formation of Anglo-Hindu law and analysing the position of 
the Hindu woman in this system. I outline the circumstances which led to 
formulation of the figure of the upper middle-class woman in the Hindu code. 
I demonstrate that gendered roles played an important role in the origin and 
conceptualisation of this code. I then build upon this to argue that certain 
normative ideas on gender roles were accepted and incorporated as a central 
feature of this code, due to the extraordinary circumstances that existed at the 
time of its enactment.  
3.2 Colonial Intervention ² Creation of Anglo-Hindu Law 
3.2.1 Religious Personal Laws under the English East India Company 
During the early years of colonisation in the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries, the European companies that came to India concentrated on trade 
and commerce, as it was their intention to enjoy commercial rights. This 
attitude was adopted by the British, French and Portuguese colonisers alike. 
However, this situation changed when the English East India Company 
(hereinafter, the Company) started acquiring more territories under its control. 
The Company was then faced with twin questions of devising a system of 
administration of justice for its Indian territories, as well as the type of law to 
be followed in such a system.116 As this was a period of consolidation of the 
Company rule over parts of India and the establishment of Presidency towns 
                                                             
 
116 The information on Indian colonial legal history in this section has been derived from the works of 
Derrett and Menski. For a detailed discussion on this history, see JDM Derrett, An Introduction to 
Legal Systems (Universal Law Publishing 2011),  JDM Derrett,  ‘dŚĞĚŵŝŶŝƐƚƌĂƚŝŽŶŽĨ,ŝŶĚƵ>ĂǁďǇƚŚĞ
British ? ? ? ? ? ? ) ?ŽŵƉĂƌĂƚŝǀĞ^ƚƵĚŝĞƐŝŶ^ŽĐŝĞƚǇĂŶĚ,ŝƐƚory,  Werner Menski, Hindu Law - Beyond 
Tradition and Modernity (Oxford University Press, New Delhi 2008). 
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of Calcutta, Madras and Bombay, the company wanted to tread carefully in 
handling the issues of Indian subjects under its administration.117  
While the Company attempted to follow a policy of non-intervention in local 
tradition or practice, it wanted to administer justice in the public sphere such 
as rights in revenue, excise and criminal law matters.118 It allowed the locals to 
handle civil or personal matters, to avoid friction with the governed 
SRSXODWLRQ'HVSLWHVXFKOLPLWDWLRQVWKH&RPSDQ\·VDGPLQLVWUDWLRQGHFLGHG
to attempt its hand at codifying personal laws for uniform and easy 
administration in the areas under its control. In this section, I demonstrate how 
colonial intervention in Hindu personal law system led to the introduction of 
Common Law and liberal principles such as autonomy and equality in 
customary Hindu law. 
When confronted by the plurality of Indian legal systems in the eighteenth 
century, the British resorted to seeking guidance from Brahmanical pundits119 
who were supposedly well-versed in 6ņVWULF laws.120 In 1772, the then 
Governor-General, Warren Hastings, enlisted a group of eleven Brahmin 
pundits belonging to the 0LWņNVKDUD121 school of Hindu customary law in 
                                                             
 
117 With this end in mind, the company administered existing principles of British Common Law in its 
courts in the Presidency towns, but it was slow to implement this system in rural areas as it feared 
opposition from the local community. It also supported the usage of Hindu customary law to settle 
disputes in caste courts. 
118 For a detailed discussion on this, see, Werner Menski, Hindu Law - Beyond Tradition and Modernity 
(Oxford University Press, New Delhi 2008), ZŝŶĂsĞƌŵĂtŝůůŝĂŵƐ ? ‘The More Things Change: Debating 
'ĞŶĚĞƌĂŶĚZĞůŝŐŝŽŶŝŶ/ŶĚŝĂ ?Ɛ,ŝŶĚƵ>ĂǁƐ ? ? ? ? ?- 2006 ? ? ? ? ? ? ) ? ? Gender & History. 
119 Pundit was the title reserved for a learned scholar. It was often provided to a person of the highest 
caste order, i.e., BrĈhmins, as they were usually considered to be well versed in religious texts and 
were respected as scriptural authorities. Pundits were trained in interpretation of religious texts or 
^ĈƐƚƌĂ- s and were the official interpreters of canonical texts.  
120 The British East India Company encouraged the ^ĈƐƚƌŝĐ training of pundits but this was confined to 
parts of Eastern India, notably Bengal and Bihar, which were Company strongholds (Werner Menski, 
Hindu Law - Beyond Tradition and Modernity (Oxford University Press, New Delhi 2008)). 
121 Variations in local customs led to the emergence of two prominent schools of legal interpretation 
in customary Hindu law, namely DŝƚĈŬƐŚĂƌĂ and ĂǇĂďŚĂŐĈ. They were founded by sŝũŹĈŶĞƐǀĂƌĂ 
and :ŝŵƻƚĂǀĈŚĂŶĂ, respectively. They paved the way for several local sub-schools of interpretation, 
leading to further diversity of customary law. These schools were characterised by their terseness, 
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Varanasi,122 to produce a written code of Hindu law. This code was published 
LQZLWKWKHWLWOHRI´ A Code of Gentoo Laws, Or, Ordinations of the Punditsµ
and was popularly called the Gentoo code. For almost a century, this code was 
considered as the fundamental document administering Hindu law and was 
referred to by English jurists in India.123 This code influenced shaping personal 
laws in India as it marked, for the first time, the entry of the state into the 
realm of personal law by way of statutes.  
After the consolidation of their territories in India, the British colonisers 
wanted to create a system of centralised administration for procedural ease. 
With this view in mind, they passed several Acts concerning secular, civil and 
criminal laws during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. While the British 
claimed that they did not interfere in the personal laws and merely acted as 
interpreters, it cannot be denied that the personal law system was impacted 
by British judgments. This led to an artificial reconstruction of Hindu law.124 
The British judges attempted to interpret 6ņVWULF texts very literally, in line with 
the Common law system that was precedent heavy, with a view to enforce 
                                                             
 
juridical skill and scholarship and dealt extensively with subjects of adoption, inheritance and 
succession; joint family rights and obligations; guardianship; maintenance of dependents; marriage 
and matrimony; caste discipline and order; religious and charitable endowments and trusts (JDM 
Derrett, An Introduction to Legal Systems (Universal Law Publishing 2011)). 
122 A famous Hindu pilgrimage city in North India. 
123 The Gentoo code was followed by other attempts at codifying Hindu law by William Jones and 
Colebrooke, who were employed by the East India Company to translate Indian texts to English. 
Colebrooke prepared a summary of Hindu procedural law using textual sources and explains in detail 
constitution of a Hindu sovereign court, subordinate courts, original and appellate jurisdiction, 
arbitration and conduct of proceedings (HT Colebrooke,  ‘KŶ ,ŝŶĚƵ ŽƵƌƚƐ ŽĨ :ƵƐƚŝĐĞ ?  ? ? ? ? ? )  ?
Transactions of the Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland). But these attempts failed to 
provide a comprehensive legislative code that would address the problems of the judicial system, 
such as the multiplicity of local customs. 
124 There was an understanding amongst most English judges that principles of common law and 
equity were a universal language, and these were used to plug the gaps of substantive and procedural 
Hindu law.  The effect was felt especially in procedural law, as there was a tendency to homogenise 
procedure by the establishment of district level courts as well as inferior and superior appellate courts 
to administer justice by 1861 (JDM Derrett, An Introduction to Legal Systems (Universal Law 
Publishing 2011)).  
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greater uniformity and streamline the legal process.125 As a result, traditional 
Hindu law merged with English Common Law principles to produce a new 
FDWHJRU\RI´ $QJOR-+LQGXµ126 Law, which was almost exclusively adopted from 
the 0LWņNVKDUDSchool and did not represent the entire gamut of customary 
Hindu law in existence at that time. The Anglo-Hindu code combined the 
issues of partition of property and maintenance of family members that had 
gained prominence in pre-modern Hindu law, with the notions of capitalist 
economy and property ownership that were a legacy of liberal thought, 
thereby prompting the British judges to view personal laws through the lens 
of property ownership.127 The capacity to hold property was associated with 
´DXWRQRP\HTXDOLW\DQGIXOOOHJDOVXEMHFWKRRGµ128  
The British jurists and judges thus transformed the plural nature of customary 
Hindu law to a more unitary one.129 The increasing rigidity and Anglicisation 
of customary Hindu law was thought necessary by the British to aid their 
administration and was actively supported by British-educated Indians, who 
adopted the colonial idea that customary or traditional laws were regressive 
and needed to be overhauled in the name of modernity.130 This process 
commenced in the closing decades of the eighteenth century and continued 
until almost to the close of the nineteenth century. 
                                                             
 
125 They were prone to dispensing justice in the areas under their control from the perspective of 
ƵƌŽƉĞĂŶƚĞǆƚǁƌŝƚĞƌƐ ?ŝŶƚĞƌƉƌĞƚĂƚŝŽŶŽĨ^ĈƐƚƌŝĐ law (JDM Derrett,  ‘dŚĞĚŵŝŶŝƐƚƌĂƚŝŽŶŽĨ,ŝŶĚƵ>Ăǁ
by the British ? ? ? ? ? ? ) ?ŽŵƉĂƌĂƚŝǀĞ^ƚƵĚŝĞƐŝŶ^ŽĐŝĞƚǇĂŶĚ,ŝƐƚŽƌǇ). 
126 JDM Derrett, Religion, Law and the State in India (Faber and Faber 1968).  
127 Rachel Sturman, The Government of Social Life in Colonial India Liberalism, Religious Law, and 
tŽŵĞŶ ?ƐZŝŐŚƚƐ (New York, Cambridge University Press 2012). 
128 ZĂĐŚĞů^ƚƵƌŵĂŶ ? ‘DĂƌƌŝĂŐĞĂŶĚ&ĂŵŝůǇŝŶŽůŽŶŝĂů,ŝŶĚƵ>Ăǁ ?ŝŶdŝŵŽƚŚǇ>ƵďŝŶ ?ŽŶĂůĚZĂǀŝƐ:ƌ ?
and Jayanth K Krishnan (eds), Hinduism and Law: An Introduction (Cambridge University Press 2010). 
129 Werner Menski, Hindu Law - Beyond Tradition and Modernity (Oxford University Press, New Delhi 
2008), JDM Derrett,  ‘dŚĞĚŵŝŶŝƐƚƌĂƚŝŽŶŽĨ,ŝŶĚƵ>ĂǁďǇƚŚĞƌŝƚŝƐŚ ? ? ? ? ? ? ) ?ŽŵƉĂƌĂƚŝǀĞ^ƚƵĚŝĞƐŝŶ
Society and History. 
130 Tanika Sarkar, Hindu Wife, Hindu Nation - Community, Religion and Cultural Nationalism (Indiana 
University Press 2001).  
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3.2.2 Religious Personal Laws under the Crown 
As customary Hindu law was thought to be oppressive and patriarchal by the 
colonisers and the newly-emergent Indian middle class,131 the movement for 
formulation of a new Hindu code of laws, based on modern notions of 
jurisprudence, started gaining momentum from the mid-1800s.132 By about 
1870, India witnessed recommendations of Law Commissions over three 
decades. These recommendations eVWDEOLVKHG WKH IRXQGDWLRQV RI ,QGLD·V
modern (and current) legal system by legislating on civil and criminal 
procedure codes, contract as well as personal laws for regulating religion, 
caste and family. After the transfer of power from the Company to the British 
Crown in 1858, the administration of British Indian territories was taken over 
by British civil servants, who wanted to maintain separate legal systems for 
Hindus and Muslims. They thought it necessary to follow a policy of non-
interference in local customs, especially with respect to personal laws.133 
However, while they maintained that they wanted to preserve Indian personal 
laws, they decided what constituted law and tried to separate social or moral 
                                                             
 
131 The British introduced English system of education in India in the 1830s. This in turn led to the 
creation a new middle-class of Indian intelligentsia that was both Indian and English simultaneously. 
For more on this, see DǇƚŚĞůŝ ^ƌĞĞŶŝǀĂƐ ?  ‘Conjugality and Capital: Gender, Families, and Property 
ƵŶĚĞƌŽůŽŶŝĂů>ĂǁŝŶ/ŶĚŝĂ ? (2004) 63 The Journal of Asian Studies. 
132 The British administrators, under the guidance of the then Governor of Bengal, William Bentinck, 
decided to enact laws for the abolition of practices such as Sati (the immolation of a wife on the 
funeral pyre of her husband), which were perceived to be archaic and barbaric. Indian reformers of 
the nineteenth century, like Raja Ram Mohan Roy and Iswar Chandra Vidyasagar, criticized gender 
imbalances in customary Hindu law, especially the practice of Sati. However, these movements were 
viewed as open opposition to Hindu custom and traditions by the conservative Hindu subjects of 
colonial India (Chitra Sinha, Debating Patriarchy - The Hindu Code Bill Controversy in India (1941 - 
1956) (Oxford University Press 2012). 
133 This view was largely accepted and acted upon, especially after the Mutiny of 1857, during which 
Hindus and Muslims fought together against the British. One of the important causes of the Mutiny 
was said to be the interference of the British in religious customs of both communities. After the 
Mutiny, the administration of British Indian territories was transferred from the English East India to 
the British Crown directly, in 1858. Moreover, the intersections between concepts of religion and 
race, along with connections to orientalism, formed an important basis for the events of 1857 (Shruti 
<ĂƉŝůĂ ? ‘Race Matters: Orientalism and Religion, India and Beyond C. 1770- 1820 ? ? ? ? ? ? ) ? ?DŽĚĞƌŶ
Asian Studies). 
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practices from law. In this sense, it was a limited form of pluralism. Hence, the 
personal law system was not free from state interference or from the 
influences of liberalism, especially the ideas of justice as equity and the nation- 
state project.134 In fact, it seems to have been shaped by such interference and 
personal law became a separate legal domain within the jurisdiction of the 
state.135 The later part of the nineteenth century witnessed a legal turn as there 
were numerous officials who read and interpreted ancient textual traditions of 
Hindu law.136 The rulers considered it unwieldy to have multiple customs to 
adjudicate and there was a concerted move towards standard legal practices 
along the lines of English Common Law. These changes, combined with the 
theme of property, served to change the nature of the Hindu family. There 
was a move towards homogenization and legal uniformity, which resulted in 
the creation of new legal identities, especially in the sphere of the Hindu 
family.137 
                                                             
 
134 The important and enduring legacy of the colonial state was the emergence of new discourses of 
polity and legality. India was constructed as a polity with precise historical origins, which was 
perceived to be backward and traditional and it became the responsibility of the colonial government 
ƚŽďƌŝŶŐŝĚĞĂƐŽĨŵŽĚĞƌŶŝƚǇƚŽƚŚŝƐĐŽŶĚŝƚŝŽŶ ?tŚŝůĞƚŚĞƵƐƵĂůĐŽůŽŶŝĂůŝŵĂŐĞƌǇŽĨ ‘ĐŝǀŝůŝƐŝŶŐŵŝƐƐŝŽŶ ?
ĂŶĚ ‘ǁŚŝƚĞŵĂŶ ?ƐďƵƌĚĞŶ ?ǁĞƌĞƵƐĞĚƚŽĚĞĨŝŶĞƚŚĞƌŽůĞ ĨƚŚĞĐŽůŽŶŝĂůƐƚĂƚĞ ?ƚŚĞƌĞǁĞƌĞĂůƐŽĂƚƚĞŵƉƚƐ
to introducĞ ƚŚĞ ĚŝƐĐŽƵƌƐĞƐ ŽĨ  “ũƵƐƚŝĐĞ ĂƐ ĞƋƵŝƚǇ ? ĂŶĚ  “ũƵƐƚŝĐĞĂƐ ůŝďĞƌƚǇ ? ? ƚŽ ƉƌŽǀŝĚĞ Ă ĚŝƐĐƵƌƐŝǀĞ
framework for the British rule. Here, justice as equity was grounded in the conscience of the 
 “ŵŽŶĂƌĐŚ ?Žƌ  “ƌƵůĞƌ ? ĂŶĚǁĂƐĂĚŵŝŶŝƐƚĞƌĞĚĞǆƚĞƌŝŽƌ ƚŽ ƚŚĞƉŽƉƵůĂĐĞ ƚŚĂƚ was being ruled. Thus, 
justice as equity became the sovereign legislative principle and this idea, along with the legacy of the 
nation-state project, was transmitted from the colonial to the post-colonial discourses pertaining to 
state and judiciary. For more on this, see Mithi Mukherjee, India in the Shadows of Empire: A Legal 
and Political History 1774 - 1950 ( Oxford University Press 2010). 
135 ZĂĐŚĞů^ƚƵƌŵĂŶ ? ‘DĂƌƌŝĂŐĞĂŶĚ&ĂŵŝůǇŝŶŽůŽŶŝĂů,ŝŶĚƵ>Ăǁ ?ŝŶdŝŵŽƚŚǇ>ƵďŝŶ ?ŽŶĂůĚZĂǀŝƐ:ƌ ?
and Jayanth K Krishnan (eds), Hinduism and Law: An Introduction (Cambridge University Press 2010).  
136 Customary law was to be given preference over ^ĈƐƚƌŝĐ texts and there was an effort to prepare 
comprehensive digests of customs as well as use of legal precedents for cases of custom. One such 
ĞǆĂŵƉůĞ ǁĂƐ  “ŶĐŝĞŶƚ >Ăǁ ? ?ǁƌŝƚƚĞŶďǇ,ĞŶƌǇ DĂŝŶĞ ŝŶ  ? ? ?dŚŝƐ ďŽŽŬĐŽŵƉĂƌĞĚ,ŝŶĚƵ ůĂǁ ƚŽ
ancient Roman legal systems and served to encourage the turn to customary practice. His theory was 
aligned to the discourse that modernization or industrialization caused the shift from joint family 
system to nuclear family system. Maine was also the Law member of ƚŚĞ'ŽǀĞƌŶŽƌ'ĞŶĞƌĂů ?ƐŽƵŶĐŝů
and was responsible for codification of several statutes. (WĂƚƌŝĐŝĂhďĞƌŽŝ ? ‘/ŶƚƌŽĚƵĐƚŝŽŶ ?ŝŶWhďĞƌŽŝ
(ed), Family , Kinship and Marriage in India (1993) Oxford University Press). 
137 Chandra Mallampalli,  ‘ƐĐĂƉŝŶŐ ƚŚĞ 'ƌŝƉ ŽĨ WĞƌƐŽŶĂů >Ăǁ ŝŶ ŽůŽŶŝĂů /ŶĚŝĂ P WƌŽǀŝŶŐ ƵƐƚŽŵ ?
Negotiating Hindu-Ness ? ? ? ? ? ? ) ? ?>ĂǁĂŶĚ,ŝƐƚŽƌǇZĞǀŝĞǁ ? 
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Under the new Anglo-Hindu law, the most significant aspect of the Hindu 
family was its joint or undivided nature. This ZDVWHUPHGDVD´FRSDUFHQDU\µ138 
of several generations of males related by patrilineal descent residing 
together in the same household and owning common property. The family 
was viewed as a property-owning unit and the relations between its male 
members were perceived to be those of rights and entitlement over property. 
Property became the central theme of personal law and influenced both 
secular and religious civil law.139 The notion of self-acquired or individual 
property was very narrow in scope. However, the judicial attitude towards the 
nature of Hindu joint family changed after 1860, when the courts started 
recognizing Hindu joint property to be divisible into shares and provided the 
right of alienation of their shares to male members, which coincided with the 
introduction of direct taxation.140 The creation of more taxable subjects was 
                                                             
 
138 The Hindu joint family was a system of coparcenary, in which all cognate male members who have 
lineally descended from a common male ancestor, shared property rights.  The members of a Hindu 
joint family were united by birth, marriage or adoption. In DŝƚĈkshara law, the undivided Hindu family 
is based on community of interests and unity of possession among persons descended from a 
common ancestor in the male line. This method was a safeguard to ensure that members of the family 
unable to support themselves were provided with maintenance (HK Saharay, Family Law in India 
(2011) Eastern Law House). In this model, wives, unmarried daughters, widows and other dependents 
had a right of maintenance but did not enjoy a right of ownership in the property. 
139 The courts dispensing justice mostly presumed that all Hindu families were joint families in nature 
and all family property was owned as joint family property.  Until the 1860s, colonial courts 
considered the joint family to be a single, property-owning unit and individual men of the family did 
not have a right to alienate or transact with their share in the joint family property. Even the property 
earned by an individual by way of his education was considered as joint family property, if his 
education was paid out of common funds. (ZĂĐŚĞů^ƚƵƌŵĂŶ ? ‘DĂƌƌŝĂŐĞĂŶĚ&ĂŵŝůǇŝŶŽůŽŶŝĂů,ŝŶĚƵ
>Ăǁ ? ŝŶ dŝŵŽƚŚǇ >ƵďŝŶ ? ŽŶĂůĚ Z ĂǀŝƐ :ƌ ? ĂŶĚ :ĂǇĂŶƚŚ < <ƌŝƐŚŶĂŶ  ?ĞĚƐ ) ?Hinduism and Law: An 
Introduction (Cambridge University Press 2010). 
140 The first Income Tax Act passed by the British Government in 1860 considered the Hindu joint 
family as a single taxable entity. This practice was continued in India after independence from colonial 
rule. The Indian Income Act, 1961, recognises the Hindu Undivided Family or HUF as a taxable entity. 
Per the Act, all the persons lineally descended from a common ancestor are considered coparceners. 
This definition is gender-independent and include mother, wives and unmarried daughters. This was 
followed by attempts to introduce wealth tax on the Hindu joint family, as a means of revenue 
ŐĞŶĞƌĂƚŝŽŶ ?ĨƚĞƌ  ? ? ? ? ?ĚĞĐůŝŶŝŶŐĂŐƌŝĐƵůƚƵƌĂů ƌĞǀĞŶƵĞƐĂŶĚĂ ĨĂůů ŝŶǀĂůƵĞŽĨ /ŶĚŝĂ ?Ɛ ĐƵƌƌĞŶĐǇĂůƐŽ
provided impetus to the shift in colonial economic policy towards greater taxation. From 1870 to 
1930, several legal measures on Companies Law, Negotiable Instruments, Income tax, Charitable 
Giving, Pension funds and distinction between gambling and speculation/futures trading, were 
introduced. For a more detailed analysis on this topic, see Ritu Birla, Stages of Capital: Law, Culture 
and Market Governance in Late Colonial India (2009) Duke University Press. 
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considered necessary for the increase of revenue. Against this background, 
the legal administration took a drastic turn. Within a few decades, sons could 
request partition of the joint family property and in 1930, the Hindu Gains of 
Learning Act allowed Hindu men to own their self-acquired property, obtained 
through their education, as individual property.141 This in turn led to the 
multiplication of taxable Hindu male subjects during this period. From the 
above discussions, it is evident that the colonial intervention in customary 
Hindu law led to the creation of a new category of Anglo-Hindu law, which 
was a curious mixture of elements of customary law, Common law principles 
and liberal thought. While I have explained the condition of male subjects 
under this law, the position of women was different. In the next section, I 
discuss the condition of Hindu women and how they were perceived as legal 
subjects during this time.  
3.3 The Hindu Woman in Anglo-Hindu Law 
The treatment of the Hindu woman was different from that of the Hindu man 
in Anglo-+LQGXODZ7KH&RPPRQODZQRWLRQVRIZRPHQ·VSURSHUW\ULJKWVDQG
lack of autonomy or capacity to manage property, led to progressive 
restrictions on Indian ZRPHQ·VULJKWWRLQGLYLGXDOSURSHUW\142 The influence of 
                                                             
 
141 dŚĞ ,ŝŶĚƵ 'ĂŝŶƐ ŽĨ >ĞĂƌŶŝŶŐ Đƚ ?  ? ? ? ? ĞƐƚĂďůŝƐŚĞĚ ƚŚĂƚ Ă ,ŝŶĚƵ ƉƌŽĨĞƐƐŝŽŶĂů ?Ɛ ƐĂůĂry was his 
individual or self-acquired property, rather than joint family property. Prior to this Act, male Hindus 
had a right in the Hindu Undivided Family (HUF) or joint family of DŝƚĈŬƐŚĂƌĂ coparcenary and were 
not entitled to own individual property. The British treated the HUF as a single entity for assessing 
income tax. But all this was changed by this Act, which paved the way for creation of two categories 
of tax assessments  W HUF and Hindu male individual. Confronted by economic depletion post-World 
War I and the Great Depression globally, the British were quick to capitalise on this opportunity to 
increase tax incomes. This Act aided in projecting individual estate as the financial base for a Hindu 
family and established the authority of a Hindu male as husband. For a more detailed analysis on this 
topic, see Eleanor Newbigin, The Hindu Family and the Emergence of Modern India - Law, Citizenship 
and Community (Cambridge University Press 2013). 
142 In pre-ŵŽĚĞƌŶ ƚŝŵĞƐ ? Ă ǁŽŵĂŶ ?Ɛ ĐŽŶĚƵĐƚ ǁĂƐ ƐƵƉƉŽƐĞĚ ƚŽ ďĞ ŝŶĚŝĐĂƚŝǀĞ ŽĨ ŚĞƌ ĐĂƐƚĞ ĂŶĚ
community status. Women could act per the dictates of their caste and most lower caste women had 
freedom of choice, especially in terms of marriage and divorce. While women could not be 
coparceners, pre-modern Hindu law had recognised their right to individual property (and in some 
instances, a share of the joint family property) in the form of Stridhana. In Sanskrit, Stridhana literally 
ŵĞĂŶƐtŽŵĂŶ ?ƐǁĞĂůƚŚ ?Stri = Woman, Dhana=Wealth). It is a customary practice in Hindu society 
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liberalism transformed topics once considered religious, into secular 
notions.143 The colonial power recognised a set of Hindu practices as law while 
ignoring others but wanted to critique the so-called oppression of women 
SUHYDOHQWLQ+LQGX/DZ,WORRNHGXSRQLWVHOIDVD´VDYLRXUµRI+LQGX women, 
in line with the civilising mission envisaged for Indians.144 However, the 
colonial liberal discourse, combined with its administration of justice, ensured 
that all Hindu women were clubbed together in a single unified category with 
rights resembling those of upper caste Hindu women.145 But, when there was 
a political and economic need for more taxable subjects, the colonial 
government did a U-WXUQRQLWVVWDQFHRQZRPHQ·VLQGLYLGXDOSURSHUW\ULJKWV
                                                             
 
to gift both movable and immovable property to a daughter at the time of marriage, which could be 
used for her personal maintenance and expenses. A woman had absolute interest in her Stridhana 
property and could use or alienate it per her will. Her husband or male relatives could not interfere 
in her decisions regarding this property. For more on this see, Werner Menski, Hindu Law - Beyond 
Tradition and Modernity (Oxford University Press, New Delhi 2008), Flavia Agnes, Law and Gender 
Inequality -dŚĞWŽůŝƚŝĐƐŽĨtŽŵĞŶ ?ƐZŝŐŚƚƐ ŝŶ /ŶĚŝĂ (Oxford University Press 1999). Traditionally, a 
ŵŽƚŚĞƌ ?ƐStridhana property was inherited by her daughters and in their absence, by daughters-in-
law. This practise is followed even today in most Hindu families. With time, Stridhana, which was a 
voluntary bequest, turned into the forced social practice of Dowry or bride price and associated social 
issues.  
143 For instance, adoption was of a religious character as it provided a male heir to perform libations. 
However, by early twentieth century, it became a secular process which dealt with transfer of 
property and its ritual significance in Hindu law was forgotten (ZĂĐŚĞů^ƚƵƌŵĂŶ ? ‘DĂƌƌŝĂŐĞĂŶĚ&ĂŵŝůǇ
ŝŶŽůŽŶŝĂů,ŝŶĚƵ>Ăǁ ?ŝŶdŝŵŽƚŚǇ>ƵďŝŶ ?ŽŶĂůĚZĂǀŝƐ Jr. and Jayanth K Krishnan (eds), Hinduism 
and Law: An Introduction (Cambridge University Press 2010). 
144 'ĂǇĂƚƌŝ^ƉŝǀĂŬ ? ‘ĂŶƚŚĞ^ƵďĂůƚĞƌŶ^ƉĞĂŬ ? ?ŝŶEĞůƐŽŶĂŶĚ>'ƌŽƐƐďĞƌŐ ?ĞĚƐ ) ?Marxism and the 
Interpretation of Culture (Macmillan Education 1988). 
145 Under customary Hindu law, widows were entitled to claim a share in the property of their 
deceased husbands for their maintenance. While custom differed from place to place, the tenet of 
ƚŚĞ ǁŝĚŽǁ ?Ɛ ƌŝŐŚƚ ƚŽ ĂďƐŽůƵƚĞ ŽǁŶĞƌƐŚŝƉ ŽĨ ƉƌŽƉĞƌƚǇ ǁĂƐ ƌĞĐŽŐŶŝƐĞĚ ? ,ŽǁĞǀĞƌ ? ƚŚĞ ĐŽůŽŶŝĂů
government did not acknowledge widows right to property for a long time. Contrary to customary 
Hindu law, Hindu widows were not entitled to maintenance under the Anglo-Hindu code, as they did 
not have autonomy and hence possessed no capacity to own property. This situation continued until 
the pasƐĂŐĞŽĨƚŚĞ,ŝŶĚƵtŽŵĞŶ ?ƐZŝŐŚƚƚŽWƌŽƉĞƌƚǇĐƚ ? ? ? ? ? ?hŶĚĞƌƚŚŝƐĐƚ ?,ŝŶĚƵǁŝĚŽǁƐǁĞƌĞ
provided differential treatment from Hindu males in matters of inheritance. The British Government 
ŝŶƚƌŽĚƵĐĞĚƚŚĞĐŽŶĐĞƉƚŽĨ “tŝĚŽǁ ?ƐƐƚĂƚĞ ?ĨƌŽŵƚŚĞƌŝƚŝƐŚ ůĞŐĂůƐǇstem. Now, the Hindu widow 
was allowed the enjoyment of the property during her lifetime, but she was deemed to possess no 
ĂƵƚŽŶŽŵǇƚŽĂůŝĞŶĂƚĞƚŚĞƉƌŽƉĞƌƚǇ ?ĨƚĞƌŚĞƌůŝĨĞƚŝŵĞ ?ƚŚĞƉƌŽƉĞƌƚǇƌĞǀĞƌƚĞĚƚŽŚĞƌŚƵƐďĂŶĚ ?ƐŚĞŝƌƐ ?
(Brenda Cossman and Ratna Kapur, Subversive Sites - Feminist Engagements with Law in India (Sage 
Publications India Pvt Ltd 1996). This legislation was piecemeal at best and suffered from legal flaws, 
such as discriminating between agricultural and non-agricultural property, and did little to alleviate 
the condition of Hindu widows. It was criticised by the liberal section of Indian society as being not 
radical enough and by the conservative elements as being too radical. However, it helped to create a 
new category of taxable and legal subject  W The Hindu widow. 
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as seen in the case of Hindu Widows Right to Property Act.146 In this manner, 
colonial Anglo-Hindu law contributed to the creation of a new kind of female 
subject in the Indian personal law system.147 
The creation of the subject of the Hindu woman had other influences as well 
as repercussions. In the mid and late nineteenth century, there arose a class 
of Hindu reformers who wanted to change the way women were treated in 
Hindu society by seeking the abolition of Sati (the practice of burning a widow 
on the funeral pyre of her deceased husband), female infanticide and raising 
the legal age of consent for Hindu marriage.148 The Hindu conservatives 
developed a resistance to the reform movement and claimed that the family 
VSDFHZDV¶SXUH·DQGZRPHQZKRRFFXSLHGWKHGRPHVWLFVSDFHVKRXOGQRWEH
touched by colonial intervention, especially in terms of definition of 
conjugality and determination of the age of consent.149 However, both the 
reformers as well as orthodox Hindus were firm in their construction of the 
                                                             
 
146 dŚĞ ,ŝŶĚƵ tŽŵĞŶ ?Ɛ ZŝŐŚƚ ƚŽ WƌŽƉĞƌƚǇ Đƚ ?  ? ? ? ? ? ŝŶ ĐŽŵďŝŶĂƚŝŽŶ ǁŝƚŚ ƚŚĞ DƵƐůŝŵ ^ŚĂƌŝĂƚ
Application Act, was touted as legislation that established property rights for women in society. In 
effect, both these enactments created additional taxable subjects which were necessary for 
generating greater revenue to the British Government of the country. For more on this, see Eleanor 
Newbigin, The Hindu Family and the Emergence of Modern India - Law, Citizenship and Community 
(Cambridge University Press 2013). 
147 The colonial state regulated property and enforced differential property rights under secular and 
ƉĞƌƐŽŶĂůůĂǁĂŶĚƚŚŝƐůĞĚ ?ŝŶƚƵƌŶ ?ƚŽ “ĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶƚŝĂůůĞŐĂůƐƵďũĞĐƚŚŽŽĚ ? ?ZĂĐŚĞů^ƚƵƌŵĂŶ ? ‘DĂƌƌŝĂŐĞĂŶĚ
&ĂŵŝůǇ ŝŶŽůŽŶŝĂů,ŝŶĚƵ>Ăǁ ? ŝŶ dŝŵŽƚŚǇ>ƵďŝŶ ? ŽŶĂůĚZ ĂǀŝƐ :ƌ ?ĂŶĚ :ĂǇĂŶƚŚ<<ƌŝƐŚŶĂŶ  ?ĞĚƐ ) ?
Hinduism and Law: An Introduction (Cambridge University Press 2010). 
148 The reformers held a protectionist stance and were of the view that protective forms of legislation 
were necessary to weed out social ills.  In contrast to reformers, conservative Hindus iterated the 
ŶŽƚŝŽŶƐŽĨĂǁŽŵĂŶ ?ƐĐŚĂƐƚŝƚǇĂŶĚŵŽdesty and demanded that the government should not interfere 
in the private lives of individuals. For more on this, see Chitra Sinha, Debating Patriarchy - The Hindu 
Code Bill Controversy in India (1941 - 1956) (Oxford University Press 2012). 
149 Child marriage was a common custom in Hindu society during nineteenth century. Girls as young 
as 10, were married to men who were 30 or even older. Sometimes, this resulted in instances of 
marital rapes or even death of these girls due to forceful sexual intercourse, as in the case of Phulmani 
Devi in Bengal. The husband was not punished as sexual intercourse with his wife was considered his 
conjugal prerogative. This case triggered a national controversy on deciding the age of consent for 
marriage of Hindu girls, a debate that was carried on into the early decades of the twentieth century 
and eventually led to the passing of the Child Marriage Restraint Act, 1929 or as it is popularly called, 
Sarda Act (dĂŶŝŬĂ^ ĂƌŬĂƌ ? ‘ŽůŽŶŝĂů>ĂǁŵĂŬŝŶŐĂŶĚ>ŝǀĞƐ ?ĞĂƚŚƐŽĨ/ŶĚŝĂŶtŽŵĞŶ PŝĨĨĞƌĞŶƚZĞĂĚŝŶŐƐ
ŽĨ >ĂǁĂŶĚŽŵŵƵŶŝƚǇ ? ŝŶRatna Kapur (ed), Feminist Terrains in Legal Domains: Interdisciplinary 
Essays on Women and Law in India (Kali for Women, New Delhi 1996). 
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role of women within families as the ideal wife and mother. Thus, the legal 
subject of the Hindu woman, who was vastly different from the Hindu man, 
came to stay in Hindu legal and social life. 
The late nineteenth century witnessed the emergence of division of public and 
private domains in the political arena.150 The public domain consisted of the 
ruling elite who enjoyed power over the subjects while the private domain was 
composed of relationships of love and affection, namely, the family. This 
divide served to reinforce the private domain or family as the space for 
preserving traditions and customs and the moral initiative of preserving these 
cultural norms were passed on to women.151 This social and cultural division 
was also characterised by the public domain being cast as materialistic and 
´:HVWHUQµ LQ LWV LGHDOVZhile the private domain was spiritual and Indian in 
character.152 The workings of the Hindu family were confined to the private 
domain during this time.  
Moreover, this period also witnessed a shift in the mind-set of Hindu male 
merchants and professionals, who were ardent critics of the 0LWņNVKDUD 
coparcenary system. They advanced arguments about caring for and 
protecting their wives so that they could acquire greater individual control and 
autonomy over their property, instead of submitting to the control of the joint, 
coparcenary Hindu family.153 So, the rise of the new middle class consisting of 
                                                             
 
150 The public domain served as the site of struggle for the emasculated male body that was subject 
to power inequalities with the colonial masters, while the private domain of the family was 
untouched by the outside and represented by the pure female body that was living according to the 
scriptures. While the conjugal relationships of the Hindu household reflected the colonial power 
structures, it was repeatedly overshadowed by discourses of self-surrender and self-fulfilment of 
women in the framework of the family. For more on this, see  Tanika Sarkar, Hindu Wife, Hindu Nation 
- Community, Religion and Cultural Nationalism (Indiana University Press 2001), Partho Chatterjee, 
 ‘dŚĞEĂƚŝŽŶĂůŝƐƚZĞƐŽůƵƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞtŽŵĞŶ ?ƐYƵĞƐƚŝŽŶ ?ŝŶ<^ĂŶŐĂƌŝĂŶĚsĂŝĚ ?^ ? ?ĞĚƐ ) ?ƵďĂĂŶ ? ? ? ? ).
151 Tanika Sarkar, Hindu Wife, Hindu Nation - Community, Religion and Cultural Nationalism (Indiana 
University Press 2001). 
152ibid. 
153 Mytheli Sreenivas, Wives, Widows, and Concubines: The Conjugal Family Ideal in Colonial India 
(Indiana University Press 2008). 
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professional elite and merchant class led to the challenging of property rights 
of the Hindu joint family. The concept of a modern conjugal family consisting 
of a man and his wife and their children assumed centre-stage in the Hindu 
social scene, as the newly emerging Hindu middle-class wanted to secure its 
self-acquired property.154 +RZHYHUWKLVYLHZZDVFRQILQHGWRD+LQGXPDOH·V
individual property, as is evident from the Hindu Gains of Learning Act, 1930, 
which was applicable only to Hindu males. What is evident from the political 
and legal events of this period is that there was a concerted effort to create 
the Hindu male as an economic subject capable of rational decisions, while 
the Hindu female was a political subject with limited economic interests, 
largely confined to the private sphere of the family.155 This notion, of a 
differential legal subjecthood based on gender, is largely responsible for 
conceptualisation of normative gender roles in the Hindu family, as I explore 
later in this chapter and in subsequent chapters. 
To summarise, while the colonial government repeatedly insisted that it 
followed a policy of non-intervention in religious personal laws, it steered the 
course of conversion of the plural nature of Hindu customary law into a more 
uniform and homogenized system. This process was aided by the way Hindu 
customary law was interpreted and administered in courts by English judges.  
Hindu law eventually came to be dependent on precedents and rules laid 
down by British courts, which made the legal system more rigid and led to the 
creation of the Hindu joint family as a legal category in the late eighteenth 
                                                             
 
154 DǇƚŚĞůŝ^ƌĞĞŶŝǀĂƐ ? ‘Conjugality and Capital: Gender, Families, and Property under Colonial Law in 
/ŶĚŝĂ ? (2004) 63 The Journal of Asian Studies. 
155 Eleanor Newbigin, The Hindu Family and the Emergence of Modern India - Law, Citizenship and 
Community (Cambridge University Press 2013). Newbigin traces the creation of legal subjecthood 
based on gender roles within the family in this book. In her concluding remarks, she states that it 
would be interesting to analyse how these legal subjects reflect in the judgments under various 
enactments of the Hindu code. I explore this idea by way of case law analysis in subsequent chapters, 
thereby taking her research forward (I arrived at a similar conclusion of how different legal and 
gendered subjects were created under the Hindu code in my background research, which coincided 
with the publication of her book). 
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and first part of nineteenth centuries.156 The culmination of several factors, 
such as the newly emerging middle class of British educated Indians as well as 
the political and economic compulsions faced by the colonial government in 
the nineteenth and early years of the twentieth centuries, witnessed an 
¶LQYHQWLRQ·RIWKH+LQGXIDPLO\. But, this family was not an invention but merely 
an inversion of the earlier joint family ideal. The Hindu joint family was viewed 
as being regressive and opposed to modernizing tendencies that prevented 
economic development due to its traditional functioning.157 This sentiment 
ZDV XWLOLVHG E\ WKH FRORQLDO UXOHUV WR JDUQHU VXSSRUW IRU D ¶PRGHUQ· +LQGX
nuclear family, as it suited their economic considerations. Therefore, individual 
property came to be the marker of the Hindu nuclear family.  
It was this modern, nuclear, heterosexual conjugal family that was the site of 
nationalist action in the early years of the twentieth century. Women were 
called to fight along with their men and were also asked to take the place of 
their men folk when the latter went to prison. With the rise of the nationalist 
movement, the family was revived in political discourse, as it was used to draw 
analogies between the nation and its subjects. There was vivid family imagery 
used for drawing parallels between a family and the nation. For example, the 
portrayal of the nation as a mother and its citizens as a happy and united 
family recurs in nationalist literature of the period.158 The leaders of the 
nationalist struggle tried to harness the support of women and in this context, 
the family once again occupied centre stage in politics. In the next section, I 
analyse how this construction of the Hindu family was altered in the late 
                                                             
 
156 Chitra Sinha, Debating Patriarchy - The Hindu Code Bill Controversy in India (1941 - 1956) (Oxford 
University Press 2012). 
157 WĂƚƌŝĐŝĂhďĞƌŽŝ ? ‘/ŶƚƌŽĚƵĐƚŝŽŶ ?ŝŶWhďĞƌŽŝ ?ĞĚ ) ?Family , Kinship and Marriage in India (1993) Oxford 
University Press). 
158 Many novels and poems written in regional language during this period (such as Subramanya 
ŚĂƌĂƚŝǁƌŝƚŝŶŐŝŶdĂŵŝǌŚ ) ?ĚĞƐĐƌŝďĞƚŚĞŝŵĂŐĞƌǇŽĨ ‘DŽƚŚĞƌ/ŶĚŝĂ ?ĂŶĚƚŚĞŶĂƚŝŽŶĂƐ ‘ŽŶĞĨĂŵŝůǇ ? ?dŚĞ
ŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůŝƐƚƐĨŝŐŚƚŝŶŐĨŽƌŝŶĚĞƉĞŶĚĞŶĐĞĨƌŽŵƌŝƚŝƐŚƌƵůĞŽĨƚĞŶƉŽƌƚƌĂǇĞĚ ‘DŽƚŚĞƌ/ŶĚŝĂ ?ďĞŝŶŐŝŶĐŚĂŝŶƐ
or shackles, as is evident from newspapers and magazines of the times. 
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colonial times, especially in conjunction with the nationalist movement for 
independence of India and questions of gender. 
3.4 The Hindu Woman in the Nationalist Movement 
With the rise of the nationalist movement seeking independence from colonial 
rule during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, it became 
important to nationalist leaders to relate every aspect of life to political 
independence of India. The ideology of the nationalist movement envisaged 
the construction of a modern Indian society that would not lose its ancient 
spiritual identity.159 For this, it was important to integrate the twin strands of 
liberal Western thought and spiritual Indian beliefs. This was made possible 
by constructing the image of a new category of the middle-FODVV´ZRPDQµ
who was Western educated but who held onto traditional value systems. This 
woman was subject to a newly emerging patriarchy of a new middle class.160 
Thus the social subject of the Hindu woman, who was vastly different from the 
Hindu man, came to stay in Indian political and social life.  
The latter half of the nineteenth century and early years of the twentieth 
FHQWXU\ ZLWQHVVHG WKH ULVH RI ZRPHQ·V PRYHPHQWV ZKLFK SULRULWLVHG
education as a tool WR DOOHYLDWH ZRPHQ·V FRQGLWLRQ LQ VRFLHW\161 These 
movements contributed to pressurising the colonial government to revisit 
legislation, especially those involving women and property rights, to 
guarantee financial freedom for women. This period witnessed increased 
legislative activity, as the British government undertook the codification and 
                                                             
 
159 This was largely a legacy of Gandhian thought in the national movement. 
160 The creation of the category of the modern middle-class woman and the absorption of the 
ǁŽŵĞŶ ?Ɛ ƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶ ŝŶ ƚŚĞ ŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůŝƐƚ ĚŝƐĐŽƵƌƐĞ ůĞĚ ƚŽ ĨĂůƐĞ ĞƐƐĞŶƚŝĂůŝƐŵƐ ŽĨ ŚŽŵĞ ?ǁŽƌůĚ ?
spiritual/material, feminine/masculine in the nationalist ideology. For detailed discussion, see Partho 
ŚĂƚƚĞƌũĞĞ ?  ‘dŚĞ EĂƚŝŽŶĂůŝƐƚ ZĞƐŽůƵƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ tŽŵĞŶ ?Ɛ YƵĞƐƚŝŽŶ ? ŝŶ < ^ĂŶŐĂƌŝ ĂŶĚ sĂŝĚ ?^ ?  ?ĞĚƐ )
(Zubaan 1989). 
161 ZĞŶƵŬĂZĂǇ ? ‘The Background of the Hindu Code Bill ? ? ? ? ? ? ) ? ?WĂĐŝĨŝĐĨĨĂŝƌƐ ? ? ?. 
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secularization of commercial, civil, criminal and procedural law in India.162  
However, Hindu personal law was left largely untouched during this period, as 
legislating on it was considered an intrusion into the private space of Hindu 
families, and the British wanted to wait to obtain the co-operation of Indians 
to legislate in the private domain of Hindu law.163 
The early decades of the twentieth century witnessed a period of intense 
political and social changes in India. With the rise of the nationalist movement, 
WKHZRPHQ·VPRYHPHQWZDVDOVREHJLQQLQJWRJDLQJURXQGDFURVV,QGLDDQG
this period witnessed the formation of Pan-,QGLDZRPHQ·VRUJDQLsations.164 
Women leaders began to seek women-friendly legislation and were 
instrumental in reshaping the political and social agenda of the times. 
However, to have a national presence, these organisations had to hitch their 
wagons to the Congress party leadership, as the Congress165 emerged as the 
dominant force on the national political scene at that time. As discussed 
earlier, the newly emerging middle class supported individual ownership and 
conjugal relationship as being the basis of the Hindu family, while retaining 
the role of women as perpetuators of tradition. The combination of the rise of 
ZRPHQ·VRUJDQL]DWLRQVVWURQJOLEHUDOOHDGHUVKLSZLWKLQWKHGRPLQDQWSROLWLFDO
                                                             
 
162 ,>>ĞǀǇ ? ‘Lawyer-Scholars, Lawyer-Politicians and the Hindu Code Bill, 1921-1956 ? ?>Ăǁ ?^ŽĐŝĞƚǇ
Review 303. 
163 Chitra Sinha, Debating Patriarchy - The Hindu Code Bill Controversy in India (1941 - 1956) (Oxford 
University Press 2012). 
164 ^ŽŵĞŽĨƚŚĞĨĂŵŽƵƐŽƌŐĂŶŝƐĂƚŝŽŶƐƚŚĂƚĞŵĞƌŐĞĚǁĞƌĞtŽŵĞŶ ?Ɛ/ŶĚŝĂŶƐƐŽĐŝĂƚŝŽŶ ? ? ? ? ? ) ?ǁŚŝĐŚ
campaigned actively to include enfranchisement of women under the Government of India Act, 
1919), National Council of Women in India (1925) aŶĚůů/ŶĚŝĂtŽŵĞŶ ?ƐŽŶĨĞƌĞŶĐĞ ? ? ? ? ? ) ? 
165 The Indian National Congress (Congress for short) was the most popular political party of the 
Indian national movement. This period witnessed the rise of M.K. Gandhi, Jawaharlal Nehru, B R 
Ambedkar, Dr Rajendra PraƐĂĚĂŶĚsĂůůĂďŚďŚĂŝWĂƚĞůŝŶƚŚĞŶĂƚŝŽŶ ?ƐĂŶĚŽŶŐƌĞƐƐƉĂƌƚǇ ?ƐůĞĂĚĞƌƐŚŝƉ ?
men who were all British-educated lawyers. While Nehru, Ambedkar and held liberal and modern 
views, Gandhi combined the modern with Indian spiritual ethics while Prasad and Patel were 
conservative in their politics. Ambedkar belonged to the lower Untouchable Caste, which made him 
more sensitive to caste discrimination and he tried to incorporate provisions to address this issue in 
the Hindu code. 
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party of the time and the emergence of the new middle class set the stage for 
socio-legal reform in the subsequent years. 
,Q WKHVDQGVQDWLRQDOLVWVDQGZRPHQ·V OHDGHUV LQ ,QGLDDVVHUWHG
that the question of maltreatment of women was a by-product of colonial 
legacy and that the liberation of women was linked to the liberation of the 
nation. The important creative contribution of the nationalist ideology was the 
HYROXWLRQ RI D FXOWXUDO SURMHFW RI DQ ´LQQHUµ LGHQWLW\ LQ ZKLFK WKH QDWLRQ·V
autonomy could be located.166 A new subject position was created for the 
+LQGX ZRPDQ ZLWK DQ ´HVVHQWLDOL]HG ,QGLDQQHVVµ ZKLFK ZDV LQKHUHQWO\
different from the ¶Westernized· woman.167 7KH GHEDWH RQ WKH ´VWDWXV RI
ZRPHQµ ZDV WDNHQ XS E\ QDWLRQDOLVW FODLPV DQG ZDV VXSSRUWHG E\ WKH
HPHUJHQFH RI OLEHUDO ZRPHQ·V PRYHPHQWV GXULQJ WKLV WLPH +RZHYHU WKLV
movement adhered to a gendered notion of family, as they constructed 
ZRPHQ·VLGHQWLW\EDVHGRQWKHLGHDORIPRWKHUKRRGDQGZRPHQZHUHWREH
ideal mothers, full of sacrifice and loyalty.168  
This period also witnessed the emergence of an equal rights discourse, which 
was assimilated into the currents of nationalism, as the freedom of the nation 
superseded all other political and social agendas of the time.169 In the inter-
ZDU SHULRG ,QGLDQ ZRPHQ·V PRYHPHQWs, with their liberal overtones, 
mobilised support for several legislative reforms, such as the Hindu Age of 
Consent Bill.170 The movement demanded reforms that were forward-looking, 
OHDGLQJWRWKHFRQVWUXFWLRQRIWKH´DOOHJHGO\QHXWUDODQGXQPDUNHGFLWL]HQ-
                                                             
 
166 WĂƌƚŚŽŚĂƚƚĞƌũĞĞ ? ‘The Nationalist ZĞƐŽůƵƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞtŽŵĞŶ ?ƐYƵĞƐƚŝŽŶ ?ŝŶ<^ĂŶŐĂƌŝĂŶĚsĂŝĚ ?^ ?
(eds) (Zubaan 1989). 
167 ibid. 
168 Brenda Cossman and Ratna Kapur, Subversive Sites - Feminist Engagements with Law in India (Sage 
Publications India Pvt Ltd 1996). 
169 DƌŝŶĂůŝŶŝ ^ŝŶŚĂ ?  ‘Refashioning Mother India: Feminism and Nationalism in Late-Colonial India ?
(2000) 26 Feminist Studies. 
170 Chitra Sinha, Debating Patriarchy - The Hindu Code Bill Controversy in India (1941 - 1956) (Oxford 
University Press 2012). 
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VXEMHFWµ171 This group opposed both the colonial regime and male 
domination in society, thereby paving the way for representational politics for 
women and for the creation of the identity of the liberal citizen, along the lines 
of liberal feminism. The activism of this movement helped to protect the 
nationalist ideology from the critiques of gender, caste and religious 
hierarchies, which were the three fundamental axes of conflict in India.172 What 
emerged was the new claim of Indian modernity, especially the modern Indian 
subject who transcended caste, gender or religious barriers and this subject 
became the blueprint for the citizen-subject of free India.173 
7KHLGHDRIWKH¶QHXWUDODQGXQPDUNHGFLWL]HQ-VXEMHFW·JDLQHGJURXQGGXULQJ
the Hindu-Muslim riots following the partition of India. While the family was 
used as a medium to redefine national identity, the independence of India and 
the partition of the country provided new perspectives to definition of 
family.174 Religious and communal identity became central to defining both 
individual and family identity. Because of the partition of the country and 
subsequent riots, the need to define a national identity along religious lines 
became important. Due to this necessity, the family signified the religious 
community and in turn, the national identity. The family was viewed as the 
bedrock of preservation of the nation. All other definitions and identities of 
                                                             
 
171 DƌŝŶĂůŝŶŝ ^ŝŶŚĂ ?  ‘Refashioning Mother India: Feminism and Nationalism in Late-Colonial India ?
(2000) 26 Feminist Studies. 
172 Chitra Sinha, Debating Patriarchy - The Hindu Code Bill Controversy in India (1941 - 1956) (Oxford 
University Press 2012). 
173 This modern citizen was subsequently enshrined in the Indian Constitution by means of providing 
universal adult franchise to all citizens of India. For more details, see DƌŝŶĂůŝŶŝ^ŝŶŚĂ ? ‘Refashioning 
Mother India: Feminism and Nationalism in Late-Colonial India ? ? ? ? ? ? ) ? ?&ĞŵŝŶŝƐƚ^ƚƵĚŝĞƐ ? 
174 For instance, during the Partition riots, about 1, 00,000 women were displaced from their homes 
and they belonged to Hindu, Muslim and Sikh Communities. The Governments of India and Pakistan 
decided to exchange these women and this exercise was carried out over almost 10 years and in most 
instances, against the wishes of the women themselves and to their personal detriment. This is an 
example of how the official discourse of the nation state tried to order family life as the means for 
legitimising the sovereign (sĞĞŶĂĂƐ ? ‘dŚĞ&ŝŐƵƌĞŽĨƚŚĞďĚƵĐƚĞĚtŽŵĂŶ PdŚĞŝƚŝǌĞŶĂƐ^ĞǆĞĚ ?ŝŶ
H De Vries and LE Sullivan (eds), Political Theologies: Public Religions in a Post-secular World (Fordham 
University Press 2006).  
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family such as lived experiences, emotional ties, care or nurturing were lost in 
the notion of national identity in the initial years of independence.175 The 
fundamentally religious and gendered character of governance, which was a 
feature of the colonial regime, became a feature of later governments in 
India.176  
Following the above discussions, it is evident that the nuclear conjugal family 
LGHDOZLWKJHQGHULQJRIWKHZRPHQ·VUROHDVWKHLGHDOZLIHDQGPRWKHUIRXQG
IDYRXU LQ ERWK WKH QDWLRQDOLVW LGHRORJ\ DQG ZRPHQ·V PRYHPHQWV LQ ODWH
colonial India. These factors combined to produce the category of the new 
middle-class Indian woman who was modern and yet traditional in values and 
they further gave rise to the category of a citizen-subject who was unmarked 
E\FDVWHJHQGHURUUHOLJLRQ7KHVHFDWHJRULHVEHFDPHWKHVLJQLILHUVRI,QGLD·V
modernity and life after colonial rule. While these were the overarching 
implications, the idea of gendering of roles in a Hindu family gained ground 
during this period and was subsequently incorporated into the Hindu code. In 
the next two chapters, I explore how this idea of gendering of roles is 
persistent in judicial reasoning in the cases under study and how this leads to 
the construction of a certain type of Hindu woman in judicial reasoning.  In 
the next section, I examine the evolution of the Hindu personal law system in 
India, before and after independence from colonial rule, along with its 
implications for the definition of the Hindu family and prescribed gender roles 
within it. 
                                                             
 
175Mytheli Sreenivas, Wives, Widows & Concubines - The Conjugal Family Ideal in Colonial India 
(Orient Black Swan, India 2009).                                                       
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3.5 Origins of the Hindu Code 
The types of narratives that were specific to personal laws in India emphasised 
FXOWXUDOGLYHUVLW\SRVLWLRQRIZRPHQSRVLWLRQRIPLQRULW\FRPPXQLWLHV·YLV-à-
vis majority community and channelizing personal law reforms to ensure a 
balance between cultural continuity and cultural change.177 These notions 
were important for the construction of social and cultural norms of the nascent 
nation and for the creation of new subjects of law. The clamour for Hindu law 
reforms gained momentum in the 1930s. Persuaded by the critique of social 
reformers and Indian lawyers, the British government decided to reconsider 
the grounds for WKH+LQGX:RPHQ·V5LJKWWR3URSHUW\$FW+RZHYHU
what provided impetus to this decision was the outbreak of the Second World 
War and its associated fiscal issues for the British, which prompted the colonial 
administration to codify and establish Hindu property laws for rigorous tax 
collection.178 The interests of the colonial fiscal system and reform-minded 
Hindu legislators intersected to produce the Hindu Code Bill. Moreover, the 
Muslim League made its appearance on the political scene and there arose a 
competition between the Congress and the Muslim League for a position of 
prominence.179 This condition, as well as the debate and modernising rhetoric 
surrounding the Muslim Shariat Application Acts and Dissolution of Muslim 
Marriages Act of 1939, prompted Hindu leaders to respond with a need for a 
+LQGXFRGHWKDWZRXOGVHUYHWRDVVHUWWKH ¶VHFXODU·DQG¶PRGHUQ·QDWXUHRI
Hindu law and politics.180 Hindu leaders wanted to portray themselves to be 
                                                             
 
177 N Subramanian, Nation and Family - Personal Law, Cultural Pluralism and Gendered Citizenship in 
India (Stanford University Press 2014). 
178Eleanor Newbigin, The Hindu Family and the Emergence of Modern India - Law, Citizenship and 
Community (Cambridge University Press 2013). 
179 There is a lot of scholarship on the Muslim League, its role in the Indian nationalist movement and 
in the creation of Pakistan. For instance, see Ayesha Jalal, The Sole Spokesman: Jinnah, the Muslim 
League and the Demand for Pakistan (Cambridge University Press 1994). 
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as liberal and progressive in their outlook as their Muslim brethren, especially 
with respect to property rights for women. This outlook made them welcome 
debates on Hindu law reforms, a possibility that would not have existed a 
couple of decades earlier. Creation of new categories of economic subjects, a 
changed ideal of Hindu family as well as a change in the outlook of Hindu 
leadership aided in the debate and reform of Hindu laws.181 It was against this 
backdrop that the attempts at codification of Hindu law were initiated. 
The British administration of India was faced with the economic pressures of 
the Second World War and embarked on providing support and 
encouragement to the creation of the Hindu code, as it was perceived that 
this would establish new political, social, legal and economic subjects. Against 
this background, it established the Hindu Law Committee in 1941 under the 
chairmanship of B.N. Rau, then judge of the Calcutta High Court.182 The Hindu 
Law Committee was constituted in January 1941 and met intermittently until 
May 1941.183 The report of the committee classified women, as potential 
property owners, into three categories ² 
                                                             
 
181 Chitra Sinha, Debating Patriarchy - The Hindu Code Bill Controversy in India (1941 - 1956) (Oxford 
University Press 2012). 
182 It is interesting to note that this committee, which was constituted to suggest changes to Hindu 
legislative policy on rights of women in Hindu law, was completely devoid of women. Initially, this 
committee was conceived ƚŽĚĞĂůǁŝƚŚƚŚĞŝƐƐƵĞƐƌĞůĂƚŝŶŐƚŽƚŚĞ,ŝŶĚƵtŽŵĞŶ ?ƐZŝŐŚƚƚŽWƌŽƉĞƌƚǇ
Đƚ ?  ? ? ? ? ĂŶĚ  “ƚŽ ƐƵŐŐĞƐƚ ƐƵĐŚ ĂŵĞŶĚŵĞŶƚƐ ƚŽ ƚŚĞ Đƚ ĂƐ ǁŽƵůĚ ƌĞƐŽůǀĞ ƚŚĞ ĚŽƵďƚƐ ĂƐ ƚŽ ƚŚĞ
construction of the Act and clarify the nature of the right conferred by the Act upon the widow; and 
ƌĞŵŽǀĞĂŶǇŝŶũƵƐƚŝĐĞƚŚĂƚŵĂǇŚĂǀĞďĞĞŶďǇƚŚĞĐƚƚŽƚŚĞĚĂƵŐŚƚĞƌƐ ? ? ?'ŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚŽĨ/ŶĚŝĂ ? ‘ZĞƉŽƌƚ
ŽĨƚŚĞ,ŝŶĚƵ>ĂǁŽŵŵŝƚƚĞĞ ?'ŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚWƌĞƐƐ ?DĂĚƌĂƐ ?). As evidenced by the terms of reference 
above, there were divergent views on Hindu Law reform, especially with respect to the position of 
women in society and these were to be addressed by the committee. 
183 It prepared a three-part questionnaire. Part I of ƚŚĞƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶŶĂŝƌĞĚĞĂůƚǁŝƚŚ,ŝŶĚƵtŽŵĞŶ ?ƐZŝŐŚƚ
to Property Act, 1937, parts II and III were about two bills that were being examined by the 
ŽŵŵŝƚƚĞĞ ?dŚŝƐƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶŶĂŝƌĞǁĂƐĚŝƐƚƌŝďƵƚĞĚĂŵŽŶŐũƵĚŐĞƐ ?ůĂǁǇĞƌƐ ?ƉƌŽŵŝŶĞŶƚĐŝƚŝǌĞŶƐ ?ǁŽŵĞŶ ?Ɛ
organisations, social reform organizations as well as traditional and orthodox groups, apart from 
being published in the popular newspapers of the time, to garner maximum public opinion. The 
Committee collated its findings and published them in the form of a report on June 19, 1941 (Chitra 
Sinha, Debating Patriarchy - The Hindu Code Bill Controversy in India (1941 - 1956) (Oxford University 
Press 2012).                                           
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1. Widow of a deceased person whose property is to be inherited 
2. Widowed daughter-in-law 
3. Daughter 
It is significant that women were divided only into the three categories 
mentioned above, without being considered as legal persons by themselves. 
Further, the spotlight was not on gender inequalities or disparities, but on the 
notion of property rights among different categories of women within a Hindu 
family.184 The key focus of the debate was on the excessive rights given to the 
widowed daughter-in-law, more than the daughter. This report also provided 
recognitLRQWRWKHUROHSOD\HGE\ZRPHQ·VRUJDQL]DWLRQVDFURVVWKHFRXQWU\
and applauded them for seeking a complete revision of the entire law as 
opposed to piecemeal legislation. The report served to portray the social 
currents of the time and polarised the debates on reforms between liberals 
and conservatives.  
The Rau committee recommended that the complete codification of Hindu 
law should be undertaken to provide unification of legal practice, quicken the 
pace of modernization of the legal system and to incorporate ideas of gender 
equality in the Hindu corpus. It also recommended that such a code should 
be prepared in stages with consensual public opinion. It specifically sought 
the legal right for separate maintenance for Hindu women as well as abolition 
of polygamy, limited estate for women,185 and inclusion of female heirs in 
inheritance of property.186 :KLOH WKH &RPPLWWHH·V UHFRPPHQGDWLRQV ZHUH
restricted to a certain view of women, it cannot be denied that if implemented, 
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185 Women were allowed enjoyment of benefits from the property during their lifetime but did not 
possess the any rights of alienation by way of sale or transfer. After the death of the woman, the 
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these recommendations would change the texture of Hindu families. This 
report was accepted by the Government and the Committee was asked to 
commence work on a Hindu code. The recommendations of the committee 
were viewed with suspicion by orthodox Hindus who contested the ability of 
women to manage property.187 Mitter, one of the earliest members of the 
Committee, resigned from his position and the other members finalised the 
Hindu Code Bill and submitted their report to the Government in February 
1947.188 The code bill was drafted by an elite few and found acceptance due 
to the backing of the Government in power. This prospect caused alarm 
among legislators as they felt that the code was elitist in its outlook.189 In this 
situation, the country obtained independence from colonial rule on 15th 
August 1947. 
The period after independence from the colonial rule was one of immense 
change with the transfer of power and partition of the country, followed by 
the worst communal riots that the sub-continent had ever witnessed. It was 
thought necessary to create a unique Indian identity as the Indian leadership 
had agreed to retain Muslims as a minority community within its fold. State 
power shifted from the colonial ruler to the Hindu majority leadership, which 
                                                             
 
187 While these bills were debated in the legislature, the Government moved a motion to refer the 
bill to a joint select committee. The Joint Select Committee tabled its report in November 1943 and 
proposed that the Hindu Law Committee be reconstituted to draft a comprehensive Hindu Code. 
Based on this recommendation, the Hindu Law Committee was reconstituted for formulating the 
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same, the constituent members of the Committee were changed to include T.R. Venkatarama Sastry, 
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189 For a detailed discussion on this, see  Eleanor Newbigin, The Hindu Family and the Emergence of 
Modern India - Law, Citizenship and Community (Cambridge University Press 2013), Chitra Sinha, 
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ZDVNHHQWRSURYLGHD´VHFXODU ,QGLDQQDWLRQDO LGHQWLW\µDVRSSRVHGWRWKH
religious Pakistani identity), a euphemism for a Hindu identity in Indian 
politics.190 This was implicit in the support provided by Indian leaders to 
codification of Hindu law, as it was widely perceived that such codification 
could be used as an example to highlight that the state could enter into the 
arena of personal laws so as to make them more secular in nature. State 
formation in post-FRORQLDO VRFLHWLHV LQYROYHV ´EDODQFHG HFRQRPLF
development, social cohesion, and political stability as well as creating 
QDWLRQDO FRQVFLRXVQHVVµ WKURXJK ´OHJLVODWLRQ DGMXGLFDWLRQ DQG ODZ
HQIRUFHPHQWµ191 This was the case in India where legislation was used to 
achieve economic, social and political order, while creating a new 
consciousness of India being a secular state. 
The effects of the partition and bloodshed that followed served to underline 
VWURQJIHHOLQJVRIUHOLJLRXVDIILQLW\7KHZRUG´+LQGXµDQGE\H[WHQVLRQWKH
Hindu family), assumed religious overtones, in contrast to its earlier 
understated position. The Hindu family thus moved from the private to the 
public domain during the late colonial times and the early years of 
independence from the colonial rule, as seen in the sentiment behind the 
passage of the Hindu code in post-independent India. There was a perceived 
QHHGWRHVWDEOLVK,QGLD·VVHFXODUFUHGHQWLDOVDQGSURYLGHSURWHFWLRQWRZRPHQ
and minority communities. This was visible in the automatic extrapolations 
made from the notion of the Hindu family to the Indian nation during the 
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debates on the Hindu code.192 The position and role of women in Hindu 
families were often the subject of these debates.  
While the role of women in families continued to be defined along the ideals 
of wifehood and motherhood, it was widely acknowledged that women 
needed to be provided rights equal to men. This created a tension between 
these two opposing notions. So, how could these two notions be balanced? 
This was resolved by providing gender equality as a fundamental 
Constitutional right, while simultaneously recognising women as a category 
with differential rights. The Indian Constitution provided for equality of all the 
citizens of India but acknowledged that women and marginalised 
communities have a lot of ground to cover in terms of equality. It provided 
guidelines to the Indian state to legislate on behalf of women and minority 
communities, so that their rights are protected, and they are brought on par 
as social equals to the upper and majority sections of society. The Constituent 
Assembly that deliberDWHGRQ,QGLD·VIXWXUHFRQVWLWXWLRQZDVVHWXSLQ
and the Congress obtained a majority in this assembly. The Hindu Code Bill 
was introduced and debated in this Constituent Assembly. Most legislators 
who were responsible for the Indian constitution were also responsible for the 
Hindu Code and there was an overlap of ideas. So, the tension between the 
idea of gender equality and protectionism of women and minorities 
originated in the drafting process of the Constitution and was passed on to 
the drafting of the Hindu code. This tension is still an insurmountable hurdle 
and is often reflected in judicial reasoning, as I explore in Chapter 4. In the 
next section, I discuss the events leading to the formation of the Hindu Code 
and its provisions with respect to gender. 
                                                             
 
192 Chitra Sinha, Debating Patriarchy - The Hindu Code Bill Controversy in India (1941 - 1956) (Oxford 
University Press 2012). 
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3.6 Formulation of the Hindu Code 
In the previous section, I described the changes in the political landscape of 
1940s India that had repercussions on the Hindu code bill, especially with 
respect to provisions on gender. In this section, I discuss the reactions to this 
bill and trace the evolution of the code during turbulent times of Indian 
independence. The Hindu Code Bill was introduced in the Constituent 
Assembly in 1948, as a part of the legislative process. The recommendations 
that were made to the Hindu Code Bill had the cumulative effect of changing 
the nature of the Hindu family, as these changes affected Hindu marriages, 
FRSDUFHQDU\ DQG ZRPHQ·V SURSHUW\ ULJKWV D SRLQW UHLQIRUFHG E\ +LQGX
conservatives repeatedly during debates on the bill.  
The major provisions of the Hindu Code Bill were as follows ²  
1. Significant changes were introduced in marriage as the Hindu Code Bill 
attempted to introduce two types of marriage ² sacramental marriage in 
accordance with scriptures (which was performed as ceremony or 
Samskņra along caste lines) and civil marriage with more individual 
freedom and choice. Civil marriages allowed persons within prohibited 
degree of relationship to marry and removed caste identity for marriages 
by permitting inter-caste marriages.193 Also, divorce became an easier 
option for civil marriages. The bill provided that sacramental marriages 
could be registered as civil marriages and could also come under the 
                                                             
 
193 For instance, it was forbidden to marry persons belonging to the same clan or Gotra, as they were 
considered Sapindas who have descended from a common ancestor. This implied that persons who 
had the same family name irrespective of whether they were remotely related, were not allowed to 
marry under customary Hindu law.  
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purview of divorce laws. The bill also advocated removal of polygamy, 
which was practised by Hindus to beget a son.194 
2. With respect to inheritance, the Bill proposed that heirs of intestate 
succession should not be treated as coparceneries but as individuals 
enjoying private or personal property, thereby acquiring an absolute right 
in the property. The Bill also stressed the lack of importance of blood 
relationship for inheritance, thereby including the widow, daughter and 
widowed daughter-in-law of a male Hindu as heirs on equal footing with 
direct male descendants. Also, it was proposed that a daughter should be 
entitled WRKDOIWKHVKDUHRIDVRQLQKHUIDWKHU·VSURSHUW\7KLVZDVGXHWR
the idea that if the daughter was qualified to hold Stridhana property by 
herself, then she was equally competent to own other property too. 
However, to maintain gender equality, it was proposed that the son would 
JHWKDOIWKHVKDUHRIWKHGDXJKWHULQWKHLUPRWKHU·VStridhana property. 
3. In the matter of adoption, the Bill provided for allowing inter-caste 
adoption. Earlier, while a widow could adopt a son to continue her 
GHFHDVHGKXVEDQG·VOLQHDJHWKHVRQFRXOGFRQWHVWWKHPRWKHU·VDOLHQDWLRQ
of property. The bill proposed that an adopted son could not challenge 
the legal rights of his widowed mother, both to reduce litigation in this 
regard and to ensure that he could not divest his mother of her property. 
                                                             
 
194 A son was and is considered very important in the patrilineal and patriarchal Hindu society for 
existence in this world and the other. A son ensured establishment of succession lines within the 
Hindu joint family and he was the person who offered libations for deceased parents, thereby 
granting them a place in heaven according to Hindu scriptures. The Sanskrit word for son,  ‘WƵƚƌĂ ?,
literally denotes he who releases one from the confines of the hell of Pitr.  The birth of a son was and 
is considered an auspicious occasion in a Hindu family. In the event of a couple being childless or 
having only daughters, they could adopt a son, usually from extended family or from outside. Hence, 
adoption constituted an important part of customary Hindu law. In view of this, it was acceptable for 
a Hindu male could remarry if his first wife was barren or did not beget a son. 
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Indirectly, this contributed to the widow acquiring absolute right in her 
GHFHDVHGKXVEDQG·VSURSHUW\ 
Sinha states that when the Bill was tabled in the legislature, it led to prolonged 
debates between liberal and conservative legislators. 195 The debates were 
reinvigorated in February 1951 and involved clause by clause discussion of the 
code bill. Several amendments were sought and there was a claim that the 
code would be accepted if it applied to all religions, rather than only Hindus.196 
Within the Congress party, Nehru and Ambedkar were the only liberals who 
wanted to proceed with the passage of the bill, while most of the hardliners 
and orthodox members of the Congress, such as Dr. Rajendra Prasad and 
Vallabhbhai Patel,197 and conservative Hindus were determined to stall its 
                                                             
 
195 To settle these debates, Ambedkar recommended that the bill be sent to a Select Committee of 
which he was a part. The Select Committee reviewed the code and suggested minor 
recommendations as follows  W 
a. With respect to marriage and divorce, two clauses were added for restitution of conjugal 
rights and judicial separation 
b. It was recommended that in the event of a male Hindu changing his religion, his wife had 
the right to adopt so long as she remained a Hindu by religion. Therefore, change of religion 
by the father served to be a disqualification for adoption 
c. In terms of minority and guardianship laws, it was recommended that the power of the 
Hindu father as natural guardian should be curtailed if the father changed his religion. 
The Select Committee recommendations were tabled before the legislature in August 1948 but were 
placed on the back-burner due to the necessity for addressing the issues of partition and the settling-
in phase of the nascent nation (Chitra Sinha, Debating Patriarchy - The Hindu Code Bill Controversy in 
India (1941 - 1956) (Oxford University Press 2012)). 
196 /ƚǁĂƐƐƵŐŐĞƐƚĞĚƚŚĂƚƚŚĞƚĞƌŵ ‘,ŝŶĚƵ ?ƐŚŽƵůĚŝŶĐůƵĚĞƵĚĚŚŝƐƚƐ ?:ĂŝŶƐĂŶĚ^ŝŬŚƐ ?ƵƚƚŚŝƐŵŽǀĞ
was opposed by some sections of the Sikh community, who claimed that they were not Hindu and 
that they had different local customs. Moreover, the Hindu orthodox parties, such as the Hindu 
Mahasabha, were in staunch opposition to the bill and claimed that it threatened the fundamental 
beliefs and practices of Hindus, as it abolished practices such as polygamy. The Hindu conservatives 
also pointed out that such practices were allowed for Muslims while being prohibited for others, 
which smacked of partisan politics. Hence, there were intense debates for the creation of a Uniform 
Civil Code instead, in view of post partition riots and charged communal atmosphere of the time. The 
Uniform Civil Code debate continues to this date in India and has been co-opted as an argument for 
ŝŶƚƌŽĚƵĐŝŶŐ,ŝŶĚƵŝĚĞĂůƐĂƐ ‘ƐĞĐƵůĂƌ ?ŝĚĞĂůƐŝŶƐŽĐŝĞƚǇĂŶĚůĂǁ ?&ŽƌŵŽƌĞ on this, see Ratna Kapur,  ‘A 
Leap of Faith: The Construction of Hindu Majoritarianism through Secular Law ? ? ? ? ? ? ) ? ? ?dŚĞ^ŽƵƚŚ
Atlantic Quarterly, WĂƌƚŚŽŚĂƚƚĞƌũĞĞ ? ‘History and the Nationalization of Hinduism ? ? ? ? ? ? ) ? ?^ŽĐŝĂů
Research, Z Hasan ? ‘'ĞŶĚĞƌ ?ZĞůŝŐŝŽŶĂŶĚĞŵŽĐƌĂƚŝĐWŽůŝƚŝĐƐŝŶ/ŶĚŝĂ ?(2010) 31 Third World Quarterly 
939. 
197 Both Prasad and Patel were close friends of Nehru during the days of the Nationalist Movement. 
However, both opposed the Hindu Code Bill in principle. Rajendra Prasad was elected the first 
President of Independent India and he engaged in lengthy correspondence with Nehru on the Bill 
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SURJUHVV 7KHELOO DOVR IDFHGRSSRVLWLRQ IURP6LNKV0XVOLPVDQG:RPHQ·V
representatives.198 Apart from the legislative and political spheres, the Code 
Bill faced widespread public opposition. Both Hindu and Muslim right-wing 
leaders encouraged opposition to the bill and leading newspapers of the time 
carried editorials opposing the bill. Indian political parties were to face their 
first general elections in 1952 and soon the Hindu Code Bill became a hotly 
contested election issue.199  
The Congress was voted to power with a resounding mandate in the first 
general elections of Independent India in 1952 and Nehru was sworn in as the 
Prime Minister. However, in view of the earlier opposition, he felt it was 
prudent to soft pedal on many of the former provisions of the Code Bill and 
the Cabinet also decided that the bill would be broken down into smaller 
components to facilitate easy passage in the Legislature.200 Many Common-
Law concepts such as restitution of conjugal rights and welfare principle in 
deciding custody cases were retained, while customary Hindu law received 
token acknowledgment. The Hindu Code was thus a diluted version of its 
former self. While it retained very little of the features mentioned earlier, some 
new ones were introduced, such as ² 
                                                             
 
urging him not to go through with it. When Nehru did not relent, Prasad threatened to withhold 
presidential assent for the bill to become an Act, triggering a constitutional face-off between the 
President and Prime Minister. Patel was the then Home Minister and he contributed to stalling the 
bill by disallowing time for discussing the bill in Parliament. Thus, the Prime minister did not find 
support even among his own party members for passing the bill (Reba Som ? ‘:ĂǁĂŚĂƌůĂůEĞŚƌƵĂŶĚ
the Hindu Code: A Victory of Symbol over Substance? ? ? ? ? ? ? ) ? ?DŽĚĞƌŶƐŝĂŶ^ƚƵĚŝĞƐ). 
198 Ambedkar resigned as the Law Minister then, as he was upset that the provisions introduced by 
him to fight caste discrimination were diluted in the debates. This left Nehru with the sole 
responsibility for the passage of the bill. 
199 Rajendra Prasad warned Nehru that his stance on the bill could prove a costly mistake in the 
elections and urged him to soft pedal the issue. Nehru relented and decided to wait for the electoral 
verdict before undertaking his reforms agenda. The Hindu code bill found a place in the manifesto of 
ƚŚĞŽŶŐƌĞƐƐƉĂƌƚǇĂƐǁĞůůĂƐEĞŚƌƵ ?ƐĞlection speeches across the length and breadth of the country 
(ibid, Chitra Sinha, Debating Patriarchy - The Hindu Code Bill Controversy in India (1941 - 1956) (Oxford 
University Press 2012)).                           
200 ibid,  ZĞŶƵŬĂZĂǇ ? ‘The Background of the Hindu Code Bill ? ? ? ? ? ? ) ? ?WĂĐŝĨŝĐĨĨĂŝƌƐ ? ? ?. 
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1. The Hindu Marriage Act of 1955 prohibited polygamy and provided a 
uniform mechanism for dissolution of marriage. However, it allowed 
practices of custom and usage and was a compromise in the end. This 
proved to be detrimental to many communities that had unique 
divorce laws, especially in South India where women were free to walk 
out of their marriages with the consent of local authorities.201  
2. The Hindu Succession Act of 1956 tended to unite various schools of 
Hindu Law by trying to ensure that there is no discrimination between 
sons and daughters in matters of inheritance. The 0LWņNVKDUD joint 
family property was upheld as a standard Hindu family and was the 
EDVLVIRU¶PRGHUQ·+LQGXODZ+RZHYHUPRVWSDUWVRI,QGLDFRQWLQXHG
to exclude daughters from inheritance rights, as they followed the 
0LWņNVKDUD coparcenary system of inheritance by sons.202  
3. The Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, 1956 and the Hindu 
Adoption and Maintenance Act, 1956 introduced the notion of one 
third of joint income being provided as maintenance to the wife post-
divorce, but the onus of proof of income was on the wife. This led to 
cumbersome litigation.203  
Collectively, these four acts were called the four pillars of Hindu Family Law. 
The common components of these enactments were that the approach to 
codification was modernist and influenced by the intellectual elite who 
disregarded traditional legal institutions advocated by Gandhi,204 the 6ņVWULF 
                                                             
 
201 Flavia Agnes, Law and Gender Inequality -dŚĞWŽůŝƚŝĐƐŽĨtŽŵĞŶ ?ƐZŝŐŚƚƐŝŶ/ŶĚŝĂ (Oxford University 
Press 1999).                       
202 This was rectified after 50 years by way of Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act, 2005. 
203 Currently, maintenance matters are provided speedy relief by way of Sec.125 of the Criminal 
Procedure Code of India that provides criminal relief. 
204 Shakuntala Rao makes an interesting comparison between the political ideologies of Gandhi and 
Nehru and their impact on reforms for Indian women. She claims that Nehru, being committed to 
modernity and liberalism, did not account for religious or communal patriarchy and considered 
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tradition was not considered significant205 and for the first time, secular 
options for contracting marriage were made available, cutting across 
communal lines.206 
The significant aspect of the Hindu Code Bill was that it generated much 
debate on the nature and role of women in Indian society. While the 
Nationalist movement had provided the platform for women to participate, it 
was the controversies surrounding the Code Bill that helped to highlight the 
perception of women and notions of gender in contemporary society. 
Moreover, the Hindu Law Committee debates laid bare the deep North-South 
divide in India, especially the contrasting perspectives on gender and role of 
women in Hindu families. However, due to an inherent northern bias in the 
political divisions, the northern view came to predominate and was finally 
accepted as the authority for preparation of the uniform Hindu code.207 This 
                                                             
 
gender equality to be necessary for Western style democracy and modernization of India. Gandhi had 
a deeper understanding of the social and religious forces in Indian society, conceived specific roles 
for women which would help in the nationalist cause and championed the subaltern cause by making 
his vision more androgynous and non-violent. However, post-Independence, Gandhi was 
assassinated, and Nehru implemented his modernist policies politically and legally. For a detailed 
discussion on this, see Shakuntala Rao,  ‘tŽŵĂŶ-as-^ǇŵďŽů ?  ? ? ? ? ? ) ? ?tŽŵĞŶ ?Ɛ^ ƚƵĚŝĞƐ/ŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂů
Forum. 
205 The ^ĈƐƚƌŝĐ tradition of Hindu law relied on interpretation of Hindu texts such as ^ŵƏŝƚŝ-s and 
ŚĂƌŵĂƐƻƚƌĂ-s and provided importance to regional customary practices. However, the codified 
Hindu law mentioned custom in passing and did not provide due recognition to the existence of local 
customs and usages. 
206 PS Ghosh, The Politics of Personal Law in South Asia - Identity, Nationalism and the Uniform Civil 
Code (Routledge 2007). 
207 During the debates, there was a state of conflict between the members from the northern and 
southern parts of the country with respect to local customs and practices. There were several debates 
with respect to provisions of the code, which were hotly contested between the two groups. Also, 
during the nationalist movement and after, politicians and legislators from the Northern part of India 
tend to dominate and take centre stage in Indian politics. All national parties of India tend to promote 
leaders from the northern and western parts of the country, i.e., the predominantly Hindi speaking 
belt. It is commonly perceived that Hindi is the national language of the country as it is spoken by 
maximum number of people and hence, any leader should emerge from the Hindi speaking belt. The 
North-South political divide is primarily linguistic and has perpetuated till date, as evidenced in every 
elected leader of government since Independence (South India has produced two of the 15 prime 
ministers in the last 70 years, of which one completed the full five-year term). This is despite the 
Southern states doing consistently better than their Northern and Western counterparts in social and 
economic development indicators. 
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resulted in a distinctive patriarchal slant to the Hindu code. The code, while 
not creating new rights, did erase existing rights for women in some parts of 
the country.208  
Despite being criticised for subscribing to traditional concepts of gender, the 
Hindu Code was instrumental in arousing social consciousness on gender 
roles and gender relations. Gender was the key site on which Hindu personal 
law was constructed and the state was the key institution through which Hindu 
law was to be altered and negotiated.209 Hindu law reform reinforced certain 
patterns of family life, such as family as monogamous nuclear unit in which 
women enjoyed limited economic independence. It was also one of the 
earliest examples of making gender a central issue in the formulation of 
modern laws in India.  
Perhaps the singular contribution of the Hindu Code Bill was the perpetuation 
of distinct legal subjecthood for Hindu men and women, which was in 
existence in the colonial times. As I discussed earlier, the Bill lost much of its 
liberal flavour and was passed as a watered-down version of its former self. 
Moreover, it was fragmented into four individual Acts, to facilitate the ease of 
its legislative passage. While some elements of liberal reform were 
incorporated, most were discarded so that the Acts would not face opposition 
from conservative Hindus in the legislature. Moreover, the Indian Constitution 
and the Hindu Code were drafted by the same legislative body and there was 
an overlap of ideas in both documents.210 The notion of disparate subjecthood 
                                                             
 
208 For a detailed discussion on how women in South India enjoyed better rights compared to those 
in North India and how the Hindu Code altered this situation, see Flavia Agnes, Law and Gender 
Inequality -dŚĞWŽůŝƚŝĐƐŽĨtŽŵĞŶ ?ƐZŝŐŚƚƐŝŶ/ŶĚŝĂ (Oxford University Press 1999). 
209 ZŝŶĂ sĞƌŵĂ tŝůůŝĂŵƐ ?  ‘Hindu Law as Personal Law: State and Identity in the Hindu Code Bill 
Debates, 1952 - 1956 ?ŝŶd>ƵďŝŶ ?ZĂǀŝƐ:ƌ ?ĂŶĚJK Krishnan (eds) (First, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge 2010). 
210 During the period between independence from colonial rule and establishment of a Constitution 
for free India (1947  W 1950), the Central Legislative Assembly functioned as a parliament in the 
forenoon and the Constituent Assembly in the afternoon (DĞŶĂŬĂ 'ƵƌƵƐǁĂŵǇ ?  ‘ƌĂĨƚŝŶŐ
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based on gender was retained in the Acts of the Hindu code as well as the 
Indian Constitution. There was, and is, a constant tension in reconciling gender 
parity with differential treatment based on gender in both the Hindu Code as 
well as the Indian Constitution.  
To summarise, the Hindu code favoured greater individualism, emphasised 
the concept of nuclear family, provided the possibility for divorce and 
advocated equality of castes by equal treatment of all Hindus in law, thereby 
attacking core Hindu traditional social systems such as caste, sacramental 
marriages, joint family and inheritance only by males.211  It provided greater 
right to individual ownership of property, as it changed the legal subjectivity 
of men from being coparceners in a joint family to absolute owners of 
individual property.  Thus, it created a new property regime of separate and 
individXDORZQHUVKLS LQZKLFKDZRPDQ·V UROHRIEHLQJWKHQXUWXUHU OHGWR
economic dependency.212 The premise of equality existed in the public sphere 
but did not carry forth into the private sphere of the Hindu family.213 
Moreover, it was considered necessary to subvert the rights of women to that 
of nation building in a newly independent nation.214 Certain normative notions 
of gender roles were embedded in the code at the time of its formulation, 
which are found in its judicial interpretation subsequently. While I analyse the 
judicial interpretation of the code in the next chapter, I now outline the 
                                                             
 
ŽŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶĂůsĂůƵĞƐථ PŶǆĂŵŝŶĂƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞ^ƵƉƌĞŵĞŽƵƌƚŽĨ/ŶĚŝĂ ?ŝŶĞŶŶŝƐĂǀŝƐ ?ůĂŶZŝĐŚƚĞƌ
and Cheryl Saunders (eds), An Inquiry into the Existence of Global Values: Through the Lens of 
Comparative Constitutional Law (Hart Publishing 2015). 
211 ibid. 
212Eleanor Newbigin, The Hindu Family and the Emergence of Modern India - Law, Citizenship and 
Community (Cambridge University Press 2013). 
213 Brenda Cossman and Ratna Kapur, Subversive Sites - Feminist Engagements with Law in India (Sage 
Publications India Pvt Ltd 1996).  
214  Chitra Sinha, Debating Patriarchy - The Hindu Code Bill Controversy in India (1941 - 1956) (Oxford 
University Press 2012). 
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evolution of the code and the Constitutional provision for UCC in the next 
section. 
3.7 The Hindu Code and the UCC 
From the late 1950s onwards, the scene of action shifted from the Parliament 
to the Courts, which became the interpreters of the Hindu code. The Hindu 
code has been interpreted and developed through case law decided by courts. 
There have been periodic contributions from the Government on gender 
relations, by means of various enactments and reports. The question of 
whether a uniform civil code (UCC) was required was debated in the 1950s, at 
the time of formation of the Hindu code and was brought up again in the 
1970s. The key argument in favour of a UCC was that there was a need for 
creating a modern political and legal community in an emerging nation. This 
tended to polarise the arguments for and against the UCC, along the lines of 
LQGLYLGXDO RULHQWDWLRQ WRZDUGV FRPPXQLWLHV RI EHORQJLQJ ZRPHQ·V HTXDO
rights within (and outside) the family as well as minority rights. For instance, 
the Hindu Nationalist Movement (HNM)215 envisaged this as the tool to create 
a Hindu nation, as the code would serve to wipe out the identities of Muslims 
and other minority groups, while WKH,QGLDQZRPHQ·VPRYHPHQWLQWKLVSHULRG
saw the UCC as an opportunity to correct gender imbalances within the 
family.216  
The 1980s and 1990s witnessed increasing communal and sectarian conflicts, 
including violence in the name of caste and religion as well as sectarian 
                                                             
 
215 I am using the term Hindu Nationalist movement to define the cultural and religious nationalism 
that emerged in 1920s India, with a markedly pro-Hindu stance. HNM denotes a combination of 
several organisations and has survived to the present day in different forms. Paola Bacchetta calls it 
ĂƐ “ĂŵŝĐƌŽ-ƌĞůŝŐŝŽƵƐŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůŝƐŵŽĨĞůŝƚĞƐ ? ?ǁŚŝĐŚŝƐĂŶĂĐĐƵƌĂƚĞĚĞĨŝŶŝƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞŵŽǀĞŵĞŶƚĂŶĚŝƚƐ
ideology (Paola Bacchetta ? ‘^ĂĐƌĞĚ^ ƉĂĐĞŝŶonflict in India: The Babri Masjid Affair ? ? ? ? ? ? ) ? ?'ƌŽǁƚŚ
and Change).  
216 While there are several other aspects to this debate, I have focused on those that are relevant to 
my thesis here. 
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movements. 1985 was a landmark year as it reopened debates on religious 
SHUVRQDOODZVDIWHUWKH6XSUHPH&RXUWRI,QGLD·VGHFLVLRQLQWKHIDPRXVFDVH
of Shah Bano Begum.217 The judgment in this case allowed Muslim women to 
claim maintenance under the Criminal Procedure Code, just like the members 
of any other community. The language of the judgment reinforced certain 
stereotypical notions of backwardness of the Muslim community and its 
treatment of women.218 This judgment was protested by the Muslim 
community widely and resulted in the passage of the Muslim Women 
(Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1985, by the then Congress Government. 
7KLV$FWQXOOLILHGWKH6XSUHPH&RXUW·VYHUGLFWE\SURYLGLQJ0XVOLPZRPHQ
maintenance according to Islamic laZ,WZDVDFWLYHO\RSSRVHGE\WKHZRPHQ·V
movement, moderates within the Muslim community and large sections of the 
civil society, as it did not provide sufficient rights to Muslim women and 
created more issues about women needing to assert their autonomy at the 
cost of giving up on their rights within the family. While the Constitution 
provided the state with the authority to legislate on personal laws, only Hindu 
laws were reformed and the personal laws of other communities were 
untouched.219 However, this enactment was used by the HNM as an argument 
for the government indulging in appeasement of minority groups and the 
Muslim community was portrayed to be parochial and resistant to reforms as 
well as to the formation of a unified political community.220 These conditions 
OHGWRWKHHPHUJHQFHRIWKHZRPHQ·VPRYHPHQWDQGWKH+10EHLQJVWUDQJH
                                                             
 
217 In the case of Mohammed Ahmed Khan vs. Shah Bano Khan (1985) SC 945, Shah Bano Begum, a 
Muslim woman, claimed maintenance from her husband under Sec.125 of the Code of Criminal 
Procedure of 1973, instead of Muslim Personal laws. Her husband argued that he did not have to pay 
maintenance under the Muslim Personal law beyond the period of Iddat (three months and ten days), 
as prescribed in Muslim Customary Law. 
218Zakia Pathak and Rajeswari ^ƵŶĚĞƌZĂũĂŶ ? ‘ “^ŚĂŚĂŶŽ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ) ? ?^ŝŐŶƐ ? 
219 Z Hasan ? ‘'ĞŶĚĞƌ ?ZĞůŝŐŝŽŶĂŶĚĞŵŽĐƌĂƚŝĐWŽůŝƚŝĐƐŝŶ/ŶĚŝĂ ?(2010) 31 Third World Quarterly 939. 
220 Flavia Agnes, Law and Gender Inequality -dŚĞWŽůŝƚŝĐƐŽĨtŽŵĞŶ ?ƐZŝŐŚƚƐŝŶ/ŶĚŝĂ (Oxford University 
Press 1999), ZĂũĞƐǁĂƌŝ^ƵŶĚĞƌZĂũĂŶ ? ‘Women between Community and State: Some Implications of 
the Uniform Civil Code Debates in India ? ? ? ? ? ? ) ? ?^ŽĐŝĂůdĞǆƚ. 
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bedfellows (as both were demanding for UCC, albeit for different reasons) and 
there arose stark differences between Hindu and Muslim communities. 
The Indian wRPHQ·VPRYHPHQWDVZHOODVPRGHUDWHHOHPHQWVVHHNLQJ8&&
abandoned their initiatives after the Gujarat violence of 2002, as it was 
perceived that the HNM was using the UCC as a tool to establish an 
DXWKRULWDULDQ +LQGX VWDWH 7KH :RPHQ·V PRYHPHQW KDV IRFXVHd on 
amendments to rape laws, banning of practices such as dowry, female 
foeticide and sex determination tests that lead to foeticides, protesting 
violence against women and evolving laws to combat sexual harassment at 
the workplace. While the movement has repeatedly sought reforms for 
women across communities, it has moved away from the UCC and focused on 
securing gender justice while acknowledging the criticality of asserting 
differences.221 The arguments of the movement have also focused on 
improving economic rights of women within families and marriages.222 While 
WKH ,QGLDQ ZRPHQ·V PRYHPHQW KDV DWWHPSWHG WR GLVWDQFH LWVHOI IURP WKH
formulation of a UCC, the HNM has adopted its formulation wholeheartedly. 
In Chapter 6, I explore the feminist positions on RPLs and how my analysis of 
case law aligns and expands these feminist positions. Here, I provide a 
snapshot of existing political conditions in India that form the background for 
the RPL and UCC debates currently.  
In the 1990s, the HNM emerged as a strong political contender and managed 
to form a government at the national level. This period also witnessed several 
religious riots which started initially due to the destruction of the Babri Masjid 
by Hindu right-wing factions and continued with their active abetment until 
                                                             
 
221 KŶĞƐĞĐƚŝŽŶŽĨ ƚŚĞǁŽŵĞŶ ?ƐŵŽǀĞŵĞŶƚŚĂƐĂƐŬĞĚ ĨŽƌĂhǁŚŝĐŚƉƌĞŵŝƐĞƐ ŝƚƐĞůĨ ŽŶŐĞŶĚĞƌ
justice, instead of religion (ibid). More on this in Chapter 6. 
222Flavia Agnes, Law and Gender Inequality -The Politics oĨtŽŵĞŶ ?ƐZŝŐŚƚƐŝŶ/ŶĚŝĂ (Oxford University 
Press 1999), Rajeswari Sunder Rajan, The Scandal of the State - Women, Law and Citizenship in 
Postcolonial India (Duke University Press 2003). 
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2002223, during which there was a massacre of 2000 Muslims by a 
predominantly Hindu Right mob in Gujarat, a Western Indian state. Since then, 
there are several instances of religion-based violence in pockets across the 
country. While there were some attempts at reform of religious laws,224 there 
have been no attempts to implement the UCC by any government in power. 
However, the HNM has emerged as a potent force trying to enforce strict 
social norms such as opposing inter-religious and inter-caste marriages, 
glorifying a rigid gender hierarchy within families, attempting to increase 
control over Hindu women by restrictions on dress and behaviour as well as 
cementing its notion of the Hindu family divided along strict gender lines.225 
Any opposition to such impositions have been met with force and violence 
repeatedly. :KLOHWKH,QGLDQZRPHQ·VPRYHPHQWPRYHGDZD\IURPWKH8&&
question in recent years, the HNM has come to power and is in the process of 
attempting to establish a UCC, along the lines of the Hindu code.226 As is 
evident from the earlier discussions in this chapter, this attempt to make the 
Hindu code become the blue print for the UCC is very problematic. The Hindu 
code is premised on certain normative understanding of gendered roles 
within the Hindu family, in which the Hindu man enjoys complete legal and 
economic subjecthood while the Hindu woman has limited legal and 
economic subjecthood. While the disparity in gender roles helps to add 
weightage to the glorification of a gendered hierarchy within Hindu families 
by the HNM, this disparity would be detrimental to gender justice across all 
                                                             
 
223 The current prime minister of India, Narendra Modi, is from the HNM movement and heads the 
Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP). He was then chief minister of Gujarat and this carnage happened under 
his watch. 
224 For instance, the Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act, 2005, which provided for pro-women 
change to Hindu inheritance rules. 
225 ,ĞŶƌŝŬĞƌŐůƵŶĚ ? ‘Hindu Nationalism and Gender in the Indian Civil Society ? ? ? ? ? ? ) ? ?/ŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂů
Feminist Journal of Politics, Sikata Banerjee,  ‘'ĞŶĚĞƌ ĂŶĚ EĂƚŝŽŶĂůŝƐŵ P dŚĞ DĂƐĐƵůŝŶŝǌĂƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ
,ŝŶĚƵŝƐŵĂŶĚ&ĞŵĂůĞWŽůŝƚŝĐĂůWĂƌƚŝĐŝƉĂƚŝŽŶŝŶ/ŶĚŝĂ ?  ? ? ? ? ? ) ? ?tŽŵĞŶ ?Ɛ^ ƚƵĚŝĞƐ/Ŷternational Forum, 
Rajeswari Sunder Rajan, The Scandal of the State - Women, Law and Citizenship in Postcolonial India 
(Duke University Press 2003). 
226 More on this in Chapter 6. 
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sections of Indian society if incorporated into a UCC. In Chapter 6, I argue why 
the Hindu code cannot be used as a blue print for a UCC, based on judicial 
reasoning in the cases under study and feminist positions on RPLs and UCC. 
3.8 Concluding Remarks 
From the above discussions, it is evident that the Anglo-Hindu law that 
evolved during colonial times creates a certain ideal of the Hindu woman, who 
is both modern and traditional simultaneously. While this woman is provided 
with limited rights, her location is within the private domain of the Hindu 
family. The Indian nationalist movement and the Indian ZRPHQ·VPRYHPHQW 
develop this figure of the Hindu woman further, by altering it to include the 
features of the unmarked citizen with equal rights. The partition and its 
aftermath further change the definition of this category by emphasising the 
religious undertones of the Hindu family. The atrocities committed on women 
and religious polarisation during this time creates an emphasis on the 
protection of Hindu women in public discourse. This protectionist ideal is 
further cemented by incorporating it in the Indian constitution. The founding 
fathers of this document utilise the figure of the unmarked citizen to provide 
equality to all, while retaining the directive to governments to ensure the 
protection of women and minorities. This creates a tension between equal 
treatment of all citizens and protectionism of women and minorities. 
Most legislators involved in the drafting of the Constitution, also drafted the 
Hindu code. Therefore, it is not surprising that the Hindu code tends to reflect 
some of the same values and ideals as the Constitution. The Hindu code 
follows a protectionist policy on women, while providing them equal rights, 
due to an inherently normative understanding of gender difference. While 
there were some proposals for a UCC in the past, these are shelved due to 
religious tensions of the post-independence period. The UCC is now included 
as a footnote in the Constitution. What is interesting is that this notion of 
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women being weaker and in need of protection in the Hindu code, has 
perpetuated for the next seventy years in judicial reasoning, as seen in my 
analysis of custody cases in the next two chapters. At this juncture, the Hindu 
code is being considered as the blue print for the UCC by the Hindu Right. 
This may be a problematic proposition as the Hindu code is premised on 
normative notion of gendered roles within the Hindu family and protectionist 
understandings.227  
As discussed earlier, most reforms carried out in Hindu law utilise notions of 
liberalism and modernity, which results in the creation of gendered subjects 
with differential rights. The social and cultural constructs on which these 
subjects are based, have been carried forward from the colonial to later times. 
These constructs have found their way into judicial reasoning as well. After the 
enactment of the Hindu code, the Hindu family was redefined as a conjugal 
unit with well-marked gender roles, in which women need to perform certain 
roles and need to be protected. The crucial elements that are present in the 
judgments of custody cases decided from 2000 to 2014 under the Hindu 
Minority and Guardianship Act, 1956, include the ideal of the nuclear and 
heterosexual conjugal Hindu family consisting of parents and their children, 
in which each of the parents have well defined gender roles. This family is 
perceived to be a miniature representation of the ideals of the nation, as it 
uses the figures of Indian modernity, such as the middle-class Hindu woman 
and the unmarked Indian citizen. While the former figure needs to be provided 
protection, the latter must be accorded equal treatment. The judgments under 
study attempt to balance protection accorded to Hindu women and equal 
treatment envisaged by the Indian Constitution. This brings out the 
contradictions inherent in the notion of the Elite Dependent, a Hindu woman 
                                                             
 
227 I explore this proposition further in my arguments in Chapter 6. 
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who needs to be protected as well as treated as an equal to a Hindu man 
under law. In the next chapter, I explore the tensions of this balancing act in 
the judgments under study, while elaborating on the theme of judicial 
interpretation of gendered roles.  
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Chapter 4 ² Gender in Judicial Reasoning 
4.1 Introduction 
In the previous chapter, I argued that the new category of elite, upper-class 
Hindu woman228 created in late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries 
intersected with the imagery of the unmarked citizen- subject in the Indian 
Constitution229 to produce a new type of woman. I called WKLVZRPDQWKH¶Elite 
Dependent·DQG,GHILQHd her as a privileged, upper class Hindu woman with 
rights equal to that of a Hindu man, but who needed to be protected by law 
for her own good. Further, I demonstrated that the Hindu code led to the 
creation of different legal subjecthoods in the Hindu family. The code 
provided male members of the Hindu family with economic and legal 
personhood and female members with legal personhood but limited 
economic personhood, which created a new kind of patriarchy.230 By the 
above analyses, I demonstrated how the Hindu code re-framed roles and 
responsibilities of individuals within the private sphere of the Hindu family, 
along the axis of normative ideas on gender roles. 
In this chapter, I examine judicial reasoning in the custody cases decided 
between 2000 and 2014, under the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, 
1956 (HMGA). In these cases, the courts premise the award of custody on the 
                                                             
 
228 For a detailed analysis on this category, see  Tanika Sarkar, Hindu Wife, Hindu Nation - Community, 
Religion and Cultural Nationalism (Indiana University Press 2001), Partho ŚĂƚƚĞƌũĞĞ ? ‘The Nationalist 
ZĞƐŽůƵƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞtŽŵĞŶ ?ƐYƵĞƐƚŝŽŶ ?ŝŶ<^ĂŶŐĂƌŝĂŶĚsĂŝĚ ?^ ? ?ĞĚƐ ) ?ƵďĂĂŶ ? ? ? ? ). 
229 For a detailed discussion on the unmarked citizen-subject, see DƌŝŶĂůŝŶŝ ^ŝŶŚĂ ?  ‘Refashioning 
Mother India: Feminism and Nationalism in Late-Colonial India ? ? ? ? ? ? ) ? ?&ĞŵŝŶŝƐƚ^ƚƵĚŝĞƐ ? 
230 For more on this, see Eleanor Newbigin, The Hindu Family and the Emergence of Modern India - 
Law, Citizenship and Community (Cambridge University Press 2013). However, this type of patriarchy 
in terms of defining the Hindu family was not unique to the Hindu code. It existed as a feature of 
customary Hindu law but in that system, the patriarch was responsible for the maintenance of all 
family members and held control of the joint family property for this purpose. What was significantly 
different was that in the Hindu code, latent patriarchal notions of protectionism, served to bifurcate 
the family along gendered roles and responsibilities. 
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Welfare principle predominantly.231 The welfare of the child supersedes the 
rights of parents and is the paramount consideration in judicial decisions. 
However, there have been instances, such as the case of Githa Hariharan,232 
when parental rights have taken precedence. While Githa Hariharan is 
considered as a landmark judgment in this respect, I demonstrate in this 
chapter that the award of custody in the cases under study cannot be reduced 
WR´SDUHQWDOULJKWWRHTXDOLW\YVZHOIDUHRIWKHFKLOGµDUJXPHQWV,DQDO\VHWKH
cases to answer my first research question - How have judges engaged with 
gender and gender roles in the custody cases decided from 2000 to 2014, 
under the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, 1956? My central argument 
here is that gender roles have been premised on normative notions in judicial 
reasoning in these cases. My sub-argument is that economic capacity of the 
parent is an important factor while deciding on custody in these cases and this 
capacity is also influenced by gendered norms. Through my analysis, I 
demonstrate how normative notions of gender, which formed one of the 
fundamental axes of the Hindu Code legislation, continue to manifest in 
judicial interpretation.  
In the first section, I start with the landmark case of Githa Hariharan, where I 
analyse the judicial interpretation of gender equality. I argue that while this 
case is seemingly premised on the Constitutional notion of equality, judicial 
reasoning is grounded in normative notions of gender roles within a family.  
In the next section, I elaborate on the definition and criteria of the welfare 
principle and evaluate how gendered norms and welfare are closely linked to 
each other. I argue that welfare is premised on gendered reasoning, by 
examining the conditions under which the mother is considered as being able 
to take on the role of the father. The economic capacity of a parent, I argue, 
                                                             
 
231 More on this in section 4.3. 
232 Githa Hariharan v. Reserve Bank of India (1999) (2) SCC 228, discussed further in the next section. 
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is an important criterion in judicial reasoning in these cases. I conclude this 
chapter by analysing how normative ideas about gender roles form the basis 
of judicial reasoning in the cases, both in expected and unexpected ways. 
4.2 Githa Hariharan ² Gender Equality or Gendered Norms? 
4.2.1 The Case of Githa Hariharan 
The case of Githa Hariharan sets a unique precedent in combining the custody 
and guardianship questions of a Hindu minor, with gender equality. In this 
instance, the Supreme Court of India was dealing with two cases. The first one 
was the divorce proceedings between Githa233 and Hariharan, in which the 
ODWWHUZDVVHHNLQJLQWHULPFXVWRG\RIWKHLUPLQRUVRQDVEHLQJWKH´ RQO\QDWXUDO
JXDUGLDQµXQGHU6HFDRIWKH+0*$6HFDVWDWHVWKDWWKH+LQGXIDWKHU
is the natural guardian of a Hindu minor and ¶DIWHU· the father, the mother.234 
The second case was filed by both parties of the divorce against the Reserve 
%DQN RI ,QGLD ,QGLD·V FHQWUDO EDQNLQJ LQVWLWXWLRQ ,Q WKH VHFRQG FDVH WKH
petitioners had jointly applied to the Reserve Bank of India for Relief Bonds in 
the name of their minor son, during the time of their marriage. They had 
mutually agreed that the mother would be named as the natural guardian of 
the child for investment purposes. However, when asked to discharge the 
bonds, the Bank refused to treat the mother as the natural guardian and cited 
Sec.6(a) of the HMGA (that the father was the natural guardian). Further, the 
Bank insisted that the mother should produce a certificate from a competent 
authority ascertaining her guardianship of the child. 
                                                             
 
233 Githa is a well-known writer, academic and an editor and has published several works of fiction as 
well as essays, newspaper articles and columns. For her detailed biography, see Githa Hariharan, 
 ‘'ŝƚŚĂ ,ĂƌŝŚĂƌĂŶ ŝŽ ?  ? ? ? ? ? ) AMŚƚƚƉƐ P ? ?ǁǁǁ ?ŐŝƚŚĂŚĂƌŝŚĂƌĂŶ ?ĐŽŵ ?ďŝŽŐƌĂƉŚǇ ?ŚƚŵůAN, accessed 12 
February 2017. In her divorce petition, Githa claimed that Hariharan was apathetic to their son but 
ŚĞǁĂƐƐĞĞŬŝŶŐƚŚĞƌŝŐŚƚƚŽďĞŚĞƌƐŽŶ ?ƐŶĂƚƵƌĂůŐƵĂƌĚŝĂŶ ?ǁŝƚŚŽƵƚĚŝƐĐŚĂƌŐŝŶŐĂŶǇŽĨƚŚĞĚƵƚŝĞƐŽƌ
obligations of a parent or a natural guardian. 
234 Emphasis added. 
110 | P a g e  
 
The petitioners filed a Writ petition seeking Sec.6(a) of HMGA to be struck 
down as it was in violation of Articles 14 and 15 of the Constitution of India.235 
,WZDVFRQWHVWHGWKDWWKHWHUP¶DIWHU·in this section, violated the provisions of 
Article 14 (equality before law) of the Indian Constitution. It was also 
discriminatory on the grounds of sex under Article 15, as the mother was being 
provided a secondary status after the father. The meaning of the terPV¶DIWHU·
DQG¶QDWXUDOJXDUGLDQ·DVZHOODVWKHFRQVWLWXWLRQDOLW\RIWKHOHJLVODWLRQZDV




the legislative intent of the Indian Constitution.236 I now analyse individual 
aspects of this judgment to understand the explicit and implicit reasoning 
provided by the judges. 
4.2.2 Reasoning in Githa Hariharan 
The significant legal question that was addressed by the Supreme Court in this 
FDVHZDVWKHLQWHUSUHWDWLRQRIWKHWHUP¶DIWHU·LQ6HFDRI+0*$7KHCourt 
RSWHG IRU D EURDG LQWHUSUHWDWLRQ RI WKH ZRUG ¶DIWHU· DQG FODLPHG WKDW WKLV
interpretation ´ZRXOGEH LQDFFRUGDQFHZLWK WKH LQWHQWRI WKH OHJLVODWLRQYL]




DIWHU the life time'. In the 
context in which it appears in Section 6(a) (supra), it means 'in the 
                                                             
 
235 Article 14 of the Indian Constitution states that the state shall not deny to any person equality 
before law or equal protection of the laws within the territory of India. Article 15 states that the state 
shall not discriminate against any citizen based on religion, race, caste, sex or place of birth. The 
Reserve Bank of India is the Central Bank of the country created by statute and falls within the 
ĚĞĨŝŶŝƚŝŽŶŽĨ ‘ƐƚĂƚĞ ? ?
236 Githa Hariharan v. Reserve Bank of India (1999) (2) SCC 228. 
237 Ibid. 
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absence of, the word 'absence' therein referring to the father's absence 
from the care of the minor's property or person for any reason whatever. 
If the father is wholly indifferent to the matters of the minor even if he is 
living with the mother or if by virtue of mutual understanding between 
the father and the mother, the latter is put exclusively in charge of the 
minor, or if the father is physically unable to take care of the minor either 
because of his staying away from the place where the mother and the 
minor are living or because of his physical or mental incapacity, in all 
such like situations, the father can be considered to be absent and the 
mother being a recognized natural guardian, can act validly on behalf of 
WKHPLQRUDVWKHJXDUGLDQµ238  
7KHZRUG¶DIWHU·XVXDOO\LPSOLHVWREHEHKLQGVRPHRQHRUWRIROORZLQWLPH
The normal use of this preposition in any sentence establishes a sense of 
hierarchy, either of persons or periods. What the Court attempts here is verbal 
gymnastics to provide a neZLQWHUSUHWDWLRQWRWKHWHUP¶DIWHU·E\SURYLGLQJD
connotation of absence. While this can be considered creative interpretation, 
the underlying reasoning emphasises that the father must be proven unfit or 
absent, for the mother to be considered the guardian. The Court claims to 
provide equal treatment to both parents while it is creating as well as 
supporting the hierarchy of preference between parents.  
In judgments preceding Githa Hariharan, the courts did not attempt a 
reconciliation between the rights of parents and the welfare principle and they 
always claimed that the welfare principle surpassed everything else.239 In the 
                                                             
 
238 Ibid. 
239 For instance, in the famous case of Rosy Jacob v. Jacob A. Chakramakkal, the Supreme Court held 
that  W 
  “dŚŝƐŽƵƌƚĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌŝŶŐƚŚĞǁĞůĨĂƌĞŽĨƚŚĞĐŚŝůĚĂůƐŽƐƚĂƚĞĚƚŚĂƚ ?ƚŚĞĐŚŝůĚƌĞŶĂƌĞŶŽƚŵĞƌĞ
chattels: nor are they mere playthings for their parents. Absolute right of parents over the 
destinies and the lives of their children have, in the modern changed social conditions, yielded 
to the considerations of their welfare as human beings so that they may grow up in a normal 
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case of Githa Hariharan, the judges use the welfare principle as the glue to 
bind their interpretation together, claiming that such an interpretation 
supports Constitutional notion of equality and furthers legislative intent. The 
Court observed that ² 
´The whole tenor of the Act of 1956 is to protect the welfare of the child 
and as such interpretation ought to be in consonance with the legislative 
intent in engrafting the statute on the Statute Book and not de hors the 
same and it is on this perspective that the word 'after' appearing in 
Section 6(a) shall have to be interpreted. It is now a settled law that a 
narrow pedantic interpretation running counter to the constitutional 
mandate ought always to be avoided unless of course, the same makes 
a violent departure from the Legislative intent-in the event of which a 
wider debate may be had having due reference to the contextual 
factsµ240 
While the judges in this case claimed that they attempted to reconcile the 
tension between rights of parents and welfare of the child(ren), their efforts 
were more focused on ensuring that the statute is not rendered void. To this 
end, they chose to employ the welfare principle in their reasoning as the key 
to this reconciliation. In its closing remarks, the Court claimed that ² 
´,QWKDWYLHZRIWKHPDWWHUTXHVWLRQRIDVFULELQJWKHOLWHUDOPHDQLQJWR
the word 'after' in the context does not and cannot arise having due 
                                                             
 
balanced manner to be uƐĞĨƵůŵĞŵďĞƌƐŽĨƚŚĞƐŽĐŝĞƚǇ ? ? ?ZŽƐǇ:ĂĐŽďǀ ?:ĂĐŽď ?ŚĂŬƌĂŵĂŬŬĂů
AIR (1973) SC 2090). 
Another instance of considering welfare to be paramount is that of Mrs. Umamaheswari vs. V. Sekar, 
where the Court observed that  W 
 “dŚĞĐŽŶĐĞƉƚŽĨǁĞůĨĂƌĞŽĨƚŚĞĐŚŝůĚ should be given a judicious interpretation and not merely 
following the ritual of giving the custody of a child to a mother for the simple reason that 
there can be no substitute for a mother to take care of the child howsoever affectionate the 
mother (father--Ě ? ?ŽĨƚŚĞĐŚŝůĚŵŝŐŚƚďĞ ? ? ?DƌƐ ?hŵĂŵĂŚĞƐǁĂƌŝǀƐ ?s ? ^ĞŬĂƌ/Z ? ? ? ? ? ?DĂĚ
272). 
240 Githa Hariharan v. Reserve Bank of India (1999) (2) SCC 228. 
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regard to the object of the statute, read with the constitutional guarantee 
of gender equality and to give a full play to the legislative intent, since 
any other interpretation would render the statute void and which 
VLWXDWLRQLQRXUYLHZRXJKWWREHDYRLGHGµ241 
The positive aspect of the reasoning in this case was the broadening of scope 
on gender parity of parenting and this was adopted as an important precedent 
in custody cases subsequently. However, this is one of the aspects in the 
reasoning and not the only one. The implicit assumptions made by the court 
in this case shows a different side to the reasoning of the judges, as I analyse 
below. 
The judicial reasoning in this case expanded the understanding of the nature 
of guardianship and differentiated guardianship from custody. The court held 
that there are two types of guardianship possible in instances of custody ² de 
facto and de jure guardianship. The court claimed that while Sec.6 (a) dealt 
with de jure guardianship, it was more important to consider the facts and 
circumstances of the case to decide the de facto guardianship.  
´It is an axiomatic truth that both the mother and the father of a minor 
child are duty bound to take due care of the person and the property of 
their child and thus having due regard to the meaning attributed to the 
word 'guardian' both the parents ought to be treated as guardians of the 
PLQRUµ242 
On the surface, this interpretation, that Sec.6(a) refers to de jure guardianship 
and that facts of the case should determine de facto guardianship, appears to 
be based on the Constitutional principle of equality. The Court also opines 
                                                             
 
241 Ibid. 
242 Githa Hariharan v. Reserve Bank of India (1999) (2) SCC 228. 
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that India being a signatory to the Convention on Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), 1979243 and the Beijing Declaration 
on Women244, it is important to adopt gender equality of these international 
instruments. Further, judicial reasoning here converges with the notions of 
welfare, guardianship, constitutional equality and international conventions 
by using the method of harmonious construction to interpret the statute - a 
kind of a judicial win-win situation.  
The reasoning on gender equality in this case is commendable as it was one 
of the first attempts to tackle the subject head-on. Moreover, the judges 
attempt to solve a knotty problem of reconciling the rights of parents with the 
welfare of the child in custody cases. That said, the judges do not provide in-
depth reasoning on these topics nor do they concern themselves with the 
ground reality of gender inequities. They base their judgment on a formal 
approach to equality premised on the autonomous, liberal subject, rather than 
an attempt to understand gender difference.245 Moreover, is it possible to 
consider the parents on an equal footing when they are not placed thus in 
society? There is extensive literature on the unequal resource positions in 
Indian, specifically within Hindu families, which have repeatedly analysed how 
women have little or no control over the economic resources of the family, 
despite being entitled by law.246 The judges seem to gloss over these issues 
                                                             
 
243 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) (adopted 
18 December 1979, entered into force 3 September 1981) 1249 UNTS 13. India is a signatory to 
CEDAW, having accepted and ratified it in June 1993. 
244 Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action, in Report of the Fourth World Conference on Women 
UN Doc. A/CONF. 177/20 (1995). 
245 For more on the autonomous, liberal subject and gender justice, see Ratna Kapur,  ‘ŚĂůůĞŶŐŝŶŐƚŚĞ
Liberal Subject: Law and Gender Justice in South Asia ?ŝŶDĂŝƚƌĂǇĞĞDƵŬŚŽƉĂĚŚǇĂǇĂŶĚEĂǀƐŚaran 
Singh (eds), Gender Justice, Citizenship and Development (Zubaan 2007). 
246 &ŽƌĂĚĞƚĂŝůĞĚĂŶĂůǇƐŝƐŽŶǁŽŵĞŶ ?ƐůŽƐƐŽĨĐŽŶƚƌŽůŽǀĞƌĞĐŽŶŽŵŝĐƌĞƐŽƵƌĐĞƐ ?ĞƐƉĞĐŝĂůůǇůĂŶĚ ?ƐĞĞ
Bina Agarwal,  ‘tŝĚŽǁƐǀĞƌƐƵƐĂƵŐŚƚĞƌƐŽƌtŝĚŽǁƐĂƐĂƵŐŚƚĞƌƐ ?WƌŽƉĞƌƚǇ ? >ĂŶĚ ?ĂŶĚĐŽŶŽŵŝĐ
^ĞĐƵƌŝƚǇŝŶZƵƌĂů/ŶĚŝĂ ? (1998) 32 Modern Asian Studies, Bina Agarwal,  ‘'ĞŶĚĞƌĂŶĚŽŵŵĂŶĚŽǀĞƌ
WƌŽƉĞƌƚǇ PƌŝƚŝĐĂů'ĂƉŝŶĐŽŶŽŵŝĐŶĂůǇƐŝƐĂŶĚWŽůŝĐǇŝŶ^ŽƵƚŚƐŝĂ ? (1994) 22 World Development. 
For a detailed analysis of women and succession rights in Hindu families, see Vijaya Nagarajan and 
ƌĐŚĂŶĂWĂƌĂƐŚĂƌ ? ‘DǇƌŽƚŚĞƌ ?Ɛ<ĞĞƉĞƌ PZegulation of the Brother WSister Relationship in the Religious 
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and appear to have taken equality in the formal sense, while it is evident that 
gendered norms underlie their reasoning. In the next section, I elaborate on 
how gender is viewed by the judges in this case. Further, I demonstrate that 
this view of equality is premised on gendered norms, a fact that is glossed 
over in this judgment as well as the ones that came afterwards. 
4.2.3 Aspects of Gender in the Judgment 
While discussing the question of constitutional validity of the legislation in 
*LWKD·V FDVH WKH %HQFK KHOG WKDW WKH FRXUWV PXVW DGRSW D KDUPRQLRXV
construction between the Constitution and other Acts, to reconcile any 
differences between the two. If any other interpretation is adopted, it would 
render the HMGA void, as this would violate the Constitutional guarantee of 
equality. Justice Bannerjee, one of the judges on the Bench,247 commented on 
the constitutionality of the legislation, as follows ²  
´,WLVWo be noted that validity of a legislation is to be presumed and efforts 
should always be there on the part of the law courts in the matter of 
retention of the legislation in the statute book rather than scrapping it 
and it is only in the event of gross violation of constitutional sanctions 
that law courts would be within its (sic) jurisdiction to declare the 
legislative enactment to be an invalid piece of legislation and not 
otherwiseµ248 
                                                             
 
Personal Laws of India ? ? ? ? ? ? ) ? ?^ŽƵƚŚƐŝĂ P:ŽƵƌŶĂůŽĨ^ŽƵƚŚƐŝĂŶ^ƚƵĚŝĞƐ ? For an extensive analysis 
on unequal resource positions in marriages, see Flavia Agnes, Family Law Volume 2: Marriage, 
Divorce and Matrimonial Litigation (Oxford University Press 2011). 
247 This case was decided by an all-male bench of the Supreme Court of India - Dr. A.S. Anand (then 
Chief Justice of India), M. Srinivasan and U.C. Banerjee, Joint Judges. While the CJI and Justice 
Srinivasan delivered a joint judgment, Justice Bannerjee agreed with them but provided his 
independent reasoning. 
248 Githa Hariharan v. Reserve Bank of India (1999) (2) SCC 228. 
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As discussed in the last section, the unequal treatment of parents in the statute 
LV FOHDUO\ LQGLFDWHG E\ WKH SUHSRVLWLRQ ¶DIWHU· ZKLFK FUHDWHV D KLHUDUFK\ RI
preference between parents in issues of custody. If the Indian Constitution 
promises gender equality, then this preposition in the HMGA attempts to 
strike at the core of the premise of equality.249 However, while discussing the 
constitutional validity, this point is not addressed by the judges. Moreover, the 
Court reasons that it is adopting a harmonious construction as any other 
explanation would make HMGA violate the Constitution. Here, there is a 
negative acknowledgement that HMGA could be opposed to Constitutional 
guarantee of gender equality, but there is a need to presume that the Act is 
constitutionally valid. More significantly, the highest court of the land does 
QRWFRQVLGHULWWREHD¶JURVVYLRODWLRQRIFRQVWLWXWLRQDOVDQFWLRQV· when gender 
parity is being compromised by creating hierarchies, due to the use of the 
ZRUG¶DIWHU·LQ6HFDRI+0*$ 
The inability to provide an explanation for how Sec.6(a) of HMGA does not 
violate the Constitutional notion of equality is further demonstrated by the 
following observation of the Court -   
´Whenever a dispute concerning the guardianship of a minor, between 
the father and mother of the minor is raised in a Court of law, the word 
'after' in the Section would have no significance., as the Court is primarily 
concerned with the best interests of the minor and his welfare in the 
widest sense while determining the question as regards custody and 
guardianship of the minor. The question, however, assumes importance 
only when the mother acts as guardian of the minor during the life time 
of the father, without the matter going to Court, and the validity of such 
                                                             
 
249 dŚŝƐǁĂƐƉŽŝŶƚĞĚŽƵƚďǇ'ŝƚŚĂ ?ƐůĂǁǇĞƌŝŶŚĞƌĂƌŐƵŵĞŶƚƐ ? 
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an action is challenged on the ground that she is not the legal guardian 
RIWKHPLQRULQYLHZRI6HFWLRQDVXSUDµ250 
Here, there is an explicit acknowledgement that the mother being the 
guardian is inherently problematic, in contrast to the father being the 
guardian of the minor. While the judges have held that HMGA is a valid 
legislation that aligns itself with the Constitution as seen earlier, they are also 
DFNQRZOHGJLQJWKDWWKHPRWKHU·VSRVLWLRQLVFRQWHQWLRXVLQWKHFDVHVXQGHU
HMGA. They do not elucidate on how it can be construed to be supporting 
the premise of Constitutional equality, when the father and mother are treated 
unequally in the custody claims made under HMGA. So, the premise of gender 
equality in this judgment rests on shaky ground as the judges are unable to 
provide a reasonable counter to the argument of how HMGA violates the 
Constitutional provision of equality. Instead, they prefer to sweep it under the 
carpet, in the name of harmonious reconstruction. Moreover, there is a tacit 
nod to gender bias in the handling of cases under HMGA. 
Apart from the above reasoning on gender parity and acknowledgement of 
differential treatment, there is an element of gendering of parental roles and 
an attempt to be protectionist of women in this case. I illustrate this using the 
following examples from the judgment. One of the judges in the Bench, Justice 
U.C. Banerjee, observed that ² 
´7KRXJK QRELOLW\ DQG VHOI-denial coupled with tolerance mark the 
greatest features of Indian womanhood in the past and the cry for 
equality and equal status being at a very low ebb, but with the passage 
                                                             
 
250 Githa Hariharan v. Reserve Bank of India (1999) (2) SCC 228. 
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of time and change of social structure the same is however no longer 
GRUPDQWEXWSUHVHQWO\TXLWHORXGµ251  
The language used here privileges the normative ideals of womanhood over 
equality and the latter is almost an afterthought, a nod to the current times. 
While the past witnessed the ¶JUHDWHVWIHDWXUHVRI,QGLDQZRPDQKRRG·, the ¶FU\
IRUHTXDOLW\DQGHTXDOVWDWXV· was at a ¶ORZHEE·but women seeking equality 
or equal rights/status are now ¶ORXG·The premise here is that the women who 
exhibit noble qualities will not seek to establish their rights. The language 
betrays judicial anxiety about the women who seek an equal position in social 
structures and the need to keep them in check, else they will turn loud. 
/DVWO\ZKLOHRSLQLQJRQWKHXVHRIWKHZRUG¶DIWHU·WKHMXGJHVVWDWHWKDW² 
´7KHIDWKHUE\UHDVRQRIDGRPLQDQWSHUVRQDOLW\FDQQRWEHDVFULEHGWR
have a preferential right over the mother in the matter of guardianship 
since both fall within the same category and in that view of the matter 
the word 'after' shall have to be interpreted in terms of the constitutional 
safe-guard and guarantee so as to give a proper and effective meaning 
WRWKHZRUG·VXVHµ252 
Here, the father iVUHIHUUHGWRDVWKH¶GRPLQDQWSHUVRQDOLW\·WKRXJKQHLWKHU
the Act nor the facts and arguments in this case use this term. This is an 
acknowledgment in judicial reasoning that existing gender norms privilege 
the male over the female, within the Hindu family. While the statement claims 
to provide equal rights to both parents in matters of guardianship, it is 
premised on an understanding of the father as a dominant personality. As I 
discussed in the last chapter, the idea that the Hindu man enjoys a prominent 
                                                             
 
251 Ibid. 
252 Githa Hariharan v. Reserve Bank of India (1999) (2) SCC 228. 
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position within the family and possesses full legal and economic subjecthood, 
as opposed to the Hindu woman who possesses limited legal and economic 
subjecthood, exists from the colonial times. This idea found its way into the 
Hindu code and is reflected in judicial reasoning, as we see in this case. The 
judicial reasoning here creates the hierarchy of the father being the dominant 
personality and the mother being the subservient one, in line with this 
normative definition of gender roles within the Hindu family. 
The analysis of judicial reasoning in the case of Githa Hariharan provides an 
interesting point of entry into how judges reflect on gender. The judges are 
keen to acknowledge gender equality, in line with the Constitution of India 
and international conventions and want to ensure that the HMGA is not 
contradictory to the notion of gender parity. However, they do not provide 
any reasoning on gender difference and choose to highlight certain qualities 
of womanhood and fatherhood that are premised on gendered norms. They 
do not address the historically disadvantaged position of women in Hindu 
society and premise their reasoning on a formal notion of equality. The 
acknowledgement of gender equality in law does not automatically translate 
to social equality on the ground, an issue that is not considered in the 
judgment. Despite not providing an in-depth analysis or reasoning on gender 
equality, the case has been hailed as a landmark judgment on establishing the 
constitutional principle of equality and is used as a precedent for subsequent 
cases on awarding custody.253  More importantly, this case is an important 
decision in the way it attempted to reconcile rights of parents with the welfare 
principle, an aspect largely ignored in subsequent judgments. I now turn to 
these judgments and their handling of the welfare principle, to deepen the 
analysis on the gendered nature of judicial reasoning. 
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4.3 Gendering of Welfare  
4.3.1 Definition and Criteria of Welfare 
The case of Githa Hariharan marked a turning point for the courts as 
subsequent cases had to consider the Constitutional principle of gender 
equality. However, gender parity was not the only consideration for the judges 
as the key legal principle for settling custody cases was that of welfare.254 The 
Welfare or Best Interests of the child is a Common-Law principle that is 
DGRSWHGLQWKH+LQGXFRGH,Q&RPPRQ/DZWKHIDWKHU·VOHJDOULJKWRIFXVWRG\
over a child born out of marriage was considered absolute and the best 
interests of the child were paramount.255 This idea of paternal power finds its 
way into Sec.6(a) of HMGA, as the father is privileged over the mother as the 
natural guardian of a Hindu minor. Moreover, during colonial rule, there was 
a selective appropriation of strands of normative literature, which led to a 
sWHUHRW\SLFDOXQGHUVWDQGLQJRI¶,QGLDQWUDGLWLRQ·256 The colonial invention of 
an Indian tradition had Common Law roots, as evidenced by the presence of 
welfare principle in the Hindu code. To this day, this concept of welfare 
provides a wide discretion to the judges to decide custody cases based on 
                                                             
 
254 The welfare principle is provided paramount consideration by the judges while deciding custody 
cases, to the extent of subsuming individual parental rights in the best interests of the child. In India, 
the concept of Welfare is dealt with in two legislations - The Guardians and Wards Act, 1890 and The 
Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, 1956. While the Guardians and Wards Act of 1890 specifies 
that the Court shall consider age, sex and religion of the minor, as well as character and capacity of 
the guardiĂŶ ĂŶĚ ƚŚĞ ŐƵĂƌĚŝĂŶ ?Ɛ ƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐŚŝƉ ƚŽ ƚŚĞ ŵŝŶŽƌ Žƌ ƚŽ ƚŚĞ ůĂƚƚĞƌ ?Ɛ ƉƌŽƉĞƌƚǇ ? ƚŚĞ ůĂƚĞƌ
enactment of 1956 is silent on these considerations and merely states that welfare of the minor is of 
paramount consideration, without providing context or definition of welfare. Moreover, the Act of 
 ? ? ? ?ĂůƐŽƉƌŽǀŝĚĞƐƚŚĂƚƚŚĞŵŝŶŽƌ ?ƐƉƌĞĨĞƌĞŶĐĞŵĂǇďĞĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌĞĚŝĨƚŚĞŵŝŶŽƌŝƐŽůĚĞŶŽƵŐŚƚŽĨŽƌŵ
such preferences, a provision that is again absent in the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, 1956. 
The 1956 Act seems to prŽǀŝĚĞǀĞƌǇǁŝĚĞůĞǀĞƌĂŐĞĨŽƌŝŶƚĞƌƉƌĞƚĂƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞŶŽƚŝŽŶŽĨ ‘tĞůĨĂƌĞ ?ĂŶĚ
leaves its definition in the hands of the judges, depending on the facts and circumstances of the case. 
Very often, the courts use both these sections in conjunction while deciding what constitutes welfare 
of the minor child. 
255 Savitri Goonesekere,  ‘dŚĞ ĞƐƚ /ŶƚĞƌĞƐƚƐ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ŚŝůĚ P  ^ŽƵƚŚ ƐŝĂŶ WĞƌƐƉĞĐƚŝǀĞ ? (1994) 8 
International Journal of Law and the Family. 
256 <ĂŶĂĚ^ŝŶŚĂ ?  ‘Ğ /ƚDĂŶƵ ?Ğ /ƚDĂĐĂƵůĂǇ P /ŶĚŝĂŶ>ĂǁĂŶĚƚŚĞ  “WƌŽďůĞŵ ?ŽĨƚŚĞ&ĞŵĂůĞ ŽĚǇ ?
(2014) 5 Journal of Indian Law and Society. 
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best interests of the child and this is to be decided using common sense.257 
Here, I analyse how the welfare principle is interpreted in custody decisions in 
the cases under study and demonstrate how this is linked to normative ideals 
of gender roles. 
While deciding on the welfare of the child, judges tend to analyse the facts 
and circumstances of the case in minute detail. Most often, the courts consider 
the ability of parents to facilitate the growth and development of the child, 
emotionally, materially and physically. For instance, in the case of Ram Murti 
Chopra and Anr vs Nagesh Tyagi, the Court held that - 
´(YHU\ &RXUW ZKLOH GHFLGLQJ WKH FXVWRG\ PDWWHUV KDV WR FRQVLGHU WKH
welfare of the child as a prime factor. While considering the welfare of 
the child, the Court has to give due weightage to all the circumstances 
such as the child's ordinary comfort and contentment, his intellectual, 
moral and physical development, his health, education, general 
maintenance etc. Apart from that, the Court has also to give due 
weightage to the emotional considerations, social set-up, care, attention, 
career build-up and bringing up of a child as a good human being. The 
Court has to ensure that the child must live in an atmosphere which is 
congenial and healthy for his growth and inculcates values of life in his 
(sic). He gets proper love and affection necessary for his development; 
the guardians provide him necessary moral boosting etc. Where the child 
is under constant strain and his mind is full of questions which are not 
                                                             
 
257 ƌĐŚĂŶĂWĂƌĂƐŚĂƌ ? ‘WĂƚĞƌŶĂůŝƐƚŝĐ>Ăǁ ?ƵƚŽŶŽŵŽƵƐŚŝůĚĂŶĚƚŚĞZĞƐƉŽŶƐŝďůĞ:ƵĚŐĞƐ ?ŝŶƌĐŚĂŶĂ
Parashar and Amita Dhanda (eds), Redefining Family Law in India: Essays in Honour of B. Sivaramayya 
(Routledge 2008). 
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answered properly, and he is only shown one side of the picture, his 
development is bound to be affected."258 
While the courts  observe that the economic affluence (or lack thereof) of a 
parent is not the sole consideration,259 they have maintained that welfare has 
to be determined based on facts and circumstances of the case and would 
WHQGWRLQFOXGH´physical well-being, education, supplying the daily necessities 
such as food, clothing and shelterµ260 DVZHOODV´child's ordinary comfort and 
contentment, his intellectual, moral and physical development, his health, 
education, general maintenance etcµ261 DQG´emotional considerations, social 
set-up, care, attention, career build-up and bringing up of a child as a good 
human beingµ262 Further, the judges emphasise that the welfare of the child 
would include tKH ´child's ordinary comfort, contentment, intellectual 
development and favourable surroundingsµ DQG WKDW WKH ´physical comforts, 
moral and ethical value cannot be ignoredµ263 
                                                             
 
258 Ram Murti Chopra and Anr vs Nagesh Tyagi (2008) ILR (12) Delhi 169. This view is also reflected in 
other cases. For instance, in Nil Ratan Kundu and Anr. v. Abhijit Kundu, the Court opined that  W 
 “ŽƵƌƚǁŚŝůĞĚĞĂůŝŶŐǁŝƚŚĐƵƐƚŽĚǇĐĂƐĞƐ ?ŝƐŶĞŝƚŚĞƌďŽƵŶĚ by statutes nor by strict rules of 
evidence or procedure nor by precedents. In selecting proper guardian of a minor, the 
paramount consideration should be the welfare and well-being of the child. In selecting a 
guardian, the Court is exercising parens patriae jurisdiction and is expected, nay bound, to 
give due weight to a child's ordinary comfort, contentment, health, education, intellectual 
development and favourable surroundings. But over and above physical comforts, moral and 
ethical values cannot be ignored. They are equally, or we may say, even more important, 
ĞƐƐĞŶƚŝĂů ĂŶĚ ŝŶĚŝƐƉĞŶƐĂďůĞ ĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌĂƚŝŽŶƐ ? ?  ?Eŝů ZĂƚĂŶ <ƵŶĚƵ ĂŶĚ Ŷƌ ? ǀ ? ďŚŝũŝƚ <ƵŶĚƵ
(2008) (2) CHN 479). 
259 For instance, in Surabhai Ravikumar Minawala Vs. State of Gujarat, the Court awarded custody to 
the mother though the father was very wealthy and stated that  W 
 “DĞƌĞůǇďĞĐĂƵƐĞĨĂƚŚĞƌŽĨƚŚĞĐŚŝůĚŝ ?Ğ ?ƌĞƐƉŽŶĚĞŶƚ Ž ? ?ŝƐŝŶďĞƚƚĞƌĨŝŶĂŶĐŝĂůƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶƚŚĂŶ
the mother, it does not mean that the child's interest will best be served if it remained with 
father and his family. No amount of wealth and 'mother like love' can take the place of 
ŵŽƚŚĞƌ ?ƐĐĂƌĞĂŶĚůŽǀĞĨŽƌƚŚĞĐŚŝůĚ ? ? (Surabhai Ravikumar Minawala Vs. State of Gujarat 
AIR (2005) Guj 149).  
Similar sentiment is expressed in Dhanwanti Joshi vs. Madhav Unde (1998) (46(1)) BLJR 743 
( “&ŝŶĂŶĐŝĂůĐĂƉĂĐŝƚǇďĞŝŶŐƐƵƉĞƌŝŽƌĐĂŶŶŽƚďĞƚŚĞƐŽůĞĚĞĐŝĚŝŶŐĨĂĐƚŽƌĨŽƌǁĞůĨĂƌĞ ? ? ?  
260 Smt. Pushpa and Another vs Smt. Anshu Chaudhary (2013) (6) ALJ 628. 
261 Ram Murti Chopra and Anr vs Nagesh Tyagi (2008) ILR (12) Delhi 169. 
262 Ibid. 
263 Mohan Kumar Rayana vs. Komal Mohan Rayana (2009) (3) Bom CR 308. 
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While better financial resources can be one of the deciding factors, the judges 
have held that it cannot be considered as the only factor for deciding the 
welfare of the child.  For instance, in the case of Mausami Moitra Ganguli vs. 
Jayant Ganguli, the Bench of the Supreme Court of India mentioned that ² 
´%HWWHUILQDQFLDOUHVRXUFHVRIHLWKHURI WKHSDUHQWVRUWKHLU ORYHIRUWKH
child may be one of the relevant considerations but cannot be the sole 
GHWHUPLQLQJIDFWRUIRUWKHFXVWRG\RIWKHFKLOGµ264 
The judges have stressed that the concept of welfare must be interpreted in 
its widest sense to include the physical, emotional, financial and moral needs 
of the child.265 The definition of physical and emotional wellness seems to 
largely include notions of care, financial resources to provide for the minor 
and most importantly, the education of the minor and overall well-being of 
the minor.266 Providing education and financial stability to the child is 
considered an important factor in determining the welfare of the child, as 
decided in several cases.267 In some instances, welfare is interpreted from a 
gendered perspective, as in the case of Eshita d/o Hasmukhbhai Sitapara vs. 
                                                             
 
264 Mausami Moitra Ganguli vs. Jayant Ganguli AIR (2008) SC 2262. This view is endorsed in other 
cases too. For instance, Vikram Vir Vohra vs Shalini Bhalla 170 (2010) DLT 303, Smt. Pushpa and 
Another vs Smt. Anshu Chaudhary (2013) (6) ALJ 628. 
265 For instance, Ruchirkumar Gajanandbhai Suthar and 2 Ors. Vs. Amitaben D/o Hasmukhlal 
Nanchanddas Mewada, Shiwani Kabra vs. Shaleen Kabra (2011) ILR 2Delhi 754, Murari Lal Sidana and 
Anr. Vs. Smt. Anita AIR (2013) Raj 100.  
266 For instance, Smt. Pushpa and Another vs Smt. Anshu Chaudhary (2013) (6) ALJ 628. 
267 For instance, Vijayaben Parshottam Kotak vs. Parshottam Kotak (2003) GLH (23) 323, Eshita d/o 
Hasmukhbhai Sitapara vs. Hiren Prabhudasbhai Brahmbhatt, Special Civil Application No.10009 of 
2009 (High Court of Gujarat at Ahmedabad, 18/12/2009), Sardar Bhupendra Singh vs. Smt. Jasbir Kour 
AIR (2000) MP 330, K.M. Vinaya vs. B.R. Srinivas, Miscellaneous First Appeal No.1729 of 2011(High 
Court of Karnataka at Bangalore, 13/09/2013), Ram Murti Chopra and Anr vs Nagesh Tyagi (2008) 
ILR (12) Delhi 169. In Kotholla Komuraiah and Kotholla Kondavva vs. Kotholla @ Bikkanuri @ Gorlakadi 
Kanaka Laxmi, it was observed that the Court must exercise its Parens Patriae jurisdiction and should 
ĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌŵŝŶŽƌ ?Ɛ “ŽƌĚŝŶĂƌǇĐŽŵĨŽƌƚ ?ĐŽŶƚĞŶƚŵĞŶt, health, education, intellectual development and 
ĨĂǀŽƵƌĂďůĞƐƵƌƌŽƵŶĚŝŶŐƐ ?  ?Kotholla Komuraiah and Kotholla Kondavva vs. Kotholla @ Bikkanuri @ 
Gorlakadi Kanaka Laxmi (2014) (1) ALD 362). Moreover, apart from physical comfort, moral and 
ethical well-being of the child was also considered to be important. 
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Hiren Prabhudasbhai Brahmbhatt, where the role and guidance of the mother 
was important for the welfare of the minor girl child.268 
While the legal principle of welfare is to be interpreted in its widest amplitude 
by the judges, welfare is often confined to the basics of day to day living at a 
practical level. The widest interpretation of welfare tends to make it 
indeterminate, value-laden, subjective, and it also tends to produce arbitrary 
RXWFRPHV GHSHQGLQJ RQ WKH MXGJHV· EDFNJURXQG DQGRU ELDVHV269 Often, 
welfare of the child is dependent on the capacity of the parent to provide basic 
amenities of life and education to the child. However, judicial reasoning on 
welfare in these cases, privileges the notion of providing for the child, 
especially providing better material comforts. This, when taken in conjunction 
with the gendered roles within the family, tends to privilege the position of 
the father as a provider of needs and wants. Hence, the underlying reasoning 
on the welfare principle supports the gendering of roles within the family.  In 
the next section, I analyse some of the cases under study in which rights of 
parents form an important part of the reasoning in the judgment. I 
demonstrate how the judges premise these rights on normative notions of 
gender roles in these cases.  
                                                             
 
268 Eshita d/o Hasmukhbhai Sitapara vs. Hiren Prabhudasbhai Brahmbhatt, Special Civil Application 
No.10009 of 2009 (High Court of Gujarat at Ahmedabad, 18/12/2009). This case is discussed in detail 
in Chapter 5. 
269 It has been argued by several scholars that the welfare principle rests on shaky theoretical 
grounds, as it tends to reinforce normative ideas about the family and works in favour of adults, 
rather than children. For instance, see Helen Reece, 'The Paramountcy Principle: Consensus or 
Construct?', (1996) 49 Current Legal Problems, Jane Fortin, 'Children's rights - flattering to deceive?' 
(2014) 26 Child and Family Law Quarterly. However, a discussion on Welfare principle in relation to 
ĐŚŝůĚƌĞŶ ?ƐƌŝŐŚƚƐ ŝƐŽƵƚƐŝĚĞƚŚĞƐĐŽƉĞŽĨƚŚŝƐƚŚĞƐŝƐ ?,ĞƌĞ ? / ĨŽĐƵƐŽŶŚŽǁƚŚĞ ũƵĚŝĐŝĂů ƌĞĂƐŽŶŝŶŐŽŶ
welfare in these cases has its basis in normative ideas of gender, rather than on the actual welfare of 
children.  
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4.3.2 Welfare of the Child vs. Rights of Parents 
In all the cases under study, welfare of the child is the fundamental principle 
on which the judges base their decisions of custody. As seen in the last section, 
welfare is often used as an umbrella term to denote several types of wellbeing 
of the child. While discussing welfare, judges tend to subsume rights of the 
parents to the best interests of the child. For instance, in the case of Arun 
Grover vs. Ritu Grover, the father was seeking visitation rights as natural 
guardian of his minor son, as he claimed that best interests of the child would 
be affected otherwise. However, the Court held that the father could not prove 
SULPDIDFLHWKDWWKHZHOIDUHRIWKHFKLOGZDVDIIHFWHGE\WKHPRWKHU·VFXVWRG\
and observed that - 
´3HWLWLRQHUQHYHUSDLGWKHVFKRROIHHRUPDGHDQ\FRQWULEXWLRQWRZDUGV
the education and other expenses of the child and even the child was 
averse even talk to the petitioner(sicµ270  
Here, the court dismissed the visitation rights of the father as he did not make 
DQ\XVHIXOFRQWULEXWLRQVWRWKHH[SHQVHVRIWKHFKLOGDQGGXHWRWKHFKLOG·V
behaviour. This case is an illustration of how welfare is the paramount 
consideration for deciding custody and judges often use the welfare principle 
to supersede parental rights. This has been stressed in several other cases as 
well, as elaborated below. 
In the case of Shamal Sharad Baride vs. Sharad Baburao Baride, the father of 
three children was an alcoholic. The mother left the house with her youngest 
child to live with her father and left her oOGHUFKLOGUHQLQWKHIDWKHU·VFXVWRG\
                                                             
 
270 Arun Grover vs. Ritu Grover Civil Miscellaneous (Main) Petition No.936 of 2010 (High Court of Delhi 
at New Delhi, 28/07/2010). In some instances, welfare has been used to explain providing visitation 
rights to the non-custodial parent, like in the case of R. Swaminathan Vs. Sivagowri, Review 
Application No.51 of 2009 (High Court of Madras, 03/08/2009). In either scenario, the emphasis has 
been on the welfare of the child over the rights of parents, in judicial reasoning.  
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As the father began to sell his agricultural property to feed his drinking habits, 
the mother filed a petition to ensure that the property was not squandered by 
the father. The father, in turn, sought custody of the third child as he claimed 
to be the natural guardian of the child and accused the mother of adultery. In 
this case, the Aurangabad bench of the Bombay High Court granted custody 
of the child to the mother and held that ²  
´9LWDOWRFXVWRG\LVDJHRIFKLOGDQGFLUFXPVWDQFHV%HVWLQWHUHVWRIWKH
FKLOGLVEDVLFFRQVLGHUDWLRQWRZKLFKULJKWVRISDUHQWVKDYHWR\LHOGµ271 
Here, the Court decided to supersede the rights of the father and chastised 
him in its closing remarks, as follows ²  
´7KHDVVHVVPHQWRIHYLGHQFHLQGLFDWH (sic) that welfare of the child to be 
paramount aspect, will be more looked taken care by the wife than 
father. The father's contention of unchastity of the wife is a stooge 
created to sabotage litigation. Consequently, I hold that the allegations 
of infidelity or illicit relations hurled at the wife with said Limbraj, are the 
product of fertile mind of the husband, not associated with any 
acceptable evidence. On the sole ground, the custody of the minor child 
FDQQRWEHUHVWRUHGWRWKHIDWKHUµ272 
                                                             
 
271 Shamal Sharad Baride vs. Sharad Baburao Baride (2009) (4) BomCR 669. Similar sentiment is 
expressed in Gaurav Nagpal vs Sumedha Nagpal AIR (2009) SC 557. In the case of Gaytri Bajaj vs. Jiten 
Bhalla, the Supreme Court stated that  W 
 “/ƚŝƐŶŽƚƚŚĞďĞƚƚĞƌƌŝŐŚƚŽĨƚŚĞ either parent that would require adjudication while deciding 
their entitlement to custody. The desire of the child coupled with the availability of a 
conducive and appropriate environment for proper upbringing together with the ability and 
means of the concerned parent to take care of the child are some of the relevant factors that 
have to be taken into account by the Court while deciding the issue of custody of a minor. 
What must be emphasized is that while all other factors are undoubtedly relevant, it is the 
desire, interest and welfare of the minor which is the crucial and ultimate consideration that 
ŵƵƐƚŐƵŝĚĞƚŚĞĚĞƚĞƌŵŝŶĂƚŝŽŶƌĞƋƵŝƌĞĚƚŽďĞŵĂĚĞďǇƚŚĞŽƵƌƚ ? ? ?'ĂǇƚƌŝĂũĂũǀƐ ?:ŝƚĞŶŚĂůůĂ
AIR (2013) SC 102). 
272 Shamal Sharad Baride vs. Sharad Baburao Baride (2009) (4) BomCR 669. 
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A more nuanced argument for considering welfare over the rights of parents 
is advanced by the judges in the case of Chethana Ramatheertha vs Kumar V. 
Jahgirdar. In this case, the mother remarried a famous cricketeer and the 
father argued that the mother would be incapable of taking care of the child 
due to her second marriage and jet-setting lifestyle. The judges held that 
either parent was equally capable, and that the custody of the child should be 
dependent on her welfare. The Court observed that - 
´7KHTXHVWLRQLVQRWYLHZHGDQ\PRUHIURPWKHDQJOHRIZKLFKSDUHQW
has a better right", but from the approach as to "the company of which 
of the two parents is better suited for the integrated development of the 
personality of the child" and "as to whether the child receives the 
necessary inputs if it is in the company of a particular parent, for a 
healthy growth and development of the personality of the child".273 
This case, along with the other two mentioned earlier in this section, 
represents a positive moment in judicial reasoning on gender. The judges 
provide equal weightage to the capacity of both parents. They reason that it 
is the welfare of the child that overrides the rights of parents and not the right 
of one parent versus another. However, the above cases are an exception 
rather than a rule. In other instances, the rights of parents have been premised 
on normative ideas on gendered roles in the family, rather than gender parity, 
as seen below. 
In the case of Mohan Kumar Rayana vs. Komal Mohan Rayana, the mother was 
an accomplished classical dancer and a television actress. The Court, while 
providing the mother custody, observed that -  
                                                             
 
273 Chethana Ramatheertha vs Kumar V. Jahgirdar (2003) (3) KarLJ 530. 
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"On the other hand, the respondent-mother is a graduate in English 
literature and she is also into Fine Arts and Culture. She knows Marathi, 
English, Hindi and Telugu very well. She is also an accomplished classical 
dancer. She has categorically stated before the court that she has given 
up her career as an Actress and she will be available 24 hours of the day 
WRWDNHFDUHDQGIRUXSEULQJLQJ$QLVKDµ274  
Here, the Court acknowledges that the mother is an educated person who is 
proficient in several languages, classical dance and has a career as an actress. 
However, her right to be a successful professional was undermined, as custody 
was provided to her only when she agreed to give up her chosen profession. 
If the situation was reversed, a father would not be expected to give up the 
right to his profession. The reasoning in this judgment provides a clear 
H[DPSOHRIKRZDPRWKHU·VULJKWLVXQGHUPLQHGIRUWKHZHOIDUHRIWKHFKLOG
without any exploration of other options, especially in comparison to the 
father. 
In the case of Romani Singh vs. Lt. Col. Vivek Singh, the father was an army 
officer and was in a transferable job. He was denied the right to custody of 
the child as he could be transferred to non-family stations and would be 
unable to look after the child. The father claimed that he would seek the help 
of his parents to take care of the child. But the Court turned this down by 
reasoning that the mother is a better guardian in the best interests of the child 
- 
"Further, even though as per him his parents are looking after the child 
but when the natural mother is there and has knocked the door of the 
court without any delay and has all love and affection for the child and 
                                                             
 
274 Mohan Kumar Rayana vs. Komal Mohan Rayana (2009) (3) Bom CR 308. 
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is willing to do her duty with all love and affection and since the birth of 
the child she has been keeping the child. In these circumstances, she 
should not be deprived of her right especially considering the tender age 
and child being a girl child. The grandparents cannot be a substitute for 
natural mother. There is no substitute for mother's love in this world."275 
In this case, the father is denied the right to his child due to the nature of his 
profession. While it may be justified to provide custody to the mother for the 
welfare of the child, the reasoning used by the judges is based on how a 
mother ought to be. The court based its reasoning on gendered norms, 
especially the normative role of a mother, while the gender of the child has 
also played a part in the judgment. This case offers another illustration of how 
gender and gendered norms impact judicial reasoning in the cases under 
study. In the next section, I elaborate on this idea by examining those cases in 
which the mother steps into the shoes of the father. 
4.3.3 Mother in the Role of the Father 
While the premise of welfare was posited above the legal rights of parents in 
several cases as seen above, there have been attempts to clarify and crystallise 
what constitutes welfare both before and after the case of Gita Hariharan. In 
considering the welfare of the minor child, both the mother and father were 
provided equal consideration by the judges in subsequent cases. But even in 
such instances of parity, the mother was preferred only if she could establish 
that she could step into the normative role of the father as provider. The 
Courts have consistently upheld the capacity of the mother to be the de facto 
guardian in several other instances. However, the logic of these decisions 
seems to rest in socially accepted, conventional models of parenthood. For 
                                                             
 
275 Romani Singh vs. Lt. Col. Vivek Singh 201(2013) DLT 742. 
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instance, in Amrit Pal Singh vs. Jasmit Kaur, the Delhi High Court ruled as 
follows ² 
´,QP\RSLQLRQWKHFKLOGUHQVKRXOGQRWEHGHSULYHGRIWKHFRPSDQ\RI
their natural mother who is educated, and I am given to understand, 
financially capable of taking care of the children¬, see no substitution, 
in the present case, for mother's love and affection nor do I find any 
justification in denying the children of the family from receiving love, 
care and affection of their natural mother, which to my mind, is essential 
IRUWKHLQWHJUDOGHYHORSPHQWDQGSHUVRQDOLW\RIWKHFKLOGUHQµ276 
While the ideals of motherhood are glorified, what is significant here is that 
the mother is being provided custody as she is educated and ¶ILQDQFLDOO\
capable·RISURYLGLQJFDUH277 7RVWHSLQWRWKHIDWKHU·VVKRHVWKHPRWKHUPXVW
¶EHFRPH·WKHIDWKHU7KLVLVLOOXVWUDWHGLQVHYHUDOFDVHVDVVKRZQEHORZ 
In the case of Chethana Ramatheertha vs Kumar V. Jahgirdar, the judges 
observed that ²  
                                                             
 
276 Amrit Pal Singh vs. Jasmit Kaur AIR (2006) Delhi 213. In another instance of Selvan.J v. N. Punidha, 
the Court demarcated the doctrine of least detrimental alternative in the best interests of the 
children and provided the following to be the issues that are common to most custody cases  W 
 “/ƐƐƵĞƐƚŚĂƚĂƌĞĐŽŵŵŽŶƚŽĂůůĐŚŝůĚĐƵƐƚŽĚǇĚŝƐƉƵƚĞƐĂƌĞ P 
(a) Continuity and quality of attachments  
(b) Parental alienation  
(c) Education 
(d) Parents' physical and psychiatric health 
(e) Parents' work schedules  
(f) Parents' finance 
(g) Styles of parenting and discipline  
(h) Social support systems 
(i) Conflict resolutions 
(j)  Cultural and ethnic issues 
(k)  Ethics and values and religion  W  
 The crucial test would be ability and willingness on part of either parties to provide to minor 
children (a) healthy environment (b) good parental care and guidance (c) physical, emotional and 
ĨŝŶĂŶĐŝĂůƐƵƉƉŽƌƚĨŽƌĚĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶƚŽĨƚŚĞŝƌŝŶƚĞŐƌĂƚĞĚƉĞƌƐŽŶĂůŝƚǇ ? ?^ĞůǀĂŶ ?:ǀ ?E ?WƵŶŝĚŚĂ ? ? ? ? ? ?
(4) CTC 56). 
277 Emphasis added. 
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´*HQGHU HTXDOLW\ LV WKH DFFHSWHG DQG GHYHORping trend and financial 
independence is as much the domain of the female members of the 
family with the female members also entering into different avocations 
and being in a position to earn. Many a times the wife is better off 
financially because of her superior skills and better employment than her 
husband. Particularly in situations where both parents are financially 
independent and need not necessarily depend on the other, the 
traditional concept of the father being the first guardian may not hold 
wateUµ278 
As seen earlier, the Chethana judgment is a positive way forward for gender 
justice. The Court asserted the mother·VILQDQFLDOLQGHSHQGHQFHDQGDELOLW\WR
provide on par with the father. However, there is also an acknowledgment 
here that the father is traditionally considered in the role of the provider and 
WKHPRWKHULVVWHSSLQJLQWRWKHIDWKHU·VVKRHVGXHWRher achieving the status 
and financial capacity of the father.  
In the case of Vikram Vir Vohra vs. Shalini Bhalla, the mother and father 
divorced by mutual consent. Their minor son was with the mother and the 
parents had an amicable visitation agreement. Subsequently, the mother 
wanted to relocate to Australia for employment. She wanted cancellation of 
the visitation right while the father contenGHG WKDW H[SRVXUH WR ´:HVWHUQ
FXOWXUHµZRXOGKDUPWKHFKLOG7KH&RXUWKHOGWKDW- 
"Much has been said regarding the Indian cultural environment in which 
the child is brought up in India to discard the claim of the respondent to 
take the child with her to Australia where she is employed for gain. It is 
not highlighted as to how the health, education or intellectual 
                                                             
 
278 Chethana Ramatheertha vs Kumar V. Jahgirdar (2003) (3) KarLJ 530. 
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development as well as physical comfort and moral values of the child 
would be affected if he is allowed to live with his mother in Australia. 
Rather, I am of the view that bringing up of the child in favourable 
surroundings as well as in physical comfort and protection of his mother, 
his education and intellectual development is likely to be more conducive 
for the welfare of the child."279 
Here, the Court acknowledges that the mother, being employed for gain, is in 
a better position to take care of the child as she can be a better provider. That 
DVSHFWRYHUVKDGRZVWKHIDWKHU·VFODLPVDVWKHPRWKHUKDVEHFRPHFDSDEOHRI
performing the role of the father in providing for the child. 
In the case of Smt. Gundamma vs. Shivasharanappa, the parents were living 
separately, each with one son. The second son, who was with the mother, did 
not know the father at all. The father was seeking custody of this minor. 
However, the mother was granted custody based on economic considerations. 
The Court opined that - 
´,W LVQRW WKHFDVHRI WKHUHVSRQGHQW WKDW WKHDSSHOODQWGRHVQRWKDYH
PHDQV WR PDLQWDLQ KHUVHOI DQG WKH ZDUG¬ 5HFRUG RI ULJKWV H[WUDFWV
produced by her indicate that she is the absolute owner in possession of 
the land measuring 12.24 acres. Further, it is shown that except she, there 
are no legal heirs to succeed the estate of her parents. Therefore, it could 
be said that the appellant is financially sound, and she is capable of 
giving good education and maintain the ward properly. Therefore, the 
Court beORZLVQRWMXVWLILHGLQSDVVLQJWKHLPSXJQHGRUGHUµ280 
                                                             
 
279 Vikram Vir Vohra vs Shalini Bhalla 170 (2010) DLT 303. 
280 Smt. Gundamma vs. Shivasharanappa AIR (2004) Kant 357. 
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,Q WKLV FDVH WKH PRWKHU EHLQJ ´ILQDQFLDOO\ VRXQGµ LV WKH PRVW LPSRUWDQW
consideration for providing her custody of the child. For all intents and 
purposes, the mother must step into the role of the provider to obtain 
custody, a role traditionally held by the father.  
The earning potential of the mother is highlighted even in those instances of 
absence of a father. For instance, in the case of Baby Kavya Awasthi and 
Another vs. State of U.P. and Others, the High Court of Allahabad stated that ²  
´7KH LPPHGLDWH ZHOIDUHRI WKHPLQRU JLUO LVRIXUJHQW FRQFHUQRI WKLV
Court in the particular circumstances of the case when her father is not 
alive. Her mother is an educated and earning lady, therefore the 
apprehension of the respondent No. 3 that she would not get proper care 
from her mother is unfounded. The natural mother can sacrifice anything 
and can cherish more love, affection and care in fact appears to have 
gone mad to have her custody for her welfare. It is not out of place to 
mention here that the mother is greater than earth and dearer than even 
the heaven. Her love and affection cannot be compared in any manner 
ZKDWVRHYHUWRWKDWRIDQ\PDQRUZRPHQµ281 
In this case, the image of the Hindu middle-class woman emerges in detail. 
:KLOHWKHPRWKHULVUHFRJQLVHGDVDQ¶HGXFDWHGDQGHDUQLQJODG\·WKHLGHDOV
of motherhood are also upheld to be natural and incomparable. While custody 
is granted to the mother instead of the paternal grandparents based on this 
normative construction of motherhood, the proposition that the mother is an 
¶HDUQLQJ ODG\· LV HPSKDVLVHG KLJKOLJKWLQJ WKH LPSRUWDQFH RI HFRQRPLF
advantage. Here, welfare is premised on economic advantage while being 
                                                             
 
281 Baby Kavya Awasthi and Another vs. State of U.P. and Others 2013(5) ACJ 72. This sentiment finds 
resonance in the cases of Alamelu Sockalingam vs. V. Venkatachalam (2012) (6) CTC 907, Smt. 
Gundamma vs. Shivasharanappa AIR (2004) Kant 357, and R. Muruga Perumal vs. J. Radhamani 
(2009) (4) LW 527.  
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reasoned on ideals of the Hindu family and motherhood. What is evident in 
this reasoning is that these judges feel a need to reconcile normative notions 
of gender roles with the realities of educated women capable of running their 
families. Whenever the mother is provided custody on this basis, there is an 
acknowledgement that she is an earning lady or is financially capable of taking 
care of the child, to justify that the decision is taken in the best interests of the 
child.282 
Throughout the cases that I have analysed here, what emerges firstly is that 
economic advantage, in one form or another, is a key premise on which 
judicial reasoning is based in custody cases under Hindu law. Time and again, 
the judges seem to focus on the parent who can provide a better standard of 
life or education to the child and this tends to influence their decisions. They 
premise the reasoning for this preference on the idea that the mother is 
considered as the parent who can provide immense love and affection to the 
FKLOGLQKHU´QDWXUDOµUROHDVWKHFDUHJLYHUDQGthe father is considered to be 
the breadwinner or provider for the entire family. The ideals of motherhood 
and womanhood are imposed on different types of women and all of them 
are measured using this yardstick. If the mother can provide for the child 
financially as well, then such a mother becomes capable of stepping into the 
IDWKHU·VVKRHVDQGEHFRPHWKHQDWXUDOJXDUGLDQRIWKHFKLOG283 However, in 
such instances, while the decision has been based on welfare of the child, the 
reasoning behind the decision has conformed to existing normative notions 
on gender roles in the family. Moreover, the mother must show sufficient 
SURRI WKDW VKH LV FDSDEOH RI VWHSSLQJ LQWR WKH IDWKHU·V UROH WR EH DZDUGHG
                                                             
 
282 This acknowledgment is found in several cases. For instance, Baby Kavya Awasthi and Another vs. 
State of U.P. and Ors (2013) (5) ACJ 72, R. Muruga Perumal vs. J. Radhamani (2009) (4) LW 527, M. 
Udhayabanu Vs. K.S. Raja (2007) (2) MLJ 246. 
283 For instance, R. Manivasakan vs. M. Vimala (2012) (8) MLJ 547, Smt. Gundamma vs. 
Shivasharanappa AIR (2004) Kant 357. 
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custody. If the mother is incapable of financially supporting the child, she has 
been awarded maintenance in some instances. But, these grants of 
maintenance are not followed up by orders for effective execution.284 Such 
situations often lead to overburdening of the mother, as she is responsible for 
the upbringing of the child without having adequate means to support the 
child. In the event of non-payment of maintenance, she must approach the 
courts to seek a remedy and enter a complicated process for recovery of 
monies due.285 Therefore, my argument is that the mother stepping into the 
role of the father cannot be construed as gender parity, despite frequent 
references made to equality and Githa Hariharan in these cases. The Welfare 
principle, which is supposed to be individualistic and child centric, is hijacked 
to accommodate judicial reasoning based on gender roles in the family. Here, 
the reasoning based on normative ideas of gender roles tend to do more 
damage than good, as both parents are not treated on the same footing. 
                                                             
 
284 Under Hindu law, execution of maintenance needs to be undertaken by a separate process of 
seeking remedy for non-payment of maintenance. Maintenance cases underline the unequal 
resource positions within the Hindu family. However, these cases are outside the scope of the present 
study. 
285 For instance, in the case of N. Sreeramudu, S/o. N. Narayana Vs. Kum. N. Lahari, D/o. N. 
Sreeramudu, Minor rep. by her natural guardian mother Smt. N. Saraswathi, the family court ordered 
a monthly maintenance of Rs.500 for the mother and Rs.250 for the daughter, when the mother (one 
of the respondents here, the other being the daughter) separated from the father (the appellant 
ŚĞƌĞ ) ?dŚĞĨĂƚŚĞƌƉĂŝĚŽŶůǇƚŚĞĚĂƵŐŚƚĞƌ ?ƐŵĂŝŶƚĞŶĂŶĐĞĂƐƚŚĞŵŽƚŚĞƌŐŽƚŚĞƌƐĞůĨĂũŽďĂƐĂŚĞĂůƚŚ 
assistant, even though he was earning much more. The mother filed a petition for increasing the 
maintenance to Rs.1500 and the trial court allowed her application. However, the High Court of 
ŶĚŚƌĂ WƌĂĚĞƐŚ ĂůůŽǁĞĚ ƚŚĞ ĨĂƚŚĞƌ ?Ɛ ĂƉƉĞĂů ĂŐĂŝŶƐƚ ƚŚŝƐ ĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶ and lowered the combined 
maintenance. The Court observed that  W 
"This aspect of the question of maintainability of the suit for recovery of enhanced 
maintenance amount on behalf of the minor child by the mother when the father can be said 
to be the natural guardian was neither raised nor canvassed before the trial Court. Hence 
this question need not be seriously considered at the appellate stage." (N. Sreeramudu, S/o. 
N. Narayana Vs. Kum. N. Lahari, D/o. N. Sreeramudu, Minor rep. by her natural guardian 
mother Smt. N. Saraswathi (2004) (4) ALD722). 
In some instances, the Court has considered maintenance to be outside the purview of HMGA and 
has claimed that the meaning of maintenance should be understood from the Hindu Adoptions and 
Maintenance Act, 1956 (Tilak Kumari & Anr. Vs. Sh. Anand (2001) (59) DRJ 580). 
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In judicial reasoning, marriage is fundamentally structured to be a partnership 
of inequality, where roles and responsibilities are gendered, and it follows that 
maintenance becomes the only avenue for women to stake financial claims or 
entitlements.286 Hence, a woman should get out of her marriage to obtain 
economic benefits from it. The impact of such situations is not addressed in 
the reasoning provided in custody cases. There can be more parity when the 
mother is economically viable of taking care of herself and her child or 
children. But the removal of the economic advantage tends to reduce the state 
of the mother to that of a person living on handouts from the benevolent 
stranger, who was once her spouse. While this situation not unique to India, it 
provides evidence of the subservient position of the Hindu woman within the 
Hindu family. Moreover, it lends FUHGHQFHWRWKH¶GHSHQGHQW·SDUWRIWKHWHUP
´(OLWH'HSHQGHQWµDFDWHJRU\,H[SORUHIXUWKHULQWKHQH[WFKDSWHU 
4.4 Concluding Remarks 
As I demonstrated in the last chapter, codification in Hindu law utilised ideas 
of liberalism and modernity and resulted in the creation of gendered subjects 
with differential rights, within the Hindu family. The legal construct of these 
subjects was carried forward from the colonial times to the Hindu code and 
this construct found its way into judicial reasoning in custody cases. 
Lawmakers in India, like elsewhere, provided gender parity in legislation 
without questioning or exploring gender roles, which led to a gap between 
paper and practice.287 In this chapter, I analyse how a formal notion of gender 
equality is premised in the custody cases under HMGA by the judges, without 
sufficient explanation of underlying premises on gender roles or imbalances 
                                                             
 
286  &ůĂǀŝĂŐŶĞƐ ? ‘Conjugality, Property, Morality and Maintenance ? ? ? ? ? ? ) ? ?ĐŽŶŽŵŝĐĂŶĚWŽůŝƚŝĐĂů
Weekly. 
287 Nivedita Menon, Recovering Subversion - Feminist Politics Beyond the Law (Permanent Black 
2004). 
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of treatment meted out based on gender of parents. While the codification of 
Hindu law attempted to manage diverse expectations at several levels,288 it is 
not entirely successful in addressing the questions of gender imbalances 
within the Hindu family and this is reflected in judicial reasoning in these cases.  
The key elements of judicial reasoning that emerge from the discussions 
above are, as follows ² 
1. Judicial reasoning in these cases is often premised on normative 
notions of gender. As evidenced in the case of Githa Hariharan, even 
in the instances when the judges draw on gender equality discourse, 
the underlying premise is that of normative understanding of gender 
roles in the Hindu family.  
2. Most custody cases studied here are premised on the welfare or best 
interests of the child(ren). Post Githa Hariharan, the courts exhibit a 
leaning towards gender equality in the wording of the judgments in 
these custody cases. However, the logic of judicial reasoning equates 
financial capacity as gender parity, simultaneously emphasising 
protectionist and normative stances towards women. Here, the welfare 
principle is being hijacked to suit the gender-based reasoning 
employed by the judges. 
3. In the cases under study, judicial interpretation portrays the Hindu 
ZRPDQDVDQ´(OLWHGHSHQGHQWµDVVKHLVH[SHFWHGWREHWKHHGXFDWHG
middle-class mother teaching normative values to her children as well 
as being dependent on her husband for economic resources. The Elite 
Dependent is a paradox, as she is treated as both an equal (legally) and 
                                                             
 
288 tĞƌŶĞƌDĞŶƐŬŝ ? ‘Slumdog Law, Colonial Tummy Aches and the Redefinition of Family Law in India ?
(2010) 30 Sage. 
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a subordinate (economically and socially). She represents the tension 
between formal notions of gender equality that is present in judicial 
reasoning and the need to protect her as she is subservient in her 
normative gender role within the Hindu family.  
It is evident upon examining these cases that what we see is not what we get. 
While almost all the cases touch upon gender equality, the underlying 
reasoning by the judges is premised on normative gender roles in the Hindu 
family. The normative notions of gender are fundamentally entrenched in 
social praxis and they continue to play out in judicial reasoning as seen in the 
FDVHVDERYH7KHFRXUWVH[LVWZLWKLQDFXOWXUDODQGOHJDOIUDPHZRUNRIZRPHQ·V
economic depHQGHQFH LQPDUULDJHDQGPDOH FRQWURORIZRPHQ·V GHFLVLRQV
and movements.289  This is evident in the judicial language in these cases. 
0RUHRYHU DV DQ LQVWLWXWLRQ WKH IDPLO\·V VWDELOLW\ KLQJHV RQ PDLQWDLQLQJ
unequal resource positions between men and women and economic interest 
plays an important role in intra-family gender relations.290 This economic 
interest is displayed in the judgments when judges determine questions of 
welfare. Further, the Constitution provides a special status to women in India 
as they are perceived to need protection. This in turn leads to an anomalous 
situation in which women are to be treated equally, but also specially. In 
practice, women are often treated as inferior to men and gender equality is a 
mirage. These tensions between theory and praxis exist in the judgments 
under study DQG WKH\ DUH UHFRQFLOHG E\ XVLQJ WKH WURSH RI WKH ´(OLWH
'HSHQGHQWµ 
                                                             
 
289 ^ƌŝŵĂƚŝĂƐƵ ?  ‘Judges of Normality: Mediating Marriage in the Family Courts of Kolkata, India ?
(2012) 37 Signs. 
290 ŝŶĂ ŐĂƌǁĂů ?  ‘ĂƌŐĂŝŶŝŶŐ ? ? and Gender Relations: Within and Beyond the Household ?  ? ? ? ? ? )  ?
Feminist Economics 1. 
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,QGLDQ IHPLQLVWV KDYH ZRUNHG WRZDUGV XVLQJ ODZ DV D WRRO IRU ZRPHQ·V
empowerment and managed to achieve landmark changes in legislation. They 
increased the bargaining power of women by legal innovation of mixing and 
matching existing laws or by creating / providing parallel legal options.291 
However, legal reforms have their own limitations as they did not translate 
well into realities on the ground. There has been a constant attempt by the 
state to domesticate gender through its policies, as women are important for 
stability and reproduction of patriarchal family values and property systems.292 
The courts perpetuate this attempt and provide a normative framework for 
gender, as argued by several Indian legal feminists.293 By way of my case 
analysis, I have provided evidence of this argument that the judicial 
engagement on gender is premised on normative notion of gendered roles 
within the Hindu family.294 Even in those instances in which there seems to be 
progress made on gender equality, it is but a fleeting impression and the 
reasoning reverts to these normative notions of gender. In the next chapter, I 
take these arguments further to demonstrate how the judges engage with 
gender roles in the context of the Hindu family, and how this leads to the 
creation of a new category of Hindu woman, namely, the Elite Dependent. 
                                                             
 
291 'ŽƉŝŬĂ ^ŽůĂŶŬŝ ?  ‘Beyond the Limitations of the Impasse: Feminism, Multiculturalism, and Legal 
Reforms in Religious Family Laws in India ? ? ? ? ? ? ) ? ?WŽůŝƚŝŬŽŶ.  
292 Nivedita Menon,  ‘^ĞǆƵĂůŝƚǇ ? ĂƐƚĞ ?'ŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚĂůŝƚǇ PŽŶƚĞƐƚƐŽǀĞƌ  “Ő ŶĚĞƌ ?ŝŶ /ŶĚŝĂ ?(2009) 91 
Feminist Review. 
293 For instance,  see Srimati Basu, The Trouble with Marriage - Feminists Confront Law and Violence 
in India (First, University of California Press 2015), Flavia Agnes, Law and Gender Inequality -The 
WŽůŝƚŝĐƐŽĨtŽŵĞŶ ?ƐZŝŐŚƚƐŝŶ/ŶĚŝĂ (Oxford University Press 1999), ^ƌŝŵĂƚŝĂƐƵ ? ‘Judges of Normality: 
Mediating Marriage in the Family Courts of Kolkata, India ?(2012) 37 Signs, Maitrayee Mukhopadhyay, 
Legally Dispossessed: Gender, Identity and the Process of Law (Stree, Calcutta 1998),  Nivedita Menon, 
Seeing like a Feminist (Zubaan, India with Penguin UK 2012). 
294 I take this argument further in Chapter 6. 
140 | P a g e  
 
Chapter 5 ² The Elite Dependent in Judicial Reasoning 
5.1 Introduction 
In the last chapter, I examined how normative notions of gender roles 
undermine formal ideas of equality that are often reflected in the judgments 
under discussion. These judgments are mediated through the perception of 
WKHMXGJHVDQGFDQEHFRQVLGHUHGDV´DFWVRIOHJDOWUDQVODWLRQWKDWUHYLVHDQG
UHFUHDWH JHQGHUµ295 While I have explored the larger idea of how judicial 
reasoning is premised on gendered norms there, I now deepen this analysis 
by looking at how aspects of gender are reasoned in the cases and how they 
create a certain figure of the middle-class Hindu woman, namely, the Elite 
Dependent. I discussed some features of the Elite Dependent in the last 
chapter. For instance, in the section on how the mother becomes the father, I 
demonstrated how judicial reasoning is quick to give the mother custody, 
especially in those instances in which she is financially sound and capable of 
providing for the needs of the child(ren). In this chapter, I take my argument 
further to demonstrate that judicial reasoning in the cases under study, 
envisages the Hindu woman to possess a second order status compared to 
the Hindu man, within the family. 
In this chapter, I argue that judicial reasoning in the cases under study creates 
a certain figure of the Hindu woman, i.e., the Elite Dependent. My sub-
argument is that this category has legal rights but a secondary status in the 
Hindu family. In doing so, I address my second research question ² How have 
judges conceptualised the Hindu woman in the cases under study? I elaborate 
on this question by analysing different aspects of gender that have been 
discussed in these cases, with a focus on the expectations of the judges on 
                                                             
 
295 Srimati Basu, She Comes to Take Her Rights (State University of New York Press 1999). 
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how a woman ought to be acting as a parent. From this analysis, I demonstrate 
that judicial reasoning in these cases creates the category of the Elite 
Dependent ² the upper-class Hindu woman who is subservient and who 
adheres to a gendered role of motherhood within the family.  
In the following section, I analyse how the judges construct notions of 
marriage, home and family life in the judgments under study. Further, I 
demonstrate how a gendered notion of the father being the provider for the 
family is constructed by the judges in these cases. In the next section, I analyse 
the cases to show that judges construct the mother as the nurturer and care-
giver and denounce any deviation from this established norm, while no such 
deviation is discussed or denounced for the father. In the last section, I 
demonstrate how this differentiation in treatment between the father and the 
mother constructs the category of the Elite Dependent. 
5.2 Judicial Construction of Marriage and Family 
In most judgments under study, the legal presumption is that marital 
relationships are the exclusive sites of legitimate sexuality.296 As I elaborated 
in Chapter 3, this presumption helped to establish normative gendered roles 
within the Hindu family as the idea found its way into the legislation of the 
Hindu code, due to a confluence of several factors. The idea of gendered roles 
within a Hindu family is often reflected in judicial reasoning, as I demonstrated 
in the last chapter. In this section, I analyse how judicial reasoning views 
marriage and family in the cases under study and how this reasoning 
reproduces the gendering of roles within the Hindu family. 
                                                             
 
296 For a detailed analysis on this, see Brenda Cossman and Ratna Kapur, Subversive Sites - Feminist 
Engagements with Law in India (Sage Publications India Pvt Ltd 1996). Also, none of the judgments 
under study pertain to unmarried couples. 
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The idea that a normative family, created through the institution of marriage, 
is the basic building block of society, finds mention in some of the judicial 
decisions. For instance, in the case of Sumedha Nagpal v. State of Delhi 
(wherein the mother was seeking custody of the children), the Supreme Court 
observed that - 
´The basic unit of society is the family and that marriage creates the most 
important relation in life, which influences morality and civilization of 
people, than any other institution. During infancy and impressionable 
age, the care and warmth of both the parents are required for the welfare 
of the child."297  
Here, the judges consider family and marriage to be important relationships 
and directly extrapolate them to morality and civilization, emphasising the 
normative basis of their reasoning. There is no explanation provided in the 
reasoning to demonstrate how such an extrapolation is possible. Further, they 
observe that it is difficult for courts to decide on custody issues but that such 
DGHFLVLRQPXVWEHPDGHZLWKRXWEHLQJ´UHSXJQDQW WRQRUPDOFRQFHSWVRI
IDPLO\DQGPDUULDJHµ298 Here, there is an underlying presumption that there 
H[LVWV ´QRUPDOµ FRQFHSWV RI IDPLO\ LQGLFDWLYH RI QRUPDWLYH SUHPLses about 
family and marriage. This shows how deeply entrenched the ideal of the 
conjugal Hindu family is, in the minds of these judges.299 
                                                             
 
297 Sumedha Nagpal v. State of Delhi (2000) (9) SCC 745. 
298  “But a decision there must be, and it cannot be one repugnant to normal concepts of family and 
marriage ?(Sumedha Nagpal v. State of Delhi (2000) (9) SCC 745). 
299 For a detailed analysis on how the state recognised only the dominant family norm of the 
patriarchal heterosexual family and how in the course of time, this emerged as the only norm, see 
ƌĞŶĚĂ ŽƐƐŵĂŶ ĂŶĚ ZĂƚŶĂ <ĂƉƵƌ ?  ‘tŽŵĞŶ ? &ĂŵŝůŝĂů /ĚĞŽůŽŐǇ ĂŶĚ ƚŚĞ ŽŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶ P ŚĂůůĞŶŐŝŶŐ
Equality RighƚƐ ?ŝŶZĂƚŶĂ<ĂƉƵƌ ?ĞĚ ) ?Feminist Terrains in Legal Domains: Interdisciplinary Essays on 
Women and Law in India (Kali for Women, New Delhi 1996), Brenda Cossman and Ratna Kapur, 
Subversive Sites - Feminist Engagements with Law in India (Sage Publications India Pvt Ltd 1996). 
143 | P a g e  
 
In Gaurav Nagpal vs Sumedha Nagpal, the father held on to the custody of 
the son, despite the lower court granting mother custody and increased 
maintenance.300 He violated the orders of the lower court and had contempt 
proceedings initiated against him. The father claimed that it was in the best 
interests of the child to be in his custody as he could provide better financially. 
He also claimed that the child hated his mother. After considering both sides, 
the Supreme Court granted the mother custody and the father visitation 
rights. The court claimed that ² 
´0DWULPRQLDOGLVFRUGVDUHRQWKHULVHDWDQDODUPLQJUDWH7he sanctity 
of marriages is under cloud, which in a great way affects the society at 
large. Individuals can in no way be segregated from the society to which 
they belong. The cultural heritage of a country is greatly influenced by a 
pattern of behaviour of individuals and more so in matters of matrimony. 
Home can be a wonderful place to live. But continuous fights between 
the partners of a marriage disturb the atmosphere at home and create 
KDYRFRQWKHPHPEHUVRIDIDPLO\µ301 
The judges in this case consider it important to save marriages at any cost as 
it is perceived that the breakdown of marriages would lead to a fall in social 
and cultural values, especially impacting children of such marriages. The 
MXGJPHQWIXUWKHUIUDPHVPDUULDJHDVD´SK\VLFDODQGPHQWDOXQLRQµWKDW´WKH
KRPHVKRXOGQRWEHDQDUHQDIRUHJRFODVKHVDQGPLVXQGHUVWDQGLQJVµZKLOH
ignoring the fact that this may not always be possible in circumstances such 
as this one.302 While the court held that the father cannot benefit from his own 
                                                             
 
300 This case had the same parties as the last, as the parents were fighting for custody simultaneously. 
301 Gaurav Nagpal vs Sumedha Nagpal AIR (2009) SC 557. 
302  “DĂƌŝƚĂůŚĂƉƉŝŶĞƐƐĚĞƉĞŶĚƐƵƉŽŶŵƵƚƵĂůƚƌƵƐƚ ?ƌĞƐƉĞĐƚĂŶĚƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚŝŶŐ ?ŚŽŵĞƐŚŽƵůĚŶŽƚďĞ
an arena for ego clashes and misunderstandings. There should be physical and mental union. 
Marriage is something, Ibsen said in "The League of Youth" you have to give your whole mind to. If 
marriages are made in Heaven as Tennyson said in Ayloner's Field, why make matrimonial home hell 
ŝƐĂďŝŐƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶ ? (Gaurav Nagpal vs Sumedha Nagpal AIR (2009) SC 557). 
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wrong, it failed to reflect on how generalisations on marriage or home are 
ineffective, not to mention detrimental, under such circumstances. The 
judgment appears to be a series of generalisations on how the judges perceive 
home, marriage and family life ought to be, rather than providing in-depth 
analysis of the case and its circumstances. But these generalisations help to 
understand the basis of the reasoning employed by the judges.  
Further, the judges made generic observations that matrimonial disputes 
impact girl children adversely as a girl child from a broken home is shunned 
E\SURVSHFWLYHVXLWRU·VSDUHQWV IRUQR IDXOWRIKHURZQ WKHUHE\UHLQIRUFLQJ
gendered social perceptions.303 However, they made no mention of the effect 
matrimonial disputes can have on boy children. Normative yardsticks are 
applied for girls and boys, as the judges state that it is the girl child whose 
PDUULDJH SURVSHFWV ZRXOG EH KDPSHUHG E\ WKH SDUHQWV· GLYRUFH 7KH
reasoning in this case is coloured by gendered norms, rather than an 
understanding of the impact of social and psychological issues upon all family 
members, in the event of a divorce. This is especially evident from the judicial 
insistence on saving marriages of parents as well as girl children, at any cost. 
Another instance of judicial interpretation of what home and family life ought 
to be is found in the case of Amit Beri and Anr. Vs. Smt.Sheetal Beri, decided 
by the Allahabad High Court. In this case, the Court observed that the father 
and mother of the FKLOGKDGD´ORYHPDUULDJHµ304 and subsequently moved to 
                                                             
 
303  “/ƚ ŝƐƵŶĨŽƌƚƵŶĂƚĞƚŚĂƚ ŝŶƚŚĞŝƌ ĨŝŐŚƚŵŽƌĞŽĨƚĞŶŽŶĂĐĐount of egoism the children suffer, more 
particularly when the child is a girl. It is not uncommon to see that at the time of negotiation of 
marriage, the boy's parents shy away because the girl is from a broken family and/or the parents are 
divorced. ? ?'Ăurav Nagpal vs Sumedha Nagpal AIR (2009) SC 557). 
304  “>ŽǀĞŵĂƌƌŝĂŐĞ ?ŝƐĂŶ/ŶĚŝĂŶ-English term used to denote the exercise of choice to find a marital 
ƉĂƌƚŶĞƌ ? ĂƐ ŽƉƉŽƐĞĚ ƚŽ ƚŚĞ ĚŽŵŝŶĂŶƚ ƐŽĐŝĂů ƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĞ ŽĨ “ƌƌĂŶŐĞĚ ŵĂƌƌŝĂŐĞ ? ? ǁŚĞƌĞ ŽŶĞ ?Ɛ ĨĂŵŝůǇ
decides on ŽŶĞ ?Ɛ ŵĂƌŝƚĂů ƉĂƌƚŶĞƌ ďĂƐĞĚ ŽŶ ĐĂƐƚĞ ĂŶĚ ƐŽĐŝĂů ƐƚĂƚƵƐ ? /ŶƉŽƉƵůĂƌ ŝŵĂŐŝŶĂƚŝŽŶ ? ůŽǀĞ
marriages are on shaky ground as they have no family/parental backing or support and this term is 
often used in a disparaging sense to indicate socially unacceptable marriages. The judges choose to 
ƵƐĞƚŚŝƐƚĞƌŵŝŶƐŽŵĞŽĨƚŚĞũƵĚŐŵĞŶƚƐĂŶĚĐůĂŝŵƚŚĂƚƚŚĞƉĂƌĞŶƚƐŚĂǀĞŚĂĚĂ “ůŽǀĞŵĂƌƌŝĂŐĞ ? ?ĂƐŝĨ
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Dubai. The mother was working in Dubai and left the child in a care home 
while she worked, just like thousands of mothers all over the world. Her sister, 
who was divorced, also lived and worked in Dubai. The parents of the child 
separated due to marital discord and the child remained with the mother. The 
IDWKHUDORQJZLWKKLVIDWKHU LH WKHFKLOG·V paternal grandfather), sued the 
mother for custody claiming that he could provide a better financial 
environment for the child. The father also accused the mother of inappropriate 
behaviour as she used to go to night clubs. In this context, the judge, while 
initially glorifying the mother,305 observed that ² 
´However, in this connection, it is material that she admitted in cross-
examination that whenever she used to come late in the night from the 
parties, her husband used to torture her and used to lock himself in the 
room to deprive her from the sexual relation. This statement clearly 
shows that the respondent used to attend such clubs and the appellant 
No. 1 had suspicion regarding her character and, therefore, forcibly used 
to keep himself aloof from her. The Indian culture is entirely different. I 
have already stated regarding the family background of the respondent 
No. 1 and her sister. She is also in the habit of attending night clubs and 
coming late to her house. During this period, the minor child has to be 
left in some care house for children. As the child will grow and attain the 
age of maturity, he is likely to come in contact with undesirable elements. 
Therefore, for proper brought-up of the child and that he may became a 
                                                             
 
that is reason enough for the marital breakdown (For instance, Amit Beri and Anr. Vs. Smt.Sheetal 
Beri AIR (2003) All 78, Mausami Moitra Ganguli vs. Jayant Ganguli AIR (2008) SC 2262). 
305  The observations made in this judgment about the role of the mother are discussed in detail in 
Section 4.4.1. 
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good citizen and may have good character, it is necessary that he may 
QRWEHOHIWZLWKWKHUHVSRQGHQWµ306 
Here, the judge reasons that the mother, who has taken care of the child from 
birth, is unsuitable to have custody as she stays out late at night and is 
influenced by her sister, who is a divorcee. There is a judicial assumption here 
that the woman who is a divorcee would somehow lead her sister down the 
VDPHSDWK0RUHRYHUWKHMXGJHVWDWHVWKDWWKHPRWKHU·VEHKDYLRXULVRSSRVHG
WRWKHLGHDRI´,QGLDQFXOWXUHµ307 Here, there is an assumption that there is 
such a thing as a common Indian culture in a land where language and cuisine 
changes every 50 kilometres. This decision is a good example of a deeply 
entrenched normative thinking of the judges, as it makes assumptions on the 
character and behaviour of the mother and her sister who do not confirm to 
normative ideals of womanhood or motherhood. The court assumes that the 
child who is left in care homes would somehow grow up to associate with 
¶XQGHVLUDEOH HOHPHQWV· ZLWKRXW DQ\ DFWXDO HYLGHQFH IRU PDNLQJ VXFK
presumptions. The court makes a moral judgment on the mother for visiting 
night clubs and links this to the fiction of Indian culture to provide justification 
for its reasoning, rather than basing it on any point of fact.  
In these cases, it is evident that WKH MXGJHV· reasoning on the Hindu family 
reveals deep-seated normative notions in the judicial thinking that subscribes 
to set gender roles of parents. This thinking does not problematise gender 
relations and has an approach of inevitability towards understanding gender. 
However, there are some instances in which some judges have attempted to 
                                                             
 
306 Amit Beri and Anr. Vs. Smt.Sheetal Beri AIR (2003) All 78. This judgment went on appeal and was 
overturned by the Supreme Court of India. It was then sent back to the High Court for revision. In the 
revision order, the blatantly gendered assumptions made in the original judgment were set aside and 
the mother was awarded custody. 
307 dŚĞƚĞƌŵ “/ŶĚŝĂŶĐƵůƚƵƌĞ ? ŝƐƵƐĞĚŝŶƉŽƉƵůĂƌƉĂƌůĂŶĐĞƚŽĞƐƚĂďůŝƐŚĂĐŽŵŵŽŶĐƵůƚƵƌĂůŝĚŝŽŵĨŽƌ
/ŶĚŝĂ ?ĞƐƉĞĐŝĂůůǇƚŽĚŝƐƚŝŶŐƵŝƐŚŝƚĨƌŽŵ “tĞƐƚĞƌŶ ?ĐƵůƚ ƌĞƚŚĂƚŝƐĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌĞĚŵŽƌĞ ‘ƉƌŽŵŝƐĐƵŽƵƐ ? ? 
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adopt a gender- neutral tone, thereby attempting gender justice, as evidenced 
in the following cases. 
For instance, in the case of Chethana Ramatheertha vs Kumar V. Jahgirdar 
discussed in the last chapter, the mother remarried a famous cricketeer and 
VKHFODLPHGFXVWRG\RIWKHFKLOG7KHIDWKHU·VFRXQVHODUJXHGWKDWWKHIDWKHU
had dedicated his life to the welfare of the child and that the mother was 
selfish to have remarried, along the lines of common social perception and 
normative notions of gender. The Court, however, quashed this argument and 
observed that - 
´7KHPRWKHUJHWWLQJPDUULHGDJDLQDIWHUWKHGLYRUFHFDQQRWEHWHUPHG
as an act of selfishness as is sought to be projected by the learned 
Counsel for the respondent-father. Developments and progress in law is 
very slow and tardy. Changes brought about by codified law to any 
customary or conventional practices are always opposed and decried as 
lowering the values in the society. We, at any rate, cannot attribute any 
virtue to the father who has remained not married subsequent to divorce 
and/or attribute any selfishness to the mother for her marriage after her 
divorce with the respondent. We cannot also accept the submission on 
behalf of the respondent-father that the father has remained unmarried 
after his divorce with the present appellant only with a view to promote 
the welfare of the child. We merely accept that it is a fact that he has 
remained unmarried so far and as to what could be the outcome on the 
aspect of the welfare of the child in the context of deciding the 
HQWUXVWPHQWRIFXVWRG\RIWKHFKLOGDQGQRWKLQJEH\RQGµ308 
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+HUH WKH&RXUW ULJKWO\SRLQWVRXW WKDWPRWKHU·V UHPDUULDJHKDV OLWWOHRUQR
bearing on the case as it would be incorrect to assume that a mother is 
incapable of looking after her child, only because she is remarried. The father 
remaining unmarried cannot be touted as a virtue or a point in his favour. The 
Court also acknowledges that in a conflict between customary and codified 
law, it is common to claim that codified law is in opposition to customary 
practices and that it erodes social values, without any reflection on whether 
this is true. What is evident is that the Court adopts a gender-neutral stance, 
rather than painting the mother as someone who has failed in her parental 
role due to her remarriage. 
In another case, Smt. Imarti Devi vs. Madhu Devi, the father died, and the 
mother of the child remarried. The child was living with the mother and her 
second husband. The paternal grandmother of the child claimed custody in its 
EHVWLQWHUHVWVEDVHGRQDSUHFHGHQWWKDWWKHPRWKHU·VUHPDUULDJHPDGHWKH
child appear to be in the foster care of the step-father. 
"The argument that as respondent has remarried, custody of the minor 
should be entrusted to the appellant is abhorrent to the very concept of 
parenthood and a throwback to feudal times in our social past. The right 
of a widow to remarry, is absolute and not circumscribed by any 
condition, that requires her to give up her minor child as a condition 
precedent to a second marriage"309 
The court references the legislative history on widow remarriage in India, 
which was hard-won after many battles with conservative Hindus. It takes the 
side of the widow and ascertains that her rights of being a parent remain 
intact, despite her remarriage. The cases of Chethana Ramatheertha and Smt. 
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Imarti Devi constitute a moment of potential where the judges attempt to 
break free from normative traditions and customs. They provide glimpses of 
a gender-neutral reasoning adopted by the judges, but such instances are few 
and far between. In most cases, normative notions of marriage and family are 
repeatedly reinforced by the judges, as seen earlier.  
What emerges from these cases is that the judges favour normative notions 
of home and family life and perceive them as they ought to be, rather than as 
they are, even as late as 2009. The ideal of the heterosexual family with 
gendered roles for parents is considered the norm. Home and family life is 
constructed around this ideal. Any rupture in this ideal form is considered to 
cause adverse effect on society, culture, morality and civilisation. The cultural 
assumptions with respect to gendered roles are emphasised repeatedly and 
any deviation from the standard is harmful to the system and a threat to the 
cultural ethos.  
More importantly, we can see the emergence of a certain type of Hindu 
middle-class woman in these decisions ² a woman who is expected to stay 
true to her traditional roots, while being educated and/or financially 
capable.310 This woman has the advantages of privilege, usually in the form of 
education and/or employment. She confirms to the definition of being elite, 
as she can determine the conditions of her own life and that of her children. 
This is a significant achievement in a country where most of the female 
population live in sub-par conditions. However, while enjoying the privilege 
                                                             
 
310 For a detailed discussion on the education and financial capacity of the mother, see Chapter 4. 
Some of the cases that support this point are Baby Kavya Awasthi and Another vs. State of U.P. and 
Ors (2013) (5) ACJ72, Smt. Gundamma vs. Shivasharanappa AIR (2004) Kant 357, Amrit Pal Singh vs. 
Jasmit Kaur AIR (2006) Delhi 213, Chethana Ramatheertha vs Kumar V. Jahgirdar (2003) (3) KarLJ 530, 
Vikram Vir Vohra vs Shalini Bhalla 170 (2010) DLT 303, R. Muruga Perumal vs. J. Radhamani (2009) 
(4) LW 527, R. Manivasakan vs. M. Vimala (2012) (8) MLJ 547, Nibha Kumari vs. State of Bihar and 
Ors (2003) (2) PLJR 60  and Mohan Kumar Rayana vs. Komal Mohan Rayana (2009) (3) Bom CR 308. 
In all these instances, the mother is suitable for gaining custody of the child as she can provide for 
the needs of the child(ren) and is usually educated, with a career of her own. 
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of being an elite, this woman is also expected to confirm to her traditional 
roots and obediently follow normative ideas of home, marriage and family life. 
This makes her position paradoxical in the social and familial hierarchy. I 
elaborate more on the role of this woman within the family subsequently in 
this chapter. Before doing this, I demonstrate how the father is constructed in 
judicial reasoning in the next section. This helps in understanding how the 
treatment of the mother is different from that of the father, in the eyes of the 
judges. 
5.3 Judicial Construction of Father 
With respect to the roles and responsibilities of a father, the courts tend to 
WDNHDQRUPDWLYHVWDQFHRQWKHIDWKHU·VUROHDVDSURYLGHU7KHIDWKHU is the 
preferred natural guardian of the child as per Sec.6 of HMGA and he is also 
considered the dominant parent in the judgments.311 The judges consider the 
father to be the provider of all needs, especially those which are economic in 
nature. The father is presumed to be the natural bread winner of the family by 
the judges and he is ready to undertake any kind of hardship to ensure that 
the material needs of the child are met.  
For instance, in one case, the maternal grandparents had custody of a four-
yeaU ROG FKLOG DV WKH PRWKHU FRPPLWWHG VXLFLGH 7KH FKLOG·V VXUQDPH ZDV
changed, and he was not told that he had a natural father by his grandparents. 
The father sued the grandparents, seeking custody. He claimed that he was 
coerced into signing an affidavit relinquishing custody to the maternal 
                                                             
 
311 See Githa Hariharan v. Reserve Bank of India (1999) (2) SCC 228, discussed in Chapter 4. While this 
idea was present in Githa Hariharan, it appears to be a well-entrenched proposition appearing in 
many judgments earlier too. For instance, in N. Palanisami vs. A. Palaniswamy, the Madras High Court 
held that  W 
  “ĨĂƚŚĞƌǁŝůůĂůǁĂǇƐďĞƉƌŽƵĚŽĨĂŶĚƉĂƐsing on his tradition to his children and the children 
also will have more interest in inheriting the tradition from the paternal side, rather than 
ƚŚĞŵĂƚĞƌŶĂůƐŝĚĞ ? ? ?N. Palanisami vs. A. Palaniswamy AIR (1998) Mad 264). 
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grandparents. He also contended that he had to face criminal proceedings 
subsequently and was denied access to the child.  Here, the Court observed 
that ² 
´$IDWKHUZRXOGGRDOOH[WUDHIIRUWWRVHHWKDWKLVson/daughter does better 
in life than he himself has done. This normally cannot be expected from 
any other person howsoever affluent he may be, howsoever rich he may 
EHDQGKRZVRHYHUUHODWHGKHPD\ZLWKWKHFKLOGµ312 
This is an example of the type of positive presumptions that have been made 
in favour of the father, to the extent that the court ruled that even emotional 
disturbances caused to the child are not valid considerations as they would be 
short-lived -  
´7KHHPRWLRQDOGLVWXUEDQFHVRI WKHFKLOGZRXOG have been for a short 
SHULRGDQGWKHFKLOGZRXOGKDYHDGRSWHGWRWKHQHZFLUFXPVWDQFHVµ313 
+HUHWKHFRXUWGRHVQRWFRQVLGHUWKHIDWKHU·VVXLWDELOLW\WRWDNHFDUHRIWKH
child on his own. The father is virtually a stranger to the child, but this is 
overlooked by the judges. The only factor under consideration is that the 
father is the natural guardian of the child and even the welfare of the child 
takes a back seat.  
,QVRPHLQVWDQFHVWKHMXGJHVSURYLGHDJHQGHUHGLQWHUSUHWDWLRQRIWKHIDWKHU·V
role as the provider. In the context of arranged marriages in India, the father 
of a girl child is responsible for her marriage expenses as well as the payment 
of her dowry. For this reason, Indian society considers a daughter to be a 
burden on the family, in contrast to sons who earn for their parents. The 
                                                             
 
312 Ram Murti Chopra and Anr vs Nagesh Tyagi (2008) ILR (12) Delhi 169. 
313 Ibid. 
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QRUPDWLYHQRWLRQWKDWWKHIDWKHULVUHVSRQVLEOHIRUSURYLGLQJIRUDGDXJKWHU·V
marriage finds its way in the judicial reasoning, as seen below ² 
´:HOIDUHZLOOEHSURWHFWHGVRFLDOO\DQGILQDQFLDOO\LIFXVWRG\LVSURYLGHG
to father. Also, child will be approaching marriage in a few years and 
father will definitely take care of her education, marriage, etc which 
would obviously ensure her welfare. Though father left minor in the care 
of maternal grandparents since age one, he still is entitled to custody as 
QDWXUDOJXDUGLDQµ314 
In this case, the father had entrusted the care of his one-year old daughter to 
his father-in-law, after the demise of his wife. He filed an application for 
custody of his daughter when she was about 8, which was rejected by the trial 
judge. On appeal, the High Court overturned the trial judge ruling and 
entrusted the custody of the child to the father. At the time of this judgment, 
the child was almost 13 years of age. The maternal grandparents contended 
WKDW WKH IDWKHU RI WKH FKLOG ZDV UHVSRQVLEOH IRU WKH PRWKHU·V GHDWK DV KH
tortured her mentally and physically leading to her illness and death. The child 
stated under oath to the trial judge that she did not want to go with her father. 
However, the court considered this to be tutored by her grandparents and was 
deemed incapable of forming her own opinions by the Court. However, the 
FKLOG·VFODLPWKDWKHU IDWKHUSURYLGHGIRUKHUPaintenance and educational 
expenses was deemed correct. The maternal grandparents were unable to 
prove their source of income though they claimed to own a small shop. The 
court observed that ² 
´6LQFH.X5RVKDQLKDVEHHQVWD\LQJZLWKKHUPDWHUQDOJUDQG-parents 
since her infancy she must have developed affinity and affection for 
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them. However, same cannot be given undue weightage or importance 
so as to deprive her natural father from seeking restoration of the custody 
RIKLVGDXJKWHUµ315 
Here, like in the case of Ram Murti Chopra, there is a positive presumption 
WKDWWKHIDWKHULVWKHSURYLGHUDQGZLOOEHDEOHWRSURYLGHIRUWKHGDXJKWHU·V
HGXFDWLRQDQGPDUULDJH7KHJUDQGSDUHQWV·FODLPDVZHOODVWKHFKLOG·VRSLQLRQ
were overturned in favour of the father. Also, the welfare of the child took a 
back seat to the rights of the father, as the child was forced to live with a father 
who was a stranger to her. 
While the above case is an example of how a father is looked at in relation to 
a girl child, I now analyse a case in which the judges describe the importance 
of a father in the life of a boy child. In this case, the role of the father is 
supposed to be positive and influential for a boy child who was about 12 ½ 
years old and approaching adolescence, the Court held that -  
´Father's care and love has a powerful and positive impact upon the 
development and health of a child. In addition, numerous studies have 
found that children who live with their father are more likely to have 
good physical and emotional health to achieve academically and more 
likely to exhibit self-control and pro-social behaviour. It is important that 
the minor has his father's care and guidance, at this formative and 
LPSUHVVLRQDEOHVWDJHRIKLVOLIHµ 316 
While the court provided joint custody of the child to both parents with equal 
visitation rights, it saw fit to make the above observations only with respect to 
the father. There was no professional evidence from child psychiatrists to 
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316K.M. Vinaya vs. B.R. Srinivas, Miscellaneous First Appeal No.1729 of 2011(High Court of Karnataka 
at Bangalore, 13/09/2013). 
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substantiate the studies mentioned in the judgment. These observations were 
made, despite the mother having custody of the child from birth in this 
instance. It appears that the Court accepted the role of the father 
unconditionally. The judicial presumption here appears to be that the father 
can do no wrong. He is the natural guardian assigned under Hindu law and 
he is taken at face value, despite the Welfare principle and the judgment in 
Githa Hariharan. 
In the case of Nallamala Padmaja vs. Nallamala Ramesh, the mother sought 
custody of a female child who was 12 years of age and studying in a residential 
school. The mother claimed that the father of the child harassed her, and she 
then separated from him. The father contravened the court order and 
committed contempt of court. However, the Court held that ² 
´7KRXJKWhe father contravened court order and committed contempt, it 
was held to be in the interest of the minor girl and according to her 
wishes. Held that the custody of minor girl should be with her father as 
LWZDVLQKHUZHOIDUHµ317 
The contempt committed by the father is condoned and he is handed over 
custody, without any enquiry into his suitability. Moreover, the Court provides 
weightage to the wishes of the child in deciding her custody. This is one of 
the few instances in which the voice of the child plays a prominent role. The 
PRWKHU·VFODLPRIKDUDVVPHQW LVnot paid much heed by the Court and the 
father is provided custody, despite acting in violation of the lower court order. 
In the case of Shailesh Khandelwal vs. Meenakshi Khandelwal, the parents 
obtained divorce by mutual consent and custody of the minor daughter was 
with the mother, though the family court did not pass any order on custody. 
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As the mother was working and staying alone at Hyderabad, she left the child 
LQWKHFDUHRIKHUIDWKHULHWKHFKLOG·VPDWHUQDOJUDQGIDWKHU7KHIDWKHURI
WKHFKLOGWRRNKHUDZD\RQDYDFDWLRQZLWKWKHJUDQGIDWKHU·VSHUPLVVLRQEXW
ZLWKRXWWKHPRWKHU·VFRQVHQW+HGLGQRWUHWXUQKHUFODLPLQJthat the child 
was looked after well by his family. The mother claimed custody, and this was 
allowed by the trial court. In this instance, the father went on appeal to the 
High Court of Chhattisgarh, which granted custody to the father and visitation 
rights to the mother. The Court observed that -  
´7KHUHLVQRWKLQJRQUHFRUGWRVXJJHVWWKDWWKH:HOIDUHRIWKHFKLOGLVLQ
any way peril in the hands of the father. The statutory presumption that 
the father being the natural guardian is better suited for the child is also 
a relevant consideration. The child was given in the custody of the 
Respondent by learned trial Court on the sole criterion of her more sound 
financial position but the trial Court ignored other aspects of the matter 
as also did not call her to ascertain her wishes as to with whom she wants 
to stay. The trial Court over looked the fact that the mother is living alone 
at Hyderabad and is not in a position to look after her daughter all the 
time. How a child of such a tender age could survive alone was not 
considered. Moreover, the child being in the custody of natural guardian 
i.e. father it cannot be said that an unauthorized person has removed the 
FKLOGIURPWKHFXVWRG\RIKHUQDWXUDOJXDUGLDQµ318 
+HUHRQFHDJDLQWKHIDWKHU·VDFWLRQVDUHSHUFHived as the norm by the judges. 
Moreover, the father being the natural guardian under HMGA excused his 
actions of taking the child away without tKHPRWKHU·VFRQVHQW7KHFKLOGZDV
supposedly happy with the father and her paternal grandparents, which was 
also in favour of the father. The fact that the mother worked in a bank in a big 
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city seemed to have worked against her, as the judges concluded that she 
ZRXOG EH XQDEOH WR ORRN DIWHU WKH FKLOG +HUH WKH IDWKHU·V DFWLRQV DUH
condoned easily, while the mother is held accountable for having a career. 
In the case of Niranjan Singh Huda and Anr vs. Tavinder Pal Singh Bhatia and 
Anr, the judges held that it was in the interest of the minor if the custody is 
provided to the father, despite the latter being criminally convicted. Here, the 
father of the child was convicted to seven years of rigorous imprisonment, as 
he was found guilty in the case lodged against him for the death of the mother 
due to burn injuries. The father was released on bail subsequently. The 
maternal grandparents of the child claimed custody as the father was 
criminally convicted for the death of the mother. The child was about seven 
years of age at the time of the judgment. She wished to remain with the father 
and claimed that she did not recognize her grandparents. The High Court of 
Chhattisgarh held that ² 
´7KHIDFWWKDWWKHIDWKHUKDVEHHQFRQYLFWHGDQGSUHVHQWO\KLVDSSHDOLV
pending before High Court would not dis-entitle him to keep his 
daughter with him, if otherwise the welfare of the daughter lies in 
residing with her father. Here, it cannot be forgotten that the Appellants 
DUHDJHGDQGWKHFKLOGKDVQHYHUUHVLGHGZLWKWKHPLQWKHSDVWµ319 
While this case is one of extreme circumstances, what emerges from the 
analysis of these cases is that the father is judged on normative notions of 
being the provider for the child(ren) and is excused in several instances due 
to his legal position as a natural guardian of a Hindu minor. The judicial 
reasoning in these cases appears to have an underlying assumption that the 
father is the dominant parent. If this is the judicial construction of the father, 
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how is the mother constructed in judicial reasoning? Is she treated any 
differently in these judgments, when compared to the father? These are the 
questions that I explore in the next section. 
5.4 Judicial Construction of Mother 
5.4.1 The Caregiving Mother 
In this section, I analyse how the mother is provided the gendered role of the 
caregiver in the family. Further, I argue that this role is used in judicial 
reasoning to legitimise gender norms. The female members in a Hindu family, 
especially in the role of mothers, are considered nurturers and care-givers by 
the judges. The role of the mother as the natural nurturer and care giver is 
accepted unquestioningly in several judgments.320 For instance, in the case of 
Amit Beri and Anr. Vs. Smt.Sheetal Beri discussed earlier, the judges held that 
² 
"When it comes to Mother v. Father for custody of the child, we should in 
normal circumstances lean towards the Mother. Mother's love is 
proverbial. Every religion, every culture, every civilization has 
acknowledged this. The love, affection and care, which a mother can 
bestow on her child, cannot be given by anyone else, including the 
father."321 
While the judges waxed eloquent about the generic role of the mother in this 
case, they chose to provide custody to the father as the mother was 
considered not to confirm to her traditional role, as she went to late night 
parties and clubs. 
                                                             
 
320 For instance, Ruchirkumar Gajanandbhai Suthar and 2 Ors. Vs. Amitaben D/o Hasmukhlal 
Nanchanddas Mewada, Shiwani Kabra vs. Shaleen Kabra (2011) ILR 2 Delhi 754, Smt. Pushpa and 
Another vs Smt. Anshu Chaudhary (2013) (6) ALJ 628, Baby Kavya Awasthi and Another vs. State of 
U.P. and Ors (2013) (5) ACJ 72, Chethana Ramatheertha vs Kumar V. Jahgirdar (2003) (3) KarLJ 530. 
321 Amit Beri and Anr. Vs. Smt.Sheetal Beri AIR (2003) All 78. 
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A similar theme is evident in the case of Baby Kavya Awasthi and Another vs. 
State of U.P. and Ors, where the judges observed that ²  
´7KHQDWXUDOPRWKHUFDQVDFULILFHDQ\WKLQJDQGFDQFKHULVKPRUHORYH
affection and care in fact appears to have gone mad to have her custody 
for her welfare. It is not out of place to mention here that the mother is 
greater than earth and dearer than even the heaven. Her love and 
affection cannot be compared in any manner whatsoever to that of any 
PDQRUZRPHQµ322   
Normative notions of gender are very prominent in the instances where the 
judges choose to define the role of the mother within the family. The judicial 
reasoning repeatedly stresses the importance of the mother in the care of a 
young child. As seen earlier, the mother is presumed to be the caregiver and 
nurturer, playing a pivotal role in the education and upbringing of her 
FKLOGUHQ 7KH PRWKHU·V FDUH DQG FRPSDQ\ are perceived to be the most 
´QDWXUDOµVWDWHIRUWKHFKLOG%XWDWWKHVDPHWLPHWKHMXGJHValso observed 
that the custody cannot be granted to the mother if she is financially, morally 
or otherwise incapable of taking care of the child. 
´7KHUROHRIWKHPRWKHULQWKHGHYHORSPHQWRIDFKLOG
VSHUVRQDOLW\DQG
her ability to do so can never be doubted. In fact, a child gets the best 
protection and education only through the mother even in 
QDWXUH¬¬1HLWKHUWKHIDWKHUQRUDQ\RWKHUSHUVRQFDQHQGRZWKHVDPH
kind of love, affection, care and sympathies to a child that as of a 
motherµ323  
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The affection and care provided by the mother is held by the judges to be 
unrivalled and even the father is not considered to be able to provide the 
same care.324 It is presumed by the judges that it is in the welfare of the child 
to provide custody to the mother, unless the mother is disqualified by her own 
mistakes.325 For instance, in the case of Master Shobhit Vs. State of U.P. and 
Ors., the mother was accused of killing the father of the children with the help 
of her paramour. The Court held that ² 
´7KHUHKDVEHHQQRGLYHUJHQFHRIYLHZVWKDWLIPRWKHULVDGUXQNDUGRU
she is a licentious lady, having extra marital relationship, or that she is 
unable to look after required welfare of the child or that she is morally 
XQILWVKHFDQQRWEHJLYHQFXVWRG\RIDFKLOGµ326 
In the definitions of the mother in the earlier cases, there is evidently a strong 
nod by the judges to the ideals of motherhood and womanhood. In this case, 
such deviations are outlined and the court states categorically that she cannot 
be given custody of the child in these instances. The circumstances of this case 
were extreme. However, the judges have used an extreme instance as an 
opportunity for moral policing of mothers in general.327 The same standard 
does not apply to a father, while deciding his fitness for custody. 
                                                             
 
324 For instance, Baby Kavya Awasthi and Another vs. State of U.P. and Ors (2013) (5) ACJ 72. This is 
echoed in Chethana Ramatheertha vs Kumar V. Jahgirdar (2003) (3) KarLJ 530. 
325 In the case of Smt Bhabani Mallick vs. Swapan Kumar Mallick, the High Court of Calcutta held that 
 W 
 “dŚĞƌĞ ŝƐ ŶŽ ǁŚŝƐƉĞƌ ŝŶ ƚŚĞ ƐĂŝĚ ĂƉƉůŝĐĂƚŝŽŶ ƚŚĂƚ ƚŚĞ ŵŽƚŚĞƌ ŝ ?Ğ ? ƚŚĞ ƉĞƚŝƚŝŽŶĞƌ ŚĞƌĞŝŶ ŝƐ
incapable to up bring the said daughter or the welfare of the daughter would be in not 
keeping her in the custody of the mother either because of her behaviour, chastity or 
ĐŚĂƌĂĐƚĞƌ ? ?^ŵƚŚĂďĂŶŝDĂůůŝĐŬǀƐ ?^ǁĂƉĂŶ<ƵŵĂƌDĂůůŝĐŬ ? ? ? ? ? ? ?>>d ? ? ?, ? ? 
326 Master Shobhit Vs. State of U.P. and Ors. (2011) (89) ALR 136. 
327 A similar instance is found in the case of Smt Radha alias Parimala v. N. Rangappa, in which the 
father accused the mother of adultery and the mother claimed that the father harassed her for 
dowry. The Court stated that  W 
 “dŚĞ ĨĂƚŚĞƌ ?Ɛ ƌŝŐŚƚ ƚŽ ƚŚĞ ĐƵƐƚŽĚǇ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ŵŝŶŽƌ ĐŚŝůĚƌĞŶ ŝƐ ŶĞŝƚŚĞƌ ĂŶ ĂďƐŽůƵƚĞ ŶŽƌ ĂŶ
indefeasible one. The welfare of the child should be the paramount consideration. The 
mother can also be given the custody of the minors, if their welfare or interest should require 
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On a different note, when the custody involves an older female child, the 
judges vigorously advocate that the mother is the ideal companion and care 
giver for such a child. According to the judges, the mother is in a better 
position to aid and assist a female child in the turbulent years of adolescence 
and puberty, which is beyond the scope of the father. For instance, Abhilasha 
Kumari, -XGJHRI WKH$KPHGDEDG+LJK&RXUWUXOHGWKDWDPRWKHU·VFDUH LV
important for the well-being of a girl child nearing her teens - 
´A different dimension comes into focus when the minor is a girl child. 
Given her inherent sensitivity, a minor girl is, normally, emotionally 
attached and attuned to her mother. A minor girl, especially, requires a 
physically, financially and emotionally stable and secure environment. 
Soon, she may be nearing the threshold of adolescence when the special 
guidance and care of a mother is necessary, for her overall wellbeingµ328 
Here, there seems to be a distinct perception of gendering of parental roles, 
as the judges stress the importance of having the company of the mother 
during adolescence. There is no reasoning provided as to why a father may 
not be able to be supportive of his daughter entering adolescence; the judges 
                                                             
 
ŝƚ ?ĞǀĞŶ ŝĨ ƚŚĞĨĂƚŚĞƌ ŝƐŽƚŚĞƌǁŝƐĞĨŝƚ ƚŽĂĐƚĂƐŐƵĂƌĚŝĂŶ ? ?  ?Smt Radha alias Parimala v. N. 
Rangappa AIR (2004) Kar 299). 
However, along with this, the Court also observed that the divorce decree was obtained by the father 
on grounds of adultery and the mother had not sought to set aside the decree, thereby casting 
ĂƐƉĞƌƐŝŽŶƐŽŶƚŚĞŵŽƚŚĞƌ ?ƐĐůĂŝŵ ?dŚŝƐŝƐŽŶĞŵŽƌĞŝŶƐƚĂŶĐĞŽĨƚŚĞŵĂŶĂŶĚƚŚĞǁŽŵĂŶďĞŝŶŐƐƵďũĞĐƚ
to double-standards in the name of morality. 
328 Eshita d/o Hasmukhbhai Sitapara vs. Hiren Prabhudasbhai Brahmbhatt, Special Civil Application 
No.10009 of 2009 (High Court of Gujarat at Ahmedabad, 18/12/2009). A similar idea is expressed by 
the Court in Prabhat Kumar Vs. Himalini and Himalini Kashyap Vs. Prabhat Kumar (2010) 166 DLT 
469. In some instances, these gendered norms are expressed by the parties to the suit. One such 
instance is that Sheila B. Das Vs. P.R. Sugasree. Here, the mother, a paediatrician by profession, 
sought custody of the child by stating that  W  
 “dŚĞĂƉƉĞůůĂŶƚƐƵďŵŝƚƚĞĚƚŚĂƚƚŚĞŵŝŶŽƌĐŚŝůĚǁŽƵůĚƐŽŽŶĂƚƚĂŝŶƉƵďĞƌƚǇǁŚĞŶƐŚĞǁŽƵůĚ
need the guidance and instructions of a woman to enable her to deal with both physical and 
ĞŵŽƚŝŽŶĂůĐŚĂŶŐĞƐǁŚŝĐŚƚĂŬĞƉůĂĐĞĚƵƌŝŶŐƐƵĐŚƉĞƌŝŽĚ ? ?(Sheila B. Das Vs. P.R. Sugasree AIR 
(2006) SC 1343). 
This was stated ahead of her claim of being a doctor and being in a better position to care for the 
child. 
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thereby undermine the role of the father. While the welfare principle is 
presumed to focus on the interests of the child, the judges hijack the notion 
of welfare to facilitate their reasoning based on gendered norms here. 
0RUHRYHUWKH&RXUWVKDYHHQYLVDJHGWKHPRWKHU·VUROHWREHRQHRIWHDFKLQJ
the girl child a healthy respect for tradition as well as the values of marriage 
in some cases. They have delineated that, a girl child as well as her mother, 
are to be confined to the traditional roles of being cultured and well-groomed 
women equipped for the institution of marriage, without any place for other 
goals that they may aspire to have, as seen in the case of Venugopalan vs. 
Beena -  
´A mother's constant presence can instil in a minor's mind qualities of 
fidelity in life, and faith in the institution of marriage as well as solemn 
relations, essential for community life. In areas where lessons are to be 
imparted, for example in hygiene, grooming, selection of companions 
and the like, a father will be a poor substitute. An educated mother, who 
has made express offer, as could be seen from the order of the Family 
Court, for attending to her educational needs, according to us, is more 
VXLWDEOHSHUVRQWREHHQWUXVWHGZLWKFXVWRG\LIQRWJXDUGLDQVKLSµ329  
Here, the court reasons that a mother must be educated or well-versed in the 
arts of domesticity and she is the best person to pass on these values to her 
daughter, the education of both mother and daughter being limited to this 
sphere. It is also ironic that a mother who is undergoing a divorce and seeking 
custody of her children (which is the circumstance in most of these cases) is 
                                                             
 
329 Venugopalan vs. Beena ILR (2006) (4) Kerala 583. The idea of an educated mother having custody 
of a female child finds resonance in several cases. For instance, Chethana Ramatheertha vs Kumar V. 
Jahgirdar (2003) (3) KarLJ 530, Ruchirkumar Gajanandbhai Suthar and 2 Ors. Vs. Amitaben D/o 
Hasmukhlal Nanchanddas Mewada, Shiwani Kabra vs. Shaleen Kabra (2011) ILR 2Delhi 754, Nibha 
Kumari vs. State of Bihar and Ors (2003) (2) PLJR 60 and R. Muruga Perumal vs. J. Radhamani (2009) 
(4) LW 527. 
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upheld as a model for educating her daughter on the values of marriage. The 
reasoning operates on underlying presumptions on gender and gendered 
norms, without considering the realities of the situation.  
The notion that the mother is important to the growth and well-being of a 
female child is reflected in other cases as well. For instance, in Chethana 
Ramatheertha vs Kumar V. Jahgirdar, the judges observe that ² 
´&RPSDQ\RIDPRWKHUPD\EHLQIDFWPXFKPRUHYDOXDEOHSDUWLFXODUO\
to a growing up female child and until and unless there are compelling 
and justifiable reasons, a child should not be deprived of the company of 
the mother. The question is not so much as to whether father or mother 
gets the custody of the child, but as to whether the child should be 
deprived of the company of the mothHUµ330 
What is significant is that in all these cases, the gender of the child (i.e., the 
child being female) plays a key role in deciding custody. While some of the 
judgments are progressive like Chethana Ramatheertha vs Kumar V. Jahgirdar, 
most of them are examples of gendered iterations of the role of the mother 
LQDFKLOG·VOLIH7KHUHLVDWHQGHQF\WRJORULI\PRWKHUKRRGRYHUDOORWKHUW\SHV
of relationships that a child has, and it appears that such glorification is a 
convenient mechanism to ensure that a woman performs the role of the 
mother and acts as the repository of culture and traditions that need to be 
passed on to the next generation of women.331 As seen in chapter 3 earlier, 
VRFLDOQRUPVGLFWDWHGWKDWDZRPDQ·VFKDVWLW\KDVDYHU\UHDOYDOXH6KHZDV
                                                             
 
330 Chethana Ramatheertha vs Kumar V. Jahgirdar 2003(3) KarLJ 530. Similar ideas about female child 
requiring the company and guidance of the mother is found in these cases - Romani Singh vs. Lt. Col. 
Vivek Singh 201(2013) DLT 742, Alamelu Sockalingam vs. V. Venkatachalam (2012) (6) CTC 907 and 
R. Muruga Perumal vs. J. Radhamani (2009) (4) LW 527.  
331 Flavia Agnes, Law and Gender Inequality -TŚĞWŽůŝƚŝĐƐŽĨtŽŵĞŶ ?ƐZŝŐŚƚƐŝŶ/ŶĚŝĂ (Oxford University 
Press 1999). See also, Brenda Cossman and Ratna Kapur, Subversive Sites - Feminist Engagements 
with Law in India (Sage Publications India Pvt Ltd 1996). 
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considered as the repository of culture and traditions that kept the family 
system together during the colonial times, an idea that is also seen in these 
cases.332  
What is evident in these examples is that the judges promote a certain 
normative ideal of the Hindu mother. She is a nurturer and care-giver for a 
young child and becomes the preserver of tradition and culture for older 
children, especially when the children are female. Judicial reasoning tends to 
be reductionist in these cases and imposes a one-size-fits-all notion of 
womanhood and motherhood, without considering the diverse contexts of 
the cases as well as the parties involved. The idea of a universal standard for 
Hindu womanhood and motherhood occupies central position in judicial 
interpretation, without much room for other positions. The roles of the mother 
and the father in a Hindu family are perceived to be inherently gendered by 
the judges and the mother is placed in a subservient position within the family. 
Such a premise tends to be debilitating to both men and women as they are 
confined to traditional roles and social hierarchies. While there is glorification 
RIWKHPRWKHU·VUROHLQWKHFKLOG·VOLIHZKDW happens in those instances in which 
the mother deviates from this role? Is she still glorified as the mother of the 
child? 
5.4.2 The Deviating Mother 
In this section, I analyse a set of cases in which the mother of the child(ren) 
contends for custody but her claim is refused by the judges. The refusal is 
SUHPLVHGRQWKHPRWKHU·V¶deviaWLQJ· behaviour from the accepted standard 
of motherhood, in the minds of the judges. The mother, in these instances, 
                                                             
 
332 For a detailed of how this was portrayed in colonial Indian society, see, Tanika Sarkar, Hindu Wife, 
Hindu Nation - Community, Religion and Cultural Nationalism (Indiana University Press 2001), Partho 
ŚĂƚƚĞƌũĞĞ ?  ‘dŚĞ EĂƚŝŽŶĂůŝƐƚ ZĞƐŽůƵƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ tŽŵĞŶ ?Ɛ YƵĞƐƚŝŽŶ ? ŝŶ < ^ĂŶŐĂƌŝ ĂŶĚ sĂŝĚ ?^ ?  ?ĞĚƐ )
(Zubaan 1989). This has been discussed in detail in Chapter 3. 
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treads an anomalous path that is unacceptable to the judicial imagination. 
What is evident in these instances is that the mother is held to a high 
normative standard and any divergence from this is unacceptable.  
In the case of Murari Lal Sidana and Anr. Vs. Smt. Anita, the respondent and 
her husband were married in 1997 and had two children in 1999 and 2000. 
Subsequently, there was matrimonial discord and the respondent left her 
marital home, leaving behind her two children (the boy was three and half 
years and the girl was two years at the time).  A year later, the husband/father 
committed suicide and the children continued to remain under the care of the 
paternal grandparents. In 2004, the mother filed for custody and was granted 
the same by the Trial court in 2007. However, the grandparents filed an appeal 
the same year and this was decided on 19th of September 2012 by the High 
Court. The timelines in this case underline the slowness of the judicial process, 
due to which the children were thirteen and a half and twelve years 
respectively and had lived with their grandparents through their entire lives. 
The grandfather passed away during the pendency of this suit and the 
grandmother was awarded custody. The time taken to resolve the case had an 
impact on the children, as illustrated below.  
The judge observed in this case that ² 
´For them, she (the mother) continues to be a mirage, a figment of 
imagination, a total stranger. To consign their custody to her is to rip 
them from their secure surrounding, to subject them to a psychological 
trauma. Such an act would amount to making guinea pigs of the children 
in a judicial experiment. It would cause them a grave injustice if their 
FXVWRG\ZHUHWREHKDQGHGRYHUWRWKHPRWKHUµ 333 
                                                             
 
333 Murari Lal Sidana and Anr. Vs. Smt. Anita AIR (2013) Raj 100. 
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The judge does not consider that the mother has become a stranger due to 
the time taken for the judicial process, though she was prompt in filing an 
application for custody after the demise of her husband. The children refused 
to talk with their mother or go with her, as she was not familiar to them. The 
judge uses this as the reason for denying the mother custody as well as 
visitation rights.334 Moreover, the fact that the grandfather died during the 
pendency of the proceedings and the grandmother is too old to take care of 
the children is not considered. 335  While there is no explicit reasoning on her 
failure to perform the role of the caregiving mother, there is an implied 
normative reasoning at play here. The spectre of welfare is raised as an excuse 
to deny the mother her rights, while not acknowledging that the situation 
arose from a lag in the judicial process. The mother is being penalized for 
leaving her marital home by denying her both custody and visitation of her 
children, while acknowledging that the grandparents prevented her from 
meeting or interacting with the children. Though the reasoning is to ensure 
that the best interests of the children are protected, this seems to be an 
instance of application of the legal principle, without considering the context. 
Here, the judicial reasoning considers the mother to have deviated from her 
expected role and denies her custody, though the underlying reasons for her 
behaviour are very different. What this case emphasises is that the perception 
of adhering to the gendered role of a mother is as important as actual 
adherence to the role, in judicial reasoning. While the father was a stranger to 
                                                             
 
334 The judge denies the mother custody and states  W  
 “/ƚǁŽƵůĚŶŽƚƐĞƌǀĞĂŶǇďĞŶĞĨŝĐŝĂůƉƵƌƉŽƐĞƚŽŐŝǀĞƚŚĞƌĞƐƉŽŶĚĞŶƚ-mother visiting rights. For, 
the children are adamant that they do not wish to interact with her. Simultaneously, the 
appellants have not encouraged the children to interact with her. If the visiting right were 
given to the respondent-mother, it may cause emotional and psychological trauma to the 
children who would have to comply with a court order that they are absolutely 
ƵŶĐŽŵĨŽƌƚĂďůĞǁŝƚŚ ? (Murari Lal Sidana and Anr. Vs. Smt. Anita AIR 2013 Raj 100). 
335 As evidenced from the facts mentioned in the judgment. 
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the child in the case of Ashok Kumar Jatav vs. Ku. Roshani and Anr.,336 the 
&RXUWDZDUGHGWKHIDWKHUFXVWRG\DVKHQHHGHGWRSURYLGHIRUKLVGDXJKWHU·V
wedding. However, the same courtesy was not extended to the mother in the 
case of Murari Lal Sidana and Anr. Vs. Smt. Anita. 
The facts in the case of Chhotibai vs. Sunita Kushwah are similar to that of the 
above case. This was a case in which the mother fought with the paternal 
grandmother for the custody of her daughter. The mother and father of the 
child had separated due to discord. The father died of an illness after the 
separation and the child was residing with the grandmother since then. The 
grandmother contended that the mother was of unchaste character and was 
FODLPLQJFXVWRG\WRXVXUSKHUVRQ·VSURSHUty. The mother refuted these claims 
and contended that there were issues of dowry harassment for which a First 
Information Report (FIR) was launched with the police but this was settled 
later. The child refused to go with the mother during the hearing of the case. 
The judge held that ² 
´$SDUWIURPWKHDIRUHVDLGLWLVZRUWKQRWLQJWKDWWKHUHVSRQGHQWGLGQRW
have good marital relationship with her husband. There was marital 
discard as an FIR was lodged in connection with demand of dowry. True 
it is, there was a compromise, but as we perceive the said efforts did not 
bring in harmony and compatibility between the spouses. During serious 
ailment of the husband the respondent did not come to see him. She was 
away at her parental home on the excuse that she was suffering. We have 
only stated the aforesaid facts with regard to the emotional bond of the 
PRWKHUZLWKWKHFKLOGµ337 
                                                             
 
336 Ashok Kumar Jatav vs. Ku. Roshani and Anr. (2005) (3) MPHT 364. For more on this, see Section 
5.3. 
337 Chhotibai vs. Sunita Kushwah (2009) (3) MPHT 175. 
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The reasoning focuses on how the mother does not build a good marital 
relationship and did not fulfil her role as the good wife, though there is an 
acknowledgement of the dowry demand by mention of the FIR. The judge in 
turn connects this to her ability to bond with the child and uses this as an 
excuse to deny her custody, as it would impair the welfare of the child. When 
a woman fails to fulfil the normative roles expected of her, she is considered 
unsuitable for custody, as in this instance. The universal standard of 
womanhood and motherhood that I demonstrated in the last section, holds 
good here as well. While the judicial presumption in most cases is that the 
mother is unique in providing care and affection to the child, she is considered 
for custody when the judges want to reinforce normative notions of gender 
(such as custody of older girl children) and rejected when she refuses to 
confirm to normative gender role of the good wife and mother.  
In the case of Dr. Seema Kumari Vs. The State of Bihar and Ors., the father and 
mother of the child were doctors pursuing their post-graduate studies. The 
father of the child died in mysterious circumstances in the hostel room of the 
mother. The paternal grandparents of the child believed that the mother was 
responsible for the death of their son. So, they refused to give up custody of 
the child, in favour of the mother. The Court provided custody to the paternal 
grandparents claiming that - 
´2QWKHRWKHUKDQGWKHSHWLWLRQHUDOVRFODLPHGWKDWVKHZRXOGQRWPDUU\
again and hence the child would be happy with her. This was in response 
to our suggestion that she has a long future and being young and 
talented she should consider to marry again with a suitable person. 
Although the apprehension of the respondents 3 and 4 may be mistaken 
but there is every possibility that in the present modern era the petitioner 
may find a suitable person to marry and resettle in a life in which the 
child may not have very welcome or healthy place¬:LWK great difficulty 
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but without any doubt we come to the conclusion that change of custody 
of the concerned minor, a one and half year-old child, in the aforesaid 
facts and circumstances is unwarranted. It is most likely to be traumatic 
and may not be conducive to his welfare. Being a male child, he is a 
coparcener in the Hindu Family of his grandfather and he has legitimate 
claims upon the family which is expected to honour such claims with 
XWPRVWFDUHDQGGHYRWLRQµ338 
Here, the mother, a highly qualified professional, states categorically that she 
would not marry again and would take care of the child, but the Court opines 
that she is less likely to do so. Moreover, there is no judicial reflection as to 
ZK\KHUUHPDUULDJHZRXOGEHKDUPIXOWRWKHFKLOG·VZHOIDUHLQDQ\ZD\7KH
JUDQGSDUHQWV· DOOHJDWLRQ WKDW VKH ZDV UHVSRQVLEOH IRU WKH IDWKHU·V GHDWK
weighs more in judicial reasoning, than the condition of the mother. Another 
reason mentioned is that the child, being male, is a coparcener in the 
JUDQGIDWKHU·VIDPLO\+RZHYHUWKLVLVQRWDFRUUHFWOHJDOSUHPLVHDVFXVWRG\
decLVLRQV DUH EDVHG RQ WKH FKLOG·V ZHOIDUH UDWKHU WKDQ DQ\ OHJDO ULJKW WR
SURSHUW\6RLWLVXQFOHDUKRZWKHFKLOG·VULJKWWRWKHFRSDUFHQDU\FDQEHXVHG
as a deciding factor in this case. 
In this section, I have analysed cases in which the mother deviates from the 
ideal standards of womanhood and motherhood that is set by the judges in 
the cases studied in the last section. When we compare these two sets of cases 
and contrast them with the cases dealing with the construction of the father, 
what emerges is that there are differing yardsticks used by the judges to 
measure the father and the mother in a Hindu family. The father is the 
standard or norm and the mother is the other. The deviant behaviour of the 
                                                             
 
338 Dr. Seema Kumari W/o late Dr. Shashi Shekhar and D/o Sri Rageshwar Prasad Sinha, Advocate, at 
present resident of Mohalla-Makhania Kuan Road, Patna Vs. The State of Bihar and Ors. (2012) (1) 
PLJR 186. 
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father is excused or considered excusable, to the extent that custody is 
granted to the father in several instances. Moreover, the father being the 
natural guardian under Sec.6 of the HMGA is used as the basis for justifying 
custody in these instances. Such a privilege is not accorded to the mother. In 
most instances, the mother must justify how she is eligible to be awarded 
custody, especially in terms of welfare of the child. While the judges claim that 
welfare is the foundational principle for deciding custody, this is true only in 
instances where the mother confirms to the standard of ideal motherhood 
and does not deviate from it in any way. This differential and disparate 
treatment of the mother constructs the figure of the Elite Dependent, as I 
argue in the next section. 
5.5 The Elite Dependent 
As I discussed in the last chapter, judicial interpretation portrays the Hindu 
ZRPDQDVDQ´ (OLWHDHSHQGHQWµDVVKHLVH[SHFWHGWREHWKHHGXFDWHGPLGGOH-
class mother teaching normative values to her children as well as being 
dependent on her husband for economic resources in the cases under study. 
The Elite Dependent is a paradox, as she is provided equal legal treatment but 
subordinate economic treatment, within the Hindu family. She represents the 
tension between normative notion of gender roles and gender equality that is 
present in judicial reasoning. I have explored some aspects of how women in 
the cases under study are elite, in terms of their education and/or employment 
in some of the previous sections.  In this section, I build on my argument from 
the last section to demonstrate that the Hindu woman holds a second-class 
status in the eyes of the judges, compared to the Hindu man, and I 
demonstrate how this disparate treatment constructs the figure of the Elite 
Dependent in judicial reasoning. 
In the case of Nibha Kumari vs. State of Bihar and Ors, the mother and father 
separated, and the child was taken away from mother forcibly. The Court 
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awarded custody to the mother due to tender years of the child. In its 
reasoning, the Court observed that - 
´%HLng an infant, 14 months old-an age at which he should be in the lap 
of the mother, there must be some cogent reason for allowing the custody 
to the father. There is no substitute for love and affection which a mother 
can give to her child, the lack of whicKPD\KDYHDQHQGXULQJHIIHFW¬
She is an educated lady with ambition to start law practice, and we see 
QRUHDVRQZK\VKHVKRXOGEHGHQLHGFXVWRG\IRUWKHSUHVHQWµ339 
In this instance, the Court provides a normative justification for providing the 
PRWKHUFXVWRG\E\SUHVXPLQJWKDWWKHPRWKHU·VFDUHRIWKHFKLOGFDQQRWEH
substituted. Simultaneously, there is an acknowledgement that the mother is 
an educated professional. What this signifies is that the woman holds a 
normative role in the family, while being an elite, educated lady. Here, the 
reasoning provides a striking contrast of opposing ideas, along with an 
attempt at establishing a legal equilibrium between the two.  
In the case of Venugopalan vs. Beena, the father and the mother contested for 
custody of their daughter. The mother was provided custody based on the 
gender of the child and the Court reasoned that the educated mother is best 
placed to guide the girl child on matters of grooming and domesticity. The 
Court observed that -  
´$QHGXFDWHGPRWKHUZKRKDVPDGHH[SUHVVRIIHUDVFRXOGEHVHHQIURP
the order of the Family Court, for attending to her educational needs, 
according to us, is more suitable person to be entrusted with custody, if 
QRWJXDUGLDQVKLS¬¬'HILQLWHO\WKHDJHDQGJHQGHURI5DYHHQDZKRKDV
                                                             
 
339 Nibha Kumari vs. State of Bihar and Ors (2003) (2) PLJR 60. 
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attained adolescence is a factor which requires the Court to opt her 
mother, contextually for acting as a governess."340 
Here, the paradox of the Elite Dependent is visible once again in judicial 
reasoning. The mother is an elite, educated person but her sophistication or 
education is reduced to the act of being a governess for the child, thereby 
PDNLQJWKHPRWKHU·VUROHVXEVHUYLHQWWRWKHIDWKHU7KH&RXUWKHUe claims that 
the mother needs to act as a governess for the child, which again raises 
questions about how the judges perceive the role of the mother in the Hindu 
IDPLO\,VWKHPRWKHU·VUROHOLPLWHGWRWKDWRIDSULYDWHWXWRUWRKHUFKLOGUHQ"
Can the motKHU·V FRQWULEXWLRQ WR D FKLOG·V OLIH EH UHGXFHG WR WKDW RI D
governess? As I discussed earlier in the section on the judicial construction of 
the mother, judicial reasoning confines itself to normative notions of how a 
mother ought to be. Her education is to be used for helping her husband and 
children. In this case, the court takes this further to provide a reductionist 
reasoning that the mother of an adolescent girl is contextually her governess. 
However, we do not witness a similar reduction of the parental role of the 
father. The tension inherent in the role of the Elite Dependent, that of being 
educated yet subservient to the father, is exhibited in this instance.341  
                                                             
 
340 Venugopalan vs. Beena ILR (2006) (4) Kerala 583. Similar sentiment is expressed in Mr. T.L. 
Sivakumar Vs.  Mrs. Sumithra @ Sumithra Sree Original Petition No.306 of 2010 (High Court of 
Madras, 07/02/2014). 
341 A similar tension can be seen in the case of Amrit Pal Singh vs. Jasmit Kaur, where the mother was 
ĂǁĂƌĚĞĚĐƵƐƚŽĚǇ ?/ŶƚŚŝƐĐĂƐĞ ?ƚŚĞŽƵƌƚŚĞůĚĂƐĨŽůůŽǁƐ ?ƵƐŝŶŐĂŶŽƌŵĂƚŝǀĞƉƌĞŵŝƐĞŽĨƚŚĞŵŽƚŚĞƌ ?Ɛ
role along with her financial capability  W 
 “In my opinion, the children should not be deprived of the company of their natural mother 
who is educated, and I am given to understand, financially capable of taking care of the 
children. She can also devote sufficient time to them, take care of their essentials, giving 
them a healthy growth and development. I see no substitution, in the present case, for 
mother's love and affection nor do I find any justification in denying the children of the family 
from receiving love, care and affection of their natural mother, which to my mind, is essential 
ĨŽƌƚŚĞŝŶƚĞŐƌĂůĚĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶƚĂŶĚƉĞƌƐŽŶĂůŝƚǇŽĨƚŚĞĐŚŝůĚƌĞŶ ? ? ?ŵƌŝƚWĂů^ ŝŶŐŚǀƐ ?:ĂƐŵŝƚ<ĂƵƌ
AIR (2006) Delhi 213). 
A similar reasoning is found in Baby Kavya Awasthi and Another vs. State of U.P. and Ors (2013) (5) 
ACJ 72. 
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While these cases are illustrative, they underline two key ideas I have discussed 
so far ² judicial reasoning constructs a certain type of Hindu woman and this 
woman is treated disparately compared to the Hindu man. In most of these 
cases, the mother is defined by normative notion of a person who puts the 
welfare of her husband and children ahead of hers. She is expected to sacrifice 
KHUDPELWLRQVDQGRUKHUFDUHHULIWKH\FRQIOLFWZLWKKHUIDPLO\·VLQWHUHVWV ,
have provided several examples of such cases throughout this chapter, in 
ZKLFKWKHMXGJHVKDYHFDOOHGLQWRTXHVWLRQWKHPRWKHU·VDELlity to look after 
her children, whenever she asserts her right to her own life. Whether it is the 
case of Amit Beri in Allahabad or that of Dr. Seema Kumari in Bihar, the judicial 
attitude is confined to a certain image of the educated mother who bows 
down to the needs of her family, rather than assert her independence. It is this 
conceptualisation of the Hindu woman that is upheld in most of the 
judgments under study. In most cases after Githa Hariharan, the judges seek 
to reconcile conflicting notions on the woman in the Hindu family. They 
attempt to balance the woman as the rights bearing individual with the 
woman as the ideal wife and mother. This constant push and pull reactions in 
the judicial voice leads to the construction of the category of the Elite 
Dependent as this woman has legal equality, while playing a subservient role 
in the family. This category of women occupies a conflicting and secondary 
position within the domain of the Hindu family. 
In contrast, this kind of reasoning does not apply to the father in any of the 
judgments that I have studied. While the judges in some instances like that of 
Chethana Ramatheertha have attempted a gender-neutral tone, there are no 
attempts to ask a man why his education, employment, ambition or career 
goals should not be set aside in the interest of his wife and/or child(ren). As I 
have repeatedly demonstrated through the cases in the chapter, judicial 
reasoning exhibits a disparate treatment of gender. 
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5.6 Concluding Remarks 
In this chapter, I first analyse the judicial perception of the Hindu family and 
argue that the Hindu family is premised on gendered roles, and this reflects 
in the reasoning of the judges. The judicial construction of the heterosexual 
family with defined gender roles, envisages that the mother is educated but 
adheres to her traditional roots. Using the cases, I then demonstrate that the 
judicial construction of the father is often that of the provider and dominant 
parent for the family. This reasoning by the judges often glosses over any 
anomalies LQ WKH IDWKHU·VEHKDYLRXUDQGFLUFXPVWDQFHV LQVHYHUDO LQVWDQFHV
However, the construction of the mother in judicial reasoning indicates a 
contradictory trend. The mother is often expected to conform to the ideals of 
womanhood and motherhood, thereby establishing a one-size-fits-all ideal of 
womanhood and motherhood. Any behaviour deviating from that which is 
expected of her, is not accepted by the judges. I then explain how the category 
of the Elite Dependent ² the woman who is educated but subservient - is 
constructed by judicial reasoning.  The cases that I analyse have indicated that 
this figure holds a subservient position compared to the Hindu man. This trope 
of the Elite Dependent is used to resolve the tension between the 
Constitutional idea of gender equality and protectionism of women in judicial 
reasoning, while simultaneously reinforcing the one-size-fits-all model of 
womanhood and motherhood that is adopted by the judges.  
The judicial practice of reinforcing normative gender roles can be detrimental 
to the rights and existence of women in families and societies, irrespective of 
WKH FRPPXQLWLHV WKH\ EHORQJ WR ,Q WKLV FRQWH[W WKH ,QGLDQ ZRPHQ·V
movement has repeatedly questioned these norms and has attempted to 
arrive at alternative soOXWLRQV LQ WKHLU VWUXJJOH IRU ZRPHQ·V ULJKWV RQ WKH
ground. Indian legal feminists have repeatedly raised this question - In a 
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hierarchical society like India, can equal laws apply to unequals? 342 This is an 
important issue, as successive governments and the courts have relied on 
creation, interpretation and implementation of laws, without considering the 
lack of gender parity in lived experiences. Moreover, while I have analysed the 
category of the Elite Dependent within the private domain of the family, how 
does this category fit into the public domain? In the next chapter, I analyse 
how the Elite Dependent is related to the arguments on gender disparity and 
gender justice, within the feminist legal scholarship in India. I then use this 
analysis to argue that the judicial reasoning, premised on normative 
formulations of gender, impacts gender justice in the UCC. 
  
                                                             
 
342 For more on this, see Nivedita Menon, Recovering Subversion - Feminist Politics Beyond the Law 
(Permanent Black 2004), Flavia Agnes, Family Law Volume 2: Marriage, Divorce and Matrimonial 
Litigation (Oxford University Press 2011).  
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Chapter 6 ² Gendered Nature of Judicial Reasoning and the 
Uniform Civil Code 
6.1 Introduction 
In the last two chapters, I demonstrated that judicial reasoning is premised on 
normative ideas on gender, based on my analysis of custody cases. I 
established that the judges have often used gender-based presumptions, due 
to an inherently normative way of looking at the roles of the father and mother 
within a family. Moreover, I argued that they favoured a gendered hierarchy 
within families, while administering Hindu law. As I explained in the 
introductory chapters, Hindu law forms the largest body of law within 
Religious Personal Laws (RPLs) in India. Any aspect of judicial reasoning in 
Hindu law has a far-reaching consequence on the legal landscape in India, 
both in terms of gender parity and gender justice. So, it is important to situate 
the findings of the case analysis within the wider ambit of political and socio-
legal debates in India. Why is it necessary to discuss the gendered nature of 
judicial reasoning and its impact on the Uniform Civil Code (UCC) in this 
thesis?  The answer lies largely in two spheres - the feminist debates on the 
UCC and the current political climate in India - as I explore in this chapter.  
Here, I analyse the relationship between judicial reasoning in the cases under 
VWXG\ DQG ,QGLDQ IHPLQLVWV· DUJXPHQWV RQ JHQGHU MXVWLFH LQ RPLs. This 
relationship has often been uneasy and conflicted. Despite existing tensions, 
feminist theorisation is pivotal to this relationship, as it provides valuable 
insights for understanding how normative notions of gender in judicial 
reasoning impacts the cause of gender justice. I argue that the differential 
treatment of gender in judicial reasoning that I have discussed in previous 
chapters, furthers this aspect of feminist theorisation. I then examine the 
impact of this relationship on the formulation of a UCC to replace RPLs in 
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India. I locate my analysis of cases within the wider context of feminist debates 
on RPLs and demonstrate that the Hindu code may not be the ideal blue print 
for creating a UCC in the Indian context. 
Most Indian feminists claim that RPLs tend to be gender discriminatory and 
treat women as second-class members within the family. These claims largely 
pertain to existing legislation and its impact on women in India. While feminist 
theorists and activists are largely engaged in analysis of how gendered roles 
create gender imbalances within families and in society, one area that is 
under-explored in scholarship is the influence of this normative view on 
gendered roles on judicial reasoning in personal laws. It is important to focus 
on this aspect, as such reasoning leads to the iteration of gendered hierarchies 
within families. As I explored in the last two chapters, judicial reasoning on 
families tends to assume a binary and idealised view of a family, with 
entrenched gender-based roles of caregiver and provider and tends to 
typecast women and men in these normative roles. While Indian feminist 
scholarship has repeatedly addressed how the law is gendered in legislation, 
there is a gap in the scholarship on how normative notions of gender have 
been applied in judicial reasoning. I address this gap in this chapter, by 
analysing how the definition and application of normative gender roles in 
judicial reasoning in the cases under study strengthens as well as deepens the 
,QGLDQIHPLQLVWV·stance that RPLs are gender discriminatory. 
The central idea in this chapter is that my arguments about the gendered 
QDWXUHRIMXGLFLDOUHDVRQLQJKHOSWRGHYHORSDQGHQKDQFHWKH,QGLDQIHPLQLVWV·
position that the system of RPLs in India perpetuates existing gender 
inequalities. My sub-argument is that the gendered sub-text in judicial 
reasoning in these cases, decided under one of the key acts of the Hindu code, 
raises concerns about the egalitarian or uniform nature of the Hindu code. I 
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use these arguments to answer my third research question (consisting of two 
parts) ²  
a. How does judicial reasoning on gender roles impact/inform the 
feminist debates on RPLs?  
b. Based on judicial reasoning in the cases under study, can the Hindu 
code be used as a blueprint for the UCC? 
In the first section, I examine the Indian feminist positions on RPLs to establish 
the common denominator of these positions ² that all religious personal laws 
are discriminatory and help to create a familial hierarchy based on gender. In 
the nexWVHFWLRQ,H[SODLQKRZ,DOLJQZLWKWKH,QGLDQIHPLQLVWV·FODLPWKDW53/V
are gender discriminatory, by way of my case analysis. I focus on the judicial 
reasoning and its treatment of gender and I demonstrate how my case 
analysis deepens and expands this position. Then, I analyse the positions 
adopted by feminist scholars on the UCC, while simultaneously providing 
some insights on how an egalitarian approach can be adopted and elaborate 
on the question of why the Hindu code may not serve as a good design for a 
UCC.  In the next section, I demonstrate how my arguments segue into the 
IHPLQLVW GHEDWHV E\ DQDO\VLQJ YDULRXV DVSHFWV RI WKH ,QGLDQ IHPLQLVWV·
arguments on RPLs and specifically the UCC. 
6.2 Indian Feminist Positions on RPLs 
In this section, I focus RQ WKH UHODWLRQVKLS EHWZHHQ WKH ,QGLDQ ZRPHQ·V
movement343 and RPLs, with a special emphasis on the role of law in that 
                                                             
 
343 dŚĞ/ŶĚŝĂŶǁŽŵĞŶ ?ƐŵŽǀĞŵĞŶƚŚĂƐĂƌŝĐŚĂŶĚĚŝǀĞƌƐĞŚŝƐƚŽƌǇĂŶĚŝƐĂĐŽŶĨůƵĞŶĐĞŽĨƐĞǀĞƌĂůůĂƌŐĞ
and small movements (For more on this, see Radha Kumar, The History of Doing - An Illustrated 
ĐĐŽƵŶƚŽĨDŽǀĞŵĞŶƚƐĨŽƌtŽŵĞŶ ?ƐZŝŐŚƚƐĂŶĚ&ĞŵŝŶŝƐŵŝŶ/ŶĚŝĂ- 1800 - 1900 (Zubaan 1993). I have 
used the phrase to indicate the movement broadly, while acknowledging that it has several 
constituent parts. 
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UHODWLRQVKLS7KH,QGLDQZRPHQ·VPRYHPHQWLVWKHILUVWWRYLHZ53/VWKURXJK
a gendered lens and it examines RPLs from two angles ² the differential 
treatment of different communities and the differential treatment of men and 
women of the same community.344 Both angles are considered important to 
DQ\ GLVFXVVLRQ RQ ZRPHQ·V ULJKWV ZLWKLQ DQG RXWVLGH IDPLOLHV LQ ,QGLD DQG
these are repeatedly explored in both feminist scholarship and activism over 
the last seven decades. Indian feminists often focus on RPLs as a source of 
gender discrimination across communities. I first outline the development of 
feminist positions on RPLs historically, as it helps to understand the debates 
in their political, social and legal contexts, and then situate my thesis within 
these theoretical debates. 
$VGLVFXVVHG LQ&KDSWHU WKHZRPHQ·VPRYHPHQW LQ ,QGLDJDLQHGJURXQG
from the 1920s onwards. In 1937, the All India WRPHQ·VFRQIHUHQFHGLVFXVVHG
the possibility of a UCC to replace the personal laws of all communities. This 
idea was subsequently adopted by the nationalist leaders of the freedom 
struggle, as it was considered a method of providing uniformity and 
modernisation of RPLs. However, due to the volatile political climate after the 
partition of the country along religious lines, most nationalist leaders, like 
Nehru, thought it necessary to compromise with the minority communities.345 
                                                             
 
344 dĂŶũĂ,ĞƌŬůŽƚǌ ? ‘Religion-ĂƐĞĚWĞƌƐŽŶĂů>ĂǁƐŝŶ/ŶĚŝĂĨƌŽŵĂtŽŵĞŶ ?ƐZŝŐŚƚƐWĞƌƐƉĞĐƚŝǀĞ෴ PŽŶƚĞǆƚ
and Some Recent Publications ? ? ? ? ? ? ) ?^ƺĚĂƐŝĞŶ-Chronik - South Asia Chronicle. She also provides a 
detailed analysis of the feminist discourse on RPLs, parts of which I have used in this section. 
345 ŐŶĞƐ ĐůĂŝŵƐ ƚŚĂƚ Ăƚ ƚŚĞ ƚŝŵĞ ŽĨ /ŶĚŝĂ ?Ɛ ĨƌĞĞĚŽŵ ? ƚŚĞĐŽŶĐĞƌŶ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ĨŽƵŶĚŝŶŐ ĨĂƚŚĞƌƐ ǁĂƐ
 “ĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞŶĞǁŶĂƚŝŽŶƐƚĂƚĞĂŶĚŝƚƐƐŵŽŽƚŚŐŽǀĞƌŶĂŶĐĞ ?ĂŶĚƚŚĞhǁĂƐĚĞďĂƚĞĚǁŝƚŚŝŶƚŚŝƐ
contĞǆƚ ŽĨ  ‘ĂƵƚŚŽƌŝƚǇ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ƐƚĂƚĞ ƚŽ ƌĞŐƵůĂƚĞ ĨĂŵŝůǇ ƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐŚŝƉƐ ŽĨ ĐŝƚŝǌĞŶƐ ĂŶĚ ƌŝŐŚƚƐ ŽĨ
ŵŝŶŽƌŝƚŝĞƐ ? ?FlĂǀŝĂŐŶĞƐ ? ‘Nation Building through the Enactment of Hindu Code Bill  W The Nehruvian 
Agenda ? ? ? ? ? ? ) ?ŽŶƚĞŵƉŽƌĂƌǇWĞƌƐƉĞĐƚŝǀĞƐ). See also, Shabnum dĞũĂŶŝ ? ‘Between Inequality and 
Identity: The Indian Constituent Assembly and Religious Difference, 1946 W ? ? ? (2013) 33 South Asia 
Research. dŚŝƐǀŝĞǁŝƐĂůƐŽĞŶĚŽƌƐĞĚďǇWĂƌĂƐŚĂƌ ?ǁŚŽƐƚĂƚĞĚƚŚĂƚƚŚĞŚŝĚĚĞŶĂŐĞŶĚĂǁĂƐ “ƵŶŝĨŝĐĂƚŝŽŶ
of the nation through ƵŶŝĨŽƌŵŝƚǇŝŶůĂǁ ? ?Archana Parashar, Women and Family Law Reform in India 
(Sage Publications Pvt Ltd, New Delhi 1992).Moreover, the nascent Indian government considered it 
better to continue the colonial policies and practices of law and governance, especially with respect 
to religious communities (Rina Verma Williams, Postcolonial Politics and Personal Laws: Colonial Legal 
Legacies and the Indian State (Oxford University Press 2006). 
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The newly formed Indian government backtracked on replacing personal laws 
with secular laws. This compromise was visible when the Constituent Assembly 
of India proposed (and later adopted) Article 44 of the Indian Constitution, 
which stated that the Indian state shall endeavour to secure a Uniform Civil 
Code (UCC) for its citizens.346 The idea of the UCC was thus confined to the 
pages of the Constitution. Initially, the public debates on a UCC and RPLs were 
primarily the subject of arguments on national integrity, secularism and 
modernity.347 The Indian Parliament formulated the modern Hindu Code, 
which combined Common Law principles with minimal aspects of customary 
Hindu law.348 The Hindu Code was hailed as a legislative milestone in 
modernising the Indian personal law system by the Indian legislators and the 
,QGLDQ ZRPDQ·V PRYHPHQW RI WKH WLPH DV VHYHUDO DUJXPHQWV RQ ZRPHQ·V
rights and their place in the family and nation started gaining ground during 
its passage in the 1950s.349  
                                                             
 
346 This provision was placed in the section on Directive Principles of State Policy, a non-justiciable 
part of the Indian Constitution, to ease minority anxieties - especially that of Muslim community and 
its leaders. (^ŝŽďŚĂŶDƵůůĂůůǇ ?  ‘Feminism and Multicultural Dilemmas in India: Revisiting the Shah 
ĂŶŽĂƐĞ ? (2004) 24 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies) The Uniform Civil Code (UCC) has been a bone 
of contention in the Indian political and legal spectrum for the last 70 years. Successive elected 
governments have failed to enact a uniform code to govern the entire population of the country, as 
they feared repercussions to their vote banks.  
347 For instance, see ZŽďĞƌƚĂŝƌĚ ? ‘ZĞůŝŐŝŽŶĂŶĚ>ĂǁŝŶ/ŶĚŝĂ PĚũƵƐƚŝŶŐƚŽƚŚĞ^ĂĐƌĞĚĂƐ^ĞĐƵůĂƌ ?ŝŶ
Robert D Baird (ed), Religion and Law in Independent India (Manohar Publishers and Distributors 
2005), 'ĞƌĂůĚ:ĂŵĞƐ>ĂƌƐŽŶ ? ‘/ŶƚƌŽĚƵĐƚŝŽŶ PdŚĞ^ĞĐƵůĂƌ^ƚĂƚĞŝŶĂZĞůŝŐŝŽƵƐ^ŽĐŝĞƚǇ ?ŝŶ'ĞƌĂůĚ:ĂŵĞƐ
Larson (ed), Religion and Personal Law in Secular India (Indiana University Press 2001). 
348 Agnes observes that "Thus what emerges here is a duality of concerns for the newly evolving Indian 
State. At one level, it was deemed necessary that the various sects, castes and tribes of the vast 
majority from the erstwhile Princely States, territories under the control of various tribes and the 
British Raj - be integrated as one community by enacting a uniform set of family laws, by introducing 
ĂĐŽŶĐĞƉƚŽĨ ‘ůĞŐĂů,ŝŶĚƵŝƐŵ ? ?dŚĞĨůŝƉƐŝĚĞŽĨƚŚŝƐŽďũĞĐƚŝǀĞŽĨƐŵŽŽƚŚŐŽǀĞƌŶĂŶĐĞǁĂƐĂŶĂƐƐƵƌĂŶĐĞ
to minorities (not just Muslim, but also Christian and Parsee) of their separate religious and cultural 
identity symbolised by the continuancĞŽĨƚŚĞŝƌƉĞƌƐŽŶĂůůĂǁƐ ? ?(&ůĂǀŝĂŐŶĞƐ ? ‘Nation Building through 
the Enactment of Hindu Code Bill  W The Nehruvian Agenda ? ? ? ? ? ? ) ?ŽŶƚĞŵƉŽƌĂƌǇWĞƌƐƉĞĐƚŝǀĞƐ) To 
date, Muslims, Christians, Jews and Parsis in India are entitled to follow their religious laws to govern 
the sphere of the family. 
349 ibid.  
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Through the 1960s and 70s and especially in the 1980s, the IndiaQZRPHQ·V
PRYHPHQWZRUNHGWRZDUGVDGGUHVVLQJZRPHQ·VULJKWVVSHFLILFDOO\ZLWKLQWKH
family.  A significant change in the movement and gender scholarship 
RFFXUUHG GXULQJ WKH V ZLWK WKH SXEOLFDWLRQ RI WKH ´7RZDUGV (TXDOLW\µ
Report in 1974 and the declaration of National Emergency in 1975, as the 
ZRPHQ·VPRYHPHQWEHJDQWRUHWKLQNTXHVWLRQVRIQDWLRQDOLQWHJUDWLRQDQG
secularism.350 During this time, groups of women tried to engage both the 
state and civil society about social issues faced by women, by way of public 
protests, demonstrations and street plays and most feminist campaigns 
evolved around individuals or events.351 This period also witnessed the idea 
that a secular code would both further the cause of gender justice and act as 
a counter to the rising force of Hindu nationalism.352 
,QWKHVZRPHQ·VJURXSVEHJDQWRPRYHDZD\IURPSURWHVWVDQGSOD\V
towards forming personal relationships, exploring traditional sources of 
ZRPHQ·V VWUHQJWK UDWKHU WKDQ VXIIHULQJ DQG FHOHEUDWLQJ FRXUDJH DQG
strength. This shift in attitude was especially pronounced after the Shah Bano 
judgment, as explained in the introductory chapter.353 The judgment was 
                                                             
 
350 For more on this, see ZĂŬĂZĂǇ ? ‘/ŶƚƌŽĚƵĐƚŝŽŶ PdŚĞWŽůŝƚŝĐƐŽĨ<ŶŽǁůĞĚŐĞ- Gender Scholarship and 
tŽŵĞŶ ?ƐDŽǀĞŵĞŶƚŝŶ/ŶĚŝĂ ?ŝŶZĂŬĂ Ray (ed), Handbook of Gender (Oxford University Press 2012). 
351 ZĂĚŚĂ<ƵŵĂƌ ? ‘Contemporary Indian Feminism ? ? ? ? ? ? ) ?&ĞŵŝŶŝƐƚZĞǀŝĞǁ ? 
352 Tanja Herklotz,  ‘ĞĂĚ>ĞƚƚĞƌƐ෴ ?dŚĞhŶŝĨŽƌŵŝǀŝůŽĚĞƚŚƌŽƵŐŚƚŚĞǇĞƐŽĨƚŚĞ/ŶĚŝĂŶtŽŵĞŶ ?Ɛ
Movement and the Indian Supreme Court ? ? ? ? ? ? ) ?^ƺĚĂƐŝĞŶ-Chronik - South Asia Chronicle. 
353 In the case of Mohammed Ahmed Khan vs. Shah Bano Khan (1985) SC 945, Shah Bano Begum, a 
Muslim woman, claimed maintenance from her husband under Sec.125 of the Code of Criminal 
Procedure of 1973, instead of Muslim Personal Law. Her husband argued that he did not have to pay 
maintenance under the Muslim Personal law beyond the period of Iddat (three months and ten days). 
The Supreme Court confirmed the judgment of the High Court and granted her a maintenance of Rs. 
179.20 per month from her husband. The Court alƐŽĚŝƐŵŝƐƐĞĚŚĞƌŚƵƐďĂŶĚ ?ƐĂƉƉĞĂůĂŐĂŝŶƐƚĂǁĂƌĚŝŶŐ
maintenance under the Criminal Procedure Code. This case had enormous consequences on the 
political and legal landscapes in India. The Supreme Court premised its judgment on certain 
perceptions on the backǁĂƌĚŶĞƐƐŽĨƚŚĞDƵƐůŝŵĐŽŵŵƵŶŝƚǇ ?ĞƐƉĞĐŝĂůůǇŝŶƚĞƌŵƐŽĨǁŽŵĞŶ ?ƐƌŝŐŚƚƐ
 ?ĂƐƚŚĞ ůĂŶŐƵĂŐĞŽĨƚŚĞ ũƵĚŐŵĞŶƚ ŝŶĚŝĐĂƚĞĚ ) ?^ŝŵƵůƚĂŶĞŽƵƐůǇ ?ƚŚĞŽƵƌƚ ůĂŵĞŶƚĞĚƚŚĞ ůĞŐŝƐůĂƚƵƌĞ ?Ɛ
ŝŶĂďŝůŝƚǇƚŽƉĂƐƐƚŚĞhŶŝĨŽƌŵŝǀŝůŽĚĞ ?dŚĞŽƵƌƚ ?ƐŽďƐĞƌǀĂƚŝŽŶƐŽŶDƵƐůŝŵƉĞƌƐŽŶĂů law angered 
the Muslim community in India, which defeated the ruling Congress party in bye-elections. This, in 
turn, led to the passing of the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights in Divorce) Act, 1986. This Act 
was intended to save Muslim personal law and stated that Muslim women could claim divorce and 
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FULWLTXHG E\ IHPLQLVWV IRU WKH FRXUW·V DQWL-Muslim rhetoric.354 After this 
judgment, it became clear to theorists and activists across the Indian feminist 
spectrum that they could no longer treat all Indian women as a monolithic or 
unitary block that needed legal reforms. What the Shah Bano case and its 
aftermath revealed was that Indian women had conflicting identities and 
obligations.355 They also realised what works for one community may not 
necessarily be good for another. They discerned that secularisation of laws 
may not be a universal remedy for all women, in theory and in practice.356 
After the Shah Bano verdict in 1985, and the destruction of the Babri Masjid 
in 1992, Indian feminists moved away from the idea of a UCC, which was then 
viewed as tainted by association with the Hindu Right. It was a defining 
moment for Indian feminists, as this led to a period of self-critique and 
reflection. 
7KH V VDZ WKH HVWDEOLVKPHQW RI DXWRQRPRXV ZRPHQ·V JURXSV DQG
identities, especially for obtaining aid.357 The questions that arose from the 
feminists at this point were whether a UCC would replicate the gender-based 
issues found in the RPLs and whether the ideas of uniformity of laws or 
nationhood were relevant to gender justice.358 From the 2000s onwards, the 
                                                             
 
maintenance according to Muslim personal law. For a detailed discussion on the case and its 
aftermath, see ĂŬŝĂWĂƚŚĂŬĂŶĚZĂũĞƐǁĂƌŝ^ƵŶĚĞƌZĂũĂŶ ? ‘ “^ŚĂŚĂŶŽ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ) ? ?^ŝŐŶƐ ? 
354 The language in this judgment was critiqued by feminists widely, as it perpetuated certain negative 
stereotypes against Islam and commented on the poor situation of Muslim women. The judgment 
criticised the government for not passing the UCC as its passage would have strengthened national 
integration. The remarks in the judgment were widely considered to be directed against the Muslim 
Community, based on popular assumptions. For more on this, see ibid.  
355 Geetanjali Gangoli, Indian Feminisms: Law, Patriarchies and Violence in India (Ashgate 2007). 
356 Tanja Herklotz,  ‘ĞĂĚ>ĞƚƚĞƌƐ ?dŚĞhŶŝĨŽƌŵŝǀŝůŽĚĞƚŚƌŽƵŐŚƚŚĞǇĞƐŽĨƚŚĞ /ŶĚŝĂŶtŽŵĞŶ ?Ɛ
Movement and the Indian Supreme Court ?  ? ? ? ? ? )  ? ^ƺĚĂƐŝĞŶ-Chronik - South Asia Chronicle, 
Hyderabad Anveshi Law Committee,  ‘'ĞŶĚĞƌ :ƵƐƚŝĐĞ KŶůǇ Ă >ĞŐĂů /ƐƐƵĞ ?Political Stakes in UCC 
ĞďĂƚĞ ? [1997] Economic and Political Weekly. 
357 dŚŝƐǁĂƐƉŽƉƵůĂƌůǇĐĂůůĞĚƚŚĞ “E'KŝƐĂƚŝŽŶ ?ŽĨƚŚĞǁŽŵĞŶ ?ƐŵŽǀĞŵĞŶƚ Wa reference to the number 
of Non-'ŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚĂůKƌŐĂŶŝǌĂƚŝŽŶƐŽƌE'KƐƚŚĂƚǁĞƌĞƐĞƚƵƉĨŽƌǁŽŵĞŶ ?ƐǁĞůĨĂƌĞ ? 
358 <ƵŵŬƵŵ ^ĂŶŐĂƌŝ ?  ‘Gender Lines: Personal Laws, Uniform Laws, Conversion ?  ? ? ? ? ? )  ? ? ^ŽĐŝĂů
Scientist. 
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movement actively questioned the construction of a single category of 
¶ZRPHQ·LQ,QGLD359 Now, there is an acknowledgment from Indian feminists 
WKDW WKH ZRPHQ·V PRYHPHQW LV QRW FRQILQHG WR ZRPHQ·V LQWHUHVWV EXW LW
extends to minority identities and claims too.360 There is a clear shift in the 
Indian feminist scholarship against RPLs and a UCC since the 1990s. The issue 
of formulation of a UCC in place of RPLs lost its primacy in the scholarship and 
LQWKHZRPHQ·VPRYHPHQW,WLVQRZRQHRIWKHPDQ\ZRPHQ·VLVVXHVWKDWWKH
movement engages with, rather than being the only issue. So, why have most 
Indian feminists rejected the UCC? Perhaps the most important change has 
come from within, as they started to question the homogenised nature of the 
ZRPHQ·VPRYHPHQW:KLOH,H[SORUHWKHIHPLQLVWSRVLWLRQVRQWKH8&&LQWKH
next section in detail, I now turn to important arguments put forth by Indian 
feminist scholars on the gendered nature of RPLs and more specifically on the 
Hindu code. 
The common position that is consistently maintained by many Indian feminist 
scholars such as Nivedita Menon, Archana Parashar, Ratna Kapur and Flavia 
Agnes, is that all RPLs are gender discriminatory and are premised on 
exclusions.361 These scholars claim that the notion that the Hindu code is more 
modern and gender-just than Muslim personal law has percolated through 
                                                             
 
359 KŶĞŽĨƚŚĞĨŝƌƐƚƚŽƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶƚŚĞĂƚƚŝƚƵĚĞŽĨƚŚĞ/ŶĚŝĂŶǁŽŵĞŶ ?ƐŵŽǀĞŵĞŶƚ ?ƌĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĞĚďǇƚŚĞ
urban, Hindu, upper caste-class women) towards Muslim and Dalit women and appropriation of their 
ŝĚĞŶƚŝƚŝĞƐǁĂƐƚŚĞtŽŵĞŶ ?ƐKƌŐĂŶŝƐĂƚŝŽŶĐĂůůĞĚŶǀĞƐŚŝ>ĂǁŽŵŵŝttee, Hyderabad. It provided a 
ƉƌŽĨŽƵŶĚĐƌŝƚŝƋƵĞ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ /ŶĚŝĂŶǁŽŵĞŶ ?ƐŵŽǀĞŵĞŶƚǁŚŝĐŚ ƉƌŽĚƵĐĞĚĂ ŶŽƌŵĞĚǁŽŵĂŶǁŚŽǁĂƐ
ĐĂůůĞĚ ‘/ŶĚŝĂŶ ? ?ĂƐƚŚĞƐƉĞĐŝĨŝĐŵĂƌŬĞƌƐŽĨŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂůŝĚĞŶƚŝƚŝĞƐǁĞƌĞĐŽŶƐŽůŝĚĂƚĞĚĂŶĚŵĂĚĞŝŶǀŝƐŝďůĞ ?
(Hyderabad Anveshi Law Committee,  ‘'ĞŶĚĞƌ :ƵƐƚŝĐĞ KŶůǇ Ă >ĞŐĂů /ƐƐƵĞ ?Political Stakes in UCC 
ĞďĂƚĞ ? [1997] Economic and Political Weekly). See also, Lakshmi Arya,  ‘dŚĞhŶŝĨŽƌŵŝǀŝůŽĚĞ PdŚĞ
Politics of the Universal in Post-ŽůŽŶŝĂů/ŶĚŝĂ ? (2006) 14 Feminist Legal Studies. 
360 ZĂũĞƐǁĂƌŝ^ ƵŶĚĞƌZĂũĂŶ ? ‘Women between Community and State: Some Implications of the Uniform 
Civil Code Debates in India ? ? ? ? ? ? ) ? ?^ŽĐŝĂůdĞǆƚ. 
361 For instance, see EŝǀĞĚŝƚĂDĞŶŽŶ ? ‘A Uniform Civil Code in India: The State of the Debate in 2014 ?
(2014) 40 Feminist Studies, Archana Parashar, Women and Family Law Reform in India (Sage 
Publications Pvt Ltd, New Delhi 1992), Brenda Cossman and Ratna Kapur, Subversive Sites - Feminist 
Engagements with Law in India (Sage Publications India Pvt Ltd 1996),  Flavia Agnes, Family Law 
Volume 1: Family Laws and Constitutional Claims (Oxford University Press 2011). 
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the legislative, judicial and public imaginations.362 However, what was 
forgotten was that Hindu law was codified and therefore did not benefit from 
reform.363 For instance, women could not inherit property on equal terms with 
men in a Hindu joint family until 2005, a Hindu woman could not adopt a child 
in her own name, the Hindu marriage is sacramental in nature and principles 
such as restitution of conjugal rights were all gender discriminatory.364 In 
contrast, debates on Muslim personal law frequently depicted this law as 
being backward and discriminatory against women, despite Muslim law 
KDYLQJDEHWWHUSRVLWLRQRQZRPHQ·VULJKWVFRPSDUHGWR+LQGX/DZLQ,QGLD365  
As is evident from the above, Indian feminist scholars grapple with two aspects 
of RPLs I mentioned earlier, namely, the different treatment of different 
communities and the differential treatment of men and women of the same 
community. The literature on the arguments on differential treatment for 
different communities is extensive and it claims that such treatment is strongly 
centred on identity politics, specifically Hindu-Muslim politics, as well as 
                                                             
 
362 Tanja Herklotz,  ‘ĞĂĚ>ĞƚƚĞƌƐ ?dŚĞhŶŝĨŽƌŵŝǀŝůŽĚĞƚŚƌŽƵŐŚƚŚĞǇĞƐŽĨƚŚĞ /ŶĚŝĂŶtŽŵĞŶ ?Ɛ
Movement and the Indian Supreme Court ? ? ? ? ? ? ) ?^ƺĚĂƐŝĞŶ-Chronik - South Asia Chronicle. 
363 Nivedita Menon,  ‘hŶŝĨŽƌŵŝǀŝůŽĚĞŝŶ/ŶĚŝĂ PdŚĞ^ ƚĂƚĞŽĨƚŚĞĞďĂƚĞŝŶ ? ? ? ? ? (2014) 40 Feminist 
Studies. 
364 For a detailed discussion on such practices, see &ůĂǀŝĂŐŶĞƐ ? ‘Has the Codified Hindu Law Changed 
Gender Relationships? ? ? ? ? ? ? ) ? ?^ŽĐŝĂůŚĂŶŐĞ, Flavia Agnes, Family Law Volume 1: Family Laws and 
Constitutional Claims (Oxford University Press 2011), Flavia Agnes, Family Law Volume 2: Marriage, 
Divorce and Matrimonial Litigation (Oxford University Press 2011).  See, also Tanja Herklotz,  ‘ĞĂĚ
>ĞƚƚĞƌƐ෴ ?dŚĞhŶŝĨŽƌŵŝǀŝůŽĚĞƚŚƌŽƵŐŚƚŚĞǇĞƐŽĨƚŚĞ/ŶĚŝĂŶtŽŵĞŶ ?ƐDŽǀĞŵĞŶƚĂŶĚƚŚĞ/ŶĚŝĂŶ
Supreme Court ? ? ? ? ? ? ) ?^ƺĚĂƐŝĞŶ-Chronik - South Asia Chronicle. 
365 Flavia Agnes, Family Law Volume 1: Family Laws and Constitutional Claims (Oxford University Press 
2011). While a Hindu woman is not considered equal to her brother in inheritance rights (a situation 
that was amended in 2005), she has a legal obligation to provide her husband with maintenance, in 
the event of a divorce. This is not considered to be unequal. Such a situation does not exist for Muslim 
women. Also, this view was incorrect at the everyday level, as there is not much difference in the 
plight of Hindu and Muslim women. In some ways, Muslim women enjoy better rights in the family. 
For instance, see Patricia Jeffery,  ‘ hŶŝĨŽƌŵ ƵƐƚŽŵĂƌǇ ŽĚĞ ? DĂƌŝƚĂů ƌĞĂŬĚŽǁŶ ĂŶĚtŽŵĞŶ ?Ɛ
ĐŽŶŽŵŝĐŶƚŝƚůĞŵĞŶƚƐŝŶZƵƌĂůŝũŶŽƌ ? (2001) 35 Contributions to Indian Sociology. Jeffery conducts 
ĂŶĞƚŚŶŽŐƌĂƉŚŝĐƐƚƵĚǇŽĨŝũŶŽƌŝŶƌƵƌĂůhƚƚĂƌWƌĂĚĞƐŚ ?/ŶĚŝĂ ?ƐŵŽƐƚƉŽƉƵůŽƵƐƐƚĂƚĞ ) ?^ŚĞĂŶĂůǇƐĞƐƚŚĞ
mobilisation of Hindu and Muslim women at the grassroots level, on issues of gender equity and 
demonstrates the need to have economic viability for women outside marriage as a long-term 
remedy. 
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comparisons of forwardness or backwardness of the RPLs of these 
communities.366 However, there is limited scholarship and critique available 
on differential treatment within same communities, especially Hindus, as there 
is a perception that these laws are codified and hence forward-looking. 
Therefore, my focus is to provide a nuanced critique of disparate treatment of 
gender in judicial reasoning in a branch of Hindu RPLs and hence I confine 
myself to this area of scholarship, rather than indulge in comparative analysis 
between communities. In the next section, I demonstrate how my caselaw 
analysis supports the position of Indian feminists, while simultaneously 
expanding this position from the perspective of the judgments. 
6.3 Gender in the Judgments - Bolstering the Indian Feminist Position on 
RPLs 
As I demonstrated through the case analysis in the last two chapters, judges 
RIWHQH[SUHVVWKDWWKHZRPDQ·VULJKWWRHTXDOLW\DVDQLQGLYLGXDOLVVXEVXPHG
within her role in the family. Gendered premises in judicial reasoning tend to 
support behaviour of women compliant with normative notions of family, 
both implicitly and explicitly. It is only in some instances that such premises 
are questioned or avoided by the Courts. In this section, I analyse how the 
aspects of gender in judicial reasoning in the cases under study align with the 
Indian IHPLQLVWV· SRVLWLRQ RQ 53/V , DOVR DQDO\VH WKRVH DUHDV LQ ZKLFK P\
FDVHODZDQDO\VLVGHHSHQVDQGVWUHQJWKHQVWKH,QGLDQIHPLQLVWV·DUJXPHQWVRQ
RPLs. 
I agree with most Indian legal feminist scholars on a significant aspect to argue 
that the gendered premise of judicial reasoning in Hindu custody law exposes 
                                                             
 
366 For instance, see Z Hasan ? ‘'ĞŶĚĞƌ ?ZĞůŝŐŝŽŶĂŶĚĞŵŽĐƌĂƚŝĐWŽůŝƚŝĐƐŝŶ/ŶĚŝĂ ?(2010) 31 Third World 
Quarterly 939 and &ůĂǀŝĂŐŶĞƐ ? ‘Has the Codified Hindu Law Changed Gender Relationships? ? ? ? ? ? ? )
46 Social Change, for a detailed discussion on portrayal of Muslim RPL vis-à-vis Hindu RPL. 
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gender-based discrimination that is inherent in RPLs. I now demonstrate this 
alignment, by using examples from my case analysis. The case of Githa 
Hariharan367 is the first instance in which judges used gender equality as an 
important premise in custody cases. As I analysed in Chapter 4, the Supreme 
Court of India considered right to equality provisions in the Indian 
Constitution and attempted to reconcile these provisions with the hierarchy 
of parental riJKW WR FXVWRG\ DV VLJQLILHG E\ WKH WHUP ¶DIWHU· LQ WKH +LQGX
Minority and Guardianship Act (HMGA), 1956. The Court decided that this 
term signifies that the mother is found to be a suitable guardian, only if the 
father is found incapacitated in some way. Moreover, the Court used the 
Welfare principle to add strength to this interpretation. This case is often used 
as a precedent in subsequent cases to emphasise gender parity between 
parents fighting for custody. However, the judicial reasoning in this case has 
reinforced prevalent notions of gendered roles, while espousing formal 
equality provided to all citizens in the Indian Constitution. The judgment 
attempts to camouflage the gendered nature of its reasoning with ideals of 
equality. But as I have demonstrated earlier, the gendered premise of judicial 
reasoning is very visible and evident when we unpack the reasoning in this 
case. This case is a good example of how the status of Indian women is mostly 
determined by a normative gender hierarchy, where a womDQ·VSRVLWLRQDVD
mother is defined by the father.368  
Apart from Githa Hariharan, what are the key ideas that are expressed by the 
judges in other cases? To answer this question, I provide a summary of the 
themes that emerge from judicial reasoning in the cases I have studied. The 
idea of a normative family with defined gender roles for the parents, is 
                                                             
 
367 Githa Hariharan v. Reserve Bank of India (1999) (2) SCC 228. For a detailed analysis of the case, 
see Chapter 4. 
368 &ŽƌĂĚĞƚĂŝůĞĚĚŝƐĐƵƐƐŝŽŶŽŶǁŽŵĞŶ ?ƐƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐŚŝƉƐŝŶĂƚƌĂĚŝƚŝŽŶĂůŐĞŶĚĞƌŚŝĞƌĂƌĐŚǇ ?ƐĞĞHuma 
Ahmed-'ŚŽƐŚ ? ‘Chattels of Society: Domestic Violence in India ? ? ? ? ? ? ) ? ?sŝŽůĞŶĐĞŐĂŝŶƐƚtŽŵĞŶ ? 
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emphasised by the judges repeatedly.369 What is more pronounced is the ideal 
of motherhood and the sacrifices that a mother can make in the interests of 
the child.370 In those instances where a mother broke the pattern of normative 
gender roles, she is denied custody for that reason.371 The father is considered 
the dominant parent (despite gender equality emphasised in Githa 
Hariharan), in some instances. Moreover, it is significant that the way the 
father is judged differs vastly from the manner of judging the mother under 
similar circumstances, as there are positive presumptions made about the 
father.372  
Moreover, the welfare principle, which is used by judges as the primary 
premise for determining custody, is based on gendered perspectives as the 
father is considered as the dominant personality and the main provider of the 
family. While welfare is often used to supersede parental rights, the embedded 
reasoning on welfare supports the gendering of roles in the Hindu family.373 
In some instances, the judges consider the gender of the child to be an 
important consideration for determining custody.374 In those instances where 
custody is provided to the mother based on welfare, the judicial reasoning is 
that the mother is financially capable of addressing the needs of the child and 
steps into the role of the father as provider.375 In all these cases, gender is one 
                                                             
 
369 Gaurav Nagpal vs Sumedha Nagpal AIR (2009) SC 557, Mohan Kumar Rayana vs. Komal Mohan 
Rayana (2009) (3) Bom CR 308.  
370 Romani Singh vs. Lt. Col. Vivek Singh 201(2013) DLT 742, Baby Kavya Awasthi and Another vs. State 
of U.P. and Ors (2013) (5) ACJ 72, Amit Beri and Anr. Vs. Smt.Sheetal Beri AIR (2003) All 78. 
371 Murari Lal Sidana and Anr. Vs. Smt. Anita AIR (2013) Raj 100, Chhotibai vs. Sunita Kushwah (2009) 
(3) MPHT 175. 
372 Ram Murti Chopra and Anr vs Nagesh Tyagi (2008) ILR (12) Delhi 169, K.M. Vinaya vs. B.R. Srinivas, 
Miscellaneous First Appeal No.1729 of 2011(High Court of Karnataka at Bangalore, 13/09/2013), 
Niranjan Singh Huda and Anr vs. Tavinder Pal Singh Bhatia and Anr (2011) (2) CGLJ 417. 
373 Mohan Kumar Rayana vs. Komal Mohan Rayana (2009) (3) Bom CR 308. 
374 Romani Singh vs. Lt. Col. Vivek Singh 201(2013) DLT 742, Venugopalan vs. Beena ILR (2006) (4) 
Kerala 583. 
375 Baby Kavya Awasthi and Another vs. State of U.P. and Ors (2013) (5) ACJ 72, Amrit Pal Singh vs. 
Jasmit Kaur AIR (2006) Delhi 213, Vikram Vir Vohra vs Shalini Bhalla 170 (2010) DLT 303, Smt. 
Gundamma vs. Shivasharanappa AIR (2004) Kant 357. 
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of the important considerations in the reasoning of the judges. In most 
instances, financial capacity of a parent is considered as gender parity, but the 
underlying reasoning emphasises a protectionist and/or normative stance 
towards women.  
While one key aspect of judicial reasoning on gender is the differentiation of 
gender roles within the family, another significant aspect is the differential 
treatment of individuals based on their gender. As I elaborated in Chapter 5, 
men and women are treated differently in judicial reasoning, even when they 
exhibit similar behaviour. Deviant behaviour of a father from the normative 
ideal is not treated in the same manner as the deviant behaviour of a mother. 
Such a mother loses her rights to custody and/or guardianship in most similar 
instances, but a father does not lose his rights. While the judges mention 
equality of gender provided in the Constitution, they do not consider gender 
justice to be the relevant approach to interpretation of the law nor do they 
reason based on gender parity, in most cases. What we see repeatedly is that 
judges determine gendered roles to be natural and inevitable and decide on 
cases based on this premise. From their reasoning, it emerges that the Courts 
provide disparate treatment to parents, based on certain presumptions on 
normative gender roles within a family. Thus, the notion of gender found in 
judicial reasoning tends to toe a normative and disparate line in spirit, while 
discussing gender equality in letter. Instead of paying homage to formal 
notions of equality, it would be both necessary and better in the interest of 
gender justice if the courts were to consider equitable treatment to both 
parents irrespective of gender ² an aspect that is almost missing in judicial 
reasoning in these cases. 
It is evident that the above arguments support the repeated claims made by 
,QGLDQIHPLQLVWVWKDWMXGJHVGRQRWSURYLGHDIDLUWUHDWPHQWWRZRPHQ·VLVVXHV
and that there exists a constant struggle to balance gender parity and religious 
188 | P a g e  
 
rights within RPLs.376 Some feminists have questioned how Hindu law can be 
considered egalitarian or used as a role model for other RPLs, when it has 
several gendered aspects that are discriminatory to women.377 However, their 
questioning has been mostly confined to the legislative aspects of the Hindu 
code. I deepen their arguments by providing evidence from case law that 
gender-based discrimination exists not just in the letter of the law, but also in 
the reasoning employed by judges in these cases. As I argued earlier, such 
discrimination is evident in the judicial portrayal of the family ideal as well as 
in its disparate treatment of gender. The layered judicial reasoning premised 
on gendered norms has not improved or supported gender justice in many 
ways, as evidenced in the case analysis in this thesis. Even a cursory glance at 
the cases discussed in Chapters 4 and 5 earlier reveals that the courts may be 
more inclined to follow gendered constructions of roles within the Hindu 
family rather than engage with an open mind on family issues.378   
While Indian feminist scholars have discussed this differential treatment in 
legislation, I deepen and nuance their analysis by contributing evidence from 
judicial reasoning that this disparate and gendered treatment is a lived reality 
for most women fighting custody cases in court. My argument is that the 
judges adopt certain gendered premises and these premises lead to a 
differential treatment of the father and the mother, as seen in the judgments. 
                                                             
 
376 For instance, see Shalina A Chibber,  ‘ŚĂƌƚŝŶŐĂEĞǁWĂƚŚdŽǁĂƌĚ'ĞŶĚĞƌƋƵĂůŝƚǇŝŶ/ŶĚŝĂ P&ƌŽŵ
Religious Personal >ĂǁƐƚŽĂhŶŝĨŽƌŵŝǀŝůŽĚĞ ? (2008) 83 Indiana Law Journal. 
377 For instance, see Archana Parashar, Women and Family Law Reform in India (Sage Publications Pvt 
Ltd, New Delhi 1992). Flavia Agnes has carried out a  detailed analysis of this aspect, using existing 
laws and judgments to support her arguments (Flavia Agnes, Family Law Volume 1: Family Laws and 
Constitutional Claims (Oxford University Press 2011), Flavia Agnes, Family Law Volume 2: Marriage, 
Divorce and Matrimonial Litigation (Oxford University Press 2011), &ůĂǀŝĂŐŶĞƐ ? ‘,ĂƐƚŚĞŽĚŝĨŝĞĚ
,ŝŶĚƵ>ĂǁŚĂŶŐĞĚ'ĞŶĚĞƌZĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐŚŝƉƐ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ) ? ?^ŽĐŝĂůŚĂŶŐĞ ? 
378 This can be substantiated from the perspective of legal practitioners as well as the judgments. An 
ĞƚŚŶŽŐƌĂƉŚŝĐƐƚƵĚǇĂŵŽŶŐůĂǁǇĞƌƐŝŶĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶƚ/ŶĚŝĂŶĐŝƚŝĞƐǁŚŽǁĞƌĞĞŶŐĂŐĞĚǁŝƚŚǁŽŵĞŶ ?ƐŝƐƐƵĞƐ
revealed that most of the lawyers felt that the courtroom procedures were intimidating to women 
(especially victims) and that Hindu upper-caste, upper-class women had better access to justice 
(ƉĂƌŶĂZĂǇĂƉƌŽůĂŶĚ^ĂǁŵǇĂZĂǇ ? ‘Understanding Gender Justice: Perceptions of Lawyers in India ?
(2010) 17 Indian Journal of Gender Studies).   
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Moreover, such reasoning is adopted in most of the cases and hence it cannot 
be dismissed as an aberration. This gendered reasoning seems more of a rule, 
rather than exception, in the cases under study. Githa Hariharan is often used 
as a ploy to create an impression of supporting gender equality in most 
judgments (as it premised its reasoning on the Constitutional notion of gender 
equality) but it is more of a smokescreen for protectionist and normative 
QRWLRQVRIJHQGHULQWKHMXGJHV·UHDVRQLQJ5HSHDWHGO\LWDSSHDUVWKDWGitha 
Hariharan has little or no effect on subsequent judgments, though it is praised 
as the first instance of discussing gender equality in custody cases. This 
GLVSDUDWH WUHDWPHQWEDVHGRQJHQGHU VWUHQJWKHQV WKH IHPLQLVWV· FODLP WKDW
RPLs are indeed gender discriminatory. 
Further, feminist legal theorists like Nivedita Menon argue that viability of 
RPLs and the question of formulation of a UCC, are the outcomes of tension 
between two notions of rights provided in the Indian Constitution ² the rights 
of a person as both an individual and a member of a collective.379 It is this 
tension which is difficult to resolve but needs to be resolved for the 
formulation of a UCC. Nowhere is this tension more evident than in the 
construction of the Elite Dependent in judicial reasoning. As I discussed in 
Chapter 5, the Elite Dependent is the educated woman who is connected to 
her traditional roots and is obedient.380 She is the personification of the 
normative and subservient position held by women in a gendered hierarchy. 
She symbolises the tension between rights of the individual and rights of the 
member of a collective as well as the tension between gender parity and 
normative notions of gendered roles. While she has formal equality as 
provided by the Indian Constitution as a woman, she is not treated on par with 
                                                             
 
379 NivediƚĂDĞŶŽŶ ? ‘hŶŝĨŽƌŵŝǀŝůŽĚĞŝŶ/ŶĚŝĂ PdŚĞ^ ƚĂƚĞŽĨƚŚĞĞďĂƚĞŝŶ ? ? ? ? ? (2014) 40 Feminist 
Studies. 
380 Nibha Kumari vs. State of Bihar and Ors (2003) (2) PLJR 60, Baby Kavya Awasthi and Another vs. 
State of U.P. and Ors (2013) (5) ACJ 72. 
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the father in her role as a mother. The judges often reason that she must 
confirm to normative ideals of womanhood and motherhood to qualify for 
sameness of treatment. Therefore, as an individual, she is entitled to 
Constitutional equality. However, her entitlement is not automatic. She is 
provided an equal treatment only if she adheres to her secondary status as a 
member of the collective and accepts her gendered role of a good mother 




while Indian women have legal and formal equality under the Constitution, 
they have a subordinate role in family and society. She is also emblematic of 
the feminist argument that the family exhibits a gendered hierarchy and 
disparate treatment based on gender. Thus, it is evident that judges envisage 
the Hindu family as a traditional and normative unit in which the father 
performs the role of bread winner and the mother performs the role of the 
nurturer. They do not consider other forms of family such as a single-parent 
family or a family with same sex or adoptive parents. They also turn a blind 
eye to the fact that the family ideal espoused by them tends to remain an 
ideal, while reality may be very different. Moreover, while there are some 
procedural provisions that allow for family counselling, such counselling is 
often used as a tool to ask women to adjust to the vagaries of family life and 
compromise with their husbands.381 Judicial reasoning is often heavy-handed 
and adversarial and attempts to align families along normative gender roles, 
                                                             
 
381 For instance, see Srimati Basu, The Trouble with Marriage - Feminists Confront Law and Violence 
in India (University of California Press 2015). 
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rather than considering stable and positive aspects of individual and collective 
relationships within a family.  
So, what we see here is that gendered nature of judicial reasoning in these 
cases creates or corresponds to the gap between the letter of the law and its 
application. Ideally, the courts should attempt to reconcile the tension 
between rights of the mother as an individual and her position as a member 
of the collective in these cases. Instead, they focus on her conformity to 
existing norms and chastise her if she deviates from these norms. Even in 
instances such as Githa Hariharan, where the court attempts to reconcile 
LQGLYLGXDOULJKWRIHTXDOLW\WRDPRWKHU·VULJKWvis-à-vis the father, it offers no 
explanation or solution to the clash of these rights and positions. Instead, it 
attempts to sweep under the carpet the disproportionate treatment accorded 
to parents under HMGA.  
The attempt at stonewalling an important question on gender parity in RPLs 
is carried out using the welfare principle seemingly as an excuse, with the clear 
and stated aim that the provisions of the Act cannot be given an interpretation 
that would make them unconstitutional. The Constitution of India can itself be 
subject to amendments and has undergone 101 Amendments on several 
subjects in the 67 years since its inception. Considering the number and nature 
of these amendments, the claim of the judges, that HMGA cannot be 
interpreted in a manner that makes it unconstitutional, rings hollow. The 
judges in Githa Hariharan·VFDVHDOVRPDNHDFODLPWKDW WKHZRUG ¶DIWHU· LQ
Section 6 of HMGA implies absence or unfitness of the father and that it lends 
support to the welfare principle when interpreted this way. But how can the 
welfare principle, a measure for determining custody in the interests of the 
child, be used as a yardstick for ascertaining gender equality? Such 
interpretations highlight the inability of the courts to reconcile tensions 
between rights of a woman as a mother and her status as a member of the 
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family. The larger question of disparate treatment accorded to men and 
women under the same RPL is left unanswered in most instances.  To 
VXPPDULVH , OHQGFUHGHQFHWRWKH,QGLDQIHPLQLVWV·DUJXPHQWWKDW53/VDUH
gender discriminatory in the letter of the law and I expand on that argument 
to claim that disparity in treatment of gender is often not confined to 
legislation but that it extends to application and interpretation of law by 
judges. In the next section, I analyse the Indian feminist positions on UCC 
formulation and demonstrate why this disparate treatment would have 
adverse consequences if the Hindu code is considered as a draft for the UCC. 
6.4 Gender Justice and Formulation of a UCC 
As seen in the last section, the feminist positions on the RPLs and formulation 
of the UCC changed with time due to the internal and external factors that 
LPSDFWHG WKH ,QGLDQ ZRPHQ·V PRYHPHQW 8QWLO WKH 6KDK %DQR YHUGLFW WKH
ZRPHQ·VPRYHPHQWZDVNHHQRQWhe implementation of a UCC for all citizens, 
as it perceived that the UCC would be a positive step towards gender justice. 
After Shah Bano WKHZRPHQ·VPRYHPHQWJDYHXS LWVFODLPIRUD8&&DQG
instead, started to favour an egalitarian, gender-just code that addresses the 
lacunae in RPLs now. This shift happened due to the feminist understanding 
that the UCC has been usurped by the Hindu Right agenda as a cultural and 
communal issue, rather than being a political or legal issue. In this section, I 
analyse the current Indian feminist position on the UCC and the political 
FRQWH[WWKDWIDYRXUVWKHIRUPXODWLRQRIWKH8&&DQGGHPRQVWUDWHZKDW·VDW
stake for women if the UCC is formulated. 
Perhaps one of the most significant developments in the work of most Indian 
feminist scholars post 1990s is the unanimous decision to drop the term 
´8QLIRUPµLQ8&&7KLVLVSUREDEO\LQWHQGHGDVDVLOHQWDFNQRZOHGJHPHQWWKDW
the code cannot be uniform for all communities. Instead, they now term it 
¶FRPPRQ·¶JHQGHU-MXVW·RU¶HJDOLWDULDQ·FRGHWRFKDUDFWHULVHWKDWWKHQDWXUHRI
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demands about the code have changed considerably.382 6R WKH ZRPHQ·V
movement has evolved from a singular position of pro-UCC383 to plural 
positions to date,384 which I briefly outline below.  
The first position is that of a compulsory and egalitarian civil code for 
everyone. However, while some scholars argue that the Hindu code could be 
used as a basis for this code, most feminist scholars claim that Hindu laws 
confirm to North Indian, upper caste practices and their codification has 
decimated liberal customary traditions.385 The second position envisages 
reforms from within communities with no state intervention. This kind of 
grassroots reform has found favour with some feminists as it accords more 
agency to women.386 7KHWKLUGSRVLWLRQDGRSWHGE\VRPHIHPLQLVWVFKRODUV·
advocates reforms from within communities as well as legislation on areas 
outside personal laws. The fourth is for an optional egalitarian code, like the 
Special Marriages Act, 1954 that governs inter-religious marriages. This 
                                                             
 
382 Srimati Basu, The Trouble with Marriage - Feminists Confront Law and Violence in India (University 
of California Press 2015). 
383 &ŽƌŝŶƐƚĂŶĐĞ ?sĂƐƵĚŚĂŚĂŐĂŵǁĂƌĐƌŝƚŝƋƵĞĚŵŝŶŽƌŝƚǇůĞĂĚĞƌƐ ? ?ŵŽƐƚůǇDƵƐůŝŵ )ĐŽŶƚĞŶƚŝŽŶƚŚĂƚƚŚĞ
UCC would be harmful to minority as it may impose Hindu ^ĈƐƚƌŝĐ law by suggesting that Hindus live 
under their personal law and not under secular laws, that personal law of a community will have 
nothing to do with outsiders, that if Hindu law exempted tribal customary law, other communities 
should do the same. She asserted that the UCC was the right way forward for all 
communities.(Vasudha Dhagamwar,  ‘dŚĞhŶŝĨŽƌŵŝǀŝůŽĚĞ PŶĨĂŶƚdĞƌƌŝďůĞŽĨ the Constitution ?ŝŶ
Upendra Baxi, Alice Jacob and Tarlok Singh (eds), Reconstructing the Republic (Har-Anand 
Publications Pvt Ltd 1999).  
384 I have provided this overview based on the points outlined in Rajeswari Sunder Rajan, The Scandal 
of the State - Women, Law and Citizenship in Postcolonial India (Duke University Press 2003), 
ZĂũĞƐǁĂƌŝ^ƵŶĚĞƌZĂũĂŶ ? ‘Women between Community and State: Some Implications of the Uniform 
Civil Code Debates in India ? ? ? ? ? ? ) ? ?^ŽĐŝĂůdĞǆƚ, as Rajan provides a comprehensive summary of all 
the arguments. These arguments, or some parts of them, have been reflected in the writings of 
others. See also Z Hasan ? ‘'ĞŶĚĞƌ ?ZĞůŝŐŝŽŶĂŶĚĞŵŽĐƌĂƚŝĐWŽůŝƚŝĐƐŝŶ/ŶĚŝĂ ?(2010) 31 Third World 
Quarterly 939, EŝǀĞĚŝƚĂDĞŶŽŶ ? ‘A Uniform Civil Code in India: The StatĞŽĨƚŚĞĞďĂƚĞŝŶ ? ? ? ? ?(2014) 
40 Feminist Studies. 
385 For instance, see Flavia Agnes, Law and Gender Inequality -dŚĞWŽůŝƚŝĐƐŽĨtŽŵĞŶ ?ƐZŝŐŚƚƐŝŶ/ŶĚŝĂ 
(Oxford University Press 1999), Archana Parashar, Women and Family Law Reform in India (Sage 
Publications Pvt Ltd, New Delhi 1992), Nivedita Menon, Recovering Subversion - Feminist Politics 
Beyond the Law (Permanent Black 2004). 
386 For more on this, see Rajeswari Sunder Rajan, The Scandal of the State - Women, Law and 
Citizenship in Postcolonial India (Duke University Press 2003). 
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provides a secular option for those who do not wish to be governed by 
religious laws. The fifth position is that of a reverse optional code, in which all 
citizens are mandatorily covered by a gender-just code but have the option 
to choose to be governed by RPLs. This is a modification on the optional 
egalitarian code and is considered by some feminist scholars to be a better 
solution. 
Of the above positions, most Indian feminists prefer the option to reform 
communities from within, with little or no state intervention, as localised 
methods of adjudication seem to yield better results.387 The imposition of a 
8&&LVQRZFRQVLGHUHGWREHD¶WRS-GRZQ·DSSURDFKE\PDQ\IHPLQLVWVZKLFK
would have little impact on the ground for women.388 Concepts such as 
¶FLWL]HQVKLS· ¶VHFXODULVP· ¶PRGHUQLW\· ¶LGHQWLW\· ¶FRPPXQLW\· DV ZHOO DV WKH
¶ZRPHQ·VPRYHPHQW·DUHEHLQJTXHVWLRQHGGXHWRWKH8&&GHEDWHV389 It is 
virtually impossible to separate these concepts from any discussions on the 
UCC and to focus on only its legal aspects. While feminists have adopted 
several positions on the UCC after 1995, there is consensus among all of them 
                                                             
 
387 &Žƌ ŝŶƐƚĂŶĐĞ ?ƐĞĞ'ŽƉŝŬĂ^ŽůĂŶŬŝ ?ƐĂŶĂůǇƐŝƐŽĨ  ůŽĐĂůĂĚũƵĚŝĐĂƚŝŽŶŵŽĚĞůƐƵƐŝŶŐĂ ůĞŐĂůƉůƵƌĂůŝƐŵ
framework in Gopika Solanki, Adjudication in Religious Family Laws - Cultural Accommodation, Legal 
Pluralism and Gender Equality in India (Cambridge University Press 2011). This view has been 
endorsed by Shalina A Chibber,  ‘ŚĂƌƚŝŶŐĂEĞǁWĂƚŚdŽǁĂƌĚ'ĞŶĚĞƌƋƵĂůŝƚǇŝŶ/ŶĚŝĂ P&ƌŽŵZĞůŝŐŝŽƵƐ
WĞƌƐŽŶĂů>ĂǁƐƚŽĂhŶŝĨŽƌŵŝǀŝůŽĚĞ ? (2008) 83 Indiana Law Journal and &ĂƌƌĂŚŚŵĞĚ ? ‘Remedying 
Personal Law Systems ? ? ? ? ? ? ) ? ?/ŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂů:ŽƵƌŶĂůŽĨ>Ăǁ ?WŽůŝĐǇĂŶĚƚŚĞ&ĂŵŝůǇ ? 
388Tanja Herklotz,  ‘ĞĂĚ>ĞƚƚĞƌƐ෴ ?dŚĞhŶŝĨŽƌŵŝǀŝůŽĚĞƚŚƌŽƵŐŚƚŚĞǇĞƐŽĨƚŚĞ /ŶĚŝĂŶtŽŵĞŶ ?Ɛ
Movement and the Indian Supreme Court ? ? ? ? ? ? ) ?^ƺĚĂƐŝĞŶ-Chronik - South Asia Chronicle. 
389 Hyderabad Anveshi Law Committee,  ‘'ĞŶĚĞƌ:ƵƐƚŝĐĞKŶůǇĂ>ĞŐĂů /ƐƐƵĞ ?Political Stakes in UCC 
ĞďĂƚĞ ? [1997] Economic and Political Weekly. In some instances, the concept of secularism has been 
used as a tool to question the unwillingness of the Muslim community to reform their personal laws, 
very similar to Hindu Right position on this issue(<ƵƐŚĂůĞď ? ‘^ĞĐƵůĂƌŝƐŵ ?WĞƌƐŽŶĂů>ĂǁƐĂŶĚ'ĞŶĚĞƌථ P
dŚĞ /ŶĚŝĂŶ /ŵďƌŽŐůŝŽ ?  ? ? ? ? ? )  ? ^ƚƵĚŝĞƐ ŝŶ ƚŚŶŝĐŝƚǇĂŶĚ EĂƚŝŽŶĂůŝƐŵ). Secularism and political 
questions of identity have also intersected with communal and identity politics in India, with some 
endorsements provided to the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986 along 
these lines (PS Ghosh, The Politics of Personal Law in South Asia - Identity, Nationalism and the 
Uniform Civil Code (Routledge 2007). However, Indian feminists have unilaterally critiqued this Act as 
ŚĂǀŝŶŐŶĞŐĂƚŝǀĞĐŽŶƐĞƋƵĞŶĐĞƐĨŽƌDƵƐůŝŵǁŽŵĞŶ ?ƐƌŝŐŚƚƐŝŶƚŚĞĨĂŵŝůǇ ?&ŽƌĂŶŝŶĚĞƉƚŚĞƚŚŶŽŐƌĂƉŚŝĐ
analysis of how judges draw upon constructions of gender and class in personal law judgments, 
ƚŚĞƌĞďǇ ‘ƌĞŝŶǀĞŶƚŝŶŐůĞŐŝƐůĂƚŝǀĞ ŝŶƚĞŶƚ ? ?ƐĞĞ^ƌŝŵĂƚŝĂƐƵ ? ‘Shading the Secular: Law at Work in the 
/ŶĚŝĂŶ,ŝŐŚĞƌŽƵƌƚƐ ? (2003) 15 Cultural Dynamics. 
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that RPLs need to be reformed and there needs to be a long-term solution 
that favours gender justice for RPLs, either in the form of an egalitarian code 
or otherwise.390  
While most of these feminist arguments are specific to the letter of the law, 
there is very little on the application or interpretation of the law by the courts. 
Gender equality may be established by the letter of the law. However, gender 
justice can be approached, and in some instances, achieved by judicial 
reasoning on the letter of the law. If the focus of feminist activism and 
scholarship is on gender justice, then it would be served by turning attention 
to how courts are interpreting the law. Some Indian feminist scholars have 
claimed that judicial reasoning provides an intersection of patriarchy with 
concepts of justice and this has largely affected gender equality and gender 
justice in judicial decisions.391 However, such analysis has been made in laws 
relating to sexual violence and rape and not with respect to RPLs.  
While I discuss the lacunae in feminist scholarship in the next chapter, here I 
confine myself to the argument that most Indian feminist scholars focus on 
rights of the woman as an individual, as provided in the letter of the law. They 
repeatedly point out how these rights are subsumed in the collective, due to 
inherent patriarchal notions in society and/or machineries of the state. The 
opposition of many Indian feminists to the UCC stems from the core idea that 
the UCC would not serve to enhance individual rights of women in India, 
irrespective of the communities to which they belong. To adopt an egalitarian 
                                                             
 
390 tŽƌŬŝŶŐ'ƌŽƵƉŽŶtŽŵĞŶ ?ƐZŝŐŚƚƐ ?t'tZ ) ? ‘Reversing the Option: Civil Codes and Personal Laws ?
(1996) 31 Economic and Political Weekly, Rajeswari Sunder Rajan, The Scandal of the State - Women, 
Law and Citizenship in Postcolonial India (Duke University Press 2003), Rajeswari Sunder Rajan, 
 ‘Women between Community and State: Some Implications of the Uniform Civil Code Debates in India ?
(2000) 18 Social Text. 
391 For instance, see dĂŝƐŚĂďƌĂŚĂŵ ? ‘Sathin Bhanwari Revisited ? ? ? ? ? ? ) ? ?/ŶĚŝĂŶ:ŽƵƌŶĂůŽĨ'ĞŶĚĞƌ
Studies, Rachel Simon-Kumar,  ‘^ĞǆƵĂůsŝŽůĞŶĐĞŝŶ/ŶĚŝĂ PdŚĞŝƐĐŽƵƌƐĞƐŽĨZĂƉĞĂŶĚƚŚĞŝƐĐŽƵƌƐes of 
:ƵƐƚŝĐĞ ? (2014) 21 Indian Journal of Gender Studies. 
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approach to RPLs and the UCC, it is important to question disparate treatment 
of gender in legislation as well as in judicial reasoning. Instead of seeking a 
rights-based solution, it may be more effective to question normative and 
gender stereotypes used in judicial reasoning. If the Courts adopt an approach 
of treating persons of all gender on an equitable footing, this may lead to a 
gender-just approach of interpretation of custody and welfare. While this is 
my argument to advance the feminist position, I now turn to what the Courts 
have observed regarding UCC formulation. 
Indian Courts have often claimed that it is the duty of the legislature to pass 
a UCC, as provided by Article 44 of the Constitution. For example, in the case 
of Shah Bano and several other judgments, the Supreme Court claimed that 
the legislature had failed to provide a comprehensive UCC as promised under 
Article 44. 392 Although some judges tried to use judicial activism to formulate 
common principles to aid gender justice and promote gender equality, there 
has been no concrete move by the courts towards directing the legislature to 
formulate a UCC.393 Some scholars on Hindu law like Menski have argued that 
the judges have attempted the process of harmonisation to arrive at better 
                                                             
 
392 For instance, see Danial Latifi & Anr vs Union of India (2001) (7) SCC, Sarla Mudgal vs Union of 
India (1995) (3) SCC 635. 
393 For a detailed discussion on this, see Tanja Herklotz,  ‘ĞĂĚ>ĞƚƚĞƌƐ෴ ?dŚĞhŶŝĨŽƌŵŝǀŝůŽĚĞƚŚƌŽƵŐŚ
the EyeƐŽĨƚŚĞ/ŶĚŝĂŶtŽŵĞŶ ?ƐDŽǀĞŵĞŶƚĂŶĚƚŚĞ/ŶĚŝĂŶ^ƵƉƌĞŵĞŽƵƌƚ ? ? ? ? ? ? ) ?^ƺĚĂƐŝĞŶ-Chronik 
- South Asia Chronicle. The areas in RPLs, in which judges have shown some level of activism by 
questioning the constitutionality or reasonableness of RPLs, are as follows  W 
a. Monogamy 
b. Restitution of Conjugal Rights  
c. Discriminatory grounds of divorce 
d. Discriminatory inheritance norms 
e. Right of maintenance upon divorce 
f. Discrimination in guardianship laws (The case of Githa Hariharan, discussed in Chapter 3, is 
an example for this category) 
g. Discriminatory nature of personal laws   
For a detailed discussion on cases in each of these categories, see ƐŚŽŬtĂĚũĞ ? ‘Interface of Personal 
Laws & Indian Constitution- Complicity, Constraints, and Contradictions: An Appraisal through Judicial 
Insight ? ? ? ? ? ? ) ? ? ? ? 
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uniformity of personal laws.394 However, this may be an optimistic outlook on 
the courts and judicial activism that is reflected only in limited number of 
cases. While we can acknowledge the attempts made by some judges to use 
judicial activism as an instrument to deliver progressive judgments, we cannot 
ignore the predominantly gendered nature of their reasoning or their 
tendency to lay the blame at the door of the legislature for not drafting the 
UCC. While feminist scholars and the Courts do not engage with the 
formulation of a UCC in recent times, the current political climate in India 
favours a UCC formulation, albeit for different reasons. 
As seen in Chapter 3, the post-colonial Indian polity constructed an 
increasingly intense opposition between secular politics and communal 
identity politics. This led to the rise of Hindu right-wing nationalist leaders to 
power post the general elections in 2014.395 The slow but steady shift from 
secular parties to Hindu right wing in the last seven decades is indicative of a 
deeper social shift of popular, especially majoritarian, endorsement of Hindu 
right-wing politics. This shift has implications for the emphasis on gendered 
norms within the family, society and nation. The Hindu Right,396 with its 
homogenized views on gender, community and nation, is now striving to 
implement the UCC.  
                                                             
 
394 tĞƌŶĞƌDĞŶƐŬŝ ? ‘Asking for the Moon: Legal Uniformity in India from a Kerala Perspective ? ? ? ? ? ? )
2 Kerala Law Times. Menski also critiqued activist elitism by academic scholars on gender issues by 
countering it with a legal pluralism framework and by insisting that good judges enact and perform 
legal pluralism (tĞƌŶĞƌDĞŶƐŬŝ ?  ‘Still Asking for the Moon? Opening Windows of Opportunity for 
Better Justice in India ? ? ? ? ? ? ) ? ?sĞƌĨĂƐƐƵŶŐƵŶĚZĞĐŚƚŝŶmďĞƌƐĞĞsZm). 
395 The current government is formed by the Hindu Right political party (Bharatiya Janata Party or 
BJP). This government has a majority in the Parliament and has managed to capture power in 
powerful state assemblies ƚŽŽ ?&ŽƌŝŶƐƚĂŶĐĞ ?/ŶĚŝĂ ?ƐŵŽƐƚƉŽƉƵůŽƵƐƐƚate, Uttar Pradesh, is headed by 
a Hindu ascetic Chief Minister. BJP has recently won the elections for the posts of President and Vice-
President of India and has consolidated its power in the executive and legislative branches of 
government. One of the chief promises in its manifesto is the formulation of the UCC and public 
opinion is being sought on this issue. For more on this, see chapters 1 and 3. 
396 As I explained in Chapter 3,  ‘,ŝŶĚƵZŝŐŚƚ ?ŝƐĂŶƵŵďƌĞůůĂƚĞƌŵƵƐĞĚƚŽĚĞĨŝŶĞƚŚĞƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂů ?ĐƵůƚƵƌĂů
and religious nationalist groups, with a pro-Hindu stance. It denotes a combination of several 
organisations and has survived to the present day in different forms. 
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The Hindu Right narrative views the UCC as an issue of national integrity and 
ZRPHQ·VULJKWVZLWKDQHPSKDVLVWKDWLWLVRQO\WKHPLQRULW\ZRPHQZKRQHHG
VDYLQJDV+LQGXVKDYHDOUHDG\JLYHQ WKHLUZRPHQ´ULJKWVµ397 This narrative 
proPRWHVDKRPRJHQLVLQJDQGPRQROLWKLFYLHZRIZRPHQ·V ULJKWVZLWKRXW
problematising issues such as power relations within families, treatment of 
lower-caste Hindu women and domestic violence. Moreover, the Hindu 
woman is never viewed as an individual but rather viewed as an extension of 
her family in this narrative.398 It claims that family is the basic social unit to 
which the individual must be subordinated, especially if that individual was a 
woman. Further, the Hindu woman is considered a part of the larger socio-
cultural context by the Hindu Right and she is not expected to have an 
individual existence beyond the traditions of the community.399 Any 
questioning of her positions or assertion of her rights would spoil the delicate 
equilibrium of established gender-based norms in society. Clearly, the Hindu 
5LJKW·VSRVLWLRQLVWRVXEYHUWWKHULJKWVRIWKH+LQGXZRPDQDVDQLQGLYLGXDO
and focus on her position as a member of the collective, a position 
diametrically opposite to that of most feminist scholars. This tendency to 
                                                             
 
397 For more on this, see Z Hasan ? ‘'ĞŶĚĞƌ ?ZĞůŝŐŝŽŶĂŶĚĞŵŽĐƌĂƚŝĐWŽůŝƚŝĐƐŝŶ/ŶĚŝĂ ?(2010) 31 Third 
World Quarterly 939, ĂŬŝĂWĂƚŚĂŬĂŶĚZĂũĞƐǁĂƌŝ^ƵŶĚĞƌZĂũĂŶ ? ‘ “^ŚĂŚĂŶŽ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ) ? ^ŝŐŶƐ ?
398 dŚĞ:W ?ƐĞĂƌůŝĞƌ election manifesto issued in 1998 is a good example of the definition of gender 
roles and family values within the Hindutva ideology  W 
 “/ŶƚŚĞ/ŶĚŝĂŶǀŝĞǁŽĨ ůŝĨĞ ?ĂŶ ŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂů ŝƐŶŽƚĂŶ ŝŶĚĞƉĞŶĚĞŶƚŽƌƐŽǀĞƌĞŝŐŶďĞŝŶŐ ?ďƵƚĂŶ
integral member of the family, community, the nation and the human race. The basic 
institution that anchors the individual in society and the nation, as also links him to the past 
and the future, is the family. The BJP believes that the integrity of the family institution is the 
main ŐƵĂƌĂŶƚŽƌŽĨ/ŶĚŝĂ ?ƐĐŝǀŝůŝǌĂƚŝŽŶĂůĐŽŶƚŝŶƵŝƚǇ ?,ĞŶĐĞ ?ƚŚĞŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶĐĞŽĨƉƌŽƚĞĐƚŝŽŶĂŶĚ
nurturing of family values cannot be overstated in the context of nation-building. If the family 
is the brick, society is the edifice.(As cited in ,ĞŶƌŝŬ ĞƌŐůƵŶĚ ?  ‘'ĞŶĚĞƌ ZĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐ ĂŶĚ
Democracy: The Conflict between Hindu Nationalist and Secular Forces in Indian Civil 
SoĐŝĞƚǇ ? ? ? ? ? ? ) ? ?EĂƚŝŽŶĂůŝƐŵĂŶĚƚŚŶŝĐWŽůŝƚŝĐƐ). 
399 For more on this, see Henrik BĞƌŐůƵŶĚ ? ‘Hindu Nationalism and Gender in the Indian Civil Society ?
(2011) 13 International Feminist Journal of Politics, ZƵŶĂĂƐ ? ‘Encountering Hindutva, Interrogating 
ZĞůŝŐŝŽƵƐ EĂƚŝŽŶĂůŝƐŵ ĂŶĚ  ?Ŷ ?ŐĞŶĚĞƌŝŶŐ Ă ,ŝŶĚƵ WĂƚƌŝĂƌĐŚǇ ŝŶ /ŶĚŝĂ ?Ɛ EƵĐůĞĂƌ WŽůŝĐies ?  ? ? ? ? ? )  ?
International Feminist Journal of Politics. 
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subvert the rights of women is detrimental to UCC formulation, as the 
underlying premise is based on normative gender roles in the family. 
While there is political momentum on formulating the UCC, most feminist 
scholars have attempted to counter this by questioning whether a UCC can 
provide gender justice in place of RPLs. Further, they argue that the Hindu 
laws that are being defended by the Hindu Right are colonial constructions of 
the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, which do not resemble 
customary Hindu law in any manner.400 Despite these arguments, the current 
party in power (Bharatiya Janata Party or BJP - the political arm of the Hindu 
Right) has stated that the UCC is one of the prime objectives in its manifesto. 
In line with this objective, the present government has instructed the Law 
Commission of India to conduct a survey of the lay public and law practitioners 
to gauge the public mood on the UCC.401 However, the structure and format 
of the published questions raise serious concerns whether the government or 
the Law Commission have addressed the issues raised by feminist scholars 
and activists. 
The Law Commission of India issued an appeal dated 7th October 2016, 
seeking public opinion on the Uniform Civil Code. This appeal sought to open 
a conversation about the formulation of a uniform civil code and it claimed 
WKDW IDPLO\ ODZ UHIRUPV VKRXOG YLHZ ZRPHQ·V ULJKWV DV DQ HQG JRal. The 
Commission invited people from all walks of life to participate in the process 
of family law reforms by completing and returning a questionnaire within 45 
                                                             
 
400 EŝǀĞĚŝƚĂDĞŶŽŶ ? ‘hŶŝĨŽƌŵŝǀŝůŽĚĞŝŶ/ŶĚŝĂ PdŚĞ^ ƚĂƚĞŽĨƚŚĞĞďĂƚĞŝŶ ? ? ? ? ? (2014) 40 Feminist 
Studies, ůĞĂŶŽƌEĞǁďŝŐŝŶ ? ‘WĞƌƐŽŶĂů>ĂǁĂŶĚŝƚŝǌĞŶƐŚŝƉŝŶ/ŶĚŝĂ ?ƐdƌĂŶƐŝƚŝŽŶƚŽ/ŶĚĞƉĞŶĚĞŶĐĞ ? ? ? ? ? ? )
45 Modern Asian Studies. 
401 I have included a detailed analysis of each of the questions in this questionnaire in Appendix 2. 
Here, I mention only those questions and areas that are relevant to this discussion. Currently, the Law 
Commission is processing the responses to the questionnaire and the outcome is yet to be published. 
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days.402 While this appeal appears to be a genuine effort to solicit public 
participation in the drafting of the Uniform Civil Code, the accompanying 
questionnaire leaves much to be desired as the basis for deciding about the 
personal laws of 1.2 billion people. I analyse this questionnaire briefly below 
and lend credence to the position that RPLs are gender discriminatory and 
any attempt at formulating a UCC needs to address gender justice.  
Question 4 of the questionnaire asks if the UCC or codification of personal 
laws and customary practices ensure gender equality. This question has a 
VLPSOH¶<HV RU1R·RSWLRQZLWKQRVSDFHIRUDQ\DGGLWLRQDOUHDVRQLQJ$QRWKHU
question that follows this pattern is question 5, which asks if the uniform civil 
FRGHVKRXOGEHPDGHRSWLRQDODJDLQZLWKD¶<HVRU1R·RSWLRQ,WLVLURQLFWKDW
the Law Commission of India, which is supposed to address legislative lacunae 
and suggest appropriate changes to the Parliament, thinks that a huge subject 
like the relationship between gender equality and UCC can be reduced to a 
yes or no answer. Feminist legal scholars in India have written vast swathes of 
literature discussing gender equality and gender justice and their relation to 
law. They have repeatedly addressed how law can be used as an instrument 
for social change. Moreover, this area of scholarship has also discussed 
exhaustively about optionality and reverse-optionality positions for the UCC. 
The Law Commission pays token respect to feminist theory and activism by 
relegating these important questions to a footnote. 
The questionnaire attempts to deal with all categories of RPLs but fails to cover 
many key aspects. It has no questions related to custody cases in Hindu law 
and only a couple of questions regarding aspects of gender in Hindu law, such 
as property rights for Hindu women. Thus, the questionnaire fails to address 
                                                             
 
402 The questionnaire consists of 16 questions (nine in multiple-choice format and seven with an 
additional space for providing reasons for the answer). 
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most of the major issues pertaining to religious personal laws, gender equality 
or gender justice. There is no provision to address those individuals who are 
atheists or agnostics and do not wish to follow any religion. Moreover, there 
is no mention of cultural minorities who may adopt specific customs or 
practices and how these would be reconciled within the larger paradigm of 
WKH FRGH $W EHVW WKH TXHVWLRQQDLUH UHIOHFWV WKH /DZ &RPPLVVLRQ·V DSDWK\
towards understanding personal laws and, at worst, it reflects the 
&RPPLVVLRQ·V DQWLSDWK\ WR JHQGHU MXVWLFH 7KLV TXHVWLRQQDLUH FDQQRW EH
considered a useful tool to gather public opinion and does not appear to 
address many of the pertinent gender issues raised by feminist activists and 
scholars.  However, it serves as a good example of all that is wrong in the 
approach of the state machinery towards gender equality or gender justice. 
Perhaps, it may be a better approach to standardise the laws for marriage, 
divorce and custody for everyone, without any consideration of religion, 
gender or sexuality and broaden the scope of definition of a family. 
As seen from my case analysis and the questionnaire above, there seems to 
be an almost universal adherence to gendered norms within the legal 
machinery, whether it is the judges of the Higher Courts or the Law 
&RPPLVVLRQRI,QGLD:KLOH´ UHOLJLRQLVDFUXFLDOVLJQLILHURIFRPPXQLW\LGHQWLW\
DQGDSOD\HULQVWDWHSROLWLFVµ403  judicial reasoning in the cases I have analysed 
is silent on aspects of religion. However, this silence merely emphasises the 
elephant in the room, i.e., the transmutation of the Hindu identity into the 
secular identity of the Indian citizen ² a notion that has found much currency 
with the Hindu Right for the creation of a Uniform Civil Code. In the current 
political climate, the Hindu identity is often used interchangeably with the 
Indian identity by the Hindu Right and this is used as premise to exclude other 
                                                             
 
403 Rajeswari Sunder Rajan, The Scandal of the State - Women, Law and Citizenship in Postcolonial 
India (Duke University Press 2003). 
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communities. Moreover, the agenda of the present government is detrimental 
as it does not pay much heed to gender-just perspectives of feminist scholars 
or activists and this can be harmful to any form of the UCC that it may propose.  
The Hindu code is often considered to be a blueprint for any secular civil code, 
as it is widely believed to be based on secular principles.  However, the latent 
gender bias and disparate treatment of men and women in judicial reasoning 
exposes the lack of gender parity in the interpretation of the Hindu code. 
Under the circumstances, it is necessary to address the imbalances within the 
Hindu code first.  Moreover, the Hindu code is not reformed but merely 
codified and this should be heeded as a warning for any argument for 
formulating the UCC along the lines of the Hindu code. At best, the Hindu 
code proves to be a facile blueprint and should not be considered to form the 
basis of the UCC. 
6.5 Concluding Remarks 
In this chapter, I situate my thesis within a wider legal and political context 
and explain its relevance to feminist debates on RPLs and the UCC. I argue 
how my analysis of cases strengthens the argument of many Indian feminist 
scholars that RPLs are gender discriminatory, by proving that there exists 
disparate treatment of gender in judicial reasoning. I also trace the position of 
WKH,QGLDQZRPHQ·VPRYHPHQWRQ53/VDQGH[SORUHKRZIHPLQLVWSRVLWLRQV
changed with time and intervening factors.  
Further, I demonstrate that an underexplored factor that needs to be analysed 
in the scholarship is the content and logic of judicial pronouncements, which 
undermine feminist efforts for gender justice. I contribute to this body of 
scholarship by deepening and extending the analysis on judicial reasoning, I 
argue that judicial reasoning premises itself predominantly on normative 
ideas of gender roles DQGWKH MXGJHV·SHUFHSWLRQRIJHQGHU WKHUHE\EHLQJ
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detrimental to gender justice. While the disparate treatment of gender in the 
cases I analysed strengthens the feminist argument about gender-based 
discrimination in RPLs, I deepen this argument to show how application of law 
by the judges is gendered. Deeply embedded notions of gender roles 
FRQWLQXHWRLQIRUPMXGJHV·UHDVRQLQJDVVHHQLQP\FDVHDQDO\VLV)XUWKHU,
analyse various positions for the formulation of a UCC in the current political 
climate. I argue that the disparate treatment of gender evident in judicial 
reasoning is a significant reason why a UCC should not be formulated based 
on the current Hindu code and its interpretation by the Courts. 
My argument here is that it is necessary to ask if Indian citizens, especially 
women, need equality or uniformity in the prevalent social and political 
conditions. Religion, gender and caste are three important axes that create 
and perpetuate identities in India. Having lived with the constant influence of 
these axes, I often witnessed that equality is an idealised notion, especially for 
women in India. It is more important to have uniformity of treatment, rather 
than equality on paper. Judicial reasoning, political will as well as social 
structures need to address and improve disparity in treatment, rather than 
using rhetoric on equality. In the next and concluding chapter of this thesis, I 
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Chapter 7 ² Concluding Remarks and the Road Ahead 
The core ideas that I have explored in this thesis are ² How have judges 
engaged with gender and specifically, gender roles in the custody cases under 
study? How have judges conceptualised the Hindu woman in the cases under 
study? How does judicial reasoning create or reproduce disparate patterns of 
gender? What is the impact of such reasoning on the legislative formulation 
of a Uniform Civil Code (UCC) in India? As I mentioned in the introduction 
chapter, my explorations have not been on the concept of equality. Rather, I 
have analysed how inherent normative notions of gender roles in judicial 
reasoning undermine the notion of gender equality and are thereby an 
impediment to gender justice. I have contributed to the existing feminist legal 
scholarship in India by expanding and deepening their argument that religious 
personal laws are gender discriminatory in nature. While most of the existing 
scholarship focuses on socio-legal theory and/or activism on the ground, I 
have focused on the analysis of case law, an under-explored area in the 
scholarship. So, the key contribution of my thesis is that I have strengthened 
WKH,QGLDQIHPLQLVWV·DUJXPHQWWKDWthe Hindu code should not be considered 
as the blueprint for the UCC, as law is gendered in judicial reasoning in case 
law. It is evident from the feminist analysis of legislation as well as my analysis 
of caselaw that there are inherent undertones of gender-based reasoning, 
even though legislation and caselaw purport to be based on principles of 
neutrality. 
I have demonstrated how the gendered nature of judicial reasoning creates 
the Elite Dependent, who is a mirror image of the female citizen-subject 
created by the Hindu code. Both these figures have legal personhood with 
limited economic rights, in contrast to their male counterparts who have legal 
personhood and complete economic rights. I have argued that the judges 
exhibit a gendered approach to their reasoning in these cases and this has 
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SURYHQ GHWULPHQWDO WR ZRPHQ·V LQWHUHVWV LQ FXVWRG\ OLWLJDWLRQ )XUWKHU P\
analysis strengthens the claim of feminist theorists and activists in India that 
religious personal laws iterate existing normative notions of gender and deny 
women their legal due. While there are instances of judges trying to provide 
a more gender-balanced approach in some of the cases, most of the cases 
exhibit underlying gendered assumptions. I have argued that the gendered 
nature RI WKHVH MXGLFLDO SURQRXQFHPHQWV H[SRVHV ODZ·V disproportionate 
treatment on gender and this factor should be taken into consideration if a 
UCC is formulated in India. My thesis, while supporting the feminist stance on 
religious personal laws, seeks to create an awareness of the disparate 
treatment of treatment of gender in judicial reasoning. 
As I explained in Chapter 1, the starting point of my thesis was my lived 
experiences as an upper-caste, upper-class Hindu woman. It was these 
experiences, which gravitated me towards the concept of the Elite Dependent. 
7KH ,QGLDQ ZRPHQ·V PRYHPHQW KDYH adapted an intersectional approach 
since the 1990s and 2000s and has questioned why the focus should be on 
the middle-class and often Elitist Hindu woman, who is the default image for 
¶:RPDQ· LQ ,QGLD 7KLV FKDQJH RI IRFXV LV QHFHVVDU\ DQG DSSURSULDWH
considering the pluralistic nature of Indian society and issues of caste and 
gender. However, my argument is that in doing so, the prototype of the 
upper-caste, upper-class Hindu woman should not be abandoned totally, as 
this woman symbolises the legal citizen in India. Moreover, this figure serves 
as a useful tool for discussions of legal change and reform. My argument is 
that if a socio-economically privileged person such as this one is being treated 
disparately in judicial reasoning, it does not bode well for the condition of the 
not-so-privileged. Therefore, I focus on this category of the Hindu woman and 
trace its position in judicial reasoning in the subsequent chapters. 
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In Chapter 2, I presented the process of my case analysis, explaining the choice 
of cases and the criteria for making these choices. I demonstrated the process 
of the analysis by explaining the activities I engaged in as well as the 
scholarship that I dealt with during the process. In Chapter 3, I provided the 
background for the creation of a certain ideal of the upper caste, upper class 
Hindu woman during the colonial period, due to the interaction of several 
discourses at that time. This ideal provided the foundation for the unmarked 
Indian Citizen, which was later adopted in the Indian Constitution. The Indian 
Constitution as well as the Hindu Code were both formulated by the same 
legislature, so it is not surprising that they were based on identical legal 
reasoning. The unmarked liberal subject gained marked preference in both 
documents. Moreover, the Partition of the country on religious lines had its 
effect on the legislators and they considered it necessary to do a balancing 
act between effective legislation and respecting religious sentiments. In the 
end, the Hindu code was a product of this balancing act. I argued that the 
Code created differential legal personhood between Hindu men and Hindu 
women and these formulations continue to impact judicial reasoning in the 
cases under study, several decades later.  
In Chapter 4, I proceeded to the substantive part of my thesis - the analysis of 
custody cases. Here, I used gender as a category of analysis to understand 
how gender equality and gendered roles are defined by judges in these cases. 
I argued that while the judicial reasoning accepts the formal notion of gender 
equality per the Constitution of India in the case of Githa Hariharan as well as 
several others, this reasoning is premised on normative understanding of 
gender roles within a family. Further, I argued that the underlying gendered 
assumptions were also evident in judicial reasoning on the welfare principle. 
Moreover, the Hindu woman is often portrayed to be the educated, middle-
class mother who teaches normative values to her children, while being 
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economically dependent on her husband. There are two key themes that 
emerge from the application of the welfare principle in judicial reasoning ² 
Firstly, the judges equated economic well-being as welfare and this reasoning 
tends to be detrimental to women, considering their reduced economic status 
within the Hindu family. Secondly, judges adopted the reasoning that gender 
RIWKHFKLOGLPSDFWHGWKHFKLOG·VZHOIDUHDQGDZDUGHGFXVWRG\RIJLUOFKLOGUen 
to their mothers and boy children to their fathers. Both these themes 
employed in judicial reasoning indicate how judges hijack the welfare principle 
intended for the benefit of children to justify protectionist and normative 
approaches towards gender roles and attempt to construct a one-size-fits-all 
model of gender roles. This type of reasoning omits the issues women face in 
obtaining property and/or maintenance, following their divorce. 
In Chapter 5, I furthered the use of gender as a lens of analysis and explored 
different aspects of gender in these judgments. I explored how judges 
construct or conceptualise the Hindu woman in these cases. I analysed the 
notions of marriage, home and family life in judicial reasoning and argued that 
these notions were premised on normative understanding of gender roles. 
Further, I argued that the same standards did not apply to men and women 
when they were exposed to similar circumstances within the family. Women 
who deviated from the standard ideals of motherhood or womanhood were 
denied custodial rights while men in similar situations were not, clearly 
indicating that differential standards were applied by the judges in their 
reasoning, based on their normative ideas of gender roles. I argued that the 
judges construct the image of the Elite Dependent in these judgments and 
this woman had to adhere to the normative notions of gender roles ² she can 
have a privileged existence but needed to be subservient to the men in her 
family. This figure symbolises the tension between normative assumptions on 
gender roles and gender parity, as is evident from the cases. The Elite 
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Dependent personifies the inherent disproportionate treatment of gender in 
judicial reasoning. 
In Chapter 6, I explored the relationship between the Elite Dependent and the 
feminist arguments on gender roles and gender equality, especially in the 
context of the formulation of a UCC. I demonstrated that the gendered nature 
of judicial reasoning in these cases strengthened the feminist position that all 
religious personal laws are gender- discriminatory. Further, I argued that since 
the judicial reasoning in these cases under the Hindu Code did not support 
gender justice, it would be detrimental to use the Hindu code as a blueprint 
for the UCC.  To summarise, I demonstrated, through my analysis of case law, 
that judicial reasoning tends to construct a one-size-fits all model of 
womanhood and motherhood for all women who fight for custody, rather 
than account for diversity and context of the cases under study. This is carried 
out by the judges by using the trope of the Elite Dependent to resolve the 
tensions between the unmarked citizen-subject of the Constitution and the 
idea of protectionism of women. Further, judicial reasoning hijacks the child-
centric welfare principle to reinforce normative gender roles in the family, as 
seen in the use of the argument of economic well-being to undermine 
ZRPHQ·V ULJKW WRFXVWRG\DQG by awarding custody to the parent with the 
same gender as the child.  It is evident from my arguments that the gendered 
nature of judicial reasoning proves that there exists a disproportionate 
treatment of gender in the machineries of the state, which impacts gender 
justice. If the state intends to evolve more gender-just laws, then it should 
consider the impact of such gendered reasoning on lived experiences of 
women. 
7.1 Reflections   
In this section, I present my reflections on my learning and experiences, during 
my journey with this thesis. The first point that struck me through this process 
209 | P a g e  
 
LVWKDWWKHQDPH¶+LQGXFRGH·RU¶+LQGXODZ·LVDPLVQRPHUDVLWKDVQRWKLQJ
in common with customary Hindu law. It is based on Common Law principles, 
which are derived from Christian ways of thinking. The object of this 
codification was to ensure uniformity in a diverse society and create a 
common Hindu identity, along the lines of a modern, liberal framework. This 
aim goes against the grain of the syncretic Hindu tradition, which is willing to 
assimilate different, and often conflicting, traditions. As a practising Hindu, 
what struck me most was how inflexible and static the Hindu code is, 
compared to the customs and traditions of the religion. Having said that, I am 
not glossing over inherent issues like an ossified patriarchy and caste that 
plague Hindu society. My emphasis is more on the positive aspects of the faith 
that find no place in the legal spectrum. Hindu law is not religious law by any 
stretch of imagination and it corresponds to secular family law in almost every 
aspect. 
In these cases, the judges are interpreting Anglo-Hindu law which is situated 
in a framework of Christian values but are claiming this to be Indian or 
specifically Hindu in nature. It appears as if there was no alternative judicial 
ODQJXDJHWRGHVFULEHVLWXDWLRQVWKDWGLGQRWILWLQWRWKHVWDQGDUGRI´,QGLDQ
FXOWXUHµRU´,QGLDQYDOXHVµ ,QVRPHFDVHV WKHMXGJHVFODLPWhat there is an 
erosion of Indian values due to Western influence. However, there was almost 
no explanation on what constitutes an Indian culture, in a sub-continent that 
exhibits vast diversity and plurality. The idea of a common Indian culture and 
a sense of Indianness was created by Indian nationalist leaders during the 
freedom struggle, to unite the masses. This idea was carried forth after 
independence from colonial rule as the fiction of unity was necessary to knit 
a plural nation together, especially in the shadows of the Partition. Perhaps 
the only common or national identity that Indian citizens have is the idea of 
constitutional citizenship for all Indians. But instead of asserting any notions 
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of equality based on the Constitution, there is an emphasis on archaic notions 
of gender in judicial reasoning. In most cases, the judges do not conduct a 
critical enquiry into their own positions and tend to adopt normative ways of 
thinking, thereby devaluing their reasoning. 
Another key aspect of these cases ZDV WKH FDWHJRU\ RI ¶:RPDQ· WKH\
represented. As I mentioned in Chapter 6, Indian feminist legal theory 
considers this an important theme in the last two decades. It claims that the 
JHQHUDOFDWHJRUL]DWLRQRI¶:RPDQ·RU¶:RPHQ·LVLQFRUUHFWDVLWFRQVLGHUs the 
upper-caste, upper-class Hindu woman as the norm, thereby reducing the 
experiences of women from the lower class or minority communities. This is 
my point of departure from existing feminist theory, as I think it is important 
to highlight the plight of all women. While the upper-caste Hindu woman has 
symbolised the Indian woman for several decades, this is more a problem of 
representation. It is necessary to opt for course correction and focus on the 
issues of gender and caste faced by women of other backgrounds and 
communities, as the upper caste woman has better access to resources as well 
as recourse to justice. But it is also necessary to highlight gender-based issues 
faced by all women. My argument here is that gender related issues have a 
common ground and it does not matter if the cage is gilded or muted. 
On the face of it, what was evident to me from my analysis of the case law 
were the entrenched gendered norms. I encountered these norms at every 
turn, as most of the cases I studied were resonating with gendered 
presumptions and stereotypes. In some instances, even the gender of the 
judges did not make an impact on the way gender norms were viewed. Even 
in those instances in which the judges questioned gender norms or tried to 
establish gender equality, they reverted to a conventional stance 
subsequently. Discussing language in law, Lucinda M. Finley claims that the 
important features of legal language are that it reflects conservative norms 
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that help to shape the context and worldview of law, thereby exposing the 
patriarchal bias and male norms in legal language.404 This accurately captures 
the language used by the judges in the cases under study. In these cases, men 
are the norm and women, the deviation from the norm. The level of 
internalisation of gendered norms by the judges in these cases is quite 
significant. Some of the cases, like that of Chethana Ramatheertha, exhibited 
moments of potential where the judges attempted a gender-balanced 
approach and applied the law without preconceived biases. But these 
moments were few and far between. However, the fact that these moments 
existed present some hope for the future.  
Perhaps the most disturbing aspect of judicial reasoning in these cases are the 
silences, especially the silences where the judges accept normative ideas on 
gender as a given. There is no questioning or critique of those instances in 
which women have been cast in gendered roles and this is considered 
acceptable. These silences help in perpetuating embedded norms and 
patriarchal bias, as they exist in those places where speech is necessary. 
Another aspect of silence has been on the question of religion. There is no 
mention of the Hindu religion in any of the cases under study, though they 
are decided under Hindu law. Here, the silence of the judges can be 
interpreted as a tacit understanding that they are interpreting so-called 
secular Common law, rather than religious personal law. It is interesting to 
note that the judges practice a unified theory of law in a country that 
symbolises diversity. It is difficult to generalise or make assumptions on any 
topic in India, as it is a land of paradox.  But judicial reasoning manages to 
                                                             
 
404 >ƵĐŝŶĚĂD&ŝŶůĞǇ ? ‘ƌĞĂŬŝŶŐtŽŵĞŶ ?Ɛ^ ŝůĞŶĐĞŝŶ>Ăǁ PdŚĞŝůĞŵŵĂŽĨƚŚĞ'ĞŶĚĞƌĞĚEĂƚƵƌĞŽĨ>ĞŐĂů
Reasoning ? ? ? ? ? ? ) ? ?EŽƚƌĞĂŵĞ>ĂǁZĞǀŝĞǁ ? 
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make generalised assumptions in speech and silence and does not engage in 
unpacking the law or context, in these cases. 
My focus in this thesis has been on the gendered nature of judicial reasoning, 
rather than on discussions of equality. However, it cannot be denied that in 
these cases, and in cases dealing with religious personal laws in general, the 
question remains whether the Courts favour diversity or equality. This 
question raises further questions ² for instance, what constitutes equality in 
the family or in the nation? Can unequals be treated equally? Should equality 
be considered as a treatment of sameness or difference? Should religious 
personal laws be equal laws or uniform laws? These questions offer scope for 
further research. I see this thesis as the first step in that direction, by 
questioning the impact of gendered nature of judicial reasoning on personal 
laws, especially on the formulation of a uniform civil code. I also question if 
the Indian legal system needs a uniform code or an egalitarian code, to redress 
its gender imbalances. The inherent patriarchy and gender bias in the 
machineries of the state need to be interrogated and rectified to establish a 
gender-just legal system in India. 
7.2 The Road Ahead 
I have discussed earlier that the Hindu code today has no basis in customary 
Hindu law and is almost entirely based on English Common Law, barring a few 
exceptions. There has been extensive research on how Common Law is 
premised on Christian principles. This opens an avenue for exploring the 
Christian basis of Hindu law. The interface between the ideology of the Hindu 
Nationalist Movement, especially its normative stance on gender, and the 
gendered nature of judicial reasoning would be another area of exploration, 
along with the Christian basis for Hindu law. It would be both interesting and 
ironic if a Hindu nationalist government in India chooses to pass a uniform 
civil code, premised on a Hindu code with underlying Christian values. 
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During my analysis of the cases under study, there is a lacuna in the 
scholarship that caught my attention. While I align myself with the Indian legal 
feminists and their stance on personal laws and gender justice, this scholarship 
concentrates on the political, socio-cultural and economic relations within the 
Hindu family. A family is essentially centred around relationships and the 
underlying emotions that make these relationships. Both the literature and the 
judicial reasoning barely focus on emotional angles that contribute to familial 
relationships. For law to be more effective for the individual, it is important to 
focus on the gossamer-thin strands that bind families together and help in 
connecting human beings together. The family cannot and should not be 
treated as a mechanical entity, as it involves the lives and emotions of human 
beings at an everyday level.  
Another important area that needs more work is to arrive at alternative 
resolutions in personal law. The Indian feminist scholarship and my thesis have 
proved beyond doubt that personal laws are gender discriminatory. Moreover, 
Indian Courts are notorious for pendency of cases over years due to the low 
ratio of judges to population.405 These cases are being fought by many women 
for several years, before they get satisfactory or adequate resolution. 
Considering this situation, it is difficult for Indian women, especially those in 
rural areas, to get speedy or effective justice. The feminist argument in the last 
two decades is to do away with any notion of a UCC and instead focus on 
localised methods of delivering legal resolution, especially for matrimonial 
disputes. More research is necessary on alternative dispute resolution 
                                                             
 
405 India has only 13 judges for a million people, as opposed to 50 or more per million in developed 
countries. The Law ministry of India gets one of the lowest budget allocations and appointments of 
judges to High Courts and the Supreme Court is not done on time, leading to stagnation of cases at 
every level. About 27 million cases are pending in Indian Courts. It is not uncommon for maintenance 
cases to last between 3 to 20 years, depending on the tiers of Courts that they have to pass through, 
before maintenance is provided to separated or divorced women (Kirti Singh, Separated and Divorced 
Women in India: Economic Rights and Entitlements (Sage Publications India Pvt Ltd 2013). 
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mechanisms based on personal laws as well as policy changes that will 
facilitate such entities, rather than a reliance on law as an instrument of social 
change. Another emerging area of research is that of custody cases of Indian 
diaspora (who may or may not be Indian citizens). Mostly, these involve 
elements of Hindu law with concurrent laws from the country of residence (UK, 
USA, Australia, Canada to name a few). This category shows potential for 
comparative research on how Hindu law on custody is translated across 
jurisdictions. Further, the Feminist Judgment Project has been launched in 
India recently and some of the judgments I have analysed here can be 
rewritten as a feminist judgment as they offer a lot of scope in terms of 
contribution to feminist theory in India.406 
In conclusion, I wish to state that in many ways, Indian feminists have 
questioned and critiqued fundamental notions of family or nation in the 
present forms consistently.407 I have attempted to take this conversation 
forward by way of my case analysis. It should not be forgotten that it takes a 
lot of strength for Indian women to defy familial and social structures in a 
country steeped in patriarchal tradition. Due to the liberal notion of rights 
residing in individuals, the Constitution and other Acts passed in India tend to 
adopt an approach of gender parity in the letter of the law. However, women 
do not envisage themselves as rights-bearing individuals despite the existence 
of such laws.408 While it is easy to remain within social and economic structures 
that provide a sense of security and comfort as well as social standing, it is 
difficult to break free of them and fight a lone battle. For most women, 
                                                             
 
406 For more on this, see the website of Feminist Judgment Project in India (2017) 
https://fjpindia.wixsite.com/fjpi (accessed 31 January 2018). One of the cases mentioned on the 
website is that of Githa Hariharan, the starting point of my case analysis. 
407 For instance, see Archana Parashar, Women and Family Law Reform in India (Sage Publications Pvt 
Ltd, New Delhi 1992), Flavia Agnes, Family Law Volume 2: Marriage, Divorce and Matrimonial 
Litigation (Oxford University Press 2011),  ZĂũĞƐǁĂƌŝ^ƵŶĚĞƌZĂũĂŶ ? ‘Women between Community and 
State: Some Implications of the Uniform Civil Code Debates in India ? ? ? ? ? ? ) ? ?^ŽĐŝĂůdĞǆƚ. 
408 ibid. 
215 | P a g e  
 
asserting their individual rights implies that they need to confront their 
relatives in the natal or marital families, a prospect that threatens them with 
loss of support systems. Many women choose to stay within such constricting 
structures at great personal cost, so that they do not lose the ground they are 
standing on. One of the significant contributions of WKH ,QGLDQ ZRPHQ·V
movement has been the ability to make women step out of these situations 
and take back control of their lives.  
As I have demonstrated in this thesis, judicial reasoning in custody cases is like 
a repainted old house. It looks bright on the outside. It is only when one 
examines it closely that the cracks in the foundation and loose hinges on the 
doors and windows become visible and one can determine the extent of 
damage to its interior. Similarly, in judicial reasoning, the superficial layer uses 
appropriate legal terminology and appears to be supporting gender parity. 
However, when we peel away the layers, the embedded gender norms 
become visible. Judicial reasoning tends to create, reproduce and iterate 
gender norms, thereby reflecting social conditions. Old houses need repair ² 
they must be stripped clean and overhauled, from foundation of the building 
upwards. While we may have to wait for such a drastic overhaul, what the 
situation needs now is basic repairs to make the house habitable. There is a 
need for an exploration of multiple and textured approaches from gender 
sensitization of judges to alternative ways of resolving family disputes, to aid 
in restoring symmetry to the judicial process. 
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Appendix 1 - Courts in India 
The nature of Indian polity is that it is a federal union. It consists of 29 states 
and 7 union territories (which do not have the status of full statehood), each 
with their own governments. Apart from these, there is a union government 
at the centre, which administers the country. Each of the states and union 
territories are divided into districts for administrative convenience. The Indian 
judicial system is a colonial legacy from the British and is mostly based on 
Common Law principles. The Indian Constitution drafted after the 
independence of the country, provides an elaborate court structure to serve 
as the judiciary of the country. At the apex of the Indian judicial system is the 
Supreme Court of India, headed by the Chief Justice of India (CJI). The CJI is 
appointed by the President of India on the advice of the Government of India 
(Executive). The CJI in turn advises the President for appointing other judges 
to the Supreme Court Collegium. The Supreme Court of India has original, 
writ, appellate and advisory jurisdictions. It hears original petitions filed 
between various arms of the government or between the Central Government 
and one or more State Governments. It has original jurisdiction to hear writ 
petitions and public interest litigations and acts as an advisor to the President 
of India on interpretation of constitutional provisions. The Court also functions 
as the highest appellate Court under the Indian Constitution and hears all 
types of cases on appeal from the lower Courts. 
Below the Supreme Court of India, there are eighteen High Courts across the 
FRXQWU\ZKLFKDUHDWWKHKHDGRID6WDWH·VMXGLFLDODGPLQLVWUDWLRQ409 Each High 
Court has a Chief Justice, along with several judges (the number varies from 
                                                             
 
409 Some states have a joint High Court. For example, Punjab and Haryana. The Union territories are 
affiliated to the nearest High Court based on geographical proximity. Only Delhi, a Union Territory, 
has a High Court of its own. (Source:  ‘/ŶĚŝĂŶ :ƵĚŝĐŝĂƌǇ ? AMŚƚƚƉ P ? ?ŝŶĚŝĂŶĐŽƵƌƚƐ ?ŶŝĐ ?ŝŶ ?AN ĂĐĐĞƐƐĞĚ  ? ?
November 2016) 
217 | P a g e  
 
state to state). The Chief Justice of the High Court is appointed by the 
President of India, in consultation with the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court. 
The Chief Justice of each High Court is consulted by the President and Chief 
Justice of India for the appointment of the other High Court judges for the 
state. The High Courts have original, writ and appellate jurisdictions for the 
geographical territory under their jurisdiction. The High Courts can deal with 
civil and criminal matters within their territories and act as appellate authority 
for the decisions of the lower courts.  
Further, there are civil and criminal courts set up in each district of the country, 
which have delineated lines of civil and criminal jurisdiction. While the civil and 
criminal jurisdictions are distinct at the level of the lower courts, the High 
Courts as well as the Supreme Court of India handle civil, criminal, family law 
and a variety of other laws as they have appellate jurisdictions. The legal 
system also consists of Tribunals (such as the Income Tax Tribunal, 
Administrative Tribunal, etc.) set up for adjudicating specific cases as well as 
WKH/RN$GDODWVRU3HRSOHV·&RXUWVZKLFKDFWDVDOWHUQDWLYHGLVSXWHUHVROXWLRQ
forums at the local level and are on par with the Tribunals.410 Each district also 
has family courts which adjudicate matters of personal law, especially those 
dealing with divorce and custody of children, for that district. The judgments 
of these family courts can be appealed first to the respective High Court and 
finally to the Supreme Court of India, wherever there is a contest. The Indian 
judicial system recognises both statutes and precedents as well as established 
principles of law, in their decisions. The Constitution of India provides for a 
system of checks and balances by making the executive accountable to the 
                                                             
 
410 ibid. 
218 | P a g e  
 
judiciary but in turn, allowing the executive to make the judicial appointments 
as well. 
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Appendix 2 - Questionnaire on Uniform Civil Code 
1. $UH\RXDZDUHWKDW$UWLFOHRIWKH&RQVWLWXWLRQRI,QGLDSURYLGHVWKDW´ WKH








2. The various religious denominations are governed by personal laws and 
customary practices in India on matters of family law, should the UCC 




iv. Guardianship and Child custody 
v. Maintenance 
vi. Successions and 
vii. Inheritance 
a. Yes, it should include all these 
b. No, it should exclude_________ 
c. It should further include_______ 
3. Do you agree that the existing personal laws and customary practices need 
codification and would benefit the people? 
a. Yes 
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b. No  
c. Personal laws and customary practices should be replaced by a 
uniform code 
d. Personal laws and customary practices should be codified to bring 
them in line with fundamental rights. 
 
4. Will uniform civil code or codification of personal law and customary 








6. Should the following practices be banned and regulated? 
a. Polygamy (Banned/ Regulated) 
b. Polyandry (Banned/ Regulated) 
c. Similar customary practices such as Maitri-karaar (friendship deed) 
et al. (Banned/ Regulated)  
 
7. Should the practice of triple talaq be _____________? 
a. Abolished in toto. 
b. Retained the custom 
c. Retained with suitable amendments 
 
8. Do you think that steps should be taken to ensure that Hindu women are 
better able to exercise their right to property, which is often bequeathed 
to sons under customary practices? 
221 | P a g e  
 
 
a. Yes, Hindu women must be made aware of this right and 
measures should be taken to ensure that women, under pressure 
from family do not forego their property. 
b. No there are adequate protections in the existing law. 
c. Legal provisions will not help in what is primarily a cultural 
practice, steps have to be taken so sensitise the society instead.  
  
9. Do you agree that the two-year period of wait for finalising divorce violates 
&KULVWLDQZRPHQ·VULJKWWRHTXDOLW\" 
a. Yes, it should be made uniform across all marriages 
b. No. This period is sufficient and in-keeping with religious 
sentiments. 
  
10. Do you agree that there should be a uniform age of consent for marriage 
across all personal laws and customary practices? 
a. Yes. 
b. No, customary laws locate this age at the attainment of puberty. 
c. 7KH SUHYDLOLQJ V\VWHP RI UHFRJQLVLQJ ¶YRLGDEOH· PDUULDJHV LV
sufficient.   
 
11. Do you agree that all the religious denominations should have the 
common grounds for divorce? 
a. Yes 
b. No, cultural difference must be preserved. 
c. No, but there should be the same grounds for divorce available 
for men and women within personal law. 
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12. Would uniform civil code aid in addressing the problem of denial of 











14. What measures should we take to protect couples who enter into inter-
religion and inter-caste marriages? 
____________________________________________________________    
___________________________________________________________. 
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16. What measures should be taken to sensitize the society towards a common 











Please provide us with your name, contact number and address. 
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Appendix 2 (Continued) - Analysis of the UCC Questionnaire 
The first question asks the reader if they are aware that Article 44 of the Indian 
Constitution instructs that the state shall secure a uniform civil code for 
citizens throughout the territory of India. It provides a yes or no choice, along 
with an add-on question asking if the reader thinks that this matter needs 
further initiatives. So, the basic premise is to formulate a Uniform Civil Code 
with no option to question whether such a code is necessary in the first place. 
However, question 3 tries to address this point to some extent by asking if the 
reader agrees that the existing personal laws and customary practices need 
codification. But the answer to this question is confined to 4 choices ² Yes, No, 
Personal laws and customary practices should be replaced by a uniform code 
or Personal laws and customary practices should be codified to bring them in 
line with fundamental rights. These options seem too simplistic to address the 
issue of whether a uniform civil code is needed at all ² a question that has 
remained unanswered in public debate for seven decades now.  
Question 4 of the questionnaire asks if the UCC or codification of personal 
laws and customary practices ensure gender equality. This question has a 
VLPSOH¶<HVRU1R·RSWLRQZLWKQRVSDFHIRUDQ\additional reasoning. Another 
question that follows this pattern is question 5, which asks if the uniform civil 
FRGHVKRXOGEHPDGHRSWLRQDODJDLQZLWKD¶<HVRU1R·RSWLRQ,WLVLURQLFWKDW
the Law Commission of India, which is supposed to address legislative lacunae 
and suggest appropriate changes to the Parliament, thinks that a vast subject 
area of gender equality and law can be reduced to a yes or no answer. Feminist 
legal scholarship in India has written vast swathes of literature discussing 
gender equality and gender justice and their relation to law. They have 
repeatedly addressed how law can be used an instrument for social change 
and cannot be relied upon to be the only instrument. Moreover, this area of 
scholarship has also discussed exhaustively about optionality and reverse-
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optionality positions for the UCC. The Law Commission pays token respect to 
feminist activism by relegating these important questions to a footnote. 
Questions 6 to 9 of the questionnaire address specific religious/customary 
practices and legal positions. Question 6 asks if practices such as polygamy, 
polyandry and customary practices such as Maitri-Karaar (Friendship deed) 
should be banned or regulated. Question 7 asks if practice of Triple Talaq411 
should be abolished in toto, retained as is or retained with suitable 
amendments. The questions on polygamy and triple talaq pander to populism 
as there is a strong belief in popular (predominantly Hindu) discourse that 
0XVOLPSHUVRQDOODZLVGHWULPHQWDOWRZRPHQDQGZRPHQ·VULJKWV412 This view 
is often reflected in judgments as in the case of Shah Bano. There is vast 
scholarship to prove that Muslim personal law is not as backward as it is often 
portrayed, but this is beyond the scope of my current thesis. It is sufficient to 
mention here that these questions reflect a populist approach, rather than any 
well-researched legal method. 
4XHVWLRQ  DGGUHVVHV WKH +LQGX ZRPDQ·V ULJKW WR SURSHUW\ ZKLFK LV RIWHQ
denied as property is bequeathed to sons. The options to answer this question 
are that Hindu women should be made aware of this right and measures taken 
to ensure that their families do not deprive them (or) that no steps should be 
taken as there are adequate provisions in existing law (or) whether legal 
provisions will not help as it is a cultural practice, which can be prevented by 
better sensitisation. Hindu women have the right to inherit property on paper 
                                                             
 
411 dƌŝƉůĞ dĂůĂƋ ƌĞĨĞƌƐ ƚŽ ƚŚĞ ƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĞ ŽĨ ĚŝǀŽƌĐŝŶŐ ŽŶĞ ?Ɛ ǁŝĨĞ ďǇ DƵƐůŝŵ ŚƵƐďĂŶĚƐ ? ŝŶ ǁŚŝĐŚ ƚŚĞ
ŚƵƐďĂŶĚĐĂŶƵƚƚĞƌƚŚĞǁŽƌĚ ‘dĂůĂƋ ?ƚŚƌĞĞƚŝŵĞƐĂŶĚŚĞŝƐĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌĞĚƚŽŚĂǀĞĚŝǀŽƌĐĞĚŚŝƐǁŝĨĞ ?dŚŝƐ
practice did not find any resonance in Sharia law but was considered as customary among Indian 
Muslims. 
412 For more on this perception, see dĂŶŝŬĂ^ĂƌŬĂƌ ? ‘sŝŽůĞŶƚĂŶĚsŝŽůĂƚĞĚtŽŵĞŶŝŶ,ŝŶĚƵǆƚƌĞŵŝƐƚ
WŽůŝƚŝĐƐ ? ŝŶ tĞŶĚǇ ŽŶŝŐĞƌ ĂŶĚ DĂƌƚŚĂ  EƵƐƐďĂƵŵ  ?ĞĚƐ ) ? Pluralism and Democracy in India - 
Debating the Hindu Right (Oxford University Press 2015), Flavia Agnes, Family Law Volume 1: Family 
Laws and Constitutional Claims (Oxford University Press 2011). 
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but in practice, most families do not provide an equal share in the property to 
daughters, citing the provision of dowry to be in lieu of immovable assets. 
While this is a significant issue in Hindu law, it is not the only area in which 
there is no gender equality. All the four enactments of the Hindu code contain 
provisions that are not gender just and need to be addressed. Again, this 
question is indicative of populist tendencies, as popular discourse tends to 
portray Hindu law to be problem-free and egalitarian, especially in contrast to 
Muslim law.  
Question 9 asks if the two-year waiting period for finalising a Christian divorce 
YLRODWHV &KULVWLDQ ZRPHQ·V ULJKW WR HTXDOLW\ 7KH DQVZHU RSWLRQV IRU WKLV
question are Yes and that it should be made uniform across all marriages or 
No as this period is sufficient and in keeping with religious sentiments. It is 
unclear which part of Christian canonical law specifies this two-year wait 
period and how this waiting period is justified under any circumstances. It 
VHHPVVXSHUIOXRXVWRHYHQDVNWKHTXHVWLRQLIVXFKDSHULRGYLRODWHVZRPHQ·V
right to equality. The only question asked about Christian Personal law shows 
no understanding of this body of law or gender equality in any way.  
After addressing a few questions to Hindu, Muslim and Christian personal laws 
and ignoring the laws of other communities such as Buddhists, Parsis, Sikhs or 
Jains, the questionnaire then turns to generic questions on marriage, divorce 
and maintenance. Question 10 asks whether there should be a uniform age of 
consent for marriage across all personal laws. The answer options for this 
question are Yes, no (as customary laws locate this age at the attainment of 
SXEHUW\ RU WKH SUHYDLOLQJ V\VWHP RI UHFRJQLVLQJ ¶YRLGDEOH· PDUULDJHV LV
sufficient. This question is significant from the perspective of the Hindu 
Minority and Guardianship Act, as this Act recognises the husband of a Hindu 
minor girl to be her natural guardian in Sec. 6(b). While age of marriage for a 
woman in India is fixed at eighteen, it is common knowledge that girls as 
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\RXQJDVDUHJLYHQDZD\LQPDUULDJH,QGLDKDVDWKLUGRIWKHZRUOG·VFKLOG
brides and about 47% of Indian women are married before they turn 
eighteen.413 This makes them vulnerable to physical, emotional and economic 
problems at a young age. A problem of this magnitude is smothered in the 
questionnaire by a single, inadequate question. 
Question 12 asks if the UCC will help in addressing the denial of maintenance 
or providing insufficient maintenance to women upon divorce. The answer 
options are yes or no and an option to provide reasons. Similar options are 
provided for question 15, which asks if the UCC would infringe on an 
LQGLYLGXDO·V ULJKW WR IUHHGRPRI UHOLJLRQ1HLWKHURI WKHVHTXHVWLRQVFDQEH
answered without a knowledge of the provisions of the UCC, making them 
arbitrary in this sense. Questions 13 and 14 pertain to registration of marriages 
and measure to protect inter-religious/inter-caste marriages. India has a 
secular legislation, the Special Marriages Act, which addresses these points 
already, albeit with some constraints on marriage registrations. It is unclear 
why the Law Commission seeks responses when there is an existing legislation 
already providing the measures which are being sought by these questions. 
The last question seeks remarks from the public as to what measures can be 
undertaken for societal sensitisation towards a common code or codification 
of personal laws. This leaves no room for any critique of the code itself and 
presupposes the existence of the code, bringing the questionnaire back to 
where it started.  
                                                             
 
413 /ŶĚŝĂhE/& ? ‘ŚŝůĚDĂƌƌŝĂŐĞ ? ? ? ? ? ? )AMŚƚƚƉ P ? ?ƵŶŝĐĞĨ ?ŝŶ ?tŚĂƚǁĞĚŽ ? ? ? ?ŚŝůĚ-Marriage> accessed 
23 August 2017. 
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Appendix 3 ² Case Analysis Spreadsheet Samples 
3.1- Analysis on Welfare Principle 
S.no. Case Keywords Comments 
1 
Mausami Moitra Ganguli 




resources Welfare as stability and security 
2 
Amit Beri son of Hardaya 
Narain Beri and Hardaya 
Narain Beri son of Jai 
Narain Beri vs. Smt. Sheetal 





Welfare as a point of fact and 
not of law 




Welfare by derivation - father 
didn't meet the child or bear his 
expenses 
4 
Shamal Sharad Baride vs. 




Welfare dominates over rights 
of parents, custody is not 
permanent 
5 
Chethana Ramatheertha vs. 
Kumar V. Jahgirdar 
Guardianship, 




Guardianship only if father is 
disqualified but this can be 
superseded by Welfare. Welfare 
as upbringing -necessary 
facilities, quality education, 
enlightened and healthy 
personality, happy, content and 
responsible member of society 
- which parent is better suited 
for integrated development of 
the child 
6 





More on marriage, matrimonial 
discord and cultural norms 
7 
Mohan Kumar Rayana vs. 
Komal Mohan Rayana and 
Komal Mohan Rayana vs. 




Welfare is not clearly defined 
here. However, it is clear from 
the precedents cited and 
counsellors' advice that gender 
is an important consideration 
8 
Smt. Pushpa and Another 
vs. Smt. Anshu Chaudhary 
Welfare, Mother 
Welfare by negation - not 
economic affluence nor 
emotional concern but facts 
and circumstances - physical 
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wellbeing, education, daily 
necessities 
9 
Ram Murti Chopra and Anr. 
Vs. Nagesh Tyagi 
Welfare, Father 
Welfare - child's ordinary 
comfort and contentment, 
intellectual, moral and physical 
development, health, education, 
general maintenance, 
emotional considerations, social 
set-up, care, attention, career 
building, good human being, 
proper love and affection 
10 
Romani Singh vs. Lt. Col. 
Vivek Singh Welfare, Mother 
Welfare - mother's natural love 
and affection for child of tender 
age and a girl child. Mother is 
educated, working, earning a 
good salary and can spend time 
with child after school (father in 
the army) 
11 




Welfare - moral, ethical, 




Suthar and 2 Ors. Vs. 
Amitaben D/o Hasmukhlal 
Nanchanddas Mewada Welfare, mother 
Welfare - mother has 
preferential claim due to tender 
years and gender of child 
13 
Ashok Kumar Jatav vs. Ku. 
Roshani and Anr 
Welfare, Rights 
of guardian 
Welfare - protected socially and 
financially if child is with father 
(as opposed to grandparents). 
Gender of child - father can 
take care of education, 
marriage 
14 
Smt. Bhabani Mallick vs. 




Welfare - not just financial 
capacity but ethical and moral 
values, contentment, health, 
education, intellectual 
development and favourable 
surroundings. Social, moral and 
statutory obligation of father to 
provide maintenance for child 
15 
Eshita D/o Hasmukhbhai 
Sitapara vs. Hiren 
Prabhudasbhai Brahmbhatt 
Welfare, Mother 
Welfare - Not only economic, 
academic or physical but also 
emotional and psychological, 
holistic development. Gender of 
child considered 
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16 
Kotholla Komuraiah and 
Kotholla Kondavva vs. 
Kotholla @ Bikkanuri @ 





Welfare - physical comfort, 
moral and ethical well-being 
17 
Shyamrao Maroti Korwate 
vs. Deepak Kisanrao Tekam 
Welfare, Rights 
of guardian 
Welfare - Construed literally 
and taken in widest sense 
18 
Niranjan Singh Huda and 
Anr vs. Tavinder Pal Singh 
Bhatia and Anr. Welfare, Father 
Welfare - best protected by 
father (father's conviction and 
pending appeal did not alter 
this) 
19 
 Nil Ratan Kundu and Anr. 
Vs. Abhijit Kundu 
Welfare, Father 
Welfare - parens patriae 
jurisdiction, child's ordinary 
comfort, contentment, health, 
education, intellectual 
development and favourable 
surroundings. Not as a negative 
test of father being unfit but a 
positive test of welfare 
"A Court while dealing with 
custody cases, is neither bound 
by statutes nor by strict rules of 
evidence or procedure nor by 
precedents." 
20 
Sardar Bhupendra Singh vs. 




Welfare - emotional wellbeing, 
parental love and sympathy 
21 
Dr. Seema Kumari W/o late 
Dr. Shashi Shekhar and D/o 
Sri Rageshwar Prasad 
Sinha, Advocate, at present 
resident of Mohalla-
Makhania Kuan Road, 
Patna, P.S.-Pirbahore, 
District-Patna vs. The State 




Welfare - premised on the 
possibility of mother being 
remarried (though she said she 
will not, petitioner being a 
doctor), male child is the 
coparcener of the grandfather's 
Hindu Undivided Family 
22 
Shailesh Khandelwal vs. 
Meenakshi Khandelwal Welfare, Father 
Welfare - Utmost care, 
admitted in a reputed school, 
love and affection of father and 
grandparents (mother living 
alone), child sweet and above 
average in intelligence. 
Statutory presumption of father 
as natural guardian 
23 
Murari Lal Sidana & Anr. 
Vs. Smt. Anita 
Welfare, Mother 
as a stranger 
Welfare - physical, 
psychological, emotional, 
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financial and moral needs, 
emotional bonding, family 
environment, school and 
neighbourhood. No visitation 
to mother to avoid emotional 
and psychological disturbance 
to children 
24 
Shiwani Kabra vs. Shaleen 
Kabra 
Welfare, Mother 
Welfare - cannot be measured 
by position of father, social 
status or academic degrees, 
physical comfort. More 
dependent on care, protection 
and guidance, psychological 
and emotional needs 
25 
Vijayaben Parshottam 
Kotak vs. Parshottam Kotak Welfare 
Welfare - education, financial 
stability, age of the children, 
natural love and affection of the 
parties, the moral character as 
well as social status and the 
wish of minor if they are 
capable enough of taking 
proper decision 




Welfare - having regard to age, 
sex and religion of minor, 
character and capacity of 
guardian (personal guidance on 
physiological changes, fidelity 
in life, faith in the institution of 
marriage, relations for 
community life, lessons on 









Welfare - physical custody, 
health, maintenance, education, 
protection of mother, 
intellectual development 
28 




Welfare - Negative definition - 
father who fails to pay 
maintenance 
29 
 Neelam Rani vs. State of 
Haryana and Ors. Welfare, mother 
Welfare - tender years, daily 
needs 
30 





Welfare - not being neglected 
by mother or second husband 
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31 




Obligation of maintenance on 
father 
32 





Welfare - financially sound, 
good education 
33 
Nibha Kumari vs. State of 
Bihar and Ors Welfare, Mother 
Welfare - tender years, mother 
educated 
34 





Welfare - crucial age of child 
(underlying presumption about 
gender of child), growth and 
maintenance, Father remarried 
35 
Baby Kavya Awasthi and 
Another vs. State of U.P. 
and Ors Welfare, Mother 
Welfare - educated and earning 
mother, love, affection, care of 
mother presumed 
36 
R. Muruga Perumal vs. J. 
Radhamani Welfare, Mother 
Welfare - child is female, living 
in a remote place, mother a 
teacher and child can get 
admission in her school 
immediately 
37 
Govind Sahai Bagarhatta 





Child's opinion to live with 
grandparents 
38 
R. Manivasakan vs. M. 
Vimala Welfare, 'after' 
Father and mother well-
educated academics but 
bickering due to family issues. 
Githa Hariharan used as 
precedent 
39 





Welfare - presumption of care 
by mother, educated and 
financially capable, sufficient 
time, take care of essentials, 
integral development and 
personality 
40 




Neither father nor mother can 
claim suzerainty over the child 
41 
Chhotibai (Smt.) vs. Sunita 
Kushwah (Smt.) 
Welfare, Mother 
as a stranger 
Welfare - good financial status 
(of grandmother), healthy, 
happy, going to school 
42 Gaytri Bajaj vs. Jiten Bhalla 
Welfare, Mother 
as a stranger 
Welfare - Looking after, 
educational facilities, proper 
and congenial manner 
43 
Master Shobhit Vs. State of 
U.P. and Ors. 
Welfare, Mother 
accused 
Moral basis for welfare for a 
mother 
44 
Mousami Moitra Ganguli 
vs. Jayant Ganguli Welfare, Father 
Welfare - father working 
member and head of the family, 
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better financial resources, love 
and affection 
45 
Smt Radha alias Parimala v. 
N. Rangappa AIR 2004 Kar 
299 Welfare, Father 
Welfare - financial, educational, 
physical, moral and religious 
welfare. Balance between 
welfare and rights of parents. 
Aspersion on mother for 
adultery but not on father for 
bigamy 
46 
Githa Hariharan & Anr. Vs. 
Reserve Bank of India & 
Anr. 
 'after', Gender 
equality, 
Guardian 
After as in the absence of, 
father as a dominant 
personality 
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3.2 - Sample Analysis of Cases 
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S.No. Cause Title 
Date of 
Decision Case facts Observations in the judgment 
1 





son of Jai 
Narain Beri vs. 
Smt. Sheetal 
Beri wife of 
Amit Beri D/o 
Raj Kumar 17.05.2006 
Custody of male minor child 
over 10 years of age. Trial 
court awarded custody to 
mother, but High Court 
reversed decision 
"When it comes to Mother v. Father for 
custody of the child, we should in 
normal circumstances lean towards the 
Mother. Mother's love is proverbial. 
Every religion, every culture, every 
civilization has acknowledged this. The 
love, affection and care, which a 
mother can bestow on her child, 
cannot be given by anyone else, 
including the father. There may be 
cases where the father is comparatively 
more affectionate, but they are 
exceptions to the general Rule."¬¬
The respondent is earning sufficient, 
money to maintain herself and her 
minor children but it alone is not 
sufficient to record finding regarding 
the welfare of the child. The allegation 
of the appellants is that she is a lady of 
bad character¬ The Indian culture is 
entirely different. I have already stated 
regarding the family background of the 
respondent No. 1 and her sister. She is 
also in the habit of attending night 
clubs and coming late to her house. 
During this period, the minor child has 
to be left in some care house for 
children. As the child will grow and 
attain the age of maturity, he is likely 
to come in contact with undesirable 
elements. Therefore, for proper 
brought-up of the child and that he 
may became a good citizen and may 
have good character, it is necessary 








Husband alleges wife 
committed adultery, wife 
claims that husband has 
drinking habits. They have 3 
children between them. Wife 
initiated proceedings for 
"The shelter of the mother, at such 
tender age, where apart from 
education, ways of life are also to be 
etched on mental screen of ward is 
more effective in the situation to 
nourish the child¬ The question is the 
236 | P a g e  
 
partition and possession of 
property and husband 
demanded custody of child. 
Father did not visit the child 
for about 2 to 3 years. 
Husband known to have 
been at rehab for detox 
program. He was also prone 
to selling his fields and 
tractor etc to fund his habits. 
Two elder children 
technically with husband but 
maintained by his brother's 
wife. Child with mother 
making progress in 
education but not the other 
two. Mother claimed 10 
acres of property on behalf 
of minor child, Custody 
awarded to mother 
case of custody and not appointing 
guardian as the child can desire to stay 
with either parent. Custody is not of a 
permanent nature. Vital to custody is 
age of child and circumstances. Best 
interest of the child is basic 






vs. Kumar V. 
Jahgirdar 27.01.2003 
Female child of 8, parents 
divorced by mutual consent. 
Mother's application of 
custody rejected, and father 
given custody. Mother 
appealed. Mother married 
Anil Kumble, a famous 
cricketer and the child was 
then living with mother and 
stepfather. Father lived alone 
with his ailing father and 
hence the environment not 
conducive for caring for the 
child. Father claimed that 
mother was not providing 
good care, "she was not a 
good mother", Also that 
father had independent 
means to take care of the 
child while the mother did 
not possess such means.  
´The historical concept that the father 
of a minor child is in a better or 
superior position to take care of the 
child has as of now given way to the 
modern thinking that it is not 
necessarily so; that either parent is 
equally capable of taking care of the 
child; that the question of custody 
should always be decided by taking 
into consideration the facts and 
circumstances that prevail in each case; 
the ability of the parents to provide 
necessary facilities--environmental, 
companionship, love and affection, are 
all factors, which Courts have to bear in 
mind in deciding the question. The 
question is not viewed any more from 
the angle of "which parent has a better 
right", but from the approach as to 
"the company of which of the two 
parents is better suited for the 
integrated development of the 
personality of the child" and as to 
whether the child receives the 
necessary inputs if it is in the company 
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of a particular parent, for a healthy 
growth and development of the 
SHUVRQDOLW\RIWKHFKLOG¬¬7KHPRWKHU
getting married again after the divorce, 
cannot be termed as an act of 
selfishness as is sought to be projected 
by the learned Counsel for the 
respondent-father. Developments and 
progress in law is very slow and tardy. 
Changes brought about by codified law 
to any customary or conventional 
practices are always opposed and 
decried as lowering the values in the 
society. We, at any rate, cannot 
attribute any virtue to the father who 
has remained not married subsequent 
to divorce and/or attribute any 
selfishness to the mother for her 
marriage after her divorce with the 
respondent. We cannot also accept the 
submission on behalf of the 
respondent-father that the father has 
remained unmarried after his divorce 
with the present appellant only with a 
view to promote the welfare of the 
child. We merely accept that it is a fact 
that he has remained unmarried so far 
and as to what could be the outcome 
on the aspect of the welfare of the 
child in the context of deciding the 






Father having custody of 
minor son by flouting lower 
court orders (Contempt 
proceedings against him) 
Father claims to be in a 
better position to take care 
of child financially and that 
the child hates the mother. 
However, lower court 
granted custody to mother 
and increased maintenance. 
Father was married earlier, 
and first wife committed 
´Matrimonial discords are on the rise at 
an alarming rate. The sanctity of 
marriages is under cloud, which in a 
great way affects the society at large. 
Individuals can in no way be 
segregated from the society to which 
they belong. The cultural heritage of a 
country is greatly influenced by a 
pattern of behaviour of individuals and 
more so in matters of matrimony. 
Home can be a wonderful place to live. 
But continuous fights between the 
partners of a marriage disturb the 
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suicide due to torture and 
harassment by family and 
several criminal cases 
pending against him. 
Discussion on using Habeaus 
Corpus for child custody 
cases. Mother granted 
custody and father visitation 
rights. Father could not take 
advantage of his own 
wrongs. 
atmosphere at home and create havoc 
on the members of a family. One does 
not need a mansion to lead a happy 
marital home. The foundation of a 
happy home is love, sharing of joys and 
sorrows, and not in that sense bricks 
and concrete. There should be 
cementing of hearts and not 
cementing of floors and walls¬. Life is 
a series of awakening. The happiness 
which brings enduring worth to life is 
not the superficial happiness that is 
dependent on circumstances. 
Ultimately, in the fight between the 
partners, the victims more often than 
not are the children. It is unfortunate 
that in their fight more often on 
account of egoism the children suffer, 
more particularly when the child is a 
girl. It is not uncommon to see that at 
the time of negotiation of marriage, 
the boy's parents shy away because the 
girl is from a broken family and/or the 
parents are divorced. The child has 
practically no role in breaking of the 










Father and mother married 
by Hindu law and daughter 
born to them. Mother 
PRYHGEDFNWRKHUSDUHQWV·
home due to alcohol 
problems of her husband, 
husband claims desertion. 
Mother also alleged that the 
father forcibly kept the 
daughter in his custody and 
hence she filed application 
for custody of child. Mother 
was TV/Film star and in 
public interviews, she did not 
acknowledge the presence 
of her child or that she was 
married. Thorough 
examination of counselling 
UHFRUGVDQGSDUHQWV·VWDWXV
´Female child on the advent of puberty 
primarily requires mother's care and 
attention. Absence of female company 
in the house of the father is relevant 
factor¬About the mother) "On the 
other hand, the respondent-mother is 
a graduate in English literature and she 
is also into Fine Arts and Culture. She 
knows Marathi, English, Hindi and 
Telugu very well. She is also an 
accomplished classical dancer. She has 
categorically stated before the court 
that she has given up her career as an 
Actress and she will be available 24 
hours of the day to take care and for 
upbringing Anisha. Her other family 
members are also educated. Moreover, 
the cRXQVHOORUV·UHSRUWVVKRZWKDW
Anisha is happy in the company of the 
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conducted. Custody given to 
mother, with the proviso that 
if she tries to poison the 
child's mind against the 
father, the decision may be 
reversed 
respondent mother and her 
educational and social needs are being 
well taken care of by the mother. 
Looking to overall facts and 
circumstances of the case and the 
evidence on record, it is clear that 
Anisha is doing well with the mother 
DQGVKHLVDKDSS\FKLOG¬:HDUHDZDUH
that initially the access period may 
temporarily cause flutter and Anisha 
may not be able to immediately adjust 
herself at the home of the appellant-
father, but it does not mean that mere 
willingness of Anisha would be decisive 
factor. Looking to her age and hostile 
attitude towards the appellant, her 
wish, insofar as access/visitation right is 
concerned, need not be given 
importance or any weightage. The 
Court is not supposed to act as 





vs. Smt. Anshu 
Chaudhary 10.04.2013 
Appellants are grandparents 
of minor girl aged 6 years, 
and respondent is mother of 
the child. Respondent 
married son of appellants, 
who died in a car accident 
when the child was 3. The 
appellants took the child and 
entered into an agreement 
of compromise with 
respondents. Subsequently, 
the mother got a job and 
wanted to take custody of 
the child. Trial court held res 
judicata as earlier 
compromise agreement was 
in operation. Custody given 
to mother in child's welfare 
"The welfare of a child is neither 
determined by economic affluence nor 
a deep mental or emotional concern. 
The welfare of the child is all round 
welfare which is to be considered 
taking into consideration entire facts 
and circumstances. The physical 
wellbeing, education, supplying the 
daily necessities such as food, clothing 
and shelter is the primary 
consideration. Welfare of child lies in 
providing good education to the child 
to create surroundings which may give 
an atmosphere to overall development 
RISHUVRQDOLW\¬7KHUHKDVWREHYHU\
strong reason to deny the custody of 
minor child to mother who is regarded 
as first teacher of a child. Selfless 
affection, the care and nursing which a 




Chopra and 25.09.2008 
Maternal grandparents had 
custody of child after suicide 
"Every Court, while deciding the 
custody matters, has to consider the 




of mother. Father is 
respondent seeking custody. 
He claimed that he was 
coerced into signing an 
affidavit providing custody 
of child to grandparents and 
had to face subsequent 
malicious criminal 
proceedings, as well as 
being denied access to child. 
Child's surname changed, 
and he was not aware of his 
father.  
welfare of the child as a prime factor. 
While considering the welfare of the 
child, the Court has to give due 
weightage to all the circumstances 
such as the child's ordinary comfort 
and contentment, his intellectual, moral 
and physical development, his health, 
education, general maintenance etc. 
Apart from that the Court has also to 
give due weightage to the emotional 
considerations, social set-up, care, 
attention, career build-up and bringing 
up of a child as a good human being. 
The Court has to ensure that the child 
must live in an atmosphere which is 
congenial and healthy for his growth 
and inculcates values of life in his. He 
gets proper love and affection 
necessary for his development, the 
guardians provide him necessary moral 
ERRVWLQJHWF¬*UDQGSDUHQWVFDQQRW
substitute the love and affection which 
is given by a father or mother and the 
anxiety which a natural father would 
have to see that his son rises in life and 
chooses a career of his own choice. A 
father would do over time/part-time 
job to earn some extra money so that 
his son/daughter may study in a better 
school. Poor parents normally see to it 
even if they have to go hungry their 
children get proper food even at the 
cost of their own health. They see to it 
that their children get milk even if they 
can hardly afford it. A father would do 
all extra effort to see that his 
son/daughter does better in life than 
he himself has done. This normally 
cannot be expected from any other 
person howsoever affluent he may be, 
howsoever rich he may be and 
howsoever related he may with the 
child." 




vs. Lt. Col. 
Vivek Singh 02.04.2013 
Wife alleges dowry 
harassment, drunkenness 
and assault by husband. 
Husband claims that wife is 
verbally abusive and 
drunken. Husband retained 
custody of child as wife left 
matrimonial home. Minor 
girl aged 5 years. Trial court 
provided custody to 
husband. High Court held 
that considering father is in 
army and may be transferred 
to non-family stations, it is in 
the welfare of child to 
provide mother custody 
´)XUWKHUUHVSRQGHQWLVDQ$UP\2IILFHU
During the course of his service he will 
be also getting non--family stations 
and it will be difficult for him to keep 
the child. Further, even though as per 
him his parents are looking after the 
child but when the natural mother is 
there and has knocked the door of the 
court without any delay and has all 
love and affection for the child and is 
willing to do her duty with all love and 
affection and since the birth of the 
child she has been keeping the child. In 
these circumstances, she should not be 
deprived of her right especially 
considering the tender age and child 
being a girl child. The grandparents 
cannot be a substitute for natural 
mother. There is no substitute for 
mother's love in this world. The 
grandparents are old. Old age has its 
own problems. Considering the totality 
of facts and circumstances, the welfare 
of the child lies with the mother i.e. 
appellant who is educated, working 
and earning a good salary and after 
school hours has ample time to spent 
with the child. In these circumstances, 
impugned order is set aside and the 
request of the appellant for the grant 
of custody of the said child to her 
being natural mother is allowed and 
the appellant is also appointed as 
guardian of her child being a natural 
guardian/mother" 
9 
K.M. Vinaya vs. 
B.R. Srinivas 13.09.2013 
Father and mother fighting 
for custody of 12 1/2-year-
old son. Child suffers from 
spinal malfunction and had 
surgeries for the same. 
Mother has custody and 
father visitation rights, father 
challenged custody. Joint 
custody provided and child 
´There should be a proper balance 
between the rights of the respective 
parents and the welfare of the child. 
The moral and ethical welfare of the 
child must also weigh with the court as 
well as its physical wellbeing. The child 
requires love and affection of both 
father and mother...¬7KHIDWKHULVD
friend, philosopher and guide to the 
child. The overall development of the 
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to spend six months of the 
year with each parent. 
child can be possible with the love and 
affection of the father. No allegation 
has been made regarding ill-treatment 
of the child in the father's house and 
congenial atmosphere is available in 
the house of the respondent for the 
sustainable growth and grooming of 
WKHFKLOG¬ Father's care and love has a 
powerful and positive impact upon the 
development and health of a child. In 
addition, numerous studies have found 
that children who live with their father 
are more likely to have good physical 
and emotional health to achieve 
academically and more likely to exhibit 
self-control and pro-social behaviour. It 
is important that the minor has his 
father's care and guidance, at this 
formative and impressionable stage of 
his life. Nor can the role of the lather in 
his upbringing and grooming to face 
the realities of life be undermined. It is 
in that view father's care is important 










Marital dispute between 
Petitioner - Husband and 
Respondent - wife, 
Reconciliation failed, 
Respondent filed application 
of custody of minor child 
(female, below 5 years of 
age), District judge allowed 
application and directed 
petitioner to handover 
custody of minor child to 
respondent, Civil revision 
application filed by 
petitioner 
"In this case the female child is below 
five years, custody of child should 
ordinarily be with the mother unless 
the welfare of the child demands 
otherwise. Such a child needs most a 
tender affection, the caressing hand 
and the company of his natural mother. 
This Court is of the view that neither 
the father nor his female relations, 
however, close, well-meaning and 
affectionate towards the minor, can 
appropriately serve as a proper 
substitute for the minor's natural 
mother. In this connection the mother 
is rightly endowed with a preferential 
claim in regard to the child's custody. 
The interest of the minor will be well 
served by keeping him with his 
mother." "The child Hemali will get best 
care, protection, nourishment and 
upbringing from her mother. This 
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Court is of the view that looking to the 
age of the child mother is the best 
person in the world to take care of the 
child and there is no alternative or 
substitute of mother so far as child is 
concerned at this stage." 
11 
Ashok Kumar 
Jatav vs. Ku. 
Roshani and 
Anr 24.06.2005 
Appellant was the natural 
father of respondent 1 and 
employed with Railways. 
After his wife's death, 
appellant sent his one-year 
old daughter (resp 1) to his 
father in law. Later, he filed 
application for custody of 
resp 1, which was dismissed 
by the trial judge (held that 
he had not looked after 
respondent and taken steps 
for custody), Present appeal 
FRQVLGHUHGDSSHOODQW·V
financial position as sound, 
his mother and widowed 
sister lived with him, his 
sister expressed her 
willingness to take care of 
her niece. Held that 
appellant being natural 
father of respondent 1, has 
natural affection and care for 
his daughter. Child willing to 
go with her father. Hence, 
appeal allowed. Maternal 
grandparents given periodic 
visitation and take minor for 
about 3 to 4 days, for up to 
one year from date of 
judgment 
´Welfare will be protected socially and 
financially if custody is provided to 
father. Also, child will be approaching 
marriage in a few years and father will 
definitely take care of her education, 
marriage, etc which would obviously 
ensure her welfare. Though father left 
minor in the care of maternal 
grandparents since age one, he still is 








Petitioner wife seeks custody 
of minor daughter. Petitioner 
married an already married 
man, who had a son through 
his first wife. Respondent 
involved in 29 criminal cases 
and petitioner unaware of 
his background. He was 
"It is not only the economic, academic 
and physical welfare that is to be seen 
but also the emotional and 
psychological welfare and wellbeing of 
the minor child. After all the minor, 
whether a boy or girl, is an innocent, 
budding human being, caught 
unawares in the crossfire of the bitter 
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taken into judicial custody 
and remained there for 5 
years after the birth of the 
girl. Petitioner took care of 
the child from birth and put 
her in school. They executed 
a deed of divorce giving the 
father custody, unless he 
remarries / lives in with 
another woman or vice 
versa. Child came to live with 
father and mother was with 
her parents. However, father 
brought strange women to 
his house. Family court 
disregarded the activities of 
the petitioner, his criminal 
background, his drinking 
habits as well as the fact that 
he was not paying the 
school fees of the child. 
Deed of divorce not equal to 
divorce decree by court and 
cannot override welfare of 
minor. Child refused to talk 
against father in his or his 
advocate's presence but was 
able to articulate that the 
circumstances in father's 
house was not conducive 
and that she wanted to live 
with her mother. Lower court 
lost sight of welfare of 
minor. Custody given to 
mother with visitation rights 
to father. 
marital relationship between his/ her 
parents. The intrinsic need of every 
minor child is a foundation of love, 
affection, security and trust, on the 
basis of which his or her personality, 
talent, intelligence and holistic 
development will take place. A good 
education helps in the flowering of the 
minor child s latent potential, but it is 
physical and emotional security and 
love and affection, that are most 
essential. An affluent background or 
palatial mansion, without the above 
qualities would hardly be conducive to 
the minor's welfare. A different 
dimension comes into focus when the 
minor is a girl child. Given her inherent 
sensitivity, a minor girl is, normally, 
emotionally attached and attuned to 
her mother. A minor girl, especially, 
requires a physically, financially and 
emotionally stable and secure 
environment. Soon, she may be 
nearing the threshold of adolescence 
when the special guidance and care of 





Anr. Vs. Abhijit 
Kundu 08.08.2008 
Appellants are maternal 
grandparents of minor and 
respondent is the father. 
Dowry case, Mother 
harassed and assaulted and 
died due to assault. Criminal 
case against respondent and 
his mother pending, 
Respondent came out on 
´,QRXURSLQLRQLQVXFKFDVHVLWLVQRW
the `negative test' that the father is not 
`unfit' or disqualified to have custody 
of his son/daughter is relevant but the 
`positive test' that such custody would 
be in the welfare of the minor which is 
material and it is on that basis that the 
Court should exercise the power to 
grant or refuse custody of minor in 
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bail and filed for custody of 
5-year-old minor son. Trial 
court ordered for child to be 
handed over to father 
immediately and this was 
endorsed by High Court. 
Appeal against HC orders by 
grandparents. Alleged that 
torture of mother had 
traumatised the child and he 
was found by grandparents 
in a very sick condition. Child 
interviewed, and custody 
provided to maternal 
grandparents 
favour of father, mother or any other 
JXDUGLDQ¬$&RXUWZKLOHdealing with 
custody cases, is neither bound by 
statutes nor by strict rules of evidence 


















vs. The State 
of Bihar & Ors. 21.10.2011 
Petitioner is mother of one 
and half year-old son and 
she alleges that the 
respondents 3 & 4 (paternal 
grandparents) have kept the 
child in illegal detention. 
Petitioner and her husband 
were medical PG students 
studying at separate places 
and child was being brought 
up by grandparents. 
Petitioner's husband 
committed suicide in her 
hostel room, while she was 
alleged to have been 
assaulted by him and 
admitted in hospital. 
Grandparents having 
custody of child and child 
has mild heart condition. 
Court granted them custody 
´7KHJUDQGSDUHQWVRIWKHFKLOGFRXOG
not be persuaded to opt for giving up 
custody in favour of the petitioner. 
They believe that petitioner was the 
reason for the unnatural death of their 
son in her hostel room under 
mysterious circumstance. They believe 
that the custody of the child is only a 
tool which may be used by the 
petitioner for mala fide reasons. On the 
other hand, the petitioner also claimed 
that she would not marry again and 
hence the child would be happy with 
her. This was in response to our 
suggestion that she has a long future 
and being young and talented she 
should consider to marry again with a 
suitable person. Although the 
apprehension of the respondents 3 and 
4 may be mistaken but there is every 
possibility that in the present modern 
era the petitioner may find a suitable 
person to marry and resettle in a life in 
which the child may not have very 
welcome or healthy place. These 
practical aspects of life are difficult to 
be ignored and we have taken them 
into consideration, even at the risk of 
some conjecture, only for coming to a 
conclusion as to whether change of 
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custody of the minor child would be 
conducive to his all-round welfare or 
not. With great difficulty but without 
any doubt we come to the conclusion 
that change of custody of the 
concerned minor, a one and half year-
old child, in the aforesaid facts and 
circumstances is unwarranted. It is 
most likely to be traumatic and may 
not be conducive to his welfare. Being 
a male child, he is a coparcener in the 
Hindu Family of his grandfather and he 
has legitimate claims upon the family 




Sidana & Anr. 
Vs. Smt. Anita 19.09.2012 
Two minor children, boy of 
13 and girl of 12, brought up 
by appellants, their paternal 
grandparents. Respondent 
mother claims custody. 
Grandfather died during 
pendency of appeal and 
contest between mother and 
grandmother. Mother 
developed discord with 
father and left matrimonial 
home, father committed 
suicide subsequently. 
Children in the custody of 
grandparents since birth. 
Trial court awarded custody 
to mother.  
"In the present case, it is an admitted 
fact that initially both the children lived 
with their parents. However, after the 
couple split in 2002, the children have 
lived with the grandparents. They lost 
their father in 2003, ever since then it is 
the grand-parents who have been 
looking after the children. Thus, for 
almost a decade now, the grand-
mother has looked after their physical, 
psychological, emotional, financial and 
moral needs. Obviously, over this 
period, the children have developed an 
emotional bonding with the grand-
mother, have gotten used to the family 
environment, have settled in their 
school, have gained friends and 
admirers in the school and the 
neighbourhood. In contrast, they have 
faint memories of having a mother. 
They have never inter-acted with her. 
They have no emotional bonding with 
her. They have never lived in a large 
city like Jaipur. To them, the mother is 
a stranger, her city, an unfamiliar 
WHUUDLQ¬However, the fact remains that 
the children have no emotional 
bonding with the mother. For them, 
she continues to be a mirage, a 
figment of imagination, a total 
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stranger. To consign their custody to 
her is to rip them from their secure 
surrounding, to subject them to a 
psychological trauma. Such an act 
would amount to making guinea pigs 
of the children in a judicial experiment. 
It would cause them a grave injustice if 
their custody were to be handed over 
WRWKHPRWKHU¬,WZRXOGQRWVHUYHDQ\
beneficial purpose to give the 
respondent-mother visiting rights. For, 
the children are adamant that they do 
not wish to interact with her. 
Simultaneously, the appellants have 
not encouraged the children to interact 
with her. If the visiting right were given 
to the respondent-mother, it may 
cause emotional and psychological 
trauma to the children who would have 
to comply with a court order that they 
are absolutely uncomfortable with. 
Since children should be permitted to 
develop their personality without too 
much of emotional and psychological 
disturbance, it would be in the interest 
of the welfare of the children to deny 
the visiting rights to the mother. For 




vs. Beena 08.11.2006 
Father and mother 
contesting for custody of 
minor aged about 10. 
Mother provided custody 
´)DWKHUDQGPRWKHUFRQWHVWLQJIRU
custody of minor aged about 10. 
Mother provided custody Raveena here 
is aged about 10 and is situated like 
Shobhana, referred to in the decision 
cited above. Very shortly she might be 
in need of a close, personal guidance, 
including monitoring of her 
physiological changes. A mother's 
constant presence can instil in a 
minor's mind qualities of fidelity in life, 
and faith in the institution of marriage 
as well as solemn relations, essential 
for community life. In areas where 
lessons are to be imparted, for example 
in hygiene, grooming, selection of 
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companions and the like, a father will 
be a poor substitute. An educated 
mother, who has made express offer, 
as could be seen from the order of the 
Family Court, for attending to her 
educational needs, according to us, is 





Shalini Bhalla 27.07.2009 
Mother and father divorced 
by mutual consent, minor 
son with mother and had 
amicable visitation 
agreement. Mother wanted 
to relocate to Australia for 
employment and wanted 
cancellation of visitation. 
"Much has been said regarding the 
Indian cultural environment in which 
the child is brought up in India to 
discard the claim of the respondent to 
take the child with her to Australia 
where she is employed for gain. It is 
not highlighted as to how the health, 
education or intellectual development 
as well as physical comfort and moral 
values of the child would be affected if 
he is allowed to live with his mother in 
Australia. Rather, I am of the view that 
bringing up of the child in favourable 
surroundings as well as in physical 
comfort and protection of his mother, 
his education and intellectual 
development is likely to be more 
conducive for the welfare of the child." 
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Appendix 4 ² The Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, 1956 
An Act to amend and codify certain parts of the law relating to minority and 
guardianship among Hindus.  
BE it enacted by Parliament in the Seventh Year of the Republic of India as 
follows: -  
1. Short title and extent ²  
(1) This Act may be called the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, 1956.  
(2) It extends to the whole of India except the State of Jammu Kashmir and 
applies to Hindus domiciled in the territories to which this Act extends who 
are outside the said territories.  
2. Act to be supplemental to Act 8 of 1890 - The provisions of this Act shall 
be in addition to, and not, save as hereinafter expressly provided, in 
derogation of, the Guardians and Wards Act, 1890 (8 of 1890).  
3. Application of Act ²  
(1) This Act applies-  
(a) to any person who is a Hindu by religion in any of its forms or 
developments, including a Virashaiva, a Lingayat or a follower of the Brahmo, 
Prarthana or Arya Samaj.  
(b) to any person who is a Buddhist, Jaina or Sikh by religion and  
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(c) to any person domiciled in the territories to which this Act extends who is 
not a Muslim, Christian, Parsi, or Jew by religion, unless it is proved that any 
such person would not have been governed by the Hindu law or by any 
custom or usage as part of that law in respect of any of the matters dealt with 
herein if this Act had not been passed.  
Explanation - The following persons are Hindus, Buddhists, Jainas or Sikhs by 
religion, as the case may be: -  
(i) any child, legitimate or illegitimate, both of whose parents are 
Hindus, Buddhists, Jainas or Sikhs by religion;  
(ii) any child, legitimate or illegitimate, one of whose parents is a Hindu, 
Buddhists, Jaina or Sikh by religion and who is brought up as a 
member of the tribe, community, group or family to which such 
parent belongs or belonged; and  
(iii) any person who is convert or re-convert to the Hindu, Buddhist, Jaina 
or Sikh religion.  
(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), nothing contained 
in this Act shall apply to the members of any scheduled Tribe within the 
meaning of clause (25) of article 366 of the Constitution unless the Central 
Government, by notification in the Official Gazette, otherwise directs.  
(3) The expression 'Hindu' in any portion of this Act shall be construed as if it 
included a person who, though not a Hindu by religion, is nevertheless, a 
person to whom this Act, applies by virtue of the provisions contained in this 
section.  
4. Definitions - In this Act, -  
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(a) "minor" means a person who has not completed the age of eighteen 
years;  
(b) "major" means a person having the care of the person of a minor or of 
his property or of both his person and property, and includes-  
(i) a natural guardian,  
(ii) a guardian appointed by the will of the minor's father or mother,  
(iii) a guardian appointed or declared by a court, and  
(iv) a person empowered to act as such by or under any enactment 
relating to any court of wards;  
(c) "natural guardian" means any of the guardians mentioned in section 6.  
5. Over-riding effect of Act- Save as otherwise expressly provided in this 
Act, -  
(a) any text, rule or interpretation of Hindu law or any custom or usage as 
part of that law in force immediately before the commencement of this Act 
shall cease to have effect with respect to any matter for which provision is 
made in this Act;  
(b) any other law in force immediately before the commencement of this 
Act shall cease to have effect in so far as it is inconsistent with any of the 
provisions contained in this Act.  
6. Natural guardians of a Hindu minor - The natural guardians of a 
Hindu, minor, in respect of the minor's person as well as in respect of the 
minor's property (excluding his or her undivided interest in joint family 
property), are-  
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(a) in the case of a boy or an unmarried girl-the father, and after him, the 
mother: provided that the custody of a minor who has not completed the 
age of five years shall ordinarily be with the mother;  
(b) in the case of an illegitimate boy or an illegitimate unmarried girl-the 
mother, and after her, the father;  
(c) in the case of a married girl-the husband;  
Provided that no person shall be entitled to act as the natural guardian of 
a minor under the provisions of this section-  
(a) if he has ceased to be a Hindu, or  
(b) if he has completely and finally renounced the world by becoming a 
hermit (vanaprastha) or an ascetic (yati or sanyasi)  
Explanation. - In this section, the expressions 'father' and 'mother' do not 
include a stepfather and a step-mother.  
7. Natural guardianship of adopted son - The natural guardianship of 
an adopted son who is a minor passes, on adoption, to the adoptive father 
and after him to the adoptive mother.  
8. Powers of natural guardian -  
(1) The natural guardian of a Hindu minor has power, subject to the 
provisions of this section, to do all acts which are necessary or reasonable 
and proper for the benefit of the minor or for the realization, protection or 
benefit of the minor's estate; but the guardian can in no case bind the 
minor by a personal covenant.  
(2) The natural guardian shall not, without the previous permission of the 
court, -  
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(a) mortgage or charge, or transfer by sale, gift, exchange or otherwise 
any part of the immovable property of the minor or  
(b) lease any part of such property for a term exceeding five years or 
for a term extending more than one year beyond the date on which the 
minor will attain majority.  
(3) Any disposal of immovable property by a natural guardian, in 
contravention of subsection (1) or sub-section (2), is voidable at the 
instance of the minor or any person claiming under him.  
(4) No court shall grant permission to the natural guardian to do any of 
the acts mentioned in sub-section (2) except in case of necessity or for an 
evident advantage to the minor.  
(5) The Guardians and Wards Act, 1890 (8 of 1890), shall apply to and in 
respect of an application for obtaining the permission of the court under 
sub-section (2) in all respects as if it were an application for obtaining the 
permission of the court under section 29 of that Act, and in particular-  
(a) proceedings in connection with the application shall be deemed to 
be proceedings under that Act within the meaning of section 4A 
thereof.  
(b) the court shall observe the procedure and have the powers specified 
in sub-sections (2), (3) and (4) of section 31 of that Act; and  
(c) an appeal lie from an order of the court refusing permission to the 
natural guardian to do any of the acts mentioned in sub-section (2) of 
this section to the court to which appeals ordinarily lie from the 
decisions of that court.  
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(6) In this section, "Court" means the city civil court or a district court or a 
court empowered under section 4A of the Guardians and Wards Act, 1890 
(8 of 1890), within the local limits of whose jurisdiction the immovable 
property in respect of which the application is made is situate, and where 
the immovable property is situate within the jurisdiction of more than one 
such court, means the court within the local limits of whose jurisdiction any 
portion of the property is situate.  
9. Testamentary guardians and their powers -  
(1) A Hindu father entitled to act as the natural guardian of his minor 
legitimate children may, by will appoint a guardian for any of them in 
respect of the minor's person or in respect of the minor's property (other 
than the undivided interest referred to in section 12) or in respect of both.  
(2) An appointment made under sub-section (1) shall have not effect if the 
father predeceases the mother, but shall revive if the mother dies without 
appointing, by will, any person as guardian.  
(3) A Hindu widow entitled to act as the natural guardian of her minor 
legitimate children, and a Hindu mother entitled to act as the natural 
guardian of her minor legitimate children by reason of the fact that the 
father has become disentitled to act as such, may, by will, appoint a 
guardian for any of them in respect of the minor's person or in respect of 
the minor's property (other than the undivided interest referred to in 
section 12) or in respect of both.  
(4) A Hindu mother entitled to act as the natural guardian of her minor 
illegitimate children may; by will appoint a guardian for any of them in 
respect of the minor's person or in respect of the minor's property or in 
respect of both.  
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(5) The guardian so appointed by will has the right to act as the minor's 
guardian after the death of the minor's father or mother, as the case may 
be, and to exercise all the rights of a natural guardian under this Act to 
such extent and subject to such restrictions, if any, as are specified in this 
Act and in the will.  
(6) The right of the guardian so appointed by will shall, where the minor is 
a girl, cease on her marriage.  
10. Incapacity of minor to act as guardian of property - A minor shall 
be incompetent to act as guardian of the property of any minor.  
11. De facto guardian not to deal with minor·s property - After the 
commencement of this Act, no person shall be entitled to dispose of, or 
deal with, the property of a Hindu minor merely on the ground of his or 
her being the de facto guardian of the minor.  
12. Guardian not to be appointed for minors undivided interest in 
joint family property - Where a minor has an undivided interest in joint 
family property and the property is under the management of an adult 
member of the family, no guardian shall be appointed for the minor in 
respect of such undivided interest: Provided that nothing in this section 
shall be deemed to affect the jurisdiction of a High Court the welfare of 
the minor shall be the paramount consideration.  
13. Welfare of minor to be paramount consideration -  
(1) In the appointment of declaration of any person as guardian of a Hindu 
minor by a court, the welfare of the minor shall be the paramount 
consideration.  
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(2) No person shall be entitled to the guardianship by virtue of the 
provisions of this Act or of any law relating to guardianship in marriage 
among Hindus, if the court is of opinion that his or her guardianship will 
not be for the welfare of the minor.   
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